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
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**HOOVER INSTITUTION**  
on War, Revolution, and Peace

FOUNDED BY HERBERT HOOVER, 1919

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# E G Y P T:

NATIVE RULERS AND FOREIGN INTERFERENCE.

BY

BARON DE MALORTIE,

AUTHOR OF 'DIPLOMATIC SKETCHES,' 'MR. GLADSTONE AND THE GREEK QUESTION,'  
ETC., ETC.

"There is one Empire which can never be subdued—the Empire of Opinion,  
whose throne is the liberty of the Press."—LORD ERSKINE.

LONDON:

WILLIAM RIDGWAY, 169, PICCADILLY, W.

1882.

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**"Maximi semper in rebus humanis momenti Ægyptus fuit."**

**LEIBNIZ.**

**“Maximi semper in rebus humanis momenti Ægyptus fuit.”**

**LEIBNIZ.**





## NOTE OF THE AUTHOR.

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So much has been written on Egypt, “the *beau idéal* of the East,”<sup>1</sup> that it seems almost presumptuous to venture on an addition to the many volumes that treat so exhaustively every phase of the history of “the most privileged of all countries.”<sup>2</sup>

Indeed, it is the very number of valuable publications—many of them standard works—which suggested to the author the usefulness of a kind of epitome of opinions; yet such is the amount of material accumulated, and so large the number of notes taken on the spot during prolonged stays in Egypt, that some time may elapse ere it will be possible to present them to the student of contemporary history.

In the meanwhile, a few condensed chapters bearing on the leading subject of the day, may be acceptable at a moment when the shifting of the Oriental question from Constantinople to Cairo intensifies the paramount interest attached to the future of Egypt.

LONDON, *September* 1882.

<sup>1</sup> ‘Journal of a Visit to Egypt,’ by the Hon. Mrs. W. Grey, p. 154.

<sup>2</sup> ‘Aperçu de l’histoire ancienne d’Égypte,’ par A. Mariette Bey, p. 7.

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## PREFACE.

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THE geographical position of Egypt ("a paradise miraculously placed in the midst of the desert"<sup>3</sup>) gives it in the eyes of the world an importance superior to any other portion of the Ottoman Empire,<sup>4</sup> and as Great Britain cannot allow Egypt to fall under the influence of any preponderant Power which might at some time be hostile to us,<sup>5</sup> a solution must be found that will place *la clef des trésors de l'Inde*,<sup>6</sup> as Egypt has been styled, beyond the grasp of Continental temptation. Single-handed, we have had to redeem Anglo-French pledges to honour joint signatures, to avenge joint humiliations; with unprecedented rapidity our victorious armies have crushed the rebellion; order will be restored, and England is replacing the Khedive on his tottering throne. The soldiers' work is almost done, and diplomacy will have to fight its own battles—let us hope with equal skill and success.

In the Prime Minister's speech at the Mansion House may be found the outlines of our policy, the leading ideas of our present and future attitude.

"We have gone to Egypt with clean hands, with

<sup>3</sup> 'Im Lande der Pharaonen,' von A. Stahl, p. 202.

<sup>4</sup> Speech of Lord Palmerston, House of Commons, June 1, 1858.

<sup>5</sup> 'Memoirs and Despatches of the Duke of Wellington,' vi. p. 219.

<sup>6</sup> 'Correspondance de l'armée française en Égypte, interceptée par l'escadre de Nelson, publiée par S. Simon,' p. 34.

no secret intentions, with nothing to conceal,"<sup>7</sup> but, "Egypt having become the great gate between the Eastern and Western hemispheres, it is essential for the industry and enterprise of mankind that that gate should be open, and in order that it may be open it is not less essential that Egypt should be under a peaceful, orderly, legal government."<sup>7</sup> To secure this primary object Great Britain has been forced to draw the sword, and having firmly clutched the "keys of the gate," the world may rest assured that henceforth there will be no danger of its ever being closed by any one but the key-holder.

Fortunately, our interests "are interests common to us with every State in Europe,"<sup>7</sup> and as we have "no interests in Egypt so great as that Egypt should be prosperous, and obtain her prosperity by the enjoyment of a wise, a regulated, and expanding freedom,"<sup>7</sup> it may be anticipated that our Government—the present Government, at least—has no intention to go beyond the object sketched out by Mr. Gladstone.

If this means that we do not intend annexing Egypt, Mr. Gladstone can rely on the cordial support of an overwhelming majority at home and abroad.

"Our people have got disgusted with territorial acquisitions,"<sup>8</sup> and we require no further extension of the vast frontiers of Her Majesty's realm. As Lord Palmerston so pithily said, "We do not want Egypt, or wish for it any more than a man with

<sup>7</sup> Speech of Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, Mansion House, Aug. 9, 1882.

<sup>8</sup> 'A Political Survey,' by M. E. Grant Duff, M.P., p. 104.

an estate in the North of England and a residence in the South, would have wished to possess the inns on the north road. All he could want would have been that the inns should be well kept, always accessible, and furnishing him, when he came, with mutton chops and post-horses.”<sup>9</sup> Yet, to use words of the late Prince Consort, “if the nation has willingly made *temporary* sacrifices, it has not paid that price in order to purchase *permanent* ones. It expects, and justly, *lasting* security in return.”<sup>10</sup> How best to attain this end is the present task of our statesmen, and we may rely on the patriotism, the high sense of justice and honour of those presiding over the destinies of our country, that nothing will be done unworthy of our traditions and of a liberal interpretation of Great Britain’s duties to herself and others. We shall presently have to examine the various combinations, possible and impossible: at this place it will suffice to indicate their nature.

There is, primo, the *status quo ante* Arabi with corollaries, suzerainty of the Porte, and Anglo-French control.

2ndly, An international control of all great Powers.

3rdly, Complete independence.

4thly, Return to the state of a Turkish Vilayet.

5thly, British occupation.

6thly, Annexation.

7thly, Neutralisation under the guarantee of all

<sup>9</sup> Letter of Lord Palmerston to Lord Cowley, Nov. 25, 1859. ‘The Life of Viscount Palmerston,’ by the Hon. E. Ashley, ii. p. 124.

<sup>10</sup> Letter of H.R.H. the Prince Consort to the Prince of Prussia (present Emperor), May 18, 1855. ‘The Life of H.R.H. the Prince Consort,’ by Sir T. Martin, iii. p. 45.

Powers, and lastly a *Protectorate*, as the first step towards the present—and pleasant—vision of an *Oriental Belgium*.

1. Experience has taught us the drawbacks of dualism, and of its nefarious consequences. Though working well in an administrative sense (thanks to the good understanding of the individual representatives), all idea of a return to the Joint Control may well be discarded, if for no other reason than the danger of allowing any combination to be dependent on personalities, and the liver or digestion of agents and controllers.

2. An international Control, while less exposed to sudden friction, would be a ponderous machine, unpalatable to native temper—they like one master, not half-a-dozen—and liable to complicate the chaotic state of the administration by an infusion of heterogeneous elements and an addition of divergent interests.

3. To proclaim the independence of Egypt at this stage, and to leave the Khedive and his people to their own devices, would be the prelude to new disorders, to another military dictatorship, the day the last British soldier leaves Alexandria; it would infallibly lead to a collapse of the Khedivate, to (4thly) Ottoman intervention and to a return of Egypt to the unenviable position of a Turkish province, with all its sequels of maladministration and misrule; indeed, the most enthusiastic Turcophile in this country would hardly dare to take the responsibility of such a venture.

Discarding Dualism, independence, and Turkish intervention, (5thly) a British occupation presents

itself to the mind, the more so as England happens to be the "man in possession." Unobjectionable as a *temporary* measure, and as a means of restoring order until the Khedive possesses a small reliable army to uphold his authority, a prolonged military occupation, independently from being contrary to British feeling, would be a constant grievance. Both France and the Porte, possibly all Powers, would resent it; it would form a dangerous precedent, and bring us all the responsibilities and burdens of actual annexation without any adequate compensation.

6. In fact annexation pure and simple would be a lesser evil. Possibly, were Lord Beaconsfield still at the head of the Government, this would be the measure resorted to; but Mr. Gladstone would not only deny all his pledges,<sup>11</sup> but renounce the very principles of his party, were he to yield to Jingo pressure and indulge in a conquering policy. Nay, were Egypt offered us by all concerned, which is not likely to be, our people would hesitate, "unless, perhaps, they were sure that their rejection would be the signal of Egypt passing into the hands of some other European power."<sup>12a</sup> As long as the Queen has a soldier to fight, and the navy of old England to uphold her honour, the very existence of the Empire, such a contingency lies happily beyond the pale of possibility; never *can or will* Egypt belong to another Power. In fact, during the memorable

<sup>11</sup> "It is my firm conviction . . . that as a general rule, enlargements of the Empire are for us an evil fraught with serious, though possibly not with immediate danger."—'Aggression on Egypt and Freedom in the East,' by the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M.P. (*Nineteenth Century*, Aug. 1877, p. 151).

<sup>12a</sup> 'A Political Survey,' by M. E. Grant Duff, M.P., p. 104.

debate of June 2nd, 1858, on the Suez Canal, Mr. Gladstone justified his support of Mr. Roebuck's motion by saying, "What is the Power that would really possess the Canal if it were opened? Is it not the first maritime Power in Europe? It is England and no foreign country that would obtain command of it"<sup>12b</sup> . . . and should ever political dangers arise in that direction they will vanish before the determination of the British people, to allow no one, directly or indirectly, to hamper their intercourse with India."<sup>12c</sup>

7. We now come to the neutralisation of Egypt and the Canal, under the guarantee of all Powers. The fate of both being inseparably linked together, there can arise no question of fine distinctions. The neutralisation of the Canal means the neutralisation of Egypt and *vice versâ*. M. de Lesseps, its chief advocate, substantiated his views on the subject by saying that otherwise, at the risk even of a conflict with France, England would be obliged to make herself mistress of Egypt, as the shortest cut to her oriental dominions<sup>13</sup>; a powerful interest<sup>14</sup> on which she would never be able to give way,<sup>15</sup> and there can be little doubt that, in theory, this solution presents itself under most favourable auspices, but what about the practice? Sir Charles

<sup>12b</sup> Speech of the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, House of Commons, June 1, 1858.

<sup>12c</sup> 'A Political Survey,' by M. E. Grant Duff, M.P., p. 105.

<sup>13</sup> Letter of M. F. de Lesseps to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, Feb. 28, 1855.

<sup>14</sup> "Si la question d'Égypte est une question Autrichienne, elle est sans doute bien plus encore une question *Anglaise*."—'Aus Metternichs nachgelassenen Papieren,' v. p. 478.

<sup>15</sup> 'Égypte et Turquie,' par Ferdinand de Lesseps, p. 48.

Dilke denounces the utter futility of such a scheme in one clear and irrefutable sentence; he says, "were we to be attacked in India no neutralisation would prevent our sending our troops to India by the shortest road, and fighting wherever we thought best. If we were *not* so attacked, neutralisation, *as far as we are concerned*, would be a useless ceremony."<sup>16</sup> Thus in either case an attempt at interference with our *right of way* would needs bring about the very consequences M. de Lesseps was and is naturally anxious to avert; "a menace to India," it would imperil interests "we are equally bound and determined to defend."<sup>17</sup> The hobby of the Comtist school thus being disposed of, there only remains one other way out of the dilemma.

8. *A British Protectorate.* Of this more anon. The purchase of the Suzerainty from the Sultan, twin brother to Lord Beaconsfield's purchase of the Suez Canal shares,<sup>18</sup> would, if confirmed, indicate the intention of Her Majesty's Government, not to abandon the vantage ground circumstances have placed within our reach.

Settling once and for all the vital question of the Suez Canal, the assumption of the nominal suzerainty over Egypt would answer the leading object of England, which is—if we can believe Canning—"to preserve the peace of the world."<sup>19</sup> Giving us a

<sup>16</sup> 'Greater Britain,' by Sir Charles Wentworth Dilke, Bart., M.P., p. 569.

<sup>17</sup> Letter of Lord Derby to Count Schouvaloff, May 6, 1877.

<sup>18</sup> "A wise and statesmanlike measure."—'England and Egypt,' by E. Dicey, p. 8.

<sup>19</sup> 'Recollections,' &c., by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe (*Nineteenth Century*, Aug. 1878, p. 381).

*locus standi*, it would allow us to restore the Khedive's authority under the wings of our own, and the sooner we accomplish the task the better for us and the interests we represent. Putting an end to the mischievous meddling of the Porte, it would also materially relieve the finances of Egypt by freeing it from the burden of a loathsome tribute. It would dissipate fears of annexation, as the nominal—I should even say, the temporary—nature of our protectorate would refute all selfish designs. Great Britain, the champion of struggling nationalities, can have no other policy but *Egypt for the Egyptians*. The staunchest supporter of Italian unity, the maker of Belgium, the sponsor of Greek independence, England would be the last to stifle on the Nile what she glories in patronising on the Continent, and all her energies will be devoted to consolidate Egypt,<sup>20</sup> to pilot her (the one country which may justly lay claim to the largest sympathies of Christian Europe<sup>21</sup>) on the path of freedom, progress, and civilisation, to make Egypt worthy of her past. "Once the most glorious, the most flourishing, and the most powerful kingdom upon earth,"<sup>22</sup> though to-day justly called "the cemetery of culture,"<sup>23</sup> Egypt has the merit of having been the first of all Mussulman countries to enter on the path of civilisation,<sup>24</sup> and under the guidance of British friendship,

<sup>20</sup> "England must wish to consolidate Egypt, on account of her connection with India," words of Mehemet Ali to Prince Pückler. 'Aus Mehemet Ali's Reich,' von Heinrich Fürst Pückler-Muskau, v. p. 381.

<sup>21</sup> 'Egypt and the great Suez Canal,' by J. Barthélémy St. Hilaire, p. 103.

<sup>22</sup> 'Views of the Levant,' by Charles Perry (1743), p. 145.

<sup>23</sup> 'Eine Orient-Reise,' by H.I. and R.H. the Crown Prince Rudolph, ii. p. 71.

<sup>24</sup> 'Egypt,' by J. Barthélémy St. Hilaire, p. 103.



ten years of peace and tranquillity would waken the dormant qualities of the most easily led people in the world, would develop the boundless resources of the "cradle and larder of nations,"<sup>25</sup> and out of the present chaos an *Oriental Belgium* would emerge as the peaceful custodian of the international highway to India.

Then, but only then, shall we be able to relinquish the hold of a certain number of points on the isthmus which now we shall have to occupy, and there are many who say that we should do so permanently,<sup>26</sup> regardless of the future of Egypt. Be it temporarily or for good, Egypt will not complain in exchanging the uncertainty of her existence for security and a lasting peace at the price even of a naval station or two at the end of the Canal, over which, at present, the Canal Company claims more than sovereign rights. But whatever the contingencies of the future may be, one thing is certain, Great Britain cannot allow the road to India to be imperilled, and whether as mandatory of Europe, as suzerain of the Khedive, or by the right of the sword, we shall know how to ensure its security for all time to come.

*J'y suis j'y reste* is not a simple phrase in the mouth of John Bull, and if the other Powers should complain of a high-handed solution of the Gordian knot, if they wish to handcuff us with international treaty obligations, and want us to revive co-operative ventures, a determined *non possumus* will remind Europe that the time for recriminations has passed.

They have left us alone to fight the battle of

<sup>25</sup> 'L'Égypte de Murtadha ibn Al-Khafif, traduit par Vattier,' p. 2.

<sup>26</sup> 'England and Egypt,' by E. Dicey, p. 49.

civilisation ; they must now leave us the settlement. And after all, who is to blame? to whom is due the crippling of Egypt, the undermining of the Khedivial authority? Who has fanned the dissensions of which the present crisis is the consequence and the climax?

Unfortunately we cannot repudiate our share of the guilt, and though our failings have been more of omission than commission, we are not the less co-responsible for the state of things that has thrown Egypt out of gear, and for the events which have forced upon us an armed intervention. A glance back on the reign of Mehemet Ali and his successors will oblige the most ill-disposed critics to admit that, whatever may have been the shortcomings of the native rulers, they are trifling compared with the blunders of their patrons, nay, I go so far as to say that, with few exceptions, they have been invariably the result of foreign meddling and advice. To substantiate this sweeping assertion will be the object of the following pages.

# E G Y P T.

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## I.

### INTRODUCTION.

"EGYPT is a country much talked about and little known,"<sup>27</sup> yet there is no more interesting country under the sun, and without reverting to the Egypt of the Pharaohs, "qui vaudrait pourtant la peine qu'on la réveille,"<sup>28</sup> the Egypt of the nineteenth century is well worth the closest attention.

Linking the Orient to the Occident,<sup>29</sup> Egypt has been foremost in the path of progress<sup>30</sup> and of reform<sup>31</sup>; to Egypt belongs the honour of having given the ex-

<sup>27</sup> 'Lettres sur l'Égypte contemporaine,' par E. Gellion-Danglar, p. 253.

<sup>28</sup> Words of M. Barthélémy St. Hilaire.

<sup>29</sup> "Est isthmus mundi principalis . . . . Orientis Occidentisque vinculum, emporium commune.—'Die Werke von Leibniz, Onno Klopp,' vii. p. 182.

<sup>30</sup> "Méhémet Ali . . . . est le premier Osmanli qui ait eu des idées gouvernementales et administratives, il est le premier qui les ait appliquées."—'Aperçu général sur l'Égypte,' par A. B. Clot Bey, p. 182.

<sup>31</sup> "In my opinion, justice has not been rendered to the Government of Egypt, which has at last the glory of having taken the initiative in reform."—'Egypt and the great Suez Canal,' by J. Barthélémy St. Hilaire, p. 81.

ample to the Mussulman world,<sup>32</sup> and of having proved that far from being hostile to civilisation<sup>33</sup> and to the liberal ideas<sup>34</sup> of our century, Islam<sup>35</sup> is capable of taking the initiative.

Though an autocratic religion, the precepts of the Prophet are breathing a decided democratic spirit.<sup>36</sup> The Caliph is only Caliph by the will of the Faithful<sup>37</sup> and so long as he answers the exigencies and duties imposed on him by the Koran.<sup>38</sup> Mussulman law repudiates, in principle, all notions of right divine, and of an hereditary power,<sup>39</sup> and if in practice this Western importation has taken root in the Orient, as far as the ruling families are concerned, it is primarily due to the right of the strongest—the right of wrong—to its abuse, though now it has long been consecrated by usage and tradition.

<sup>32</sup> "Les réformes de la Turquie ont été entreprises à la suite, et en rivalité de celles de Méhémet Ali."—"Aperçu général sur l'Égypte," par A. B. Clot Bey, p. 179.

<sup>33</sup> "Le génie Arabe a été ni dépourvu ni stérile."—"Mahomet et le Koran," par J. Barthélémy St. Hilaire, p. 223.

<sup>34</sup> "Reflect on what happens under the most liberal rule in the world, and then fling stones at the Mahomedan ruler (Ismail) . . . who has broken down as far as he can the barrier which separates the Mahomedan from the Christian—the old world of the strong arm to the new world of the strong mind."—"A Diary in the East," by W. H. Russell, p. 455.

<sup>35</sup> "Un maître juste est l'idéal de l'Islamisme."—*La Nouvelle Revue*, 1 Juillet, 1881, p. 7.

<sup>36</sup> See Koran.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> "Si quelqu'un de vous parvient à découvrir que j'ai commis une faute ou une injustice quelconque, je l'autorise et lui donne le droit de s'opposer à tous mes actes."—"Paroles du Prophète."

<sup>39</sup> Only with the Bedouins have name and property been hereditary from time immemorial, but this affects in no way the custom recognised by Mussulmans in general.—The Author.

In advising the Faithful to select the most worthy, the wisest, the most venerated amongst them as chief of the temporal power, Mahomet may justly claim the paternity of universal suffrage; and even since the family of Othman has monopolised the sceptre, the accession of a Sultan would not be strictly legal without the ceremony of the *Beyat*.

An empty form, if you like, it nevertheless indicates the principle of the sovereignty of the people; the nation thus sanctions the self-installation of a new master, whilst it equally claims the right of changing him, should he fail to comply with the precepts of the Koran, should he violate the law of the *Chereat*, should he neglect his duties as a ruler or show himself unworthy to reign. Nothing could be more democratic, yet so it is, and only the other day Turkey<sup>40</sup> resorted to its right by deposing Sultan Abd-ul-Asiz, as answering no longer the requirements of his people.

But though the spirit of the Mussulman law makes all men equal, and though, in theory, all have a voice in common matters, practice has long modified the application, and nowhere has the right of the strongest asserted itself more crushingly than in the East;<sup>41</sup> in fact, the people have for ages renounced their share in public affairs in favour of their rulers, and of the governing class—pashas and courtiers.

The temporal power, by its amalgamation with the

<sup>40</sup> See 'Two Years of the Eastern Question,' by A. Gallenga, ii. p. 83.

<sup>41</sup> "The whole source of influence here is *strength*, and the fear that follows it."—Letter of Mr. H. L. Bulwer to Lord Palmerston, July 30, 1838. 'Life of Viscount Palmerston,' by Lord Dalling, ii. p. 279.

mystic and spiritual authority of the Caliphate, has thereby increased its own prestige; and we know prestige is everything—certainly in the East.<sup>42</sup>

Fountain of all favours, Sultans have at all times succeeded in securing supporters—life peers—but they have strenuously abstained from creating an hereditary nobility, hereditary privileges or honours. All is at will, and therein resides the strength of the master. Absolute equality before the Sultan is the basis and the power of the Turkish government, the backbone of the whole system; and it is this equality which someday will form the force of the people; the day the masses will have learned to understand that the sovereignty belongs not to a particular man or dynasty, but to the nation, and that God, the Prophet, the Koran, the law of the *Chereat*, empower them to claim and to use it.<sup>43</sup>

It is a mistake to believe that the Mussulman religion is antagonistic to constitutional and parliamentary rule.<sup>44</sup> On the contrary, self-government has been for centuries established in the dominions of the Sultan;<sup>45</sup> and to go no farther, we have only to look at Egypt,<sup>46</sup> where the rural system of

<sup>42</sup> "Le sentiment national et les aspirations du peuple auraient pu s'harmoniser avec le pouvoir absolu du Vice-Roi (Ismail) si, tenu dans des mains fermes, ce pouvoir avait été exercé avec l'éclat et le *prestige par lequel il s'impose aux populations Orientales*."—"La Question Égyptienne," p. 32.

<sup>43</sup> See Koran.

<sup>44</sup> *Vide* Kaireddin Pasha's writings; Midhat-Pasha's Constitution; the Fetvas of the Sheikh-ul-Islam; and the declarations of the Ulemas of El Ahzar; also, 'Midhat Pasha,' by L. Léouzon le Duc, p. 146 *et seq.*

<sup>45</sup> *Vide* rural organisation of the Ottoman Empire.

<sup>46</sup> 'Philosophical dissertations on the Egyptians,' &c., by de Pauw, p. 249.

administration, the time-honoured composition of the *Medjliss*, the mode of election of Sheikhs and *Omdés*, furnish ample proofs of its existence and working.

The germ is there, and needs only judicious and gradual development. In truth the autocratic form of government in the East is not due to Islam being opposed to constitutional institutions, but to the fact that the people are not ripe for a more extended application of parliamentarism, as first introduced by Ismaïl Pasha, and again revived by Cherif Pasha, in calling a consultative Chamber of Notables for the purpose of administrative control. Recently some political amateurs tried to produce Arabi in the garb of an enlightened reformer,<sup>47</sup> much noise was made about a so-called national party,<sup>48</sup> we were told of a liberal current,<sup>49</sup> constitutional aspirations, and the usual stock-in-trade of revolutionary *doctrinaires* was duly advertised by complacent dreamers. Misled and misleading,<sup>50</sup> they did a deal of harm. It was wasting sympathy, and as events have taught us, a move in the wrong direction; for the Egyptian people are not,<sup>51</sup> and have never been for anything

<sup>47</sup> 'The Egyptian Revolution,' by W. S. Blunt (*Nineteenth Century*, Sept. 1882); and Sir William Gregory's Letters to the *Times*, Dec. 1881 and June 1882.

<sup>48</sup> *Pall Mall Gazette*, Jan. 20, 1882.

<sup>49</sup> Vide speeches of Sir Wilfrid Lawson, Bart., M.P., in the House of Commons, at Aspatia, &c.

<sup>50</sup> See 'The Egyptian Revolution,' by W. S. Blunt (*Nineteenth Century*, Sept. 1882).

<sup>51</sup> Speech of the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, Mansion House, Aug. 10, 1882, *Standard*, Feb. 16, 1882. "The absurdity of supposing that the movement in Egypt was a national one, and that Arabi was its soul, has been fully exposed by events."

in the rebellion, nor can they be made responsible for the crimes of Arabi and his native and foreign accomplices.<sup>52</sup>

All the Fellah wants is not to be bothered by new-fangled institutions for which he is not fitted, whilst he commonly takes kindly to those in harmony with his wants and usages.<sup>53</sup> He only aspires to a little justice, to the security of his person and property<sup>54</sup>—moderate wishes—of a race fated, as Amron describes them, to work for others,<sup>55</sup> and so little does he care for politics, that until recently few knew even the name of their ruler; “Effendina” for them was like a distant and misty vision of terrestrial deity, and their interest in current affairs was by no means encouraged or sweetened by their contact with the tax collector, the Sheikh, and that deputy Khedive the Moudir.

Arabi, the *fons et origo mali*,<sup>56</sup> is simply a sanguinary incendiary,<sup>57</sup> an ambitious soldier<sup>58</sup> dreaming the usurpation of power,<sup>59</sup> the true representative of

<sup>52</sup> “Les chefs du mouvement sont guidés par des Européens.”—Dépêche de M. Sienkiewicz au Min. des Aff. Étrangères, Jan. 29, 1882.  
<sup>53</sup> “With European friends to guide him.”—Letter of S. W. Gregory (*Times*, Oct. 30, 1882).

<sup>54</sup> ‘England’s Intervention in Egypt,’ by E. Dicey, p. 171.

<sup>55</sup> “They have neither property nor family constituted on any solid or permanent basis.”—‘Egypt, &c.,’ by J. Barthélémy St. Hilaire, p. 102.

<sup>56</sup> ‘L’Égypte et la Syrie,’ par M. Breton, ii. p. 111.

<sup>57</sup> *Standard*, Sept. 16, 1882.

<sup>58</sup> Speech of Mr. Leatham, M.P., to his constituents at Huddersfield, Feb. 15, 1882.

<sup>59</sup> ‘England’s Intervention in Egypt,’ by E. Dicey (*Nineteenth Century*, Aug. 1882, p. 167 *et seq.*).

<sup>60</sup> On the 9th of May, Arabi said openly in his own house, before about twenty-five people, of whom several were Europeans, “that they had tried Tewfik, but that he won’t do; that there was no necessity for any member



military tyranny, as Mr. Gladstone expressed himself at the Mansion House, who managed to make use of the fanatical disposition and the credulity of the people for his own selfish ends and with the view of taking his master's place.<sup>60</sup> One must know the East to understand how he could succeed in misleading the masses by empty promises<sup>61</sup> of freedom, liberty, welfare and prosperity, things the reverse of what military dictators are in the wont of carrying in their train.

Had he succeeded in his audacious enterprise, and had brute force continued to triumph over right and justice, no one but himself and his accomplices would have been the gainers;<sup>62</sup> nay, his accession would have revived the reign of the Mamelukes, the emancipation of the people and the development of the country would have been thrown back by fifty years; a dearly bought change for which the wretched Fellah would have had to pay with his blood and the sweat of his forehead—the Fellah in whose name Arabi has dared to speak, without any

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of Mehemet Ali's family to reign in Egypt; and that there were better men to take the Khedive's place."

"Arabi is simply an adventurer playing, by the advice of *intriguers*, with the English people, for his own benefit. His only power is to excite religious fanaticism among the people."—'Egypt for the Egyptians,' by A. N. Montgomery, p. 15.

<sup>60</sup> On congratulating Madame Arabi Bey No. 1, on her husband's elevation to the rank of pasha, she is said to have modestly replied, "Pray wait till we are at Abdin" (Abdin is one of the Khedivial palaces).

<sup>61</sup> "Mahmoud Pasha Samy, Arabi Pasha et leurs amis ont promis à Égypte une ère de prospérité sans précédent; nous demandons au pays tout entier de juger de quelle façon ils ont tenu leur promesse."—*Phare d'Alexandrie*, June 10, 1882. Blue-book, Egypt, No. 11 (1882).

<sup>62</sup> "Un grand nombre de promotions de nature à satisfaire les colonels et les autres officiers vont avoir lieu dans l'armée."—Télégr. de M. Sienkiewicz au Min. des Aff. Etrangères, March 11, 1882.

other mandate but that of the sword. For it is notorious that he has only been able to carry the day by terrorising<sup>63</sup> the population, the gentlest and most good-natured of the universe,<sup>64</sup> and by forcing the hand of the Notables, whom he wanted, in order to give to his acts a semblance and coating of legality. Once master of the situation he used his ephemeral ascendancy<sup>65</sup> to play the champion of Islam, and to represent himself as the instrument of the Khedive.<sup>66</sup> It was a clever trick, though it must be admitted that the Sultan contributed to facilitate the task. Always ready to avail herself of the mistakes of others, the Porte had not allowed so propitious an occasion to pass by without turning the fictitious or apparent popularity of the dictator to good account. Some say that slighted, humiliated, and decimated by Europe,

<sup>63</sup> "I have spoken to Sultan Pasha, President of the Chamber of Representatives, on the subject, and he has told me that it is idle to deny that the Corporation acted under fear, for that the officers on this occasion went beyond their usual system of taking people separately and threatening them with death. They openly went about the streets in bands, and drove the Notables before them. Their violence was such that the heads of the Corporation veritably believed, as they stated to the Khedive, that their lives, and the city itself, were in danger, unless His Highness yielded."—Sir E. Malet to Lord Granville, June 5, 1882. Blue-book, Egypt, No. 11 (1882), No. 124.

"It was notorious that when the Council of Notables assembled, they acted under the terrorism of the military party."—Speech of Lord Houghton, House of Lords, July 24, 1882.

<sup>64</sup> 'Lettres sur l'Égypte,' par S. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, p. 212 *et seq.* 'Lettres sur l'Égypte contemporaine,' par E. Gellion-Danglar, p. 74. 'England's Intervention in Egypt,' by E. Dicey (*Nineteenth Century*, Aug. 1882), p. 164.

<sup>65</sup> See his proclamation of July 21 and July 29, 1882.

<sup>66</sup> "Arabi a signé son manifeste comme *chef suprême de l'Égypte, délégué par le Sultan.*"—*Temps*, Aug. 3, 1882.

Turkey believed the moment favourable for falling back on Egypt,<sup>67</sup> and by means of Pan-Islamite propaganda<sup>68</sup> to gain again a footing on the shores of the Nile,<sup>69</sup> where since Mehemet Ali's days he had been reduced to the barren honour of calling himself "the Suzerain," and of touching 680,000*l.* a year for the use of his name as international scarecrow.<sup>70</sup> Possibly, had the tribute not been pledged to Continental usurers, Europe would long ago have put a stop to so monstrous an iniquity.<sup>70</sup> For surely no excuse can be found for saddling a nation, already smothered in debts and taxes, to be mulct into an additional one for the benefit of a foreign Power, without the slightest compensation. True, Continental statesmen have considered the link<sup>71</sup> that binds Egypt to the Ottoman Empire as the best and only guarantee against the covetousness of the great Powers.<sup>72</sup> But to my mind that is only a way of

<sup>67</sup> "En recevant M. de Ring, alors membre de la Commission Européenne d'organisation de la Roumélie orientale, le Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid lui dit que *l'Afrique devait lui servir de compensation* à la perte de ses plus belles provinces d'Europe, et que ses efforts tendraient à y *reconquérir l'influence et le prestige du passé*."—*La Question Égyptienne*, 1881, p. 7.

<sup>68</sup> "La Question Égyptienne se trouve compliquée de la politique pan-islamique inaugurée par Abd-ul-Hamid."—*Ibid.*, p. 14.

<sup>69</sup> See 'The Sultan's Policy in Egypt,' *Times*, Dec. 28, 1881.

<sup>70</sup> The tribute annually paid by Egypt amounts to 681,486*l.* 9*s.*—'Budget du Gouvernement Égyptien pour l'année 1881.' In 1743 it amounted to 6000 purses at 84*l.* each.—'View of the Levant,' by Charles Perry, p. 229. In 1671, according to Leibniz, in five casenas at 1,200,000 piastres each, equal to 1584 purses (the purse at 756 piastres 19 medains).—'Die Werke von Leibniz, Onno Klopp,' ii. p. 227.

<sup>71</sup> "Link of the worn-out chain binding Egypt to the swindling Government of Constantinople."—Speech of Sir C. W. Dilke, Bart., M.P., to his constituents, Aug. 19, 1879 (see *Times*, Sept. 20, 1879).

<sup>72</sup> "What we wish about Egypt is, that it should continue attached to

speaking, and the Turkish label would prevent no one from stretching out a greedy hand, had it not been in the interests of all Powers alike to maintain the relative independence and absolute neutrality of Egypt on account of the highway to India which makes her the most important international station.<sup>73</sup>

To return to the Sultan, others say that His Majesty had only condescended to humour Arabi and the pseudo-national party, with a view of subduing Egypt again to the position of a Turkish vilayet. It is likely that fear rather than covetousness has been the cause of his erratic proceedings. The fear that Arabi might aim a blow at the Caliphate,<sup>74</sup> as it was no secret that the would-be dictator had openly declared his intention of proclaiming the Grand Sherif of Mekka Caliph, should the Sultan oppose him. Possibly Abd-ul-Hamid has remembered how that spiritual dignity, the prestige of which is worth armies, came into the hands of the House of Othman, how it was acquired, how it was wrenched little by little from the Grand Sherifs of Mekka. For it must not be forgotten that the Sultans of Turkey imposed themselves primarily as defenders simply of the Caliphate,

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the Turkish Empire, which is a security against its belonging to any European Power."—Letter of Lord Palmerston to Lord Clarendon, March 1, 1857. 'Life of Lord Palmerston,' by the Hon. E. Ashley, i. p. 129.

<sup>73</sup> "L'Égypte comme point géographique offre naturellement aux communications de l'Occident avec l'Orient le trajet le plus avantageux."—'Égypte et Turquie,' par F. de Lesseps, p. 10.

<sup>74</sup> "Le bruit circule qu'Arabi a obtenu d'un certain nombre d'Ulémas du Caire un fetva prononçant la déposition du Sultan, et nommant le grand Sherif de la Mecque pour lui succéder."—Telegr. from Alexandria, Aug. 15, 1882.

with the humble title of "Servants of the Holy Places,"<sup>75</sup> and it is only thanks to devices as cunning as they were audacious that they managed to supplant the Grand Sherif, to amalgamate the Sultanate and the Caliphate, to unite the two in one hand, and to represent it as an indivisible heirloom. Almost fallen into oblivion, an antiquated page of history, the Sultan's title to the Caliphate is nevertheless not unimpeachable, and His Majesty may have had weighty reasons for not provoking a schism, and for not wishing to stir up claims, more legitimate than his in the eyes of a large section of the Mussulman Arabs,<sup>76</sup> who have bowed to a *fait accompli* rather than challenge the right of the mighty incumbent. Orientals have a keen appreciation of Prince Bismarck's maxim, "Right is might," and seldom do they court defeat by hasty conclusions, and by raising an uncertain issue.

The threats of Arabi, puerile if you like, indicate nevertheless a dormant danger, and one can easily understand the Sultan's objections to proclaim the dictator a rebel, before having been assured of the certain defeat of such an *enfant terrible*. Playing with the fire, His Majesty has burned his fingers, and as usual Turkey is certain to pay the piper.<sup>77</sup> True, religious wars are out of fashion,

<sup>75</sup> This title refers specially to the Kaaba at Mecca.

<sup>76</sup> "The assassination of the Grand Sherif of Mecca in 1880 is attributed to Abd-ul-Hamid's jealousy of his superior claims to the Caliphate."—Vide *Pall Mall Gazette*, Oct. 11, 1881. "The famous Marabout Sanoussi has always steadily refused to recognise the claims of the Sultan to the Caliphate."—Vide *Times*, Aug. 27, 1882. Vide also *St. James's Gazette*, July 19, 1882.

<sup>77</sup> "Ce qui dans toutes ces affreuses complications est bien sûr et positif,

but fanaticism smoulders under the ignorance of the masses, and until civilisation shall have levelled all religious controversies—will she ever?—a spark will suffice to put the Moslem world on fire.<sup>78</sup> It is so easy to persuade poor wretches panting under an unbearable burden of taxes and injustice, that their miseries originate in lax observations of their faith, that all the evil is solely due to the presence of infidels, and that by driving them out of the country and by ridding Moslem soil of unclean footsteps, prosperity and happiness in this world and eternal beatitude in the next may be secured. It is the old battle song of religious wars in England, France, and Germany, translated into Arabic. But though the Sultan may be exaggerating the present danger, and the drift of any such movement, it cannot be denied that Arabi had contrived temporarily to monopolise the blind fanaticism of the lower strata, and that he might have shaken the spiritual power of the Sultan. Already Arabi has wrought irretrievable mischief by spreading false reports about the intentions and attitude of the Caliph, and by inoculating an ignorant and credulous<sup>79</sup> rabble with

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c'est que la Turquie payera finalement, non seulement ses imprudences, mais encore les erreurs, les fautes, les crimes, l'imprévoyance ou la perfidie de presque tous les cabinets Européens."—'Dépêches inédites du Chevalier de Gentz,' iii. p. 444.

<sup>78</sup> One has only to look at the Moslem agitation in Tunis, Tripoli, the Hedjaz, &c., to read Arab papers, and to remember "that on the first day of Moharram in the year 1300 (Nov. 12, 1882) the Messiah of Islam is expected to appear, and that for some time past the followers of Sheikh Sanoussy have asserted that he will on that day proclaim himself as the long looked for El Mahdi."—*Times*, Aug. 27, 1882.

<sup>79</sup> 'Tchevet-el-Nazerine,' by Sheikh Abdullah-el-Charqaouy, p. 8.

pernicious notions on the duties of a true Mussulman<sup>80</sup>; but His Majesty knows best, that Arabi would never have been able to exercise such undisputed influence on the mind of the people, without his tacit, not to say effective complicity.

Had the Sultan from the first pronounced against Arabi, had a fetva of the Sheikh-ul-Islam proclaimed him a rebel, and had the Ulemas of the El-Ahzar been in a position openly to speak out against his odious and tyrannical sway, the military insurrection would never have degenerated into a politico-religious movement.

The truth is, the Sultan played a double game and intended to use the name and pseudo-prestige of Arabi, whilst the latter, who could not have been without doubts as to the sincerity of the secret encouragement<sup>81</sup> he was receiving, retorted by actually using the name of the Commander of the Faithful.<sup>82</sup>

It has been a misfortune in more than one respect. Consulting only the interest of the moment, the Sultan compromised the future, and jeopardised gratuitously the work of the last half century by an erroneous interpretation of the interests and duties of Islam.

Since the days of Sultan Mahmoud, Europe has

<sup>80</sup> See Arabi's proclamations and speeches.

<sup>81</sup> "L'élément national a l'instinct de la perfidie des encouragements qu'il reçoit de la Porte."—'La Question Égyptienne,' 1881, p. 28.

<sup>82</sup> To mention one instance among many, Arabi's manifesto of Aug. 2, 1882, was signed as "Supreme Chief of Egypt delegated by the Sultan."—The Author.

striven to break all barriers between the Occident and the Orient. Civilisation having narrowed the distances, it was justifiable to cherish a hope that religious differences had for ever been relegated to the political lumber room, when suddenly the Sultan Caliph, in a fit of Pan-Islamite craze,<sup>83</sup> thought it expedient to lend his name and his authority to the fanning of long forgotten animosity and hatred. Resuscitating entombed passions, he threw *de novo* the Mussulman world into a slow fever of latent excitement. It was a step back into the darkness of past ages, an awakening of the strifes that have desolated the world during centuries from one end to another, a challenge to civilisation, to modern ideas and feelings, and a plunging back into the slums of ignorant fanaticism. But those are considerations which have never troubled the brain of a Turkish ruler; nay, if he wished to put on the break in the last moment, it is too late, the harm is done.

It is true that recently the Porte seems to have succeeded in overruling the palace, and that—ostensibly at least—the Sultan has adopted a more conciliatory attitude and “consents” to join us in restoring order. A history of the famous “military convention” would form an edifying page of modern statesmanship, and the telegrams announcing every morning the signature for the next day, and every evening a postponement on account of urgent modifications, became somewhat monotonous. But now

<sup>83</sup> ‘The Sultan’s Policy in Egypt’ (by R. Wallace?), *Times*, Aug. 28, 1881.



that the war is over, that the rebellion has been crushed by our unaided efforts, and that civilisation triumphs once more over retrograde barbarism, the tardy co-operation of Turkey appears less desirable than ever. The presence of Turkish troops on our side might at one time have been useful, in thus dissipating the story spread by Arabi, that we had come to fight Islam and that the Caliph had declined to join us; but now their arrival would only hamper future action and give a semblance of truth to the reports current in the interior, "that the Caliph had ordered both the Giaours and Arabi to lay down arms, that they had obeyed and that he was sending his troops to prevent further bloodshed." All this may sound very absurd, but it shows the activity of those who continue to poison and confuse the Arab mind.

To bring into Egypt a few thousand Turkish soldiers would be introducing as many Pan-Islamite emissaries;—and for what purpose? <sup>84</sup> Surely Mr. Gladstone cannot wish to associate Mr. Carlyle's "unspeakable Turk" <sup>85</sup> in the work of interior re-organisation? If he has sold his superior rights, the Sultan has no longer the shadow of a pretence for future interference in Egyptian affairs. But even if he has not done so, his chances would hardly be better. It little matters whether he joined us or not, whether he proclaimed Arabi a rebel or loaded him

<sup>84</sup> More than twenty years ago Lord Clarendon writing to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, said: "Mahometan rule is incompatible with civilisation and humanity."—Speech of Lord Carnarvon, House of Lords, June 27, 1879.

<sup>85</sup> Letter of Mr. Carlyle. See *Times*, Nov. 28, 1876.

with honours, whether he has supported the Khedive or conspired against him, and whether he is trying or not to make political capital out of his spiritual dignity, nothing will give him back Egypt, and, he may rest assured, Egypt will not mourn for him, nor complain.<sup>86</sup>

Doubtless foreigners are not much liked in Egypt, how could they be? Is there a country on the globe where the invader, be he a religious, commercial, or military intruder, can boast of being loved? especially when to the detriment of the natives he monopolises the administration and places;<sup>87</sup> when he parades his influence and exploits the country<sup>88</sup> for selfish purposes, and regardless of the interests and the welfare of the inhabitants. Such has been the case in Egypt, and the thoughtless and overbearing<sup>89</sup> conduct of

<sup>86</sup> "In as far as the Fellahs have any distinct idea of foreign policy, that idea is probably a hatred of Turkey. According to a characteristic saying attributed to Mehemet Ali, if the Fellah had ever the courage to spit out anything, he would spit out a Turk."—'England's Intervention in Egypt,' by E. Dicey (*Nineteenth Century*, Aug. 1882, p. 165).

<sup>87</sup> "Quant aux marchands Européens . . . écume et lie de toutes les nations, à d'honorables et rares exceptions près, cette tourbe a bien autre chose en tête que . . . tous sont venus pour faire au plus vite leur fortune, *per fas et nefas*, et de préférence *per nefas*."—'Lettres sur l'Égypte contemporaine,' par E. Gellion-Danglar, p. 254. "Ever since his arrival at power in Egypt, he has been incessantly encircled by a cloud of locusts collected from all parts of Europe, but chiefly from France, where the animal abounds in greatest plenty."—'Egypt and Nubia,' by J. A. St. John, p. 47.

<sup>88</sup> "At the beginning of 1879 only 744 Europeans were in the pay of Egypt; . . . at the close of 1879, 208 were added; in 1880, 250 more; in 1881, a further batch of 122; . . . and in March 1882 there were 1325, with a total pay of 373,000*l*."—'Spoiling the Egyptians,' by J. S. Keay, p. 28. See also Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 6 (1882).

<sup>89</sup> "L'abus que font les Européens de leur situation exceptionnelle en Orient, est un mal qu'il est plus facile de constater qu'il ne l'est d'y trouver

Europeans, officials as well as travellers, has much contributed to the bitter feeling rankling in the breasts of the natives, whose sullen attitude demonstrates that they deeply resent the treatment they have been subjected to. But notwithstanding the mistakes made, the Egyptians prefer Europeans to Turks, their dislike to the latter<sup>80</sup> dating of old.<sup>81</sup> The reason is, that Europe has done much, a great deal even, for Egypt, not for Egypt's sake, but simply to sow the seeds for a better European harvest; and the development of the boundless resources of the Nile valley has been chiefly undertaken to increase the value of the pledge.<sup>82</sup> But though enriching Continental pawnbrokers, both the people and the country have benefited in a certain measure by their contact with Europe, whilst the Turks have never done anything but squeeze the last piastre out of the wretched Fellah, and in exchange—what? Nothing except the traditional<sup>83</sup> courbash. We have only to remember the state of Egypt<sup>84</sup> before the days of Mehemet Ali, and ere

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un remède.”—‘Lettres sur l’Égypte contemporaine,’ par E. Gellion-Danglar, p. 249. “Le premier paltoquet qui a passé la Méditerranée, arrive ici avec des airs de conquérant, s’arme d’un bâton et frappe à tort et à travers les malheureux indigènes qui le servent.”—Ibid., p. 72.

<sup>80</sup> “Arabes etai Mahometi, non tamen Portæ addictissimi sunt.”—‘Die Werke von Leibniz, Onno Klopp,’ ii. p. 349.

<sup>81</sup> “Un seul sentiment animait la presque totalité des habitants de l’Égypte: une haine irréconciliable pour les persécuteurs de Constantinople.”—‘L’Égypte depuis la conquête des Arabes,’ par J. J. Marcel, p. 12.

<sup>82</sup> ‘L’Égypte et l’Europe, par un ancien juge mixte,’ p. 154.

<sup>83</sup> “The food of Egypt, earned with stripes and toil.”—‘The Holy Land, Egypt, &c.,’ from drawings by D. Roberts, R.A., by the Rev. George Croly, i. p. 5.

<sup>84</sup> “The Arab proverb, ‘The grass never grows in the footprint of a

his genius wrenched the pearl of Ottoman dominions<sup>95</sup> from the hands of the oppressor.<sup>96</sup> It is perhaps the most interesting page of modern history,<sup>97</sup> and great are the lessons that may be derived from a conscientious study of Mehemet Ali's work;<sup>98</sup>—a work continued by Ismaïl<sup>99</sup> *à la vapeur*, and on rather a vast scale, and confided in 1879 to his young son under a co-operative guardianship.<sup>100</sup> In contemplating the endless difficulties which had to be overcome, the ill-will<sup>101</sup> and incompetence of the natives, and the mischievous interference of the great powers,<sup>102</sup> an idea of the magnitude of

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Turk,' painfully expresses the desolation of Moslem progress. Thus under this miserable rule . . . ."—'Colburn's New Monthly Magazine,' cxlii. Jan. 1, 1868, p. 17.

<sup>95</sup> "The invasion of Napoleon made an interruption in the annals of Turkish misrule in Egypt."—'Egypt,' by Stanley Lane-Poole, p. 162.

<sup>96</sup> "He found all Egypt a chaos, he left it a country."—'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 63.

<sup>97</sup> "Aucune des grandes figures de l'histoire n'est susceptible d'exercer plus d'attraction sur la plume de l'historien."—'Histoire de Méhémet Ali,' par Paul Mouriez, vi. p. 5.

<sup>98</sup> "Under his rule the Egyptians have exchanged anarchy for tranquillity."—'Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians,' by E. W. Lane, p. 559. "Ich sagte Mehemet Ali dass er dem Orient jetzt das sei was einst Peter der Grosse für Russland gewesen."—'Aus Mehemet Ali's Reich,' von H. Fürst Pückler-Muskau, p. 187. "Cette civilisation . . . ce sont les glorieux instincts, et l'habile ambition d'un grand homme qui l'ont provoquée."—'Aperçu général de l'Égypte,' par A. B. Clot Bey, p. 178.

<sup>99</sup> "Ce serait injuste de ne pas le reconnaître : si l'Europe peut aujourd'hui trouver en Égypte un élément de progrès . . . c'est au 16 années du règne du Khédive Ismaïl qu'elle en est redevable."—'La Question Égyptienne,' 1881, p. 36.

<sup>100</sup> Nov. 18, 1879.

<sup>101</sup> "L'immobilité est le principal caractère des Orientaux, de là en Égypte cet esprit de résistance à toute espèce d'innovation."—'Histoire Ancienne de l'Orient,' par J. J. Guillemin, p. 90.

<sup>102</sup> "L'Europe s'écartant de plus en plus de l'esprit primitif des capitulations, a établi en Égypte un système très dur de domination, d'oppression, et d'exploitation."—'L'Égypte et l'Europe, par un ancien juge mixte,' p. 113.

the task may be formed, and the conclusion will be arrived at that Continental statesmen were rather rash in substituting a foreign—I should say an anti-Egyptian—policy to the vast and patriotic conceptions of Mehemet Ali, which it would have been wiser to assist him and his successors in realising. It is sad to acknowledge, that Egypt seems only to exist, and to have existed, as an interminable source of wealth for venturesome Europeans.<sup>103</sup> Only when their interests happen to coincide with those of the natives, has it ever been thought worth while to remember that there are such people as the Egyptians, and since the time Mehemet Ali brought Egypt under the notice of the Powers, Europe has had but one aim, that of appropriating the revenues of Egypt,<sup>104</sup> and of preventing her from standing on her own legs. Fear,<sup>105</sup> greed,<sup>106</sup> and deplorable rivalry<sup>107</sup> are the causes, the present crisis is the result. A strong and powerful Egypt<sup>108</sup> was

<sup>103</sup> "Ce qu'il il y a de plus abominable dans les colonies Européennes, c'est leur complicité pour s'enrichir au dépens du pays et des Fellahs."—*Ibid.*, p. 113.

<sup>104</sup> "La coalition étrangère exploitait l'Égypte."—"La vérité sur les affaires d'Orient," par Scipion Marin, p. 6.

<sup>105</sup> *Vide* 'The Eastern Question,' by Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, p. 81.

"Ni la France ni l'Angleterre ne se sentaient assez fortes pour se passer l'une de l'autre."—"L'Égypte et l'Europe, par un ancien juge mixte," p. 264.

<sup>106</sup> "Le protectorat Anglo-Français n'a été fondé que dans l'intérêt des créanciers étrangers."—*Ibid.*, p. 265.

<sup>107</sup> "In European jealousies lies Egyptian safety."—"The Khedive's Egypt," by E. de Leon, p. 379.

<sup>108</sup> "C'est une détestable politique que celle qui consiste à chercher la sécurité dans l'affaiblissement d'autrui."—"La Question d'Orient," par E. Gioja, p. 147.

and is considered an international danger—an imaginary danger would be nearer the mark—and breaking the wings of the eagle by opposing his struggle for independence<sup>109</sup> the Powers restrained Mehemet Ali from giving life to his creation, and instead of helping<sup>110</sup> they hampered him in his civilising mission.

Ibrahim did not reign long enough<sup>111</sup> to count, otherwise his great abilities would hardly have been looked upon with equanimity by jealous Europe. As to his successors Abbas and Saïd, they did not give sufficient umbrage. It was only when Ismaïl<sup>112</sup> undertook to revive the work of his great ancestor, when he showed the world the part Egypt was able to take,<sup>113</sup> and how fitted she was to become in the East the pioneer of Western civilisation<sup>114</sup> that,

<sup>109</sup> "The cabinet yesterday agreed that it would not do to let Mehemet Ali declare himself independent."—Letter of Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, June 8, 1838. 'Life of Viscount Palmerston,' by Lord Dalling, ii. p. 287.

<sup>110</sup> "It cannot be denied that Egypt has, during the past twenty years, made the most satisfactory progress, and *almost by her own unaided efforts*. . . . If Europe will but stretch out an aiding hand, she may assuredly foster a multitude of excellent germs in that country."—'Egypt,' by J. Barthélémy St. Hilaire (1855), p. 118 *et seq.*

<sup>111</sup> "His military genius was his chief characteristic . . . he is said to have displayed considerable administrative ability."—'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 76 *et seq.*

<sup>112</sup> "The Khedive Ismaïl inherits many of the traits of his great progenitor as administrator and manager of men, but his ambition, though equal to his ancestors', does not work through the sword, or through force, but through diplomacy and persuasion."—'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 80.

<sup>113</sup> "L'Égypte vient de nouveau jouer un rôle important, et faire sentir qu'il faut désormais compter sérieusement avec elle."—'L'Égypte actuelle, &c.,' par A. Guillemin, p. 32.

<sup>114</sup> "La population d'Égypte a sur les autres populations Mussulmanes l'avantage incontestable d'être plus apte à concevoir les idées de la civilisa-

getting nervous, the Powers devoted afresh their attentions to the borders of the Nile. Egypt was once more worth looking after. France had thought of securing a footing by means of the Canal,<sup>115</sup> and England followed suit by flooding the country with capital,<sup>116</sup> a second invasion of the Jews. The interests of the "canalistes" and the capitalists joined in chorus, and the Powers shook hands over a gigantic deficit which Europe had helped and pushed the Khedive to create.<sup>117</sup> The consequent financial disorder was used as a pretext for political interference,<sup>118</sup> for the sake of European creditors.<sup>119</sup>

Claims were not only disregarded, but the most shameful pressure<sup>120</sup> was used to extort Shylock's "pound of flesh." To the groans of her population Europe had only one answer, "I stand upon the

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tion Européenne et à en réaliser le progrès.'—*La Question Égyptienne*, 1881, p. 30.

<sup>115</sup> "It is evident enough that the Suez Canal scheme has been from the beginning a blind for the occupation of Egypt by France."—*Greater Britain*, by Sir Charles Wentworth Dilke, Bart., M.P., p. 568.

<sup>116</sup> In 1862 and 1864 British speculators raised for him (the Khedive) two loans amounting to 10,000,000*l*. The State, though it got none of the money, was saddled with the debt.—*Parliamentary Papers*, 1425 (1876), footnote, p. 8.

<sup>117</sup> 'Spoiling the Egyptians; a tale of shame,' by J. Seymour Keay, p. 2.

<sup>118</sup> "The fact that well-to-do people in England and France were not getting the enormous dividends they had been accustomed to extract from the Khedive, set diplomacy to work, and brought about the deposition of Ismail."—*Egypt*, by Stanley Lane-Poole, p. 182.

<sup>119</sup> 'Spoiling the Egyptians; a tale of shame,' by J. Seymour Keay, (preface) p. 2.

<sup>120</sup> "The Khedive's own people murmur at the payment in full of the bondholders, while his own employés . . . are left unpaid."—*Parliamentary Papers*, 2233 (1879), p. 97. 'Spoiling the Egyptians; a tale of shame,' by J. Seymour Keay, p. 17. *Lettres sur l'Égypte contemporaine*, par E. Gellion-Danglar, p. 66.

law;" and to insure its stringent application, financial bailiffs were put in possession, stripping the Khedive of the right to preside at his own Council,<sup>121</sup> in fact mediatizing him, they overstrained the bow, the Khedive demurred, but like his subjects he was sacrificed to exclusive European interests, and the Anglo-French Control took his place.<sup>122</sup> In bringing about Ismail's fall, especially by the way it was done,<sup>123</sup> the last blow was given to the authority and prestige of the Khedivate; however, to save appearances, they allowed his son to succeed him, well aware that the young prince's want of initiative and experience would not interfere with the business of his guardians.<sup>124</sup> A poor service the Powers, especially England and France, rendered Tewfik; they gravely compromised his reversionary interest by obliging him to take possession of his inheritance before the time, and under most humiliating restrictions.<sup>125</sup> In fact, it was utterly disregarding the Oriental character <sup>126</sup> to imagine that a

<sup>121</sup> "M. Waddington qui n'avait jamais demandé que le Président de la République n'assistât pas au Conseil, était mal fondé à demander à un souverain absolu et étranger de ne pas présider ses ministres."—'La Question Égyptienne,' 1881, p. 18.

<sup>122</sup> Parliamentary Papers, 2233 (1879), p. 21.

<sup>123</sup> "The mode of the deposition had grossly impaired the Khedivate."—'England's Intervention in Egypt,' by E. Dicey, p. 167.

<sup>124</sup> "The present Khedive (Tewfik) does not govern Egypt."—'Egypt,' by Stanley Lane-Poole, p. 184.

<sup>125</sup> "Esprit timide, Tewfik rendait sa déchéance plus flagrante par sa manière d'être. À Riaz il se plaignait sans cesse des empiètements du Contrôle. Au Contrôle il se plaignait des exigences de Riaz. Et à ceux qui l'approchaient il se plaignait des deux."—'La Question Égyptienne,' 1881, p. 32.

<sup>126</sup> "The whole source of influence here, then, is strength, and the fear that follows it."—Letter of Mr. H. Lytton Bulwer to Lord Palmerston,



zero would be acceptable as master, or that a Khedive without prestige, without a will of his own, and without power, a tool of Giaours,<sup>127</sup> would be able to preserve his hold over people who worship but one god—an iron rod. Had we not taught Egypt no longer to respect her ruler, Arabi never would have been able to carry the population with him in a rebellious enterprise; in fact, in Ismaïl's days he would not have dared to lift his eyes on Effendina,<sup>128</sup> so great was still the magic charm of Eastern royalty. Of course, now that our brave soldiers have crushed the mutiny, that we have reconquered Egypt for Tewfik, we shall have no difficulty in restoring order, and in propping up his throne, but it will be less easy to revive his lost prestige—the only thing that impresses in the East<sup>129</sup>—and to restore the Khedivial authority which we the first, with France, have trampled under foot. And if we succeed in doing so, shall we likewise succeed in making Egypt forget that she owes it to us, to the foreigner, to Christians? Prestige and reputation once lost are lost for ever; crimes can be condoned, weakness never. But we must not blame Tewfik,<sup>130</sup> for it was

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July 30, 1838. 'Life of Viscount Palmerston,' by Lord Dalling, ii. p. 279.  
 "En Orient le fait domine le droit."—Speech of Prince Napoleon, Feb. 15, 1864. 'Lettres de Ferdinand de Lesseps,' p. 398.

<sup>127</sup> The Khedive complained personally to the author of the "cavaller" ways of certain foreign agents and others, and of slights which badly impressed the population.

<sup>128</sup> These are the very words used by Ismaïl Pasha, in speaking one day of Arabi.

<sup>129</sup> "En Égypte il n'y a rien en dehors de l'État, et l'État c'est le Prince."  
 —'Lettres sur l'Égypte contemporaine,' par E. Gellion-Danglar, p. 209.

<sup>130</sup> "Tewfik has acted loyally to the Control and to his people."  
 'Egypt for the Egyptians,' by A. N. Montgomery, p. 13.

not his doing, but circumstances that have placed him in this difficult position of Khedive of Egypt, *malgré lui*, "*Chargé des Affaires de l'Europe*." Undoubtedly H.H. might have declined the offer of a crown of thorns, the titular honour proffered him by his father's creditors. But could he have done so without sacrificing the dynasty and the direct succession which Ismaïl had purchased so dearly at Constantinople?<sup>131</sup> I think not, for it would only have been making room for Halim, the Sultan's candidate.<sup>132</sup> Furthermore, Tewfik was very young, very inexperienced, without friends, advisers, and support, and he could not realise the possible consequences, when he attempted the ornamental and honorary functions with which the Powers were so anxious to invest him. But first we must return to Mehemet Ali and Ismaïl; we shall examine later the abnormal position foreign intervention assigned to poor Tewfik, who during the last few months has nobly and courageously<sup>133</sup> expiated his own mistakes and those he was made to commit. The present cannot be understood without studying the past,<sup>134</sup> and both the reigns of Mehemet Ali and of Ismaïl are rich with lessons, as well as in promises for the future.<sup>135</sup>

<sup>131</sup> "A gigantic bribe of 900,000*l.* in cash was laid at his Majesty's feet."—"Spoiling the Egyptians," by S. Seymour Keay, p. 3.

<sup>132</sup> *Times*, Dec. 28, 1881 ('The Sultan's policy in Egypt,' Constantinople, Dec. 20). 'England and Egypt,' by E. Dicey, p. 195.

<sup>133</sup> *Vide* unanimous opinion of the English Press.

<sup>134</sup> "On ne régénère pas un peuple *ex abrupto*."—"Constantinople," &c. par E. Thouvenel (*Revue des Deux Mondes*, i., Janvier 1840, p. 35).

<sup>135</sup> "Fondateur, Méhémet Ali a ressuscité la nationalité Arabe . . . .

Lord Palmerston expressed one day the opinion <sup>136</sup> that there are few public men in England who follow up foreign affairs sufficiently to foresee the consequences of events "which have not happened."

In Egypt events have spoken, so there will be no organic impediment to prevent our statesmen from benefiting by the lessons of the past.

And should the programme sketched out by Mr. Gladstone in his Mansion House speech be followed, should a Liberal English Ministry <sup>137</sup> put an end to the abuses, the denouncement of which had sufficed to popularise the rebellion, should they call to life the reforms <sup>138</sup> the people have a right to claim; then indeed will Egypt bless the helping hand stretched out from over the seas, the powerful hand of the greatest Mussulman Empire, the hand of Great Britain, which will know how to heal the open wounds of the patient, and how to guide her ward towards a peaceful and happy manhood, without interfering

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Plus haut que cette célébrité de conquérant, vulgarisée par tous les siècles, l'élèvent aux yeux de l'avenir les pacifiques conquêtes, les trophées plus solides et plus rares dont il a enrichi ses peuples; il a eu la gloire de poursuivre sa réforme avec une indéfatigable ardeur."—*Revue des Deux Mondes*, i., April 1835: 'Mohammed Ali,' par Lucien Davésiés. "Under the sway of the present ruler (Ismail), Egypt and its inhabitants have in many respects made undoubted progress. Every year the Khedive introduces fresh European customs and usages."—'Africa,' by Keith Johnston, p. 204.

<sup>136</sup> Letter of Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, June 5, 1838. 'Life of Lord Palmerston,' by Lord Dalling, ii. p. 266.

<sup>137</sup> "Que deviendrait l'Égypte entre les mains d'un peuple éclairé! . . . L'état brillant dont l'Égypte a joui doit laisser une grande opinion de ce qu'elle peut devenir encore."—'Lettres sur l'Égypte,' par M. Savary (1786), iii. p. 63.

<sup>138</sup> "La première réforme à introduire concerne le 'protectorat Européen.'"—'L'Égypte et l'Europe, par un ancien juge mixte,' p. 262.

with the most precious of blessings—independence.<sup>139</sup> Nay, should the purchase of the suzerainty be confirmed, Egypt would thereby make a further step towards her final aim, and when we shall have terminated our mission—the work of regeneration, when Egypt will no longer need the arm of a protector, that day Europe will greet an “Oriental Belgium,” the peaceful guardian of the great international highway to India. It will be one of the proudest moments in the annals of contemporary history for all who will have assisted in this noble task of adding a bright jewel, another useful member, to the family of civilised nations.

England expects every man to do his duty, and the world expects the same from England.

<sup>139</sup> “Let us prove that we have higher objects than additions of territory.”—‘The Rise of our Indian Empire,’ by Lord Mahon (Earl Stanhope), p. 72.

## II.

## MEHEMET ALI.

It is impossible to pronounce the name of Mehemet Ali without admiration,<sup>140</sup> for next to Napoleon<sup>141</sup> he is certainly the most remarkable man of his age, and considering the circumstances under which he undertook to regenerate Egypt out of chaos, it is doubtful whether his creative genius is not the greater of the two. Count Prokesch-Osten, who had the best opportunity of judging his illustrious contemporary, declares "that Mehemet Ali has never been wholly understood in Europe, and that, towering far above ordinary mortals, inadequate weights have been applied to measure his genius."<sup>142</sup>

However, one thing is certain, that he has left a mark on Egypt which it will not require pyramids to immortalise. There is something in the filial

<sup>140</sup> "Man that wohl daran die Erinnerung an jenen grossen Mann, mit Verehrung zu pflegen, denn viel leistete er in der That und hätten seine Erben, seine Werke, seinen Geist, und seine Energie in vollem Maasse übernommen, wäre Aegypten heutzutage zu einer andern und grösseren Rolle berufen, als es die jetzige ist."—'Eine Orient-Reise,' by H.R. and S.H. Crown Prince Rudolph, ii. p. 30.

<sup>141</sup> 'Histoire de Mehemet Ali,' par Paul Mouriez, i. p. 5.

<sup>142</sup> 'Mehmed Ali (aus meinem Tagebuch, 1826-33),' von Grafen Prokesch-Osten (Austrian Internuncius at Constantinople), p. 2.

veneration for the memory of Mehemet Ali which resembles that of the Russians for Peter the Great<sup>143</sup>—of the Prussians for the Great Frederick—and he would equally be worthy of the title of Father of his country, had Egypt been able to understand the inestimable value of that great expression, which, indeed, so few Christian nations have yet realised.<sup>144</sup> He was a man of genius, not an apostle of civilisation,<sup>145</sup> and it would have been impossible for any one to do better.<sup>146</sup> At any rate, he was the first Oriental ruler<sup>147</sup> open to Western ideas,<sup>148</sup> and in every point of view he has shown himself superior<sup>149</sup> to his contemporary, the Sultan Mahmoud,<sup>150</sup> on whom the Turks proudly look as an enlightened and well-meaning reformer. It is beyond controversy that

<sup>143</sup> 'Aus Mehemet Ali's Reich,' von Heinrich Fürst Pückler-Muskau, p. 187.

<sup>144</sup> 'Egypt,' &c., by J. Barthélémy St. Hilaire, p. 98.

<sup>145</sup> 'Aperçu général sur l'Égypte,' par A. B. Clot Bey, p. 178.

<sup>146</sup> "Mit einem Sprunge kann Aegypten kein civilisirter Staat nach Europäischen Begriffen werden, selbst wenn es morgen unter die Botmässigkeit der Engländer und Franzöesen käme."—'Aus Mehemet Ali's Reich,' von H. Fürst Pückler-Muskau, p. 203.

<sup>147</sup> "Mehemet Ali is the greatest man of whom the Turkish Empire can boast."—Letter of H. Salt, Esq., H.M.'s Consul in Egypt, to Sir Sidney Smith.

<sup>148</sup> "Méhémet Ali est le premier Osmanli qui ait eu des idées gouvernementales et administratives. Il est le premier qui les ait appliquées."—'Aperçu général sur l'Égypte,' par A. B. Clot Bey, p. 182.

<sup>149</sup> "À Constantinople ce n'est que par imitation du Vice-Roi que le Sultan Mahmoud, son rival entêté, commença les réformes Européennes."—*Ibid.*, p. 174.

<sup>150</sup> "To judge him fairly, we should compare Mehemet Ali with another Turkish reformer—the Sultan Mahmoud. In every point of view he has shown his superiority to the latter."—'Modern Egyptians,' by E. W. Lane, p. 557.

Ismail Pasha said one day to the author, "Mahmoud adopta le costume Européen, Mehemet Ali les idées."

he has done much, but it is certain that all may be presented under different lights, according to the views of his enemies or his friends.<sup>151</sup> Yet, though his private character and political career have been subject to the most adverse criticism, no one has been able to contest the fact "that all he has done originated solely in his own energies, and that his endeavours to civilise Egypt have been highly praiseworthy,<sup>152a</sup> whatever means he may have employed to bring about the results he had in view."<sup>152b</sup>

He has been accused of having had no other object but a selfish craving for power<sup>153</sup> and riches,<sup>154</sup> of having decimated the population,<sup>155</sup> and of having ruined<sup>156</sup> his country, of having increased the misery of the Fellaheen,<sup>157</sup> of having been a vulgar adventurer, and a bloodthirsty tyrant.<sup>158</sup> Nay, French writers have gone so far as to contest him all original initiative.<sup>159</sup> According to them, Mehemet Ali has simply plagiarised the conceptions of Napoleon I.,<sup>160</sup> and has been nothing but the testamentary executor

<sup>151</sup> Vide Appendix IV., A.

<sup>152a</sup> 'Modern Egypt and Thebes,' by Sir Gardner Wilkinson, ii. p. 556.

<sup>152b</sup> Ibid., p. 555.

<sup>153</sup> 'Histoire de l'Expédition Française en Égypte,' par X. B. Saintine, x. p. 467.

<sup>154</sup> 'L'Égypte et la Syrie,' par M. Breton, ii. p. 105.

<sup>155</sup> 'L'Égypte moderne,' par Lucien Davésiés, p. 445 and 588.

<sup>156</sup> 'L'Égypte actuelle,' par A. Guillemin, p. 34.

<sup>157</sup> 'Modern Egyptians,' by E. W. Lane, p. 559.

<sup>158</sup> "Méhémet Ali puisait ses inspirations dans le maxime Arabe: Le peuple doit être traité comme le sésame, il faut le fouler et l'écraser pour tirer de l'huile."—'L'Égypte sous la domination de Méhémet Ali,' par P. et H. (1848), p. 27.

<sup>159</sup> 'Lettres sur l'Égypte,' par J. Barthélémy St. Hilaire, p. 98.

<sup>160</sup> 'Mohammed Ali,' par Lucien Davésiés (*Revue des Deux Mondes*, Avril 1835, p. 444).

of the great Emperor;<sup>161</sup> indeed, we are seriously told that he owed almost everything to France<sup>162</sup> and Frenchmen,<sup>163</sup> though he is generously credited with the shortcomings and failures of his reign.<sup>164</sup> On the other side, his genius may have been exaggerated, some of his admirers may have credited him with aims more lofty than his practical mind contemplated; yet if we follow the wonderful career of this exceptional man, and if we analyse the motives of every one of his measures, we can come to no other conclusion than that, not selfish ambition,<sup>165</sup> but the good of his country,<sup>166</sup> was his primary aim, whatever may have been the means he adopted to accomplish it.<sup>167</sup>

It was in 1769 that the founder of the present dynasty, the liberator of Egypt, the first Mussulman reformer, was born. A fortunate circumstance, the energetic repression of some local disorders at Cavala

<sup>161</sup> "Napoléon avait légué à ce pays ses puissantes conceptions et Mohamed Ali s'est fait son exécuteur testamentaire."—*Ibid.*, p. 604.

<sup>162</sup> 'Aperçu général sur l'Égypte,' par A. B. Clot Bey, ii. p. 176.

<sup>163</sup> "Méhémet Ali qu'un Consul Général de France (Comte Mathieu de Lesseps) avait, selon les instructions de Napoléon, suscité sur le Nil, grandit appuyé par la France."—'La Question d'Orient,' par E. Gioja, p. 14.

<sup>164</sup> 'Memoirs of the Lady Hester Stanhope,' iii. p. 66. 'Eastern Life, present and past,' by Harriet Martineau, p. 246 *et seq.*

<sup>165</sup> "He was capable of being swayed by high and generous impulses."—'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 67.

<sup>166</sup> 'Journal of a route across India, through Egypt to England,' by Lieut.-Colonel FitzClarence, p. 424.

<sup>167</sup> Mehemet Ali said, "Some day my grandchildren will reap what I have sown. Civilisation can only strive slowly where such endless confusion has to be overcome. You know Egypt has once been the first country of the globe, a shining example to all others. Now Europe has taken its place. In time Egypt may possibly become again the seat of civilisation. In this world there is an eternal up and down."—'Aus Mehemet Ali's Reich,' von H. Fürst Pückler-Muskau, p. 189.



and Drama, brought him first under the notice of the authorities, and being at the time chief of the municipal police, they selected him to accompany, with some irregulars, a pasha to Egypt—some great man whose name has long been forgotten, whilst the poor boy of Cavala has immortalised his birth-place. When, after a time, the pasha returned home, he left Mehemet Ali in command of his little troop, and in this capacity he took part in Khosrew Pasha's campaign against the Mamelukes; however, when, after the unfortunate battle of Damanhour, the pasha wanted to throw the blame of the defeat on him, and divested him of his command, he went over to the Mamelukes, and putting himself at their head, he drove Khosrew back to Damietta.<sup>108</sup>

The history of his further rise, step by step, until he made himself master of Egypt is so well known, that we may glide over it in silence. Only this much may be said, that the Sultan had no more loyal subject than Mehemet Ali until his suspicions were roused by an incident little known. Already "Pasha" of Egypt, having just reconquered the holy places and sent the keys to Constantinople, Mehemet Ali was still absent from Cairo,—he had left Lasoglou as regent,—when the Sultan despatched Latif Bey (raised, against Mehemet Ali's wish, to the rank of pasha) on a special errand to Egypt: this mission was to assassinate Mehemet Ali, and he had even obtained his blood-money in advance,

<sup>108</sup> 'Mohammed Ali,' par Lucien Davésiés (*Revue des Deux Mondes*, Avril 1835, p. 445).

in the shape of a firman nominating the would-be assassin Governor in Mehemet Ali's place. How his secret leaked out is immaterial, the fact is that Lasoglou got wind of it, and had Latif's house searched whilst the latter was with him at the citadel. The firman having been found and brought to Lasoglou in Latif's presence, the latter was then and there beheaded, but from that day Mehemet Ali wavered in his blind allegiance to a treacherous sovereign, and determined on securing the independence of Egypt, "which he required for the immutable preservation of himself, his family, and the great work of his whole life; and surely, having acquired it *de facto*, he might justly have indulged in the hope of seeing it recognised *de jure* by the Powers, who elsewhere had constantly acted in this spirit."<sup>169</sup>

But here begin the sins and the short-sightedness of the Continental Cabinets, petty rivalries preventing the recognition of the incalculable benefits Mehemet Ali might have conferred on the whole Eastern world had he, instead of being crippled, been allowed to extend his vast conceptions. A comparison of the great results obtained by Mehemet Ali with their own misery, made the Sultan's subjects look with envy on Egypt and with hope on Mehemet Ali.<sup>170</sup> But though anxious to shake off

<sup>169</sup> 'Egypt under Mehemet Ali,' by Prince Pückler-Muskau, i. p. 119.

<sup>170</sup> "Graf Senft schrieb an Fürst Metternich: Der Vergleich der ausserordentlichen Erfolge Mehmed Ali's mit der Schmach und dem Elend welche Herrscher und Staatsmänner über das Reich gebracht haben, macht den Musulman mit Hoffnung auf Mehmed Ali blicken. . . . Könnte Mehmed Ali dem Sultan seine Begabung auflösen, so würde das Reich erstärken und sich wieder erheben."—'Mehmed Ali,' von Grafen v. Prokesch-Osten, p. 121.

hindering fetters, and determined to establish a lasting edifice, Mehemet Ali had himself no intention to supersede the Sultan. He may at one time have aspired to become Grand Vizir;<sup>171</sup> (and Sultan Mahmoud's death is even attributed to having entertained this idea himself<sup>172</sup>), but so great was his veneration for the Caliph, that though at war at the time with the Sultan, he ordered a grand review to be held, and prayers to be read all over Egypt, on the accession of Abd-ul-Medjid. He has often been reproached with having undertaken the conquest of Syria; even his own son Ibrahim had been much opposed to the undertaking, and only obeyed his father's order to take the command when Boghos Bey explained to him that otherwise some incompetent general was likely to bring ruin over his father's armies; in fact, the author was told by a contemporary of Ibrahim, that he regretted it up to his death, always saying, "how different would matters stand had we not wasted so much money and men in Syria." However, the truth is, that when he was provoked by the Pasha of Acre, Mehemet Ali undertook the conquest of Syria in order better to secure

<sup>171</sup> "Mehemet Ali's ambition, though appeased for the moment by the sacrifices recently made to him, still aspired not merely to sovereign independence in Egypt, but to dictate, as mayor of the palace, the policy of the Porte at Constantinople. His prestige at that time was great both with European Christians and Eastern Mussulmans."—'Life of Viscount Palmerston,' by Lord Dalling, ii. p. 254 *et seq.*

<sup>172</sup> After the battle of Nésib Mahmoud is reported to have said, "If Méhémet Ali pushes as far as Constantinople, he will come and kiss my hand, if he is the clever man I know him to be, and I shall appoint him Grand Vizir and Ibrahim Seraskier." Two days after the Sultan was poisoned.

Egypt proper. He was aware that his independence would not be granted without giving up something, and in order not to make territorial sacrifices in Egypt he wished to secure Syria, with a view to its eventual retrocession. But whether he meant to keep or relax his hold, alters in no way the fatal mistake of Continental statesmanship in having insisted on his giving it up, instead of helping him to make Egypt a power. France was the only one of the great Powers lending him a support, which at one time gave great anxieties,<sup>173</sup> and threatened to involve us all in war.

But the action of France was by no means disinterested; M. Thiers requiring an outlet for superfluous steam, wanted a popular foreign question to distract attention from home affairs,<sup>174</sup> and as France had for a long time been looking upon Egypt as a second Algiers, and an undisputable dependancy,<sup>175</sup> he fancied French interests were served by patronising

<sup>173</sup> How great the apprehensions were may be gathered from a few playful words of the Queen in a letter on the 10th of October, 1840, to King Leopold: "I think our child ought to have, besides its other names, those of *Turco-Egypto*, as we think of nothing else."—'Life of the Prince Consort,' by Sir T. Martin, i. p. 14.

<sup>174</sup> "In diplomacy the Pasha has always been the tool of his worst enemy, the Court of the Tuileries."—'Egypt and Nubia,' by J. A. St. John, p. 48.

<sup>175</sup> "Le génie de la liberté qui a rendu dès son naissance la République l'arbitre de l'Europe, veut qu'elle le soit des mers et des nations les plus lointaines."—Proclamation de Buonaparte, 19 Mai, 1798.

"Atteindre et frapper l'Angleterre dans son Empire Indien, s'assurer d'un moyen d'échange pour retirer de ses mains nos colonies, ou fonder sur la Méditerranée une colonie nouvelle, qui nous indemnîsât de la perte de toutes les autres, et transformât réellement cette mer en un lac français, tel était le triple but auquel tendait Buonaparte."—'Égypte,' &c., par J. J. Marcel, M. A. Ryme, et M. P. et H., p. 5.

Mehemet Ali. Consequently England took the opposite line, and opposed whatever France was doing. But instead of putting an end to French ambition by endowing Mehemet Ali with a sufficient power of resistance, our statesmen preferred whipping France on the back of Egypt.

Not willing to take the valley of the Nile, still less inclined to let France have it, they thought the next best thing would be to keep the country in Turkish bondage, and not allow Mehemet Ali to make Egypt worth having. It never occurred to the otherwise far-seeing mind of Lord Palmerston <sup>176</sup> that an independent and strong Egypt would have become a valuable ally, one not likely ever to turn against us, for the best of reasons, that the loss of our overland traffic to India would have grievously affected her pocket, and there is no better ally in this world than material interest.

But before giving our attention to the question of independence, and the settlement of the succession, we shall have to turn once more to his first struggles for the establishment of power, to the reforms introduced, and generally to the work of regeneration undertaken by him in every direction.

Invested on July 9th, 1805, with the government of Egypt, he found his path crossed from the beginning by the jealous animosity of the Powers. Encouraged by England, the Capitan-Pasha opposed the new dignitary, and English agents taking the

<sup>176</sup> *Vide* Letter of Lord Palmerston, July 6, 1838. 'Life of Viscount Palmerston,' by Lord Dalling, ii. p. 270.

Mamelukes under their special patronage, threatened Egypt with an invasion in favour of the Elfy,<sup>177</sup> without in any way taking into account the irreconcilable hatred of the inhabitants against their tyrannical persecutors.

The support of the Elfy by England was sufficient to secure Mehemet Ali the assistance of France, the French Ambassador at Constantinople became his zealous supporter, and a new firman reinstated him against payment of an additional tribute of half-a-million. But dissatisfied at seeing Mehemet Ali reconciled with the Porte, England disembarked, on May 17, 1807, 8000 men under General Fraser at Alexandria, where our troops remained until September of the same year, the wrath of Great Britain having by that time been soothed.

Yet Mehemet Ali was far from being at the end of his troubles, the firm support received by the Mamelukes had made their attitude one of constant danger. Menaced in his life and power, he anticipated the treachery meditated against him; but in judging the terrible retribution dealt on the savage oppressors of Egypt, it is but fair to do so by the canons of his own time, place, and people, which condoned his <sup>178</sup> crime, if crime there were.

It must be admitted that he had recourse to a horrid expedient for a most desirable end.<sup>179</sup>

From this moment the reign of Mehemet Ali

<sup>177</sup> 'Égypte,' &c., par J. J. Marcel, M. A. Ryme, et M. P. et H., p. 5.

<sup>178</sup> 'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 67.

<sup>179</sup> 'Modern Egyptians,' by E. W. Lane, p. 559.

begins; the peaceful possessor of one of the most fertile countries of the world, he promptly devised means for repairing the wretched state of the finances, and he fully realised the advantages which agriculture and commerce would secure him for the realisation of his ambitious views. In 1808 he began the great territorial revolution which was to make him almost the only landed proprietor of Egypt. He respected in the beginning the *Rizâqs* in order not to hurt religious feelings, but even those had to disappear when later on he undertook personally the maintenance of all ecclesiastical establishments.

✓ Having substituted himself to the *Moultezims*, Mehemet Ali thus came into direct communication with the Fellah, and made it possible to organise agriculture by a high-handed introduction of canalisation. Alone, the difficulties of doing everything himself induced him to grant concessions for about 200,000 feddans,<sup>180</sup> concessions which he forced on the great and rich of the land, obliging them to cultivate, nay, to reclaim waste lands, often at a ruinous cost, and, in addition, to pay taxes for the questionable grants in land forced upon them by their master.<sup>181</sup>

To develop the resources, to improve agriculture, one thing was wanted, water,<sup>182</sup> and his first care was to devise an efficient system of canalisation,

<sup>180</sup> 'Aperçu général sur l'Égypte,' par A. B. Clot Bey, ii. p. 195.

<sup>181</sup> The origin of almost every one of the present great territorial fortunes in Egypt, such as that of the Yeghen family and others, and including the greater part of the land owned by the reigning family, the descendants of Mehemet Ali, originated in that first and forced grant.—The Author.

<sup>182</sup> "La richesse de l'Égypte, la mamelle véritable de l'État c'est l'agri-

beginning, 1820, the famous Mahmoudieh Canal.<sup>183</sup> He knew of no obstacles, the gold of the rich, the lives of the poor, he took whatever he wanted to ensure the final success of his schemes. He covered Egypt, by compulsory labour, with a network of minor canals, and crowned the work of irrigation by beginning the gigantic breakwater of the Nile, which it was left to Ismaïl to complete.<sup>184</sup>

But not satisfied with being the greatest land-owner, he created a universal monopoly, and claimed for the Government the exclusive right of buying from the native growers and selling to foreign traders at the prices he thought proper; <sup>185</sup> certainly a most objectionable way of filling the public exchequer, yet as one of his contemporaries, Prince Pückler-Muskau remarks very justly, "one has only to open David Hume to remember how England under Henry VIII., and even under Elizabeth, had to groan under exactions not less revolting than those of Mehemet Ali." <sup>186</sup> He endeavoured to civilise his country to the best of his judgment, and finding

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culture. Tout émane du sol auquel le Nile donne la vie."—'L'Égypte sous Méhémet Ali,' par P. N. Hamont, i. p. 24.

<sup>183</sup> "In January 1820, Mohamed Ali began with 313,000 Fellahs the canal between the lake Mareotis and the lake Medieh, taking the water of the Nile at Atfeh. They had to use their hands, not being supplied with tools."—'L'Égypte moderne,' par Lucien Davésiés (*Revue des Deux Mondes*, Sept. 1835, p. 588).

<sup>184</sup> 'The Khédive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 67.

<sup>185</sup> 'Life of Lord Palmerston,' by Lord Dalling, ii. p. 258. 'Aperçu général sur l'Égypte,' par A. B. Clot Bey, ii. p. 195.

<sup>186</sup> "The reckless despotism of the sovereign was just the same at that time in England as it is now in Egypt."—'Aus Mehemet Ali's Reich,' von H. Fürst Pückler-Muskau, i. p. 124 and 203.



no assistance at home<sup>187</sup> or abroad, he had to create resources such as the circumstances suggested. His was the leading spirit, the creative mind, his will brought order out of disorder, and once master at home he turned to the Continent, inviting and encouraging European immigration.<sup>188</sup>

He did for commerce, industry, and art what the Medicis have done in Tuscany.<sup>189</sup> The entire construction of the Government is his work ; with a few exceptions he destroyed all former usages, and introduced a system partly derived from European models. The army and navy are his creation, so are the taxation, the regulation of import and export, the quarantine laws, the manufactories, colleges, and the ministry.<sup>190</sup> Greater equity in the administration of justice was his work ; he fettered fanaticism, and exercised more tolerance than is found in many Christian states ; and last, but not least, he founded the system of schools and education, of which not the smallest conception had existed in the East for hundreds of years.<sup>191</sup>

Yet after such great deeds he was proscribed by European interests, as the dreaded Corsican had been before him, but with much less reason, and there is a

<sup>187</sup> Nothing corroborates Marmont's assertion that "Mehemet Ali had the assistance of a compact and homogenous population."—"The present state of the Turkish Empire," by Marshal Marmont, Duc de Raguse, translated by Colonel Sir F. Smith, p. 126.

<sup>188</sup> 'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 68.

<sup>189</sup> 'L'Égypte sous Méhémet Ali,' par Thédénat Duvent, p. 36.

<sup>190</sup> 'Egypt,' by Stanley Lane-Poole, p. 177.

<sup>191</sup> 'Egypt under Mehemet Ali,' by Prince Pückler-Muskau, translated by H. Evans Lloyd, i. p. xv.

deal of truth in the prophecy of one of his contemporaries, that he was only working for Europe, which would become the heir to all he was doing.<sup>192</sup> Unfortunately the Porte did not leave him the time to devote himself entirely to home policy; he frequently lamented the misfortune of his differences with the Sultan, and he was looking in vain to Europe to put an end to the wanton hampering of his work, which had aroused the envy of his suzerain;<sup>193</sup> and those who knew him best ridicule the current saying that he wanted to dethrone the Sultan.<sup>194</sup>

The origin of a renewed rupture with Turkey is to be traced to the unsuccessful campaign of 1825 against the Greeks,<sup>195</sup> and due solely to the hatred and rancour of Khosrew Pasha, who had never forgotten the treatment experienced at the hands of Mehemet Ali in 1805, when the latter ousted him from his governorship. The great favourite of Mahmoud, Khosrew poisoned the Sultan's mind against his powerful vassal, and when his master entrusted him with the supreme command of the

<sup>192</sup> "Qu'il élève des manufactures et des instituts scientifiques, qu'il creuse des ports et des canaux, qu'il coupe l'isthme de Suez, le satrape ne travaille pas pour rien. L'Europe chrétienne s'approche, qui se portera l'héritière de tout cela."—'Des relations extérieures de la France,' par L. de Carné (*Revue des Deux Mondes*, ii., Oct. 1835, p. 513 *et seq.*).

<sup>193</sup> "The Sultan hates Mehemet Ali with an intense hatred; and any one who said that he should not be subdued, and could not be subdued, would probably lose not only his Sublime Highness's favour, but his own head."—Letter of H. L. Bulwer to Lord Palmerston, July 30, 1838. 'Life of Viscount Palmerston,' by Lord Dalling, ii. p. 275.

<sup>194</sup> 'Aus Mehemet Ali's Reich,' von Heinrich Fürst Pückler-Muskau, i. p. 202.

<sup>195</sup> 'Mehmed Ali,' von Grafen von Prokesch-Osten, p. 5.

fleet and forces despatched against the Greeks, he not only neglected supporting Ibrahim and the Egyptian contingent, but did whatever he could to provoke their destruction. The consequence was that Mehemet Ali declared, in 1826, his intention of recalling his son and his troops. Moreover the Pasha of S. Jean d'Acre, instigated by the English,<sup>196</sup> refused to allow Egyptian products to pass through his Pashalic to Mesopotamia. The exile of Khosrew soothed Mehemet Ali's just complaints in that direction, and it is beyond doubt that he brought even considerable sacrifices to assist the Sultan and to strengthen Mahmoud's authority in Arabia and Syria. In fact it was more in the interest of the Sultan and the Empire, than in his own, that he first claimed the government of a country he had *de novo* subjected to Turkey's rule. He knew the utter corruption of the Pashas, their incompetence to organise, their habit of ruining the provinces confided to their care, and he often dwelt on the facility and the many means at the disposal of the Porte to turn Turkey into a flourishing and powerful empire.<sup>197</sup>

Khosrew Pasha's return from exile was the signal for renewed vexations, and he secretly encouraged Abdullah Pasha, the governor of St. Jean d'Acre, in his persistent enmity against Mehemet Ali. Notwithstanding repeated applications no redress could be obtained; year after year Mehemet Ali pointed

<sup>196</sup> 'Mehmed Ali,' von Grafen von Prokesch-Osten, p. 9.

<sup>197</sup> Ibid., p. 15.

out that he should be obliged to enforce his rights with the sword, until at last he despatched 20,000 men to Syria; but even before doing so he renewed to the Sultan the assurances of his devotion, and begged to be entrusted with the governorship of Syria, volunteering to pay all the arrears of tribute due from that province, in addition to a present of four million Spanish dollars.<sup>198</sup>

Not in the position to look upon the occupation of Syria as a *casus belli*, the Sultan ordered both Pashas to lay their case before the Porte, and invited Mehemet Ali to recall his troops. Possibly an understanding might have been effected had the Powers been united in their advice at Constantinople, but especially England underrated the strength of the Viceroy, and Lord Palmerston would only see in Mehemet Ali an ambitious vassal eager to take Mahmoud's place.<sup>199</sup> Notwithstanding Mehemet Ali's entreaties not to listen to Khosrew's insinuations, the Sultan despatched 60,000 men with 160 guns to chastise the invader, whom he stripped of all his honours, and even the government of Egypt.

Already the Pasha of Acre had been sent a prisoner to Alexandria, and though victorious, Mehemet Ali made new proposals for a peaceful settlement, but Khosrew declined to listen to reason, and then, but only then, he ordered his son to take up the glove thrown him by his suzerain.

The battle of Koniéh was the result: the victory

<sup>198</sup> 'Mehmed Ali,' von Grafen von Prokesch-Osten, p. 17.

<sup>199</sup> Ibid., p. 18.

of Christmas Day, 1832, opened to Ibrahim the gates of Constantinople.<sup>200</sup> But far from availing himself of the advantages gained, Mehemet Ali stopped short, and making new peaceful overtures, declared "that he did not want the break-up of the Empire, and wished to remain the faithful servant of the Sultan."<sup>201</sup> Left alone, Mahmoud and Mehemet Ali would have settled their differences,<sup>202</sup> but the Powers took upon themselves to intervene, and diplomacy widened once more the gap between the two. The offer of the Emperor Nicholas to support the Sultan, the appearance of a Russian fleet in the Bosphorus, united the otherwise divergent Cabinets of London and Paris in a joint naval demonstration. The Sultan, already shaken in his faith, took umbrage at the threatening conflict of foreign interests in Turkish waters, he prohibited the passage of the Dardanelles, and rather than yield on that point gave way to the moderate demands of Mehemet Ali, who at once recalled Ibrahim. It would be doing him an injustice not to recognise at this place the conciliating spirit that animated him in all his relations with the Porte.

After destroying the Turkish army and capturing the Grand Vizir, nothing could have stopped his advance on Constantinople, nothing the break-up of the Empire, had such been his intention; he had therefore every reason bitterly to complain that after having recalled his armies, after having

<sup>200</sup> 'Égypte,' par J. J. Marcel, M. A. Ryme, &c., p. 17.

<sup>201</sup> 'Mehmed Ali,' von Grafen von Prokesch-Osten, p. 21.

<sup>202</sup> See footnote <sup>172</sup>, p. 33.

stretched out the hand of friendship, after having contented himself with a most modest extension of power, in fact with concessions indispensable to the peaceful continuation of his projects, he was, nevertheless, constantly credited by the Powers with a secret desire to dethrone the Sultan.<sup>203</sup> The truth is, that on the contrary, in this unfortunate conflict, Mahmoud had been instigated to provoke a rupture, and to force upon Mehemet Ali a strife which the latter seemed most anxious to avoid. In fact the quasi-independence of Egypt is more due to the attempt of the Porte and the desire of the Powers to destroy Mehemet Ali, than to his own premeditated initiative.<sup>204</sup>

We have only to remember his friendly attitude towards the Sultan Abd-ul-Medjid, and the offer he made him to abandon Egypt and Syria to his children, and to devote the rest of his days to the exclusive service of his young master, in helping him to reorganise the Empire and to make<sup>205</sup> it worthy of its past.

These views were well known to all the cabinets, but the interests of Europe,<sup>206</sup> the individual interests of the Powers, overruled once more the large and humanitarian projects of the man of Cavala. A regeneration of the Ottoman Empire, a strengthening

<sup>203</sup> 'Mehmed Ali,' von Grafen Prokesch-Osten, p. 49.

<sup>204</sup> 'Modern Egypt and Thebes,' by Sir Gardner Wilkinson, p. 544.

<sup>205</sup> 'Mehmed Ali (aus meinem Tagebuch),' von Grafen Prokesch-Osten, p. 103 *et seq.*

<sup>206</sup> "The Egypto-Turkish question was a Russo-Anglo-French one."  
—*Ibid.*, p. 132.

of the sick man, neither suited Russia nor any of the other patrons of the Porte. Possibly Lord Palmerston may also not have had confidence in the friendly protestations of Mehemet Ali, and though he might not have objected to a Grand Vizir of Mehemet Ali's ability,<sup>207</sup> a Sultan of his stamp and energy would hardly have suited his policy.

A man who could have freed Turkey from Continental patronage, who could have raised the Ottoman Empire to be again a power, was a common danger, for the day the Porte no longer needed the support of the Western Powers against Russian aggression, the day she would be able to hold her own, that day she would also be in a position to strike bargains with the dreaded Muscovite, injurious to British and French interests. Then there was the apprehension that in case of a conflict, and of a new defeat, Russia would, on the strength of the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, rush to the assistance of the Sultan, and monopolise a patronage coveted alike by all Powers.<sup>208</sup>

All these are considerations that may have prompted Lord Palmerston's stereotyped opposition to Mehemet Ali's aggrandisement.<sup>209</sup> But there is

<sup>207</sup> "With one man of ability (M. A.) all things are concentrated, and one knows where to grasp and to grapple with them. Confusion is more difficult to deal with."—Letter of Mr. H. L. Bulwer to Lord Palmerston, August 28, 1838. 'Life of Viscount Palmerston,' by Lord Dalling, ii. p. 283.

<sup>208</sup> Ibid., ii. p. 292.

<sup>209</sup> "Our object is a permanent one, viz. to keep the pasha in a state of obedience and subordination to the Sultan."—Memo. of the Duke of Wellington, April 19, 1830. 'Despatches of the Duke of Wellington,' vi. p. 582.

also another reason, not less interested, yet of a less lofty nature; that is, the fear of seeing British commerce impaired by Mehemet Ali's efforts to establish manufactories in Egypt, to make his country independent of foreign imports, and to compete in Eastern markets with the products of the West. Though only in their infancy, these endeavours had called the attention of the commercial world to the enterprising Viceroy, who thus dared to challenge a heretofore unquestioned monopoly. Master of both shores of the Red Sea, Mehemet Ali threatened also to appropriate the entire coffee trade, and his influence being already felt in the Persian Gulf, it became expedient to check it in the bud.<sup>210</sup> Lord Auckland therefore supported the claims of the East India Company, which, after having obtained permission of the Imam of Aden to establish a coal depôt, now demanded the formal cession of town and port.<sup>211</sup>

Small as all these matters may appear, they tend to show the "*dessous des cartes de la grande politique*." Lord Palmerston's well-known saying, "*Les nations n'ont pas de cousins*," is never so true as when material interests are directly or indirectly affected.

Yet, as an excuse for a policy dictated by apparently selfish motives, it must be said that the patriotism of Lord Palmerston was apprehensive of French encroachments<sup>212</sup> should England draw back

<sup>210</sup> 'Lettres sur l'Égypte,' par M. Savary, iii. p. 63.

<sup>211</sup> 'Mehmed Ali,' von Grafen Prokesch-Osten, p. 82.

<sup>212</sup> "I understand that Louis Philippe said to some foreign minister the other day, that the reason why he protects Mehemet Ali is that France



from her stand on the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The independence of Egypt and the union of Syria were both an infringement of a principle laid down by Europe, less for the sake of Turkey than for the protection of a balance of power deemed necessary in the interests of all. Already the conquest of Algiers had given a shock to the Mussulman world, and the boastful declarations<sup>213</sup> of the French at home and abroad indicated a determination to extend their influence along the shores of the Mediterranean under the plea that they were wanted to organise Egypt.<sup>214</sup>

The Oriental question has always been the rock on which Anglo-French alliances have been wrecked, and though no one dares to dispute Great Britain's right to a free and unimpaired access to her Indian Empire,<sup>215</sup> France has done all in her power to rouse the suspicions of English statesmen by trying to gain a permanent footing in Egypt, a tendency Mehmet Ali fully discerned. Nay, he frequently expressed his justified<sup>216</sup> distrust of the French, and

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will probably be at war with England before two years are over, and that then the French will want the co-operation of Mehmet Ali's fleet in the Mediterranean. *A very friendly speech*, if really made."—Letter of Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, Nov. 22, 1839.

<sup>213</sup> See Lord Palmerston's letter of Sept. 22, 1840, to Mr. H. L. Bulwer, speaking of the "bullying" and "swaggering" of the French, the "mysterious threats" of M. Thiers, &c.—'Life of Viscount Palmerston,' by Lord Dalling, ii. p. 327.

<sup>214</sup> "Méhémet Ali et ses successeurs préférèrent la France pour organiser l'Égypte," so says a French writer of consummate ability in 1881, and thus only re-echoes the old story of half a century ago.—*La Nouvelle Revue*, July 1881, p. 7.

<sup>215</sup> *Revue des Deux Mondes*, June 1840, xxiii. p. 481.

<sup>216</sup> "The Court of the Tuileries, whilst using its utmost exertions to

never missed an opportunity for expressing his marked preference for England,<sup>217</sup> notwithstanding the opposition he personally encountered in Downing Street. But instead of availing ourselves of this kindly disposition, instead of trying "to conciliate his confidence," as the Duke of Wellington recommended,<sup>218</sup> we bullied and exasperated him, and Lord Palmerston playfully threatened "to chuck him into the Nile" if he did not behave himself.

It was exactly the reverse of that policy, recently proclaimed by Lord Granville, "that Her Majesty's Government pursues objects of no selfish character, and has no interests inconsistent with those of the Egyptian people."<sup>219</sup> In those days no one had ever heard of an "Egyptian people," and much less cared for the interests of the Fellaheen; the policy of the Powers was solely dictated by their own convenience.

Had Russia not pressed her aid on the Sultan, and offered to assist him against Mehemet Ali, it is possible that we should have refrained from taking the same line; it was, however, impossible for England to leave to Russia the part of champion of the East, and the one fixed idea of our statesmen was to get rid of the provisions of the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. To

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bring about a rupture between Mehemet Ali and Great Britain, has been secretly undermining his authority in Egypt, and taking every practicable means to precipitate his downfall."—'Egypt and Nubia,' from S. L. Burckhardt and Lord Lindsay, by J. A. St. John, p. 48.

<sup>217</sup> "His Highness received us with every flattering expression of esteem for our country."—'Narrative of a Journey in Egypt,' by Th. Legh, M.P., p. 22.

<sup>218</sup> 'Despatches of the Duke of Wellington,' vi. p. 582.

<sup>219</sup> Parliamentary Papers, 3258 of 1882, p. 13.

spoil Russia's game we had to take the same line, and we endeavoured to outbid her by denouncing Mehemet Ali as a rebel, and by volunteering to send our fleet in support of the Sultan.

In Egypt again it was the French attitude, the French bolstering up of Mehemet Ali's schemes, that confirmed us in our antagonism; in siding with Russia at Constantinople we thwarted her plans and weakened her influence; had we sided with France at Cairo the result would have been a strengthening of French influence, and the inauguration of a dualistic policy such as circumstances forced on us half a century later, a policy inconsistent with our mutual interests, and liable to constant friction. The action of the other Powers was, as it is now, of an almost platonic nature; Germany's voice was still in abeyance, Italy did not exist, alone Austria took a direct interest in Eastern matters. In fact, Prince Metternich displayed a restless activity behind the scenes, always on the alert to benefit by the mistakes of his neighbours, opposed in principle to all concessions, a declared enemy of popular aspirations, of any rebellious attempt against existing institutions, against the right Divine of crowned heads; nevertheless, in this instance, though blaming the vassal for having taken up arms against his suzerain, he was advocating conciliation, well aware that support of Constantinople or pressure at Cairo might equally involve the Powers, and oblige them to support one side or the other. The Prince believed, as did also Lord Palmerston, that France wanted to secure

in Mehemet Ali a future ally; however, Prince Metternich declined any direct or isolated diplomatic interference, and was a strong advocate of a maintenance of the *Concert Européen*<sup>220</sup> in a question affecting the interests of the community. A capital theory, but as unpractical as most good intentions.

The note of the Porte of Aug. 22, 1839, addressed to the Five Powers,<sup>221</sup> stirred up somnolent statesmen to more definite action. Few were those who deprecated an interference and joint pressure of the Continental cabinets. Amongst them stood foremost Count Prokesch-Osten, a warm supporter of Mehemet Ali,<sup>222</sup> whose cause he eloquently pleaded at Vienna. He warned Prince Metternich against forcing on Mehemet Ali unacceptable conditions which either he, or after his death his son, would be compelled to upset, a view likewise held by Mr. Bulwer (Lord Dalling),<sup>223</sup> and curiously enough equally shared by the Turkish Ambassador at Vienna, who thought that any action of the Powers would only render an understanding more difficult.<sup>224</sup> But though pro-

<sup>220</sup> 'Mehmed Ali,' by Count Prokesch-Osten, p. 37 *et seq.*

<sup>221</sup> It contained the request of the Porte: "D'aviser aux moyens de faire rentrer Mehmed-Ali dans ses devoirs, en le décidant à restituer la flotte impériale, à renoncer à l'hérédité de la Syrie et à revenir de la demande inconvenante concernant le changement du Grand-Vizir." — Circular Despatch of the Porte of Aug. 22, 1839, to the Five Powers. 'Mehmed Ali,' von Grafen Prokesch-Osten, p. 118.

<sup>222</sup> See Count Prokesch-Osten's 'Memoir to Prince Metternich,' dated Sept. 22, 1839.

<sup>223</sup> 'Life of Viscount Palmerston,' by Lord Dalling, ii. p. 273 *et seq.* and p. 283 *et seq.*

<sup>224</sup> Afterwards, when too late, Lord Beauvale agreed, that those who had been against a war and in favour of conciliation "had been seeing clear." — From Count Prokesch-Osten's Diary, p. 135.

fessing to desire reconciliation it was exactly what the Powers did *not* care for. It was evident that Mehemet Ali's genius would have ensured a new lease of life and power to the Ottoman Empire had he been allowed to advise the Sultan; they knew full well of his desire to lend a helping hand to his master; <sup>225</sup> his moderation when victorious had amply proved the deep regard he cherished for the person of the Sultan, and we have the testimony of Europeans of the highest standing, such as Count Prokesch-Osten, <sup>226</sup> Prince Pückler-Muskau, <sup>227</sup> and others, which not only refutes the ambitious designs often attributed to Mehemet Ali, but which bears witness to his attachment to the Empire, to his often expressed sorrow at its decline, and his fervent wish to be instrumental to its regeneration. <sup>228</sup> Nay, it is perhaps this very clinging to the Sultan as head of the Mussulman world that chiefly alienated

<sup>225</sup> 'Life of Viscount Palmerston,' by Lord Dalling, ii. p. 255.

<sup>226</sup> "Ich sah im Hintergrund seines Herzens keinen andern Wunsch als von dem Sultan nach Constantinopel berufen zu werden, und kein anderes Ziel als die Wiedergeburt des Türkischen Reichs."—'Mehmed Ali,' von Grafen von Prokesch-Osten, pp. 15, 48 *et seq.*

<sup>227</sup> "Als ich in Aegypten war, konnte ich mich nach seinen so oft wiederholten Aeusserungen nur überzeugen dass er eben so sehr eine friedliche Lösung durch Europäische Unterstützung gewünscht hätte, um alle Kraft seines Genies auf das Wohl seines eigenen Landes zu verwenden. . . Es ist lächerlich zu behaupten Mehemet Ali habe den Sultan entthronen wollen."—'Aus Mehemet Ali's Reich,' von Heinrich Fürst Pückler-Muskau, i. p. 202.

<sup>228</sup> "Powerful amongst all, I am bound by a holy law to devote myself, with all means at my disposal, to the welfare of the Empire and the Sultan, to support him to the best of my ability, to save them from destruction."—Mehmed Ali's *ipsissima verba*. From Count Prokesch-Osten's Diary, p. 51.

Contemporaries of Mehemet Ali assured the author that he had frequently expressed his sorrow at not being able to infuse into the Turkish Government the spirit of honest reform which could alone save the Empire.

from him the support of at least one Power <sup>229</sup> which otherwise might have welcomed a split, but which dreaded the strengthening of Islam.

The concessions which the Sultan had been obliged to make in respect of Syria, and which he *did* make, more to get rid of the interference of the Powers than out of fear of Mehemet Ali (whose loyalty he knew to be incapable of laying hand on Constantinople), were naturally galling to Ottoman pride. The Sultan could not forget that he had been humiliated, Khosrew would not forget the past, and Reschid resented his recent defeat. Though men of different type, and as staunchly opposed to each other as two statesmen could be, they united in one sentiment, rancour against a rival, a victorious antagonist, whose very generosity seemed to prey on the Turkish mind and to stimulate renewed hostility. Listening to their advice and encouraged by the meddling of the Five Powers, the Sultan forced the second war on Mehemet Ali, who this time had to give way, not to Turkish armies, but to the will of Europe. A match for Turkey, he could not struggle against the universe. He stood alone; the fussy support of France had alienated England from him, and when it came to the test the French left him to his fate. He had to content himself with what the Powers thought fit to let him have.

<sup>229</sup> Even the Emperor Nicholas, staunchest opponent of whatever flavoured of rebellion, told Count Prokesch-Osten that he would have no objection to the establishment of an independent Arab empire, which, by dividing the Mussulman world, might more than counterbalance the danger accruing from Turkey.

The possession of Syria,<sup>230</sup> so necessary to make Egypt a homogeneous and compact unit, would have made him a Power, and regardless of the benefit it would have conferred on Egypt, and the good it would have wrought, and had already brought to Syria, the latter was denied him, and a "scientific frontier" devised at the green table.

His complete independence would have allowed him to make Egypt the equal of other nations; the antagonism which a loathsome Turkish interference in his internal affairs was in the habit of kindling, would have vanished, and in its place the mutual interests of two Mussulman countries would have made Mehemet Ali the natural ally of the Sultan<sup>231</sup> and his staunch supporter in any future conflict with Europe. These considerations were quite sufficient to raise a violent opposition to Egyptian independence, and to a settlement of the succession. Notwithstanding Mehemet Ali's declaration "that the interests of his children and family imperiously called upon him to fix their future state,"<sup>232</sup> and

<sup>230</sup> "I wrote to Prince Metternich that, in the days of the Mamlouks, Egypt might have been able to do without Syria, but that the development of Egypt under Mehemet Ali required Syria as a port requires the sea, and a house access by a road."—'Mehmed-Ali,' by Count Prokesch-Osten, p. 22.

<sup>231</sup> This, however, was not Lord Palmerston's opinion, who, on June 8th, 1838, wrote to Lord Granville: "The Cabinet yesterday agreed that it would not do to let Mehemet Ali declare himself independent, and separate Egypt and Syria from the Turkish Empire. They see that the consequence of such a declaration on his part must be either immediately or at no distant time a conflict between him and the Sultan."—'Life of Viscount Palmerston,' by Lord Dalling, ii. p. 267.

<sup>232</sup> Mehemet Ali said ". . . That he was between two swords, his family and the great Powers; that the interests of his children and family

regardless of the plea of Mr. Bulwer<sup>233</sup> and others, "that the Powers would not be able to count on Mehemet Ali's content and tranquillity as long as he had nothing to lose or to bequeath," the Powers imposed their will. The governmental press in England<sup>234</sup> saw in the extension of Mehemet Ali's power a direct threat against English interests in the Orient and in India. The treaty of Unkiar Skelessi and Russian patronage at Constantinople and French tutelage at Cairo, obscured the clear judgment of our statesmen; all this put together culminated in the determination to keep Mehemet Ali in the bondage of Ottoman suzerainty, as the surest way of perpetuating division, of preventing Mussulman ascendancy.

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imperiously called upon him to fix their future state; that it was "*les larmes aux yeux et le cœur serré*" that he had taken his present resolution, from which he would not swerve; but that the interests of his family demanded it . . . and as he might soon be carried off by death, he could not any longer delay the settlement of the question." He then requested me to inform my Government . . . of his fixed determination, and that he would wait a reasonable time for a reply, in the full persuasion and hope that the British Government would take such measures as would permit an amicable and satisfactory arrangement of this affair, so as to preserve peace, at the same time that his (Mehemet Ali's) independence should be established and recognised."—Extract from Despatch from Colonel P. Campbell to Lord Palmerston, May 25, 1838. 'Life of Lord Palmerston,' by Lord Dalling, ii. p. 419.

<sup>233</sup> "As long as Mehemet Ali has nothing certain to lose or to bequeath, we cannot count upon his content and tranquillity; but give him the one and the other, and it is more than probable that in his old age he would prefer a smaller sum in his pocket to a larger one staked on the great gambling table of war. Confined to the government of Egypt, also, and secure of its possession, his attention would be concentrated on peaceful pursuits."—Letter of Mr. H. L. Bulwer to Lord Palmerston, July 30, 1838. 'Life of Viscount Palmerston,' by Lord Dalling, ii. p. 277 *et seq.*

<sup>234</sup> 'Mehmed Ali,' by Count Prokesch-Osten, p. 145.



The convention of July 15, 1840, "*pour la pacification du Levant*," as they called it, meted out what England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia condescended to grant to Mehemet Ali: Egypt proper for himself and his descendants, and to him "for life" the administration of the Pashalik of Acre. Space does not admit of going more closely into the shameful proceedings which curtailed even the provisions of 1840, and by which the interest, the ill-conceived interest, of Europe crippled the great work of one of the greatest men of our age.

The fall of St. Jean d'Acre on Nov. 22, 1840, and the defeat of Ibrahim decided the fate of Syria; the beginning of 1841 ended the strife by Mehemet Ali's acceptance of the conditions imposed on him by the Four Powers, and which Admiral Stopford had transmitted in December. They were: return of the Turkish fleet, evacuation of Syria, and in exchange "Egypt as an hereditary fief."<sup>235</sup>

That the Powers should have insisted upon the return of Syria under Turkish rule is certainly a blot on Continental statesmanship. The immediate consequence could only be the surrender of these provinces to the miseries of poverty and extortion; it was arresting the progress of civilisation, causing the abandonment of the recent improvements, and renewing anarchy and confusion.<sup>236</sup> Mehemet Ali's

<sup>235</sup> See Firman of Investiture of Feb. 13, 1841, also Firman conferring upon him the government of Nubia, Darfoor, Kordofan, and Senaar.—'Life of Viscount Palmerston,' by Lord Dalling, ii. p. 431 and 435.

<sup>236</sup> 'The present state of the Turkish Empire,' by Marshal Marmont,' p. 129.

conceptions<sup>237</sup> and Ibrahim's praiseworthy efforts had rescued these provinces from the reign of terror and barbarism which had been their normal condition,<sup>238</sup> into which Europe gratuitously replunged them by a jealous veto. Events have proved the error<sup>239</sup> committed, and the present state of Syria remains a living reproach; nay, even Turkish statesmen<sup>240</sup> have been obliged to recognise the good work done by Ibrahim during his rule, but of which the last traces have long passed into oblivion. The preceding pages, in reminding us of the nefarious interference of the European cabinets, will have given a rough idea of the difficulties thrown into the way of Mehemet Ali from all sides.

Disturbed in the peaceful pursuit of regeneration by the necessity of defending his very existence, it entailed upon his exchequer the heaviest burden, and well might his son have exclaimed, "What would Egypt be had we not been obliged to sink millions in suicidal war and strife!"<sup>241</sup> His wars were only the consequence of the instability<sup>242</sup> and uncertainty of his tenure of office. It was the means of ensuring

<sup>237</sup> 'Mehmed Ali,' by Count Prokesch-Osten, p. 41.

<sup>238</sup> 'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 347.

<sup>239</sup> "Mit Fürst Metternich and Herrn v. Gentz die Orientalischen Verhältnisse häufig besprechend war ich der warme Vertreter der Meinung, dass es *gegen* uns selbst handeln hiesse nicht die Versöhnung zwischen Sultan Mahmoud und seinem mächtigen Vasallen unter allen Verhältnissen als Frage erster Wichtigkeit zu behandeln."—'Mehmed Ali,' von Grafen von Prokesch-Osten, p. 15.

<sup>240</sup> In speaking one day of Ibrahim, Fuad Pasha said to a friend of the author, "Reschid Pasha a changé tout ce qu'Ibrahim avait fait en Syrie, cela a été un malheur pour le pays."

<sup>241</sup> Diary of Count Prokesch-Osten.

<sup>242</sup> 'Life of Viscount Palmerston,' by Lord Dalling, ii. p. 283.

a peaceful basis, a school that enabled him to train his people and to teach them discipline.

He has been reproached with having ruined the country by a reckless expenditure of life and treasure, by establishing the "state monopoly"<sup>243</sup> and by keeping an army in no proportion to the number of inhabitants.<sup>244</sup> No doubt Mehemet Ali must have thought so himself, but there was no other way open to him to lay the foundation of his work. Figures, moreover, prove that Egypt has not been a loser, for when Mehemet Ali undertook the government of this province the net revenue did not exceed 2000 purses,<sup>245</sup> half of which was spent on the pilgrimage to Mecca, the other half going to Constantinople; whilst at his death the revenue exceeded three millions sterling, including the tribute, which had been increased to 450,000*l.*<sup>246</sup>

It may be said that the result was arrived at by additional taxation; it was not so, it was by a judicious increase of the cultivated area.<sup>247</sup> Undoubtedly

<sup>243</sup> "The Pasha's monopoly was a grave error in political economy and administration; but it was not a social crime in Egypt. . . . Mehemet Ali may be said of having inherited the whole of Egypt with slight exceptions. . . . The Egyptian Government, however, has become so well aware of this error, that it has relinquished the monopoly, and substituted a more regular and equitable mode of taxation."—"Egypt and the great Suez Canal," by J. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, p. 83 *et seq.*

<sup>244</sup> "According to Herodot (ii. p. 165, 166), Egypt with 7½ millions inhabitants could raise an army of 410,000 men; according to Diodor, Sesostris was at the head of 600,000 men . . . and Mehemet Ali with half the number of inhabitants raised as many as 2 and 300,000 men."—"Das heutige Aegypten," von H. Stephan, p. 178 *et seq.*

<sup>245</sup> 'Aegypten,' A. von Kremer, ii. p. 3.

<sup>246</sup> 'Das heutige Aegypten,' von H. Stephan, p. 217.

<sup>247</sup> "Of a total of about 7 million acres, about one-third was cultivated in the beginning of the century; in 1843 there were 3,856,341 acres

these results could not have been arrived at by leaving the cultivation, we had better call it the canalisation, of the soil to the individual initiative<sup>248</sup> of the Fellah, and as I mentioned before, Mehemet Ali had to make the State,<sup>249</sup> or rather himself, the sole landed proprietor in order efficiently to regulate and to organise the water supply, which, in such a country as Egypt, could only be secured by compulsory labour.<sup>250</sup> Though Mehemet Ali studied how to lighten the burdens of the *corvée*,<sup>251</sup> undoubtedly cruel injustices were perpetrated, much harshness was resorted to, yet it must not be forgotten that the work of reorganisation which he undertook had been accomplished in Europe centuries before,<sup>252</sup> and it

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cultivated, whilst the lands suitable for cultivation were estimated at 1,551,000, of which about half were in cultivation by 1869."—*Statistique de l'Égypte*, par E. de Régný, p. 67.

<sup>248</sup> 'Égypte et Turquie,' par F. de Lesseps, p. 6.

<sup>249</sup> "This organisation of property, monstrous as it may seem, has received in Egypt the sanction of ages, and the acquiescence of the people. Down to the present day, the state of things is nearly the same. . . . The Sultan is always looked upon as the legal proprietor of the land, the Viceroy is the general and hereditary tenant since the Hatti-sherif of 1841. . . . There is hardly a single real landed proprietor but himself. . . . This is a very serious consideration, which should not be lost sight of, in estimating the conduct of the Egyptian Government in recent times. . . . It is easy, to comprehend that between the great and sole proprietor of such a possession and the . . . poor Fellah, there is room for a multitude of middlemen, who live at the cost of the prince, as well as that of the tax-payer."—*Égypte*, &c., by J. Barthélémy St. Hilaire, p. 105.

<sup>250</sup> And here I may be allowed to mention that even the Suez Canal owes its existence largely to the *corvée*, though, when the harm was done, Prince Napoleon is said ('*L'Égypte et Ismail Pasha*,' par A. Sacré et L. Outrebon, p. 279) to have generously proclaimed: 'Je ne veux pas de *corvée*' (speech of Prince Napoleon, Feb. 11, 1864, at the Suez Canal banquet).—The Author.

<sup>251</sup> 'Égypte,' &c., by Barthélémy St. Hilaire, p. 106.

<sup>252</sup> "Le travail de réorganisation que Méhémet Ali entreprit pour l'Égypte a déjà été accompli pour l'Europe pendant les siècles d'obscurité

would be unjust to measure him and his people by an inadequate standard.

It is sheer nonsense to reproach him with the *corvée*,<sup>253</sup> and with treating people as serfs who had been so from all recorded time.<sup>254</sup> They were children, and he treated them as such,<sup>255</sup> but he did everything in his power to elevate them, to free them from this very serfdom with which he has been reproached. He checked the slave trade as far as he could, and abolished slavery as far as it was possible without interfering with the necessities of the harem.

But to improve the condition of the Fellah, the education of the masses presented itself as the first necessity;<sup>256</sup> and this was one of the chief pre-occupations, we might say the "hobby" of the Viceroy.<sup>257</sup> The difficulties to overcome were in-

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relative du moyen âge."—'L'instruction publique en Égypte,' par V. Edouard Dor, p. 28.

<sup>253</sup> Those who know Egypt will agree that even in our days the *corvée* is absolutely necessary for public works, otherwise the cleaning of the canals would simply come to a standstill; left to themselves, the villages would secure water regardless of their neighbours, in fact at each other's expense. That the work done should be paid for, that the men should be indemnified for lost time and labour is another question, but they must be kept to do the work.—The Author.

<sup>254</sup> "The people *were* serfs, and had been serfs from all recorded time."—'Life of Viscount Palmerston,' by Lord Dalling, ii. p. 255. See also 'Lettres sur Égypte contemporaine,' par E. Gellion-Danglar, p. 74.

<sup>255</sup> "Ces peuples sont des enfants: il faut les traiter comme des enfants."—*Ibid.*, p. 73.

<sup>256</sup> "La véritable réforme de l'enseignement scolaire commence avec Méhémet Ali," &c.—'L'instruction publique en Égypte,' par V. E. Dor, p. 207.

<sup>257</sup> "He always spoke with the greatest animation of the young, related what he had done in this direction, and what he intended to do. It is difficult to believe the good that has been done in so short a time. I have

numerable; though he opened schools all over the country<sup>258</sup> parents could not be brought to send their children, not even with the inducement of having them clothed and fed at the expense of the State. Nay, Mehemet Ali decreed that all children attending school should receive monthly a small sum in cash, in fact pocket-money, as a sort of bribe, which has perpetuated itself up to the present day in all public schools in Egypt. Notwithstanding that, children had frequently to be brought in chains to school, and I know of a number of men of mark,<sup>259</sup> who owe everything to this compulsory mode of education. He began by establishing fifty primary schools in the centres of the various districts, accommodating about 11,000 children.<sup>260</sup> The college where his own sons were brought up numbered 1500 and was called the School of the Princes; he established a school of languages, a staff college at Kankah, a school of medicine at Abou-Zabel, a school of cadets at Ghizeh, a school of artillery at Tourah, a naval college at Alexandria, a school of infantry at

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seen it with my own eyes, and he must be blind who would deny that Mehemet Ali has frequently taken upon himself the appearance of brutal selfishness in order thus to become the benefactor of his people for centuries to come."—'Aus Mehemet Ali's Reich,' von Heinrich Fürst Pückler-Muskau, i. p. 205.

<sup>258</sup> See 'An Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians,' by E. W. Lane, p. 60.

<sup>259</sup> To mention one amongst many, I will cite Ali Pasha Moubarek, a member of the present Cabinet, and one who has done excellent work in the days of Ismaïl as Minister of Public Instruction.—The Author.

<sup>260</sup> 'L'instruction publique en Égypte,' par V. E. Dor, p. 211 *et seq.* 'Aus Mehemet Ali's Reich,' von Heinrich Fürst Pückler-Muskau, i. p. 207.

Damietta; besides, every regiment had its primary school, and he established even a school of military music.

Notwithstanding that his reforms were, chiefly in the beginning, of a military nature,<sup>261</sup> he fully understood that civil instruction was the most powerful auxiliary of military training; he did not want to make machines, he wanted to form men, and in that direction he has done more for Egypt "than any of its rulers since the days of Saladin."<sup>262</sup>

Never at rest, and anxious to emulate Europe, nothing useful escaped his scrutinising eye.<sup>263</sup> "With admirable talent for organisation, he introduced into one of the most neglected countries of the world, order and security, those first desiderata of a civilised state."<sup>264</sup>

He caused manufactories, foundries, and arsenals to spring up, as if by enchantment;<sup>265</sup> he encouraged commerce, industry, art;<sup>266</sup> "he was the nerve, the heart, the soul of his country,"<sup>267</sup> and he enriched his people "with trophies more solid and more rare than those which had been vulgarised for centuries

<sup>261</sup> "He has established a system of obedience, foundation of regular order; for the first step to civilisation is to produce submission."—"The present state of the Turkish Empire," by Marshal Marmont, Duc de Raguse; translated by Colonel F. Smith, p. 126.

<sup>262</sup> 'Aus Mehemet Ali's Reich,' von Heinrich Fürst Pückler-Muskau, i. p. 5.

<sup>263</sup> 'L'Égypte sous Méhémet Ali,' par Hamont, ii. p. 195 *et seq.*

<sup>264</sup> 'Egypt,' by Prince Pückler-Muskau, translated by H. Evans Lloyd, i. p. 15.

<sup>265</sup> 'Instruction publique en Égypte,' by V. E. Dor, p. 208.

<sup>266</sup> 'L'Égypte sous Méhémet Ali,' par Thédénat-Duvent, p. 93.

<sup>267</sup> 'Égypte,' par M. J. J. Marcel, M. A. Ryme, &c., p. 1.

by conquests.”<sup>268</sup> He resuscitated “the ancient glories of the reign of the Pharaohs.”<sup>269</sup>

But not content with exchanging anarchy for tranquillity,<sup>270</sup> laying the germs<sup>271</sup> of public instruction, regulating the administration of justice, abolishing slavery, improving agriculture, creating an army with the assistance of Soleiman Pasha,<sup>272</sup> and calling to life useful institutions of every description,<sup>273</sup> being, so to say, the maker of future generations, he was far from erecting a Chinese wall around his creation; on the contrary, all his efforts were directed towards one aim, to throw down the barriers which religion, custom, and tradition had thrown up between the East and the West.

He favoured commerce,<sup>274</sup> and under his care export as well as import increased to an enormous extent, and Egypt became the mart between two hemispheres,<sup>275</sup> which carried in its train a considerable rise in the value of labour, as well as of all

<sup>268</sup> ‘Mohammed Ali,’ par Lucien Davésiés (*Revue des Deux Mondes*, April 1835, p. 459).

<sup>269</sup> ‘Deux mois en Égypte,’ par C. H. Taglioni, p. 21.

<sup>270</sup> ‘Manners and Customs of Modern Egyptians,’ by E. Lane, p. 559.—‘Egypt,’ by Stanley Lane-Poole, p. 175 *et seq.*

<sup>271</sup> ‘L’Égypte actuelle, etc.,’ par A. Guillemin, pp. 8, 32.

<sup>272</sup> Soleiman Pasha (the French Colonel Sèves) father-in-law of Cherif Pasha, was the “Field-marshal von Roon” of Mehemet Ali, and to him was due the splendid organisation of a well disciplined, well armed, and highly efficient army, of which, alas, nothing is left in the present days but the record of glorious achievements.—The Author.

<sup>273</sup> “Nature had made Egypt agricultural, Mehemet Ali determined she should be manufacturing too!”—‘The Khedive’s Egypt,’ by E. de Leon, p. 69.

<sup>274</sup> “Den Handel mit Europa hat er nicht nur belebt sondern neugeschaffen.”—‘Aus Mehemet Ali’s Reich,’ von Heinrich, Fürst Pückler-Muskau, i. p. 4.

<sup>275</sup> ‘L’Égypte sous Méhémet Ali,’ par Thédénat-Duvent, p. 187.



commercial products,<sup>276</sup> so that the Fellah had never been better off.<sup>277</sup>

He patronised immigration on a large scale, and attracted Europeans—often at a ruinous cost<sup>278</sup>—to assist him in his work, and to train the natives, whilst on the other hand he sent hundreds to Europe, and established in 1826 the Egyptian Mission in Paris,<sup>279</sup> where most of the leading men of the day have been educated.<sup>280</sup> Nothing was left undone to promote the development and regeneration of his country, but though one of those born rulers of men who achieve power and hold it by their own force of will,<sup>281</sup> he could not do the impossible. To transform his people and to shape them into useful instruments generations were required, and many of his creations collapsed for want of men.<sup>282</sup> Nevertheless he

<sup>276</sup> "From 1827 to 1841-2 wages increased from 20 fodda to 2 piasters per labourer, from 1 piaster to 4 for a bricklayer, from 4 to 9 for a builder, &c. Cotton more than doubled its value, printed cottons rose from 4 piasters to 12, coffee from 4 piasters to 21, sugar from 2 to 20 piasters, and most products in a similar proportion, though the daily necessities of life remained pretty stationary, thus bread only increased from 4 fodda to 5, rice from 2 piasters 20 fodda to 3 piasters, eggs from 80 for a piaster to 24 for a piaster, only meat almost trebled in price."—*Modern Egypt and Thebes*, by Sir Gardner Wilkinson, i. p. 471.

<sup>277</sup> 'The Future of Egypt,' by E. Dicey (*Nineteenth Century*, August 1877, p. 9).

<sup>278</sup> "He delighted in telling me how he had to pay a number of European adventurers before finding a man who would answer his purpose. He called this 'purchasing his experience.'"—*Mehmed Ali*, by Count Prokesch-Osten, p. 8.

<sup>279</sup> 'L'Égypte sous Méhémet Ali,' par Hamont, ii. p. 182 *et seq.*

<sup>280</sup> Amongst them the Khedive Ismail, Prince Ahmet, Prince Moustapha Fazil, Prince Halim, Cherif Pasha, Mourad Pasha, Ali Pasha Moubarek, &c.

<sup>281</sup> 'England and Egypt,' by E. Dicey, p. 51.

<sup>282</sup> "Méhémet Ali sait créer, mais il ne sait pas conserver. Dans le principe on lit sur ses fondations : Ouvrage d'un homme de génie. Puis

obtained marvellous results, but to accomplish them he required, as M. de Lesseps remarks so truly, "a permanent and uncontested power," complete liberty of action, and forty years of incessant labour and efforts directed towards one aim. Nay more, he would not have accomplished it without the conviction that his task would be continued by his family, and that he was working for posterity."<sup>283</sup>

And yet how long had he to struggle ere the Powers would yield him this primary condition of success!

However, his undaunted will carried the day, and he is surely "a great man" in the highest acceptance of the word,<sup>284</sup> and might assuredly, without the opposition of Europe, have raised the Orient—the Ottoman world—from its decline.<sup>285</sup>

Eminently practical,<sup>286</sup> persevering, highly gifted,<sup>287</sup> a consummate politician,<sup>288</sup> yet kind and good-natured,<sup>289</sup> he possessed excellent qualities as an

Méhémet Ali livre ses fondations aux hommes de son pays; les fondations croulent et l'on lit: Travail des Turcs."—*L'Égypte sous Méhémet Ali*, par Hamont, i. p. 435.

<sup>283</sup> 'Égypte et Turquie,' par F. de Lesseps, p. 14.

<sup>284</sup> "Par sa volonté inébranlable, son énergie et l'élévation de ses visées, Méhémet Ali fut un grand homme dans toute l'acception que nous donnons à ce mot lorsque nous l'appliquons à un souverain."—*L'Instruction publique en Égypte*, par V. Edouard Dor, p. 29.

<sup>285</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 28.

<sup>286</sup> "Marschall Marmont rühmte seinen Geist, praktischen Blick und Beharrlichkeit."—*Aus dem Tagebuch von Grafen Prokesch-Osten*, p. 57.

<sup>287</sup> "The Emperor Nicholas rendered justice to his great qualities and his talent of organisation."—*Ibid.*, p. 53.

<sup>288</sup> "I consider him as one of the most consummate politicians in Europe."—*Memoirs of Lady Hester Stanhope*, iii. p. 65.

<sup>289</sup> 'Égypte,' par M. J. J. Marcel, M. A. Ryne, &c, p. 22.

individual,<sup>290</sup> was devoted to his wife, an energetic and superior woman, whom he treated with the most profound respect,<sup>291</sup> and had in more than one way a strange affinity to Napoleon I.,<sup>292</sup> whom the French love to call his prototype,<sup>293</sup> though to my mind Mehemet Ali's achievements<sup>294</sup> are relatively far more meritorious, for unlike Bonaparte, Mehemet Ali found neither a country nor men to help him; nay, totally uneducated, he had even to mould himself, and it is touching to think how he, the maker of Egypt, learned at the age of forty-five to read and write like a schoolboy.<sup>295</sup> And this is the man whom civilised Europe endeavoured to crush and to impede in his glorious work of redemption!

One of the greatest figures in history, there is none more apt to inspire the historian,<sup>296</sup> and with all his faults,<sup>297</sup> and semi-barbarian ways, his genius overshadows the hosts of Continental pigmies by right Divine, of whom so many manage to wreck their civilised inheritance, whilst he, the *parvenu* amongst

<sup>290</sup> 'Modern Egypt,' &c., by Sir Gardner Wilkinson, ii. p. 555.

<sup>291</sup> 'Egypt,' &c., by J. A. St. John, after J. L. Burckhardt and Lord Lindsay, p. 46.

<sup>292</sup> 'Aus Mehemet Ali's Reich,' von Heinrich Fürst Pückler-Muskau, i. p. 8. 'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 64.

<sup>293</sup> 'Événements et aventures en Égypte en 1839,' par Scipion Marin, ii. p. 292. 'Histoire de Méhémet Ali,' par Paul Mouriez, i. p. v.

<sup>294</sup> 'Recollections of Egypt,' by the Baroness Menu von Minutoli, p. 214.

<sup>295</sup> The slave who taught him to read only died two winters ago at Cairo, where she was held in great esteem by all the members of the Khedivial family.—The Author.

<sup>296</sup> 'History of Mehemet Ali,' par Paul Mouriez, i. p. v.

<sup>297</sup> 'Mehemet Ali was an exceptional man, both in the evil and the good he wrought in and upon Egypt, of which the latter predominated.'—'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 76.

crowned heads, was even expected to create a nation.<sup>298</sup> Let those who have better deserved of their country first cast the stone; posterity<sup>299</sup> will sit in judgment,<sup>300</sup> and Mehemet Ali's work will plead his cause.<sup>301</sup>

<sup>298</sup> "Méhémet Ali est un grand homme sans doute, mais il ne lui est pas donné de créer un peuple."—'Des relations extérieures de la France,' par L. de Carné (*Revue des Deux Mondes*, Oct. 1, 1835, iv. p. 518).

<sup>299</sup> "What Mehemet Ali did in and for Egypt has passed into history . . . the hand of the mighty master is still to be seen in the traces it has left."—The Khedive's Egypt, by E. de Leon, p. 67.

<sup>300</sup> "Futurity will do full justice to Mehemet Ali's mighty influence on the commencing regeneration of the East."—'Egypt under Mehemet Ali,' by Prince Pückler-Muskau, i. p. 103.

<sup>301</sup> Al Koran, cap. xvi.

## III.

## ISMAÏL.

THE reign of Ismaïl can be summed up in three sentences—great projects, great results, and great expenditure. On his accession he found nothing but the ruins of Mehemet Ali's work, everything had to be commenced afresh, and new life infused into the great undertakings of the founder of his dynasty. His father Ibrahim, one of the most attractive figures of his time, brave, upright, clever, just, had flashed through Egypt like a shining meteor. Having proved himself in Syria, not only a first-rate soldier, but a most able administrator,<sup>302</sup> his coming to power was full of promise, but he only reigned two months. His memory is untarnished, and his name ever pronounced with pride and veneration.<sup>303</sup>

<sup>302</sup> "His warrior son Ibrahim, who swept like a flame through Syria and Arabia, was the sword-hand of his father. His military genius was his chief characteristic, and the record of his battles the record of his life. The pious care of his son, the present Khedive, has erected a fitting monument to his memory in the spirited equestrian bronze statue which he has caused to be placed at Cairo."—"The Khedive's Egypt," by E. de Leon, p. 76.

<sup>303</sup> His son erected a grand statue to his father on one of the public places in Cairo, and one of the feats by which Arabi & Co. will perpetuate their memory is that of having thrown it from its socket and destroyed it.—The Author.

Abbas Pasha may be said to have had order, and he died without debts, the only good point of his reign. He treated Egypt like a conquered province; a tyrant, and hard with the people, yet his well-regulated administration eased their burden. The army numbered 80,000 men, without counting 20,000 Bashi-Bazouks. Nothing was wanting, artillery, cavalry, equipment, all was in the best order, and yet there was no deficit in the Budget.

Not satisfied with the working of the schools<sup>304</sup> established by Mehemet Ali, he suppressed them all, founding in their place the "Mafroussa," a nursery intended to train officers for the army. Though sometimes very odd,<sup>305</sup> he was not devoid of common sense,<sup>306</sup> yet as a rule too absorbed by his love of pleasure to give much thought to other things. He hated foreigners, avoided the society of natives, shut himself up from the world, and died as miserably as he had lived.

Saïd Pasha was exactly the reverse. He was as

<sup>304</sup> "On his accession, he had the original idea of a general examination of teachers and pupils, which took place in his presence at Abou-Zabel; the result was disastrous for both masters and boys, and Abbas decreed the immediate closing of all schools."—"Instruction publique en Égypte," par V. E. Dor, p. 214.

<sup>305</sup> " 'You are always troubling me about your "barrage,"' said Abbas, 'and an idea has struck me. Those great masses of stone, the Pyramids, are standing there useless. Why not take the stone from them to do the work? Is it not a good idea?' "—"The Khedive's Egypt," by E. de Leon, p. 263.

<sup>306</sup> One day that Hassan Pasha Monasterli, his Prime minister, implored him to sign a decree prohibiting the sale of hatchich, Abbas demurred, saying, "The people must take something to amuse themselves. If I suppress hatchich they will buy rakki from the Greeks, who will put revolutionary ideas in their heads. Hatchich stupefies, rakki does the reverse."—The Author.

fond of show and extravagance<sup>307</sup> as Abbas had been of order. A capricious autocrat, he suppressed the Council of Ministers. He wanted to be and to do everything himself, and though his first ideas were generally good, he was wanting in system. The army was his hobby; he was constantly making changes, having one day 50,000 men, and the next perhaps only half that number, following in everything the impulse of the moment. Very sociable, loving especially the society of foreigners, quick, witty,<sup>308</sup> an agreeable conversationalist, he was brave,<sup>309</sup> though wanting in moral courage<sup>310</sup>; very generous,<sup>311</sup> well disposed to his family, to whom he restored their estates confiscated by Abbas. He was not a patron of public instruction,<sup>312</sup> but kind to the people,<sup>313</sup> and he will be remembered by the abolition

<sup>307</sup> He paid for the decoration of one of the reception-rooms at the palace of Abdin the enormous sum of ten million francs, and had so little sense of the worth of the money that, when Mr. Bravais complained one day that a certain estimate in Italian lire had been taken too low, he simply replied, "Well, put it in English livres," and it was done.—The Author.

<sup>308</sup> When in London during the Exhibition, the weather had not favoured his stay. However, one day walking in the Exhibition buildings, he noticed a ray of sun forcing its way through the glass roof, and turning to Zulficar Pasha who accompanied him, he said, "You see the sun is so rare in this country that they are exhibiting it."—The Author.

<sup>309</sup> "Saïd was a bold, frank, fearless, and reckless man, fond of foreign society, speaking French like a Parisian, and enjoying, of all things, the witty turns of which that language is capable; himself a wit of no mean calibre."—"The Khedive's Egypt," by E. de Leon, p. 85.

<sup>310</sup> He trembled whenever he saw Sabatier, the French Consul-General, and he openly confessed that he could not help it.—The Author.

<sup>311</sup> 'L'Égypte et Ismaïl Pacha,' par A. Sacré et L. Outrebon, p. 21.

<sup>312</sup> One day, when his old tutor, Koenig Bey, implored him to reopen the schools suppressed by Abbas, Saïd replied, "Why open the eyes of the people, they will only be more difficult to rule."—The Author.

<sup>313</sup> "S. A. le Vice-roi aime son peuple, ces hommes patients et laborieux,

of some of the most grinding monopolies;<sup>314</sup> in fact, he introduced the present taxation in room of the *monopole* and the tithe.<sup>315</sup> A drill-sergeant in an Oriental garb, a tyrant with all the seductions of a man of the world, he united the virtues and faults of the East and West.

To him belongs, however, the doubtful merit<sup>316</sup> of having contracted the first<sup>317</sup> Egyptian loan,<sup>318</sup> one of the consequences of his commitments<sup>319</sup> to the Suez Canal Company.

He left to his successor a debt of 10,000,000*l.*,<sup>320</sup> a

de serfs qu'ils étaient naguère, Mohammed Saïd s'efforce de les élever à la dignité d'hommes."—'Lettres, etc., de Ferdinand de Lesseps,' p. 162.

<sup>314</sup> 'Egypt,' by Stanley Lane-Poole, p. 178.

<sup>315</sup> 'Egypt and the great Suez Canal,' by J. Barthélémy St. Hilaire, pp. 86 and 106. Vide also *Times*, March 27, 1857.

<sup>316</sup> "At my last interview with him, he expressed deep regret that he had saddled his country with a public loan and a public debt."—'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 101.

<sup>317</sup> "Saïd eut le tort de ré-introduire les Européens, et de se laisser voler par eux, de faire le premier emprunt . . . d'écouter M. de Lesseps," &c. —'L'Égypte et l'Europe, par un ancien juge mixte,' p. 99.

<sup>318</sup> "In 1862 Saïd concluded the first public loan in London, with Fröhling and Goschen (in room of two private loans made previously in Paris), the amount being 3,292,800*l.* at 7 per cent., and 1 per cent. amortisation, but realising only 2½ millions, a dead loss of 800,000*l.* (which at 8 per cent. represents a payment of 64,000*l.* a year for money never seen)." —'L'Égypte et l'Europe, par un ancien juge mixte,' p. 151. Vide also 'Egypt as It Is,' by J. C. M'Coan, p. 92.

<sup>319</sup> "The first Egyptian foreign loan was negotiated in 1862, when the commitments of Saïd Pasha to the Suez Canal Company, amounting to nearly 4,000,000*l.*, and the pressure of a heavy floating debt, compelled him to imitate the example of the Porta."—'The Finances of Egypt' (W. Ridgway, 1874), p. 4.

<sup>320</sup> "When Saïd Pasha died, in 1863, the foreign debt of the country was only 3,000,000*l.*" (but his debts amounted to over three times that sum.—The Author). —'The Financial Position of Egypt,' by R. H. L., p. 1.



rotten administration, great disorder, and, in addition, that, for Egypt, disastrous<sup>321</sup> Suez Canal concession,<sup>322</sup> with all its ruinous obligations,<sup>323</sup> which that great charmer M. de Lesseps had got him to sign without ever having read it, as I was assured by one of his own Ministers.

The greatest discontent existed from one end of the country to the other.

On succeeding to his uncle, an almost crushing<sup>324</sup> task awaited Ismail Pasha, and we shall see whether Egypt has benefited by the reign of him called "le grand dilapidateur."

In the days of Saïd he had wisely kept in the background,<sup>325</sup> occupying himself with agriculture, and the administration of his extensive properties,<sup>326</sup> and he only began to give his attention to the question of reform<sup>327</sup> when the death of his brother Ahmed made him heir-presumptive. After

<sup>321</sup> "Saïd Pasha had irretrievably committed the Government to . . . that for Egypt disastrous concession, with its mischievous obligations."—'Egypt as It Is,' by J. C. M'Coan, p. 89.

<sup>322</sup> 'The Great Canal at Suez,' by Percy FitzGerald, p. 22. 'L'Égypte et l'Europe, par un ancien juge mixte,' p. 99. 'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 98.

<sup>323</sup> All Saïd contributed towards the preliminary expenses was 100,000*l.*, leaving to Ismail the burden of millions to come.—The Author.

<sup>324</sup> "La tâche du Vice-roi demeure immense et presque accablante."—'Lettres sur l'Égypte,' par J. Barthélémy St. Hilaire, p. 103.

<sup>325</sup> 'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 157.

<sup>326</sup> On his accession Ismail Pasha had an income of 160,000*l.* a year in land, no debts and no mortgages on any of his extensive properties—so the author has been told by several of his ministers.

<sup>327</sup> During many months Mr. Pini, one of the leading lawyers, spent daily several hours with Ismail Pasha, in order to initiate him into the working of Continental law codes.—The Author.

his accession he attempted to do on a great scale what on a small one he had effected on his properties.<sup>328</sup>

Everything had to be created,<sup>329</sup> and in summing up the results obtained during seventeen years of restless activity, in putting to his credit the great things he has done, posterity will judge with less severity the enormous deficit which Europe has helped him to pile up.<sup>330</sup>

Foremost amongst the achievements of his reign stands :—

1. The settlement of the succession and the establishment of primogeniture.<sup>331</sup>

2. Next to it, autonomy<sup>332</sup> and administrative reforms.<sup>333</sup>

<sup>328</sup> "Depuis qu'Ismaïl Pacha gouverne l'Égypte il a fait pour elle en grand, ce qu'il avait fait sur une petite échelle pour ses domaines. L'agriculture, l'industrie, le commerce se sont développés dans de larges proportions, protégés par une puissante volonté, qui n'a reculé ni devant les sacrifices ni devant les obstacles . . . et si l'on quitte le terrain des réformes matérielles pour entrer sur celui des réformes politiques, on trouvera un progrès aussi considérable."—"Deux mois en Égypte," par Ch. Taglioni, p. 22.

<sup>329</sup> "Tout est à créer," etc.—'Lettres sur l'Égypte,' par J. Barthélémy St. Hilaire, p. 103.

<sup>330</sup> "Le contact de l'Europe a été désastreux pour l'Égypte au point de vue économique, et même au point de vue moral."—"L'Égypte et l'Europe, par un ancien juge mixte," p. 341.

<sup>331</sup> 'Das heutige Aegypten,' von H. Stephan, p. 153.

<sup>332</sup> "Ismaïl's first step was to remove as far as possible the irksome control of the Porte."—"Egypt," by Stanley Lane-Poole, p. 179.

<sup>333</sup> "He began a series of reforms such as no previous governor of Egypt ever contemplated. He re-established and improved the administrative system organised by Mehemet Ali, which had fallen into decay under Abbas' indolent rule; he caused a thorough remodelling of the customs systems; . . . in 1865 he bought the Egyptian post office, and placed it under the direction, with full powers, of an official from St. Martin's-le-Grand."—"Egypt," by Stanley Lane-Poole, p. 179 *et seq.*

3. Judicial reform,<sup>334</sup> and equality of all before the civil law.

4. Public instruction.<sup>335</sup>

5. Abolition of slavery.<sup>336</sup>

6. Ministerial responsibility and Chamber of Notables.<sup>337</sup>

7. Increase of the resources of the country by means of the development of agriculture and public works.<sup>338</sup>

8. Extension of territory.<sup>339</sup>

9. And lastly, a great feat negative for Egypt,<sup>340</sup> but priceless for the world at large<sup>341</sup>—the Suez Canal, completed, thanks to Ismail's help and munificence.<sup>342</sup>

The *revers de la médaille* is the gigantic debt; but in reproaching the Khedive with his financial disorder,

<sup>334</sup> Despatch of Lord Stanley, Oct. 18, 1867.

<sup>335</sup> "The educational progress during Ismail's reign has been truly remarkable, and would be considered so in every country of the globe."—'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 160.

<sup>336</sup> His Highness the Khedive Ismail to the Minister of the Interior, Aug. 23, 1877.

<sup>337</sup> Vide 'Das Aegypten,' von H. Stephan, p. 170. Vide also 'La Question Égyptienne,' 1881, p. 31.

<sup>338</sup> "Of the enormous increase of the aggregate wealth of the country there can be no doubt."—Lecture of Sir Bartle Frere at the Edinburgh Philosophical Institution, Jan. 5, 1874.

<sup>339</sup> 'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 342.

<sup>340</sup> "C'est l'Égypte qui a payé les frais de la construction du Canal, ou à peu près."—'L'Égypte et l'Europe, par un ancien juge mixte,' p. 46. Vide also 'Egyptian Finance,' by M. G. Mulhall (*Contemporary Review*, Oct. 1882, p. 530).

<sup>341</sup> "A scheme which, on the face of it, is beneficial to mankind."—Speech of the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, House of Commons, June 1, 1858.

<sup>342</sup> Speech of Prince Napoleon, Feb. 15, 1864. Vide 'Lettres, etc., de Ferdinand de Lesseps,' p. 392.

one must examine its origin and take into account the objects he had in view when he threw himself into the open arms of money-lending Europe.

It is neither fair nor just only to listen to the woful tale of his creditors, who in truth have little to complain of,<sup>343</sup> whilst Egypt—the Fellah—the real sufferers, may complain more of the lender<sup>344</sup> than of Ismail.

At any rate the Khedive has done whatever was in his power to atone for his own mistakes. He has given up his private property,<sup>345</sup> and even his throne,<sup>346</sup> to facilitate a liquidation. To save the dynasty, to ensure the succession to Tewfik, and to preserve for Egypt the goodwill of exacting Europe,<sup>347</sup> he did whatever he was asked to do, and sacrificed himself without a moment's hesitation.

But before driving His Highness to so desperate a step, the international liquidators ought to have considered whether an Eastern country can do without the *prestige* of the master, and whether the financial genius of the Occident could replace the authority of "Effendina."

<sup>343</sup> 'Egypt,' by Stanley Lane-Poole, p. 183.

<sup>344</sup> "L'histoire des finances européo-égyptiennes sous Ismaïl est scandaleuse. C'était la spoliation organisée du Vice-roi, du pays, des fellahs, par les emprunts, les avances, les bons du trésor, les exactions au profit des Européens."—'L'Égypte et l'Europe, par un ancien juge mixte,' p. 341.

<sup>345</sup> 'Spoiling the Egyptians,' by J. Seymour Keay, p. 31.

<sup>346</sup> "L'abdication d'Ismail—ou plutôt son renoncement, sans réserve et sans arrière-pensée, à la couronne qu'il transmettait à son fils aîné—a été un dernier acte de sacrifice à l'harmonie qu'il avait toujours eue en vue d'établir entre l'Europe et l'Orient."—'La Question Égyptienne,' 1881, p. 36.

<sup>347</sup> Ibid.

Events have shown that the liquidation was not only an iniquity, but also a political blunder.

The same results might have been obtained by different means. A settlement of the debt and the institution of the "Caisse de la dette publique" did not necessitate a change of government; administrative reforms could have been introduced without mediatising the new Khedive; and a well-balanced budget required the talents of an accountant, hardly those of Continental diplomacy.

The gradual amortisation of the debt was simply a question of time, considering the boundless resources of the country, which only require the steady development of the beneficial impulse given by Ismail and fostered by his very prodigality. But the Powers wanted more, and substituting themselves for the Khedive, they took the government of Egypt out of his hands,—with what result recent events have shown. Financial critics, more or less interested,<sup>348</sup> invaded Egypt, and there was no end of experimentalising, until the work was crowned by the institution of the Anglo-French Control.<sup>349</sup> Unimpeachable as an administrative agency, it has done much good financially,<sup>350</sup> but on the other hand the dualistic interference in the affairs of Egypt is the cause of the present political disorganisation; however, we must not anticipate events.

Ismail's chief merit is having ensured the suc-

<sup>348</sup> 'L'Égypte et l'Europe, par un ancien juge mixte,' p. 151. Vide also 'Spoiling the Egyptians,' by J. Seymour Keay, p. 8 *et seq.*

<sup>349</sup> 'Spoiling the Egyptians,' by J. Seymour Keay, p. 9.

<sup>350</sup> 'England and Egypt,' by E. Dicey, p. 251 *et seq.*

cession in tail male; for a country cannot be exposed to a greater misfortune than being convulsed by the intrigues of pretenders.<sup>351</sup> He had to overcome enormous difficulties; first, the prejudices of the old Turkish party, opposed to any alteration of established usages; secondly, the opposition of the Sultan, whom the change divested of the means of terrorising the occupant of the Khedivial throne, with threats of a deposition in favour of a "better paying" candidate; and, thirdly, the very natural efforts of his brother, Prince Moustapha Fazil, and of his uncle, Prince Halim, who could hardly be expected to favour a scheme which deprived them and their children of hereditary rights, based on Mehemet Ali's Firmans, not on "Mussulman" law, as people are generally made to believe. And, lastly, Ismail had to conciliate Ali Pasha, whose influence was paramount, and who had never forgiven the Viceroy the recall of his troops from Candia.<sup>352</sup>

During a first visit to Constantinople Ismail's overtures had been somewhat coolly received, and all he had been able to obtain by means of a present of 50,000*l.* to the Grand Vizir<sup>353</sup> was a Hatt, granting him permission to make certain financial arrange-

<sup>351</sup> "Of all the misfortunes in regard to its rulers, to which a country like Egypt can be subject, none, perhaps, are more formidable than intrigues and disturbances connected with a disputed succession."—*'A Diary in the East,'* by W. H. Russell, p. 69.

<sup>352</sup> The fact is, Ali Pasha wanted Ismail to send more troops; whilst the latter wanted to recall them, and had even received from Constantinople the order to do so before Ali Pasha ever arrived at Candia. And though, to suit the convenience of Ali, the Khedive allowed his troops to remain another month, Ali never forgot what he considered a slight.—The Author.

<sup>353</sup> Parliamentary Papers, 2395 of 1879, p. 28.

ments without first submitting them to the Porte, a concession most unpalatable to the Divan, as it curtailed the profits of high dignitaries, always ready to give their consent to any financial folly at a given price, but which was an undoubted economy, as it saved Egypt one of the heavy commissions with which she had been burdened by every consecutive loan.

He, however, succeeded on a second visit in his chief object. "*Les petits cadeaux entretiennent l'amitié, et les grands l'augmentent.*" 900,000*l.* in cash,<sup>354</sup> placed at the feet of His Majesty,<sup>355</sup> secured a most favourable reception, and on the 9th of June, 1863, a Firman<sup>356</sup> altered the succession.

The importance of this change can hardly be over-rated. It freed Egypt for ever from the intrigues of pretenders, and it ensured security to the people and to the Khedivial family; it amalgamated the interest of the reigning house with that of the nation; and in future Egypt had no longer to fear that a Viceroy would misuse his life tenancy, as he could now consider the accession of his immediate family. A new

<sup>354</sup> "In order to obtain the alteration of the succession so beneficial for his country, I have been assured that he had to spend three millions sterling at Constantinople; and he is sure to find opportunities for further payments."—'*Das heutige Aegypten*,' von H. Stephan, p. 153.

<sup>355</sup> Parliamentary Papers, 2395 of 1879, p. 50.

<sup>356</sup> This firman, after settling the succession in tail male, by order of primogeniture, and providing for a regency, &c., recognised the complete autonomy of the Khedive in all internal matters, and gave him the right to bestow military grades as high as colonel, and civil grades as high as Bey; it, moreover, authorised him to contract loans without permission, to enter into commercial or other treaties with foreign Powers, as long as they did not interfere with the political treaties of the Sublime Porte, and also empowered him to increase his army and navy.—The Author.

horizon opened. The certainty of having to leave a crown to his descendants became an inducement to do good in order not to make children suffer for the bad government of their fathers. Thus Ismaïl realised the dream of Mehemet Ali's life, the great object for which he had vainly struggled, and which the short-sightedness of Europe had wantonly frustrated; and if Ismaïl had never done more, this ought to be sufficient to ensure him the gratitude of Egypt and of his son. Indeed, no one gained more by it than Tewfik, who otherwise at his father's death would only have been fourth in the order of succession,<sup>357</sup> and whose children would only have had a very remote chance of ever succeeding. Strangely enough, it was the Second Princess who conducted these delicate negotiations with consummate ability at Constantinople, and who, in gaining her husband's cause, thus ensured the throne to the son of the Fourth Princess, the present Khedive. Princess Djenajar, the Second Princess, is the same who was refused permission to return to Egypt last winter, and I confess that I have not seen any one of standing, from Cherif Pasha downwards, who did not disapprove of this measure, whilst the princesses and the harems of the Pashas were fire and flame, as can well be imagined. It is impossible to know what may have prompted the Khedive to an act of

<sup>357</sup> According to the old law of succession, Prince Halim, youngest son of Mehemet Ali, was heir-presumptive to his nephew; next to him Prince Osman, eldest son of Moustapha Fazil; after him Prince Ibrahim, son of the Khedive's elder brother Ahmed, and then Tewfik.—The Author.



severity, so contrary to his usual kindheartedness; and considering that there have been no complaints of intrigues in the seven palaces inhabited by Ismail's own mother and the mothers of various younger brothers and sisters of Tewfik, it stands to reason that the safety of the State could hardly have been endangered by an additional establishment, as, in Oriental fashion, they are all equally devoted to the head of the family.

And here I cannot omit mentioning the knavery of Moustapha Pasha Fehmi, one of Arabi's colleagues, and at the time Minister for Foreign Affairs. It appears that a slave brought up with the daughter of the Second Princess, and treated as one of her own children, had been married to Moustapha's brother, to whom she brought a handsome dower and a capital position. On hearing of the arrival of Princess Djenajar her adopted daughter rushed to Alexandria to greet her. For this monstrous crime Moustapha obliged his brother to divorce her then and there, thus leaving his unfortunate young wife perfectly destitute, and almost friendless; for those who know the East are well aware that all doors are invariably closed to one in disgrace at Court.

But we must revert to the Firman of June 9th. I have mentioned the fabulous sums it has cost Ismail, and I remember that asking him one day whether there was not some exaggeration in the figures, he laconically remarked, "It was not less." But to the monetary sacrifices must be added the humiliations to which he had to submit, and it was,

according to his own words, recorded in the *Times* of Sept. 26th, "only for Tewfik's sake" that he cringed for years before the Sultan, and that he sank millions, which he had to get at any price, and for which he finally paid with his throne. However, he who wants the end must not mind the means, and posterity will remember that if Mehemet Ali wrenched Egypt from the hands of the oppressor, it has been given to Ismail to crown the work. By the establishment of primogeniture he laid the foundation of a stable, and consequently a paternal, government. Egypt will no longer be at the mercy of family jealousies, but governed by princes anxious to leave to their children an inheritance worth having, the country must benefit even by what mere selfish interest may prompt its ruler to do.

The second important act of Ismail's reign is that of having obtained administrative autonomy, freeing Egypt once and for ever from the fatal interference of the Porte in her internal affairs. It had always been his great object, not to loosen the existing tie, but to make Egypt the *point de contact*<sup>358</sup> between Christian and Mussulman civilisation, an impossible feat as long as progress could be impeded by the all-absorbing influence of a Sultan-Caliph whose very existence depends on perpetuating the past. Here again difficulties without end stood in his way, but an hereditary khedivate would have been without value had the Sultan not relinquished his tutelary rights. What good could the best meaning ruler

<sup>358</sup> 'La Question Égyptienne,' 1881, p. 3.

have achieved if at every step forward the path could be barred by the veto of a Suzerain blinded by retrograde notions. Sole masters of the destinies of Egypt, we shall see what use Ismaïl and Tewfik have made of their opportunities.

At any rate, whatever may be his faults, by ensuring primogeniture and autonomy, Ismaïl has done enough to rank with the kings whom history remembers.<sup>359</sup>

His powerful and liberal rule has transformed Egypt; communications, agriculture, commerce, industry, public instruction, judicial reform, sciences, art, all have received a fresh impulse, as if he had been anxious to make up for lost time, and to obtain for Egypt a place among civilised nations.

Unfortunately his haste to reach the coveted end became indirectly the cause of his ruin. "Che va piano vasano, che va sano va lontano"; but instead of proceeding by degrees, Ismaïl went ahead at a pace<sup>360</sup> which obliged him frequently to resort to expedients of the worst kind. "Most able, energetic, with undoubted administrative talents, an enthusiastic patron of Western civilisation, he was devoured by an ambition<sup>361</sup> worthy of the grandson of Mehemet Ali, and Egypt had in him a ruler superior to any since the Arab conquest."<sup>362</sup> Ismaïl's great qualities, as

<sup>359</sup> *Phare d'Alexandrie*, 26 Mai, 1882.

<sup>360</sup> "In his zeal for rapidly reforming his cities and his people on the European model, he has gone too far and too fast for his own comfort and that of his subjects."—"The Khedive's Egypt," by E. de Leon, p. 170.

<sup>361</sup> "He possesses that sin by which fell the angels—ambition."—*Ibid.*, p. 102.

<sup>362</sup> "The reign of Ismaïl, son of Ibrahim, who succeeded his uncle in

I have said before, were equally his misfortune, and in judging his exaggerated generosity, his reckless extravagance, and his utter disregard for money and the means of procuring it, we must not forget that he is an Eastern prince and that he cannot be measured by the standard of Continental parsimony and order, two things utterly unknown to the Oriental mind. Moreover, considering himself, what he virtually was, the freeholder of Egypt, he hypothecated the land to build a house, out of proportion to his means, and Europe acting the part of certain building societies, forced upon him advances, with a view of appropriating the pledge the moment he could no longer meet his instalments. A most ingenious proceeding by which the borrower is certain to collapse.

But before entering on the subject of finance we must give our attention to the chief reform<sup>363</sup> of his reign, which was the complete divorce of justice from the administration,<sup>364</sup> substitution of legality and the judgment of competent tribunals for the arbitrary system, which the promulgation of Mehemet Ali's code of justice had in no way altered as it had never been applied.<sup>365</sup> Law existed in name, not in

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1863, promised to be the beginning of a new era for Egypt. A man of undoubted ability, possessed of unusual energy in administration, fully appreciative of the importance of Western civilisation, fired with the ambition proper in the grandson of Mohammed Aly, the ex-Khedive appeared a ruler such as Egypt has scarcely seen since the Arab conquest." — 'Egypt,' by Stanley Lane-Poole, p. 178 *et seq.*

<sup>363</sup> 'Egypt,' by Stanley Lane-Poole, p. 179 *et seq.*

<sup>364</sup> "The main principle of the complete divorce of justice from the administration." — 'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 307.

<sup>365</sup> "Le code qui a été promulgué par Méhémet Ali, n'a jamais été mis en vigueur." — 'Égypte,' &c., par J. J. Marcel, M. A. Ryme, &c., p. 25.

fact;<sup>366</sup> by the establishment of the mixed tribunals he wanted to ensure justice for all, to introduce equality before the law, and to assimilate the status of natives and foreigners; he wanted to put an end to the privileged consular jurisdiction, to the capitulations, and yet preserve their spirit, so as not to deprive foreigners of the guarantees of justice enjoyed under the old conventions.<sup>367</sup> In fact, he aimed at making the courts of justice alike independent of Government and of Consuls. Security of person and of property was the leading object.

Already in the days of Saïd Pasha, when through his brother's death he became heir-presumptive, he devoted earnest study to judicial reform,<sup>368</sup> and struck by the injustice of a privileged jurisdiction for foreigners, he at once realised that a thorough reform of the existing tribunals would be the first step towards equality. He had the vices of the Egyptian system explained to him, and when he came to power one of his principal thoughts was how to remedy the evil, but absorbed during the commencement of his reign by the great questions of succession and autonomy, it was only in 1867 that he first broached the subject to the French Cabinet; and at the Khedive's request Nubar Pasha<sup>369</sup> suc-

<sup>366</sup> 'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 411.

<sup>367</sup> 'Consular Jurisdiction in Turkey and Egypt,' by J. C. M'Coan, p. 29.

<sup>368</sup> For a long time one of the leading European barristers, Mr. M. Pini, attended daily on Ismaïl Pasha to initiate him in the intricate bearings of Continental codes.—The Author.

<sup>369</sup> "Nubar Pasha has been well and favourably known in Europe as an able statesman for 20 years past. . . . He is an Armenian Christian, and

ceeded in getting M. de Moustier, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, to institute in Paris a commission composed of MM. Duvergier, Tissot, Max Outrey, Sandbreuil, and Féraud-Giraud,<sup>370</sup> with a view of examining the changes proposed by Nubar in his master's name.

It was the first step towards the institution of the mixed tribunals, and though the primary idea is a very old one,<sup>371</sup> it is but right to say that Ismail was the first to give it a trial, and that he was greatly aided by some of his native ministers, such as Cherif, Riaz, and Nubar; but foremost to the latter belongs the chief merit of having carried the judicial reform, which constitutes the great and crowning work of his career.<sup>372</sup> It may be a matter open to doubt whether Ismail Pasha fully realised all the consequences of the change; certainly desirous of crippling the undue influence with which the consular courts had invested the foreign agents, and possibly prepared to see a check placed on his own absolute power, it can hardly be supposed that he anticipated the final consequence,

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that three viceroys should have retained a man professing and practising that creed for a series of years speaks volumes both for their liberality and his own capacity. . . . Gifted with rare conversational powers, and courteous, almost caressing, in manner and speech, he has a persuasive charm with which few men are endowed."—'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 177 *et seq.*

<sup>370</sup> 'L'Égypte,' par G. de Laleu, p. 21.

<sup>371</sup> 'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 297.

<sup>372</sup> "The initiation of the existing judicial tribunals is due to Nubar Pasha, who for seven years laboured indefatigably with the foreign Powers and the Khedive to remove difficulties."—'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 305.

yet it is a fact that this "his own creation destroyed him."<sup>373</sup>

Certainly the day will come when the mixed tribunals, such as instituted in 1875,<sup>374</sup> will have to be revised; for much as it is desirable to ensure to the administration of justice a complete and unfettered independence, it is contrary to the practice existing in the most advanced European countries to allow the courts an encroachment on the sovereignty of the ruler.<sup>375</sup> Yet in Egypt the mixed tribunals have arrogated to themselves a supreme power superior to that of the Khedive, and backed by Europe<sup>376</sup> they enforced the execution of their judgments against not only the State, but the person of the sovereign,<sup>377</sup> a proceeding which can only lower the prestige of the ruler<sup>378</sup>; and in the case of Egypt there was the additional drawback (so we are assured on the authority of one of the judges of this

<sup>373</sup> "An international factor was introduced by the foundation of the mixed tribunals in 1875, by Ismail Pasha, in substitution for the consular courts. This, his own creation, destroyed him."—'Egypt: political,' &c., by Griffin W. Vyse, p. 8.

<sup>374</sup> "The reform tribunals, which owe their origin to the life-long exertions of Nubar Pasha, are now an established fact."—'England and Egypt,' by Edward Dicey, p. 125 *et seq.*

<sup>375</sup> 'L'Égypte et l'Europe, par un ancien juge mixte,' p. 117.

<sup>376</sup> "Things were going from bad to worse, when Germany suddenly interfered for the first time in the affairs of Egypt, and declared her intention of upholding at all costs the authority of the international tribunals by securing the enforcement of certain judgments."—'England and Egypt,' by E. Dicey, p. 22.

<sup>377</sup> 'L'Égypte et l'Europe, par un ancien juge mixte,' p. 21.

<sup>378</sup> A conflict between the courts and the executive must necessarily lead to the collapse of one or the other, and as here the courts were backed by the Powers, the result was fatal to the Khedive.—The Author.

very tribunal) "que leur justice a merveilleusement servi la coalition étrangère qui exploitait le pays."<sup>379</sup>

But notwithstanding these evident defects inseparable from any radical change, undoubted good has resulted, and no better proof of the superiority of the mixed tribunals to the native courts could be found, than the efforts of the population to get their cases removed from the native courts by any means at their disposal.

Had not the interior disorders due to Arabi and the soldiers monopolised the entire energy and time of ministers, the long contemplated change of the native administration of justice would by this time have been effected. Both Cherif Pasha and Riaz Pasha, when Prime Ministers, told the author that as soon as something like order was re-established, the necessary transformation would be taken in hand as they fully understood the reluctance of foreigners to submit to the native courts, as constituted at present, and of which the following may give a summary idea, such as was explained to me by one of the most influential men in Egypt.

"The Moudir," he said, "is supreme, and as there is no appeal, people are afraid of bringing grievances before him. Out of fifty cases of murder and theft, not three are brought to light, for as it is the custom to bring the witnesses also in chains, and to handle them very roughly, people are not particularly anxious to appear. It is most difficult to get an Arab to denounce another Arab, they seldom

<sup>379</sup> 'L'Égypte et l'Europe, par un ancien juge mixte,' p. 21.



peach ; torture is abolished by law, yet by *nefas* still constantly applied—bastinado and thumb-screw are pet stimulants for opening the mouth of the Fellah.

“ Only the other day one of Count della Sala’s Arab servants was horribly tortured, simply because he was suspected of knowing the whereabouts of an escaped female slave ; and here I may mention that when a female slave escapes and gets her card of liberty, she is immediately accused of theft by her late master, in order to bring her to justice and get her tried. In this case the slave had belonged to the brother of the police doctor, and Count della Sala, the head of the Anti-Slavery Department, after giving her a card of liberty, sent her to the house of one of his married servants to be taken care of ; the next day he heard that his servant had been arrested, and subjected to the thumb-screw (I have seen the mutilated fingers myself), and it required Count della Sala’s official influence to get both his servant and the slave released, though he expressed to me a doubt whether he should be able to obtain the dismissal of the doctor and the magistrate.

“ As to the bastinado,” continued my informant, “ it is of daily occurrence. A short time ago a murderer was brought before the Moudir of X— with fourteen witnesses in chains ; not one of them would speak. The Moudir, sitting on his divan and smoking cigarettes, called on one of the witnesses. He advanced, and crouched down on the floor. Nodding kindly, the Moudir said, ‘ Now, friend, tell me all.’ The witness swore the most sacred oaths that he had

not seen anything. 'Come, come, I know you were present; tell me all, my son.' Again the witness denied more solemnly than ever any knowledge of the case. The Moudir frowned. 'Nonsense, speak out, you son of a donkey.' Third and still more vehement denial. The Moudir, turning smilingly to an official, muttered the magic word 'Kourbash.' The witness screamed, howled, implored, and swore he'd tell everything. So down they settled once more. The Moudir called him again, 'My friend and my son,' and the fellow swore again that all he could say was, he knew nothing, and so they went on for more than an hour, until finally the bastinado opened the lips of the recalcitrant witness. He was only the first of the fourteen, and you may imagine," added my Pasha, "the time wasted by our system of paternal cross-examination." <sup>380</sup>

It should, however, not be concluded from the present wretched state of native justice that it is of Egyptian origin. "The general testimony of antiquity affirms that Egypt was distinguished amongst ancient nations not only for the wisdom of its laws, but for the obedience paid to them." <sup>381</sup> We are told that the administration of justice was entrusted to a particular body, <sup>382</sup> and "that their judicial and justiciary proceedings were modelled upon the most equitable plan possible to be framed" <sup>383</sup>—so

<sup>380</sup> From the Author's diary, 1881-82.

<sup>381</sup> 'Ancient Egypt under the Pharaohs,' by J. Kenrick, ii. p. 35.

<sup>382</sup> 'Philosophical Dissertations on the Egyptians and Chinese,' by M. de Pauw, translated by Captain Thomson, ii. p. 245.

<sup>383</sup> 'View of the Levant,' by Charles Perry, p. 397.

excellent that one of the most competent authorities of the day expressed a wish "that all kingdoms and states would try and copy them."<sup>384</sup>

We are far from those happy days. There can be no doubt that it is the Turkish maladministration which brought the change for the worse over Egypt, and the state of things, both civil and criminal, has at length become intolerable.<sup>385</sup> The sentiment of respect for the public good has long ceased to exist,<sup>386</sup> yet in undertaking a change it had to be considered that people always prefer being judged by their own countrymen and by their own laws,<sup>387</sup> be they good or bad. Nubar Pasha's reform project endeavoured to conciliate native and foreign exigencies, and whilst the French were raising all kinds of objections, it is pleasing to note the encouragement he received from the first from Her Majesty's Government and Lord Stanley (Lord Derby), who in a despatch of October 18th, 1867,<sup>388</sup> recognised that the existing system was injurious to the interests of foreigners, as well as of the Egyptian people; that the most cordial co-operation of Great Britain would not be withheld from so salutary a work.<sup>389</sup> In his letter Lord Stanley laid special stress on the fact that "Her Majesty's Government have no fondness for an extra-

<sup>384</sup> 'View of the Levant,' by Charles Perry, p. 397.

<sup>385</sup> 'Consular Jurisdiction in Turkey and Egypt,' by G. C. M'Coan, p. 29.

<sup>386</sup> 'Egypt for the Egyptians: Retrospect and Prospect,' p. 148.

<sup>387</sup> 'L'Égypte,' par G. de Laleu, p. 1.

<sup>388</sup> Despatch of Lord Stanley, Oct. 18, 1867, in reply to Nubar Pasha's Memorandum.

<sup>389</sup> 'A Political Survey,' by M. E. Grant Duff, M.P., p. 105 *et seq.*

territorial jurisdiction, and would hail with the utmost satisfaction such an improvement in the judicial system as would justify their altogether renouncing any judicial action in Egypt." Nay, in dwelling on "the great abuses and the encroachments of extra-territorial jurisdiction," Lord Stanley went even so far as to say "that Her Majesty's Government was certainly not inclined to hold out for a jurisdiction to which they had no treaty right, which they admit to be a usurpation, though brought about by force of circumstances, and which is as injurious to British interests as it is derogatory to the character and well-being of the Egyptian administration."<sup>390</sup>

Notwithstanding the support vouchsafed by Great Britain, and the goodwill of most of the other Continental Powers, considerable difficulties had to be overcome at Constantinople as well as at home. Both the Sultan and the Ulemas were stoutly opposed to reforms interfering with their privileges. Thus the Cairene Sheikh-ul-Islam declared the proposed changes to be religiously inadmissible, to which Ismaïl replied by dismissing the obstructionist *Mufti* and intimating that he would suppress the whole body if further opposition were offered. The consequence was that the new Sheikh endorsed the contemplated reforms with his ready *fetva*, and since then not a whisper of complaint has been heard.<sup>391</sup>

But apart from the objections put forward against

<sup>390</sup> Despatch of Lord Stanley, Oct. 18, 1867.

<sup>391</sup> 'Our new Protectorate—Turkey in Asia,' by J. C. M'Coan, ii. p. 183.

any reform as such, there was the serious drawback of lacking natives competent to sit in the mixed courts; nay, even now that the new tribunals have been working some years, one of the European judges of the Court of Appeal assured the author "that not one of his native colleagues<sup>392</sup> had acquired any knowledge of the procedure"; in fact, he went so far as to say that it would be impossible to look for efficient native judges until the coming generation had been trained to a serious study of the law, as the present education was utterly deficient in the development of logical thoughts, so rare in Arabs.

But he added to this criticism on the native judges that the composition of the Continental part of their body left also much to be desired. In fact, he gave me to understand that really good men were rarely sent, possibly because they could not be induced to go abroad; possibly also because ministers in some countries looked upon these appointments as a convenient patronage to be bestowed on needy relatives, or on people they wanted to get rid of at home.

Attention was called to another flaw in the composition of the tribunals by its president,<sup>393</sup> who suggested the suppression of the four lay assessors, on the ground that no impartial judgments could be expected if in a court of seven members (three judges and four

<sup>392</sup> "Il ne suffit pas de faire l'éducation des juges indigènes, pendant qu'ils exercent leur fonction de juge. Il faut aussi qu'ils aient reçu une instruction, une éducation préparatoire. Il faut les choisir plutôt dans la classe des ulémas que dans celle des militaires, des ingénieurs, des traducteurs, etc."—'L'Égypte et l'Europe, par un ancien juge mixte,' p. 305.

<sup>393</sup> Vide Report of Mr. Lapenna, President of the Court of Appeal at Alexandria, of June 14, 1878, to the Minister of Justice.

lay assessors) the casting vote was left to men not conversant with law, and frequently men of more than doubtful antecedents.<sup>394</sup>

But whatever may have been, and are still, the shortcomings of the new organisation, much good has been effected by the change.

Called into existence in January 1875, they only opened in February 1876, in consequence of difficulties raised by France.

Three courts "de première instance" were established at Cairo, Alexandria, and at Mansourah, and a Court of Appeal at Alexandria.<sup>395</sup> No doubt this was the right step in the right direction, yet far from sufficient to answer the requirements of the case, and until the serious reform of the native courts is taken in hand, the population will have good reason to complain, and it will be impossible to expect Europeans to submit to native jurisdiction. Last year an effort in that direction was made, and Ismaïl Pasha Yousri<sup>396</sup> was appointed head of the contemplated

<sup>394</sup> 'L'Égypte et l'Europe, par un ancien juge mixte,' p. 114.

<sup>395</sup> The court at Alexandria was composed of 20 judges (14 foreigners and 6 natives), that of Cairo of 11 (7 foreigners and 4 natives), that of Mansourah of 4 foreigners and 3 natives. Five judges form a quorum (3 foreigners and 2 natives, the court of appeal composed of 11 judges (7 foreigners and 4 natives), and the quorum of 8 judges (5 foreigners and 3 natives). The courts are invariably presided over by a European judge, elected every year by all the members of the court. The judges are immovable, and fully independent of their governments or consulates. All proceedings are public, the courts are competent in all cases, and between foreigners of different nationalities, in special cases the court is composed of 3 judges and 4 lay members.—'Jurisprudence des Tribunaux Réformés en Égypte,' par le Comte Marogna, Juge d'Appel, p. 118 *et seq.*

<sup>396</sup> A very able administrator, speaking English well. The same who was attached to our young princes during their trip up the Nile.—The Author.

new native courts; but that was very like putting the cart before the horse, for it is less a *Procureur-Général* Egypt was wanting than a thorough re-modelling of the whole system, and competent judges and magistrates. It seems indeed difficult to arrive at any satisfactory result as long as the Egyptian Government demurs at the introduction of European judges, whose presence alone would be sufficient to inspire confidence until a new generation of Egyptian magistrates shall have sprung up.

On the other hand, Arabic should be adopted as the leading judicial language, and no European judges should be appointed without a previous knowledge of it; this certainly would be only fair. There is good hope that these reforms will receive the most careful attention at the hands of the present Egyptian Cabinet as the decrees were even ready for the Khedive's signature, when Cherif Pasha's last cabinet had to retire. But as Cherif very justly remarked to the author, "Changes are easy on paper, but it requires time to find the right man for the right place, and to reform a procedure and customs consecrated by centuries of arbitrary rule."<sup>397</sup>

As to Riaz Pasha, I know him fully to share the

<sup>397</sup> And here I may remark that Cherif Pasha was indignant at the attempt of Arabi Bey's European friends to attribute to him (Arabi) the initiative of judicial reform, "for as you know," said Cherif, "it is quite the other way, and the military riots have only contributed to bring to a standstill whatever we contemplated doing by monopolising our entire time and attention, and that, at the very moment we had nominated a commission to examine a revision of the laws in question." This commission, I may add, has never begun its work, as Cherif Pasha's Cabinet retired almost on the day the Khedive's decree was to be issued.—The Author.

views of Cherif on this point, and when Prime Minister he assured me, more than once, that he was anxiously waiting to reform the native tribunals, and to bring about a fusion of the different courts, so warmly advocated in certain European quarters.<sup>398</sup>

According to Riaz, the mixed tribunals, though paving the way to reform, have nevertheless done a deal of harm. He said, "We must have the same law for all, and we must establish something that will allow us to place foreigners under our laws with every guarantee of fair play. It is impossible to speak of equity and equality as long as Europeans enjoy a privileged jurisdiction. I am the first to encourage immigration, the first to welcome Europeans here, but only if they will abide by our laws, and I should be lacking in patriotism were I to encourage the formation of a "state within the state."<sup>399</sup>

It may be concluded from the above that the work inaugurated by Nubar under the auspices of Ismaïl, and the germ laid by the latter, will thrive and be moulded by his successor into a shape adapted to present requirements. There is little doubt that Tewfik and his ministers will receive every assistance from Her Majesty's Government, now that British common sense and fair play will no longer be hampered by the encroaching fussiness of France. At least to judge from his letter of November 4, 1881, to Sir Edward Malet, Lord Granville has for a long

<sup>398</sup> 'L'Égypte et l'Europe, par un ancien juge mixte,' p. 296.

<sup>399</sup> From the Author's diary, 1881-82.



time been favourable to a reform, "the keystone of the well-being of the natives," and which Sir Edward and the Controllers had likewise warmly at heart. "The future," so wrote the Controllers-General, M. de Blignières and Mr. Colvin, in their report of February 1881, "will only be ensured when the reforms of the Government shall not only have substituted uniform legislation to incoherent arbitrary ways, but when these new laws shall be effectively enforced on all points of the Egyptian territory."<sup>400</sup>

Changes of such magnitude are not effected in a day, and I think what M. Barthélémy St. Hilaire wrote a quarter of a century ago about Egypt applies equally to the efforts of Ismail Pasha in the matter of judicial reform. He said, "I do not believe that one has been just towards the Egyptian Government which has had the glory of the initiative, nor do I think that Europe has sufficiently acknowledged its laudable efforts and intentions. . . . Given the great difficulties which had to be overcome, which have been met with much energy, and have frequently been surmounted with great success, we ought not to be too severe on a Government which deserves the deepest sympathy and forbearance for having done so much, notwithstanding the mistakes inevitable in every beginning."<sup>401</sup> Nay, in Ismail's case, one might add, *and notwithstanding a foreign coalition*<sup>402</sup> always ready to take, but most chary

<sup>400</sup> 'Rapport Annuel des Contrôleurs-Généraux à son Altesse le Khédive,' Feb. 21, 1881.

<sup>401</sup> 'Lettres sur l'Égypte,' par J. Barthélémy St. Hilaire, p. 96 *et seq.*

<sup>402</sup> 'L'Égypte et l'Europe, par un ancien juge mixte,' p. 342.

in giving anything but advice — so costly to Egypt.

Educated himself in Europe, and as I said before, deeply impressed with the necessity of educating the masses in order to prepare Egypt for other reforms, it was natural that Ismail from the first turned his mind to this, the most interesting and important of all questions. Mehemet Ali had founded schools chiefly to supply his want of officers and officials; Ismail's aim was more lofty, he wished to educate the masses, to popularise education.<sup>403</sup> And perhaps nowhere in the world could be found a more grateful field for the labours of the pedagogue, for there is no race more intelligent,<sup>404</sup> or quicker and more eager to learn, or, thanks to an unequalled memory,<sup>405</sup> better able to pick up knowledge than the Arab, and it required centuries of degradation, and the stifling influence of Ottoman rule to efface the glories of the past.<sup>406</sup>

Once the cradle of sciences<sup>407</sup> and occupying the first place amongst nations, Egypt had sunk to be almost the last. Her ancient colleges amalgamating learning and sacerdotal mysticism<sup>408</sup> had been renowned throughout the world. Already in Abraham's time we find the seed not of a, but of *the*

<sup>403</sup> "Si le Vice-roi, avec l'intelligence et l'énergie qui le distinguent, parvient à créer une pépinière d'hommes où il soit possible de puiser à coup sur de bons sheikhs-el-beled, il aura fait immensément pour le bonheur et pour l'avenir des Fellahs."—'Lettres sur l'Égypte,' par J. Barthélémy St. Hilaire, p. 216.

<sup>404</sup> 'Das heutige Aegypten,' von H. Stephan, p. 201.

<sup>405</sup> 'Le Vice-Roi et le Fellah,' par A. Mayrargues, p. 22.

<sup>406</sup> 'L'Égypte sous Méhémet Ali,' par Hamont, ii. p. 527.

<sup>407</sup> 'Aperçu général sur l'Égypte,' par A. B. Clot Bey, ii. 330.

<sup>408</sup> 'De la destination des Pyramides,' par Fialin de Persigny, p. 196.

flourishing Egyptian kingdom in the lower valley of the Nile,<sup>409</sup> and Herodotus attributes even the civilisation of Ethiopia to deserters from the army of Psammeticus,<sup>410</sup> though on this point there may be differences of opinion.<sup>411</sup> At any rate all agree that no establishment is entitled more to the thanks of humanity than the famous school of Alexandria, founded by Ptolemy,<sup>412</sup> and even in our days the El-Ahzar,<sup>413</sup> with its 314 professors and 9600<sup>414</sup> (some say 13,000<sup>415</sup>) students,<sup>416</sup> from Egypt, Syria, Turkey, Persia, India, from all corners of the world, and which has been illustrated by such men as Makrizi,<sup>417</sup> Charqaoui, &c.,<sup>418</sup> is the most celebrated University of the Mussulman world. With such a past,<sup>419</sup> hopes for the future may well be cherished, and Ismail was fortunate enough to secure

<sup>409</sup> 'Egypt and the Book of Moses,' by Dr. E. W. Hengstenberg; translated by R. D. C. Robbins, p. 18.

<sup>410</sup> Ibid., pp. 2 and 30.

<sup>411</sup> 'Modern Egypt,' &c., by Sir G. Wilkinson, i. p. 4.

<sup>412</sup> 'Égypte Ancienne,' par Champollion-Figeac, p. 410.

<sup>413</sup> 'Modern Egyptians,' by E. W. Lane, p. 210.

<sup>414</sup> 'Instruction publique en Égypte,' par V. E. Dor, p. 377.

<sup>415</sup> 'Travels through Europe, Egypt, &c.,' by the Hon. J. A. Van Egmont and J. Heyman, p. 65.

<sup>416</sup> "Il n'était pas rare de voir un mougawrin (étudiant) s'exposer vaillamment au fatigue d'un long voyage uniquement pour recueillir une seule parole de la bouche autorisée d'un maître en renom."—'Encyclopädische Uebersicht der Wissenschaften des Orients,' von Hammer-Purgstall, ii. p. 625.

<sup>417</sup> "On dit que Makrizi aurait suivi les leçons de plus de six cents professeurs, Al-Mizzi de plus de mille, Ad-Dahabi de plus de douze cents."—'L'Instruction publique en Égypte,' par V. E. Dor, p. 160.

<sup>418</sup> 'Histoire des Sultans Mamlouks de l'Égypte,' par Taki-Eddin-Amed-Makrizi; traduite par M. Quatremère, i. p. 187.

<sup>419</sup> "Les connaissances dont s'honorent actuellement les nations policées de l'Europe, les Égyptiens les ont possédées."—'L'Égypte sous Méhémet Ali,' par Hamont, p. 599.

the services of a number of able specialists such as Dor Bey,<sup>420</sup> Clot Bey,<sup>421</sup> Rogers Bey,<sup>422</sup> &c., whilst there were amongst his native ministers also men able and willing to collaborate in this noble work. Cherif Pasha,<sup>423</sup> Nubar Pasha,<sup>424</sup> Riaz Pasha,<sup>425</sup> and Ali Pasha Moubarek<sup>426</sup> must be mentioned as foremost amongst those who contributed to further the education of the masses, whilst however "the primary credit of the great progress made during recent years is due to the enlightened liberality of the Khedive himself."<sup>427</sup>

The organic law of the 10th Raggab, 1284 (1868), regulates in a very exhaustive way an educational scheme for all Egypt. The results may certainly be looked upon as satisfactory, when we remember that a few years sufficed to augment the number<sup>428</sup> first

<sup>420</sup> 'Egypt as It Is,' by S. C. M'Coan, p. 105.

<sup>421</sup> 'L'Instruction publique en Égypte,' par V. E. Dor, p. 220.

<sup>422</sup> 'Egyptian Finance,' by M. G. Mulhall (*Contemporary Review*, Oct. 1882, p. 531).

<sup>423</sup> 'L'Instruction publique en Égypte,' par V. E. Dor, p. 220.

<sup>424</sup> 'L'Égypte et Ismaïl Pacha,' par A. Sacré et L. Outrebon, p. 142.

<sup>425</sup> 'Egypt as It Is,' by J. C. M'Coan, p. 105.

<sup>426</sup> Ibid.

<sup>427</sup> Ibid.

<sup>428</sup> "According to statistics published in 1870, there were 40,000 pupils gratuitously taught, fed, and clothed, in addition to a small pay; there were primary schools at Cairo, Alexandria, Tantah, and Syout (1078 pupils); preparatory schools at Cairo (Daab-el-Gammais), (550 pupils), Abassieh (750 pupils), and at Alexandria (Ras-el-Tin) (450 pupils). law school (50 pupils), school of medicine (75 pupils) (Kasar-el-Ain), polytechnic (60 pupils), chemistry (25 pupils), veterinary school (50 pupils), *arts et métiers* (100 pupils) (Boulacq), school of midwifery (40 pupils), and observatory (4 pupils); a school of infantry (500 pupils) (Abassieh), a school of cavalry (100 pupils), a school of artillery (100 pupils), engineers (30 pupils), a staff college (20 pupils), a naval school (40 pupils) (Alexandria). In addition to the above, the Government keeps abroad, 100 pupils at the military school, Paris, besides 40 civilians;

to 52,000 pupils in 1301, different establishments,<sup>429a</sup> since increased to 140,977 pupils in 4817 schools,<sup>429b</sup> though the last official inspection was confessedly incomplete, and this comprises neither the military schools nor the university of El-Ahzar. Cairo alone possesses more than 295 schools, with close upon 10,000 pupils.<sup>430</sup> And amongst the special schools must be mentioned the polytechnical school, the law school, the school of medicine, of languages, of engineering, of Egyptology, of chemistry, and a school *des arts et métiers*.

Education is voluntary, and in fact it need not be made compulsory now that the present generation seems as eager to learn as they were adverse to it in Mehemet Ali's days.<sup>431</sup> "We don't want more schools, nor do we want pupils," said an Egyptian minister to the author, "for of both we have more than we require, but what we want is method and school-masters; and to form this class of men is the great

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50 at Turin, and 3 in England. There are, furthermore, important primary schools (*écoles libres*) at Cairo, Alexandria, Damanhour, Tantah, Zagazig, Mansura, Ghisé, Benisouef, Medinet Fayoum, Minié; these schools are all attached to mosques, about half of them kept by the mosques themselves, with a very trifling school fee; of the remainder, 93 schools are kept by the Divan of Wakfs (Ministry of Public Instruction); there are also 30 schools kept by private endowment, and 2 schools by the Ministry of Finance. The *écoles libres* of Cairo alone comprise over 6000 pupils; then there is the El-Ahzar, with its thousands of students, and European schools with some 700 more, about 60,000 in all, which gives something like 12 pro mille on 5,000,000 of inhabitants."—'Statistique de l'Égypte,' by E. de Régný, p. 89.

<sup>429a</sup> 'Instruction publique en Égypte,' par V. E. Dor, p. 380.

<sup>429b</sup> 'Egypt as It Is,' by S. C. M'Coan.

<sup>430</sup> Ibid., p. 355.

<sup>431</sup> 'Aperçu général de l'Égypte,' par A. B. Clot Bey, ii. p. 337.

object of the present day." The leading idea of Ismaïl's organic law was to ensure all over the country the same kind of instruction, a solidarity of teaching, limiting it in the primary schools to the rudiments of reading and writing; no confessional difference,<sup>432</sup> and an absolute tolerance. In the higher schools, all branches of knowledge to be taught, including languages, the choice of which is left to the pupil, though they must learn one besides Arabic and Turkish. This law, with its forty articles, has certainly placed scholastic reforms on a most solid basis,<sup>433</sup> yet the want of funds on one side, of men on the other, has hampered the progress one might otherwise have expected; possibly there is also a flaw in the system. The State has undertaken too much; even free schooling has its drawbacks; and here children are frequently clothed, have as a rule one meal, and receive in all public schools a monthly attendance fee, as mentioned before. When thus the entire care is taken out of the hands of those who ought to contribute towards the expense, the consequence must naturally be, that the parents take no interest in the matter, whilst they would of course insist on getting their money's worth, had they to pay. However, given the backward state of the Fellah, it might be difficult to burden him with school fees; and schooling being optional, many

<sup>432</sup> "Le Vice-roi semble devoir montrer en tout la supériorité de son intelligence. Il a su, dans un grand nombre de circonstances, secouer le joug des préjugés devant lesquelles ses co-religionnaires courbent humblement la tête."—'Aperçu,' &c., par A. B. Clot Bey, ii. p. 69.

<sup>433</sup> 'Instruction publique en Égypte,' par V. E. Dor, p. 216.

would in that case keep their children at home. We have only to look at our own school-board prosecutions, yet in England education is compulsory, and I dare say we flatter ourselves that we are a degree or two above the Fellaheen, both in understanding and in obedience to the law.

The system introduced by Ismail of primary schools, preparatory schools, and special schools, answers all purposes. It does not in the beginning overburden the children with useless and lumbering matter, and only those who really wish to push forward need avail themselves of the preparatory schools, whilst the students of the special schools, if educated at the expense of the State, are obliged to serve their country—not gratuitously however—a number of years corresponding to the time they have spent at school; the best pupils being as a rule selected for the polytechnical and medical classes, whilst the "*fruits secs*" are invariably to be found in the military schools—a most unjust proceeding, and as one of the head masters of a primary school explained to me "a premium for idleness, for," said he, "look at me: I was first in my class, and consequently drafted into the polytechnical school; again amongst the first, the minister picked me out as a pupil teacher; I have now been toiling for twelve years and I get 9*l.* per month, whilst those of my schoolfellows who did not qualify for the technical classes and who entered a military school, are most of them colonels with 40*l.* a month, and I can assure you that if I had to begin

again, I should certainly be found amongst the idlers.

In the preparatory schools the boys are mostly boarders, as likewise invariably in the higher classes. But to discourage harem education and to induce the upper classes to send their boys into the public schools, the Khedive himself set the example. Already on his accession he had transferred the school of Maniel on the island of Rhoda, where sixty pupils shared the studies of the Princes, to the Abdin Palace, but shortly after he made them all join the public schools at the Abassieh, to which Cherif Pasha, then Minister of the Interior and of Public Instruction, had given a new and promising impetus. There were at that time 1200 pupils at the primary school of Abassieh, and 700 at the preparatory school, the one joined by the Princes, independent of the three military schools, the polytechnical school, and the staff college, which were all in the same building. Here the Princes remained for a number of years, and though inhabiting a private house, were treated in every respect like the other boys, and were obliged to pass all the usual examinations.<sup>434</sup>

An insurmountable difficulty was and is still the scarcity of European teachers possessing a sufficient knowledge of Arabic; and lectures through an interpreter are certainly not satisfactory. As to the native teachers, though most kind and patient, they

<sup>434</sup> Egyptian Sketches, II.—*Pall Mall Gazette*, Oct. 11, 1881.



lack method, and seem only to lay stress on the development of the memory.

Unfortunately this is purely mechanical, and I have seen a boy who knew a book by heart without being able to grasp the meaning of a single sentence. However, it helps them in learning languages, and it is marvellous in what a short time they master the rudiments of English, French, or German. They also have great aptitude for drawing, and unequalled imitative powers.

In addition to the above schools, there are a number of independent establishments, either belonging to mosques or endowed by bequests, and some started privately by the various nationalities and denominations. But first in rank of all native establishments stands, of course, the El-Ahzar, with its thousands of students. It is impossible to assist at their lectures without a mingled feeling of admiration and regret; admiration for the zeal of study, and regret to see such precious energy almost wasted in mechanical feats of memory.

The course of the El-Ahzar varies from a minimum of ten to a maximum of forty years—a lifetime. But as the El-Ahzar stands outside the control of Government there is no occasion for entering more closely into its organisation. Yet to show the love of learning amongst these young Sheikhs, I will mention a touching instance which came to my knowledge in 1880. Most of the students are kept at the expense of religious bodies, some at that of their villages, and but few have private means. For-

unately little is required, as they can sleep in the mosque if they like. However, I heard of two young men who had not the needful to pay for their daily pittance of rice and bread, so one of them assisted at the lectures, whilst the other broke stones on the road; in the evening his mate repeated to him the day's lesson, and thus alternately one always earned the needful for both, whilst the other crammed learning for two.<sup>435</sup> It should be thought that with such material it would be easy to produce first-rate men with only a little time and management, and it would be well worth the while of one of our rich philanthropists to endow a really efficient Arab University, not fettered by either religious or Governmental influences; a nursery for the teachers of the young, and at the same time a training school for European lecturers, anxious to acquire Arabic before entering on their duties at the various Government schools.

However, it must not be thought that all these schools were founded by Ismaïl, in fact a number of them had existed of old, some had been established by Mehemet Ali, as, for instance, the school of medicine, in 1827.<sup>436</sup> The great merit of Ismaïl had been the reorganisation and the liberality with which he increased the budget of public instruction; first to over a million francs, and more recently by the princely present of the domain of Al-Ouaddy, which he repur-

<sup>435</sup> The author was so struck by the grandeur of the case, that he called the attention of the then Prime Minister to it.

<sup>436</sup> 'L'Instruction en Égypte,' par V. E. Dor, p. 220.

chased for ten million francs from the Canal Company, and the revenues of which are now devoted to public instruction.<sup>437</sup>

But more important almost than the revival of the instruction of the male part of the population, was the attempt to establish girls' schools—a revolution, and a direct blow at the harem system as well as at slavery. The first school of that kind was started under the patronage and at the expense of the Third Princess, and it was intended there to train the female children of the Fellah to domestic duties, with a view of letting them take the places of the slaves, “who are a great expense and a great nuisance,” to use the Khedive's own words.<sup>438</sup>

The idea was excellent in more than one respect, and independently of creating a class of female servants which does not exist in the East, it had the double advantage of improving the mind of the women, of giving them a taste for order, cleanliness, and comfort; once accustomed to more civilised ways it could be anticipated that the girl would not condescend to share the mud hovel of the Fellah. In fact, women trained to a more refined mode of living would indirectly drive the Fellah himself to assimilate himself to the requirements of the women.

Commencing with the lower classes the Khedive hoped, little by little, to extend female education, and in raising the women of the middle and upper classes to an intellectual equality with man, he con-

<sup>437</sup> ‘Lettres sur l'Égypte contemporaine,’ par E. Gellion-Danglar, p. 197.

<sup>438</sup> ‘The Khedive's Egypt,’ by E. de Leon, p. 280.

templated the gradual abolition of harem life. In fact, in speaking one day of his plans to the author, His Highness remarked that polygamy and harem life would cease the day the education of woman would make her the companion and helpmate of the husband, instead of being, as at present, "plus ou moins un article de luxe." It was a beginning, and has been continued since, and we shall have an opportunity of reverting to it when we come to the reign of Tewfik. Here it will suffice to say that Ismaïl laid the germ,<sup>439</sup> that this germ had brought forth fruit, and that generations to come will reap the benefit of the civilising results of the education of the masses.<sup>440</sup>

Having attempted to ensure security of person and property, and equality before the law, and done his utmost to raise the standard of the population by means of public instruction, it would have been a

<sup>439</sup> "In treating the subject of public instruction, it ought not to be forgotten that the library at Cairo owes its existence in its present form to Ismaïl, who enriched it by collecting a large number of the most precious manuscripts, illuminated Korans, &c., which were scattered over the country, the prey of ignorant custodians and greedy antiquarians. The collection is unrivalled, and competes favourably with London, Paris, and Turin. In fact, some of the Persian specimens surpass anything existing. Purchasing the collection of books and manuscripts of Moustapha Pasha Fazil (after his brother's death) for about 40,000*l.*, Ismaïl presented it most generously to the National Library; and it is sincerely to be hoped that its treasures have not been tampered with, as Arabi dismissed the able German librarian, Spitter Bey, who has been engaged for years in cataloguing it. It would indeed have been a calamity had the fate of the famous Libraries of Memphis, with 'Remedy for the Mind' over its porch ('*Les Fables Égyptiennes*,' par Dom A. S. Pernety, i. p. 354), and of Alexandria, with its 700,000 volumes (see '*History of Egypt*,' by Samuel Sharpe, ii. p. 379), befallen its modern and more modest successor.—The Author.

<sup>440</sup> '*Aperçu général sur l'Égypte*,' par A. B. Clot Bey, ii. p. 428.

derision to allow slavery, and the slave trade—this infamous traffic<sup>441</sup>—to continue in Egypt, and not contented with abolishing it on paper only, like his predecessors,<sup>442</sup> though M. Barthélémy St. Hilaire is full of praise of Saïd Pasha's efforts,<sup>443</sup> Ismaïl determined<sup>444</sup> to root out the trade with a strong hand, and to reduce slavery to a minimum, in fact to a semi-voluntary domesticity in the harem. But, as Lord Palmerston very truly said, "it is impossible to hope that the slave trade can be entirely and permanently abolished until the condition of slavery shall itself have ceased to exist"<sup>445</sup>; an opinion which the author had equally an opportunity of expressing in a letter to the same society, in which he said, "to do away with slaves, you must first do away with the harem, and to do so you must educate the women and change Eastern habits altogether, in short, you must Europeanise the Orient."<sup>446</sup>

There can of course be but one opinion—and there is but one—that this blot on humanity, that moral

<sup>441</sup> 'Ismailia,' by Sir S. Baker, ii. p. 503.

<sup>442</sup> Even the Imperial Firman addressed to Mehemet Ali, Feb. 1841, conferring upon him the government of Nubia, Darfour, Kordafan, and Senaar, enjoined him to abolish the negro hunts, &c.—"Actes de cruauté qui répugnent aux principes de justice et d'humanité, &c."—'Life of Lord Palmerston,' by Lord Dalling, ii. p. 435.

<sup>443</sup> 'Egypt,' by J. Barthélémy St. Hilaire, pp. 137 *et seq.* and 163.

<sup>444</sup> "On his accession Ismaïl considered it one of his first duties to carry through the great measures inaugurated by Saïd of the suppression of the slave trade, and the abolition of the monopoly and the *corvée*."—'Das heutige Aegypten,' von H. Stephan, p. 153.

<sup>445</sup> Reply by Lord Palmerston to an address from the Anti-Slavery Society, Oct. 18, 1842.—'Life of Viscount Palmerston,' by Lord Dalling, iii. p. 435.

<sup>446</sup> Letter of the Author, June 14, 1881, to the Secretary of the Anti-Slavery Society. Vide *Anti-Slavery Reporter*, July 18, 1881.

cancer, as Sir Samuel Baker calls it,<sup>447</sup> must be eradicated, and Ismaïl is certainly entitled to full credit for his strenuous efforts to suppress it, regardless of the enormous expense it entailed upon his exchequer—efforts the more creditable as he was acting against the teaching of his faith, the traditions of his people, and the interests of masses of his subjects.<sup>448</sup>

To write the history of slavery would be writing the history of the world, so old is it as a recognised institution amongst the ancients and amongst barbarian or semi-civilised nations, and its abolition, wherever it has been attempted, goes hand-in-hand with the spreading of civilisation, though not always with Christianity and Christian practices.<sup>449</sup>

But if it has been comparatively easy for the United States to decree the abolition of slavery, if Great Britain has had no difficulty in proclaiming individual freedom in her remotest colonies, and if even Alexander II. has been able to strip his people of the antiquated shackles of serfdom,<sup>450</sup> the Egyptian Government had to contend with almost insurmountable obstacles. To begin with, slavery has been the traditional fate of the Egyptians from the days of Joseph, when they offered first their lands and then their bodies to Pharaoh in exchange for seed,<sup>451</sup> and

<sup>447</sup> 'Ismailia,' by Sir S. Baker, i. p. 6.

<sup>448</sup> 'A Diary in the East,' by W. H. Russell, p. 456.

<sup>449</sup> 'Egypt and the Great Suez Canal,' by J. Barthélémy St. Hilaire, p. 115.

<sup>450</sup> "The English emancipation was great, the Russian greater, the American still greater; but the Egyptian may prove to be the greatest of all."—'Our Inheritance in the Great Pyramid,' by Piazzi Smyth, p. 567.

<sup>451</sup> Genesis, xlvii. 19.

forced labour has in one shape or another been only a disguised form of slavery, so that the Fellah is far from seeing in the nominal ownership of one mortal over hundreds of his equals anything but an accidental freak of luck, a question of being rich or poor, and in his mind, as in the mind of the Oriental in general, no stain attaches to compulsory servitude,<sup>452</sup> and even contemporary history offers numerous examples of liberated slaves raised to the highest dignities of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>453a</sup> In fact, an Arab looks upon slavery as Continental nations do on conscription, a blood tax of another kind, and frequently more easy to bear.

These few remarks will suffice to remind us that even before Islamism consecrated slavery as a domestic institution, Egypt had for centuries been accustomed to the rod of masters, who looked upon the entire population as movable property, born to yield returns in labour and sweat for the questionable privilege of dragging on a wretched existence of toil and misery.

The ground having thus been prepared, and the notions of individual freedom, liberty, and equality being confined to a limited ring of hereditary magnates, the Mahometan religion had no difficulty in grafting on Egyptian servitude the more modern institution of domestic slavery, without which no harem can exist.

<sup>452</sup> 'Correspondance d'Orient,' par M. Michaud et M. Poujoulat, ii. p. 407.

<sup>453a</sup> I need only mention Kheir-ed-Din Pasha, who ultimately became Prime Minister in Tunis and Grand Vizir of Turkey.—The Author.

Polygamy,<sup>453</sup> and the necessity of secluding the gynæceum from the outer world, increased the demand for slaves of both sexes, and the most infamous traffic became the natural consequence of the impossibility of supplying the wants as heretofore from amongst the prisoners of conquered nations: Turkish conquests had come to an end, people had to pay for the accommodation, and as the white ware was not within the reach of all purses, nor answering all requirements, speculation turned towards the boundless plains of Central Africa as the best field for the unlimited supply of an article marketable in those parts.<sup>454</sup> Unless one has read 'Ismailia' and 'The Albert Nyanza,' even the most fertile imagination cannot realise the horrors perpetrated by the slave-hunters and traders, who have converted a terrestrial paradise into an infernal region,<sup>455</sup> who have brought ruin and devastation over rich and well-populated countries; who, screening their heinous calling behind the so-called ivory trade, capture annually at least 50,000 negroes,<sup>456</sup> and throw on the Government of Egypt a large part of the odium.<sup>457</sup> Nay, such are the hardships endured *in transitu* by these poor wretches that scarcely ten per cent. are ever supposed to survive, to become "marketable." It is not a matter of surprise that the indignation of the civilised

<sup>453</sup> "Polygamia apud Ebræos et Aegyptios permissa."—'Canon Chronicus Aegyptiacus, Johannis Marshami' (1676) p. 173.

<sup>454</sup> 'Mémoire sur le Commerce des Nègres,' par C. L. Frank, p. 7.

<sup>455</sup> 'Ismailia,' by Sir S. W. Baker, i. p. 2.

<sup>456</sup> Ibid., i. p. 4.

<sup>457</sup> 'A Political Survey,' by M. E. Grant-Duff, M.P., p. 108.



world should have been roused, when, thanks to the undaunted energy of explorers like Livingstone, Baker, and Stanley, the pitiful tale of so much misery and loss of life became known, and it is certainly gratifying to think that the first practical step taken for the suppression of the slave trade of Central Africa<sup>458</sup> "is due to the initiative of His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales,<sup>459</sup> who communicated to the Khedive his idea<sup>460</sup> of entrusting Sir S. Baker with the suppression of the slave trade on the White Nile, and with the establishment of order in the Soudan, and to whom the final arrangements and the conditions of service which the Viceroy proposed to Sir Samuel Baker were entirely due."<sup>461</sup>

The Khedive, thus supported and encouraged in his ideas of reform, determined, at the risk of his popularity among his own subjects, to strike a direct blow at the slave trade in its distant nest.

"The suppression of the slave trade was a compliment to the European Powers, though rather a costly one to the Egyptian exchequer—the first stone of a new civilisation. In this humane enterprise Ismaïl was firmly supported by his two Ministers, Cherif Pasha and Nubar Pasha. But beyond the young princes, his sons, who are well-educated and

<sup>458</sup> 'Ismailia,' by Sir S. W. Baker, i. p. 1.

<sup>459</sup> "The Prince of Wales, who represented at heart the principles of Great Britain, took the warmest interest in the suppression of the slave trade."—*Ibid.*, i. p. 5 *et seq.*

<sup>460</sup> 'A Diary in the East,' by W. H. Russell, p. 384.

<sup>461</sup> *Ibid.*

enlightened men, who took the greatest interest in the undertaking, and a few others, the object of the expedition was regarded with ill-concealed disgust."<sup>462</sup>

And Sir Samuel adds that His Highness the Khedive was not only ignorant of the existing abuses, but fully determined to succeed in the suppression of the slave trade,<sup>463</sup> *in spite of the adverse opinion of the public*,<sup>464</sup> that he trusts to have laid a firm foundation for a good work hereafter.<sup>465</sup> We refer those who wish to form an idea of the difficulties Sir Samuel had to overcome to the graphic account of his humanitarian mission,<sup>466</sup> in which he was loyally supported by the Egyptian Government; and though the results were of a temporary nature, it is right to pay a tribute to the discharge of an arduous and most trying duty, and to the courage of Lady Baker, who accompanied her husband throughout his expedition.

Colonel Gordon followed in Sir Samuel's steps, and all who know the undaunted energy and almost fanatical devotion of "Chinese Gordon" to any task he may undertake, will readily believe that he did all that was humanly possible to extirpate *ferro et igne* practices more than hateful to a man of his religious

<sup>462</sup> 'Ismailia,' by Sir S. W. Baker, i. p. 6 *et seq.*

<sup>463</sup> "To give an idea of the magnitude of the task, I may mention that alone one trader, Agâd, assumed the right over nearly 90,000 square miles."  
—'Ismailia,' by Sir S. W. Baker, i. p. 4.

<sup>464</sup> Ibid., ii. p. 315.

<sup>465</sup> Ibid., i. p. 10 *et seq.*

<sup>466</sup> Vide 'Ismailia,' by Sir S. W. Baker (2 vols., MacMillan and Co., 1874).

temperament. It was he who gave the *coup de grâce* to the Gellabs, and to whom the merit is due.<sup>467a</sup> Yet how far did he succeed? <sup>467b</sup> No sooner was his back turned than matters got worse than ever, and even during his operations in the Soudan a brisk trade was carried on at remote points of the Egyptian territory, and at present there is no end of complaint.

The third European entrusted with the suppression of the slave trade<sup>468</sup> is the present Chief of the Anti-Slavery Department, General Comte della Sala, who yields neither in activity nor in energy to his able predecessors; however, his efforts have been limited to Upper Egypt, his powers only extending as far as the Second Cataract, and he has been so far successful that not a single slave caravan has lately ventured down to Assiout. Now, of these three men whose devotion to this great cause is beyond controversy, not one has been able to do more than to check the evil on a given point,<sup>469</sup> and to close certain tracks, whilst all three admit that it is *impossible* to stop the supply so long as the demand for slaves is countenanced in the Ottoman Empire and in Egypt. Thus it appears that the honest attempts of the Egyptian Government to throw difficulties in the way of supply, and the well-intentioned efforts of the

<sup>467a</sup> 'Summary of Letters and Reports of Governor-General' (Gordon Pasha), Cairo, 1877; and 'Colonel Gordon in Central Africa,' &c., edited by J. B. Hill.

<sup>467b</sup> Vide *Observer*, Dec. 9, 1880.

<sup>468</sup> Vide Circular of the Minister of the Interior, of June 9, 1880, to the Moudirs.

<sup>469</sup> 'Ismailia,' by Sir S. W. Baker, ii. p. 500.

rulers of Egypt have only led to increased hardships, and to a greater loss of life ; for, warned off the beaten tracks, slave dealers endeavour now to smuggle their human contraband ware through parts of the desert where want of water makes pursuit impossible, and one may almost question the utility of expeditions so disastrous in their consequences to the very people it is intended to protect, to save, and to benefit, so long as the social institutions of the Orient offer opportunities and a pretext for slave-dealing.

Yet, though they patronise the market and buy what they require, it must not for a moment be imagined that the wealthy clients of the slave-dealers approve of the cruelties and horrors attendant on the kidnapping of the unfortunate blacks. Like our fashionable European ladies, who seldom give a thought to the endless sufferings of the white toilers, the half-starved machinists, who in some unhealthy garret eke out a miserable pittance in producing gorgeous fineries for their more fortunate sisters, so Mahometan slave-owners shut their ears to the doleful tales of what has passed previous to the purchase of what to them are "household necessities."

If you allude to the infamy of the system, and point out that it is the duty of right-thinking men to abstain from keeping and buying slaves, as thereby people make themselves liable to a tacit complicity in these monstrous proceedings, the Egyptian shrugs his shoulders and replies, "So long as our religious

code and social customs remain unchanged, we must either employ slaves, hire Christian women (whom we cannot trust), or wait upon ourselves. Slavery is *therefore a necessity interwoven with our faith and notions of decency*, and cannot be abolished without subverting the very basis of our social and moral institutions.<sup>470</sup>

And this opinion is fully corroborated by the most ardent abolitionists. Thus Miss Martineau says: "These two hellish practices, slavery and polygamy, which as practices can clearly never be separated, are here avowedly connected, and in that connection are exalted into a double institution, whose working is such as makes one almost wish that the Nile would rise to . . . sweep away the whole abomination. Till this happens there is in the condition of Egypt a fearful warning before the eyes of all men. . . . The European may see, when startled by the state of Egypt, that slavery is indispensably required by the practice of polygamy; . . . neither the pasha nor any other human power can abolish slavery, while polygamy is an institution of the country."<sup>471</sup>

The truth of these words is practically illustrated by the existence of both slavery and slave trade, notwithstanding the honest efforts of the late Khedive,<sup>472</sup> in which he has been emulated by his son.<sup>473</sup>

<sup>470</sup> 'Our New Protectorate,' &c., by G. C. M'Coan, ii. p. 156 *et seq.*

<sup>471</sup> 'Eastern Life, Present and Past,' by Harriet Martineau, p. 241.

<sup>472</sup> Vide 'L'Afrique Equatoriale,' par Sir S. W. Baker, abrégé par H. Vatteville. 'The Albert Nyanza,' by Sir S. W. Baker, ii. p. 313.

<sup>473</sup> "I hate the very idea of slavery," words of H.H. the Khedive to the author, vide 'Anti-Slavery Reporter,' July 18, 1881.

But great are the difficulties, and to cite on y a recent instance, I will mention that the late Sheikh-ul-Islam intimated to the Khedive "that the total suppression of slavery would be an encroachment on the individual rights of Mussulmans, on whom the Prophet had conferred the privilege of liberating slaves as a means of atonement for their sins"; in other words, that the individual emancipation of slaves being a meritorious act, the Khedive had no power to deprive the faithful of a currency wherewith to settle outstanding accounts with heaven.<sup>474</sup>

But, notwithstanding opposition at home, and very little help from the Powers, the Convention with Great Britain of August 4th, 1877, the Khedive's decree of the same date, his Cabinet order of August 23rd, a second Convention with Great Britain of Sept. 7th, a Cabinet order of Oct. 15th, and the decree of Jan. 1st, 1878, are proofs of the praiseworthy attempts of Ismail for putting down slavery. It would have been impossible to do more; no expense or pains were spared to act up to the terms of the Conventions,<sup>475</sup> and neither Ismaïl nor his successor can be blamed if matters remain much the same, nor will Her Majesty's Government be able to do more to satisfy the unceasing protestations of the Anti-Slavery Society.<sup>476</sup> Much as one may sympathise

<sup>474</sup> *St. James's Gazette*, Aug. 8, 1881.

<sup>475</sup> The Convention authorised the sale of slaves for another period of seven, and respectively twelve years.—Vide Convention, Aug. 4, 1877.

<sup>476</sup> Vide last letter of Sept. 23, 1882, addressed by the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society to Mr. Gladstone.—*The Times*, Sept. 27, 1882.

with their laudable aims, experience ought by this time to have taught whining philanthropists who thunder anathema against the Egyptian Government for its lukewarmness, that neither conventions, nor decrees, nor expeditions will prove of any avail so long as polygamy requires seclusion and the harem a supply of slaves. No Government, Christian or Mussulman, can do the impossible; none more than Ismail has done in this direction. Indeed, Lord Haddo (the late Lord Aberdeen) did not exaggerate when he said of him, "The present ruler of Egypt has undoubtedly done more to abolish slavery in his dominions and to improve the condition of his subjects than any Mahommedan, and probably *any European* prince during an equal space of time."<sup>477</sup>

Turning to the question of the Notables, we have only to remember the centuries<sup>478</sup> it has taken ere Continental monarchs could be induced to grant parliamentary rights to their subjects, and in almost every single case have the people been obliged to resort to violence, and most constitutions owe their birth to revolution—not to the generous impulse of the ruler, not to a spontaneous recognition of the people's rights, but to the force of circumstances, to the pressure from without or from within. Even we, the freest nation on the globe, have only to remember the struggles and convulsions England had to pass through, ere it could boast of its present

<sup>477</sup> Speech of Lord Haddo in the House of Commons, June 1, 1858.

<sup>478</sup> 'Principles of British Policy in Egypt,' by Sir Richard Temple, K.C.S.I. (*Contemporary Review*, Oct. 1882, p. 502).

unequalled parliamentary institutions; to remember that the Stuarts had to pay with their crown an untimely opposition to the requirements of the age. We hear and read a good deal about the wrongs inflicted on the Egyptians by an autocratic system; we are told of a National party,—of people pining for liberty and freedom; of mutinous soldiers intoxicated with a longing for reform. Officious meddlers have endeavoured to raise a cry against the tyrants—Khedives, Controllers, and Consuls-General for not having called upon the people to participate in the government of their country.

Now, unless I am grievously mistaken, one does not begin with the roof when one builds a house; in Europe hundreds of years have elapsed ere the people were sufficiently advanced to understand true liberty, to take an interest and a share in their own affairs. The education of the masses had to precede political manhood. Paper constitutions do not carry with them a constitutional spirit, and parliamentary rights are meaningless without a previous understanding of parliamentary duties. In fact, parliamentary life is the outcome of the well-balanced, well-defined relations between the governed and the governing elements of the State.

In most countries the beginning was made by the formation of a consultative body, a council, nominated by the sovereign, to advise on matters of taxation and of administration, without any further rights; little by little these functions have extended, and have bloomed into national institutions. The great of



the land insisting on being consulted, sent delegates to Court to represent their case; this became in due time a right; from the nobles of the land this right extended to the people until universal suffrage has put its seal to the popular chart of the sovereignty of the nation.

But I do not intend to write the history of parliamentarism; what I want to bring to mind is that Egypt is simply going through a process common to all countries. The *Medjliss* correspond with the Russian *Mir*, municipal councils, provincial assemblies, *états généraux*, delegations, or whatever the bodies may be called, which on the Continent formed the nucleus of future parliaments. Even Mehemet Ali<sup>479</sup> had already realised the necessity of putting a stop to arbitrary ways, by calling to his assistance a council of deserving men able to advise him on matters of State,<sup>480</sup> and that in addition to the *Medjliss* composed of Ulemas and Omdés (Notables). Suppressed in the tyrannical days of Abbas, Ismaïl of his own accord recalled the latter to life, and re-established the *Medjliss* under the name of the Chamber of Notables,<sup>481</sup> one of the most noteworthy experiments yet made in any Oriental country.<sup>482</sup>

<sup>479</sup> 'Egypt as It Is,' by G. C. M'Coan, p. 117.

<sup>480</sup> "Quoique son pouvoir soit absolu, il a eu assez de prudence pour vouloir se mettre lui-même en garde contre l'arbitraire . . . et il y a attaché à sa personne un conseil privé, avec lequel il traite de toutes les affaires."—'Aperçu général sur l'Égypte,' par A. B. Clot Bey, p. 182.

<sup>481</sup> "Ismaïl presided at the opening of the first Chamber of Notables on Nov. 27, 1866."—'Das heutige Aegypten,' von H. Stephan, p. 170.

<sup>482</sup> 'Principles of British Policy in Egypt,' by Sir Richard Temple, K.C.S.I., p. 502. "In 1866 the Khedive revived the defunct assembly of

Though in principle an elective body<sup>483</sup> it must be well understood that the Moudirs had a word to say in the matter. Generally it fell to the most wealthy men of the province to represent their neighbours, and like the election of the Sheikhs by the Fellah, and the Omdés by the Sheikhs, the election of the Notables was a mere matter of form.<sup>484</sup> Such was the reluctance of many to undertake responsibilities which might lead to friction with the Moudir, or possibly with the Government, that frequently compulsory nomination had to be resorted to. Indeed it has been said that Ismail had less the desire to associate his people in the management of interior affairs, than to give to his acts a semblance of constitutional measures, and to shift some of the responsibilities from his own shoulders.

Be that as it may, he defined their functions very clearly, and "they were to consider and advise on all proposed fiscal changes, new public works, and other matters of national concern that may be laid before them,"<sup>485</sup> but of course when they first met they had only a vague notion of their duties.<sup>486</sup>

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delegates, one of the inchoate reforms projected by Mehemet Ali."—'Egypt as It Is,' by G. C. M'Coan, p. 117.

<sup>483</sup> "This germ of an Egyptian parliament consists of village Sheikhs and other provincial notables elected by the communes, and assembles once a year to receive from the Privy Council a report on the administration during the twelvemonth."—'Egypt as It Is,' by G. C. M'Coan, p. 117.

<sup>484</sup> "Whether the mode of election was rude and informal or not, the members *were* elected."—'Principles of British Policy in Egypt,' by Sir R. Temple, K.C.S.I., p. 502.

<sup>485</sup> 'Egypt as It Is,' by G. C. M'Coan, p. 117.

<sup>486</sup> 'Principles of British Policy in Egypt,' by Sir Richard Temple, K.C.S.I., p. 502.

"It will be superb if the farce of a constitution ever should be acted here," writes Lady Duff-Gordon,<sup>487</sup> and she gives us the reply of one of the new representatives when congratulating him on Egypt's birth to constitutional life: "Who," said he, "is there on the banks of the Nile, who can say anything but 'Hadar' (ready), with both hands on the head, and a salaam to the ground even to a Moudir? and thou talkest of speaking before Effendina." And thus, adds Lady Duff-Gordon, the wretched delegates to the Egyptian Chamber are going down to Cairo with their hearts in their shoes.<sup>488</sup> But if, even to-day, "the very elements of constitutional life are utterly wanting in Egypt,"<sup>489</sup> the merit of Ismail is only the greater, for having had the courage<sup>490</sup> to face the sneers of contemporaries; he has laid the foundation, and the Chamber of Notables, which disappeared in consequence of the modifications introduced by Tewfik's accession,<sup>491</sup> had to be convoked again as soon as Cherif Pasha resumed office—in fact, as the very condition of his resuming office.

And here I may allude to the utter fallacy<sup>492</sup> of the story that the Notables owe their existence to Arabi and the army. We have only to go back

<sup>487</sup> 'Last Letters from Egypt,' by Lady Duff-Gordon, p. 76.

<sup>488</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 86.

<sup>489</sup> 'La Question Égyptienne,' 1881, p. 31.

<sup>490</sup> 'Principles of British Policy in Egypt,' by Sir R. Temple, p. 502.

<sup>491</sup> 'England's Intervention in Egypt,' by E. Dicey (*Nineteenth Century*, Aug. 1882, p. 169).

<sup>492</sup> See the 'Egyptian Revolution,' by W. S. Blunt (*Nineteenth Century*, Sept. 1882, p. 332 *et seq.*).

to Cherif Pasha's constitution of August 1879,<sup>493</sup> and to remember that the convocation of the Chamber of Notables was the *conditio sine qua non* of his remaining in office, nay that he resigned in consequence of the opposition offered to his enlightened policy.<sup>494</sup>

There may of course be a deal to say in favour of the views of Riaz, who does not consider Egypt ripe for constitutional life. But everything in this world has a beginning, and one must leave to time and circumstances the care of moulding crude elements into a practical shape. It may appear ludicrous to speak of an Egyptian constitution; but when Napoleon III. conferred on a young nobleman the oldest ducal title of Royalist France, everybody laughed, and so did the new duke with the old name himself, but he said, "In half a century no one will remember the Napoleonic origin of the most ancient title in Christendom; my children and grandchildren will outlive the ridicule which I cannot escape."

So also in generations to come no one will remember the hollow beginnings of constitutionalism in Egypt; education will have raised the

<sup>493</sup> Mr. Lascelles to the Marquis of Salisbury, August 19, 1879.—Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 1 (1880) p. 65.

<sup>494</sup> "Between June and August Cherif had been working with the view of securing to the country a representative form of government, and had only a short time before, Aug. 16, laid his proposition before Tewfik. Cherif's idea was that the representation being in the hands of the people, there would be more chance of Egypt maintaining her independence than if the government was a personal one. . . . Had this advice been taken, Ismail would have now been Khedive of Egypt."—Extract from Colonel Gordon's Letter (*Times*, March 1882).

people, and will have made them again — for once they were the first — at least the equal of other civilised nations; they will then be able to take a part in the management of their affairs; alive to the duties, they will no longer be denied the full enjoyment of parliamentary rights; and posterity will inscribe in golden letters the name of Ismail on the first charter granted to modern Egypt.

After having thus reviewed what I should call the social and moral reform, we now come to the material improvements undertaken by Ismail. It would be as rash to say that he had only the good of the Fellah in view, as it would be exaggerating to throw the chief cause of his difficulties on the Suez Canal. But the results are identical, and working for the greatness of the country he benefited the people, whilst it certainly will not be denied that the heavy commitments to the Canal Company linked him to Continental money markets.

On the other hand the urgent want of money gave indirectly a stimulus to the development of the resources. Moreover, he had to make up for the many thousands of arms taken from the plough by Saïd's Canal concession. With undaunted energy Ismail took in hand the canalisation. More than two hundred new canals,<sup>495a</sup> and numerous breakwaters, owe their existence to his initiative. He created

<sup>495a</sup> Mr. Mulhall puts it at 8400 miles.—*Contemporary Review*, Oct. 1882, p. 530.

new communications, and increased the railway net in a short time by a thousand miles<sup>495b</sup>; and unlike that old Turk who thought roads a nuisance, as only facilitating the transport of cannon,<sup>496</sup> Ismail constructed several thousand miles, which included 500 bridges,<sup>497</sup> amongst others, that of Gesireh, one of the finest engineering works; add to this 5200 miles of telegraph, and an idea may be formed of the magnitude of the improvements.

The vast and steady increase of exports<sup>498</sup> is the best proof that Ismail's outlay in this direction has certainly been remunerative; but though his chief attention was directed towards agricultural development<sup>499</sup> he did not forget that Egypt had been of old the centre of commerce.<sup>500</sup> Fifteen new light-houses<sup>501</sup> were erected to ensure the safety of shipping, a trifling expense compared with the new docks. The French having been entrusted with those of Suez, Ismail thought it but fair to give

<sup>495b</sup> "Steam and railways have done at least as much for Egypt as for almost any European country."—Lecture of Sir Bartle Frere at the Edinburgh Philosophical Institution, Jan. 5, 1874.

<sup>496</sup> "An old Turk once said to me that he saw no use in roads because, once created, they would only facilitate the advance of cannon, whilst their absence created a difficulty to an invading army."—'To and from Constantinople,' by Hubert E. H. Jerningham, M.P., p. 249.

<sup>497</sup> 'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 365.

<sup>498</sup> Value of exports in 1862 (last year of Saïd Pasha), 4,454,000*l.*, and in 1879 (last year of Ismail) 13,810,000*l.*—'Egyptian Finance,' by G. M. Mulhall, p. 531.

<sup>499</sup> "1,373,000 acres, representing gross annual product of crops worth 11,000,000*l.*, or a rental value of 1,400,000*l.* per annum, were reclaimed."—'Egyptian Finance,' by M. G. Mulhall, p. 531.

<sup>500</sup> 'Handbuch der gesammten Aegyptischen Alterthumskunde,' von Dr. Max Uhlemann, p. 131.

<sup>501</sup> 'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 366.

the contract to Englishmen for the Alexandria harbour works, and with a true Oriental recklessness he allowed himself to be cajoled into one of the most iniquitous contracts ever made.<sup>502</sup> In fact it was on a small scale a repetition of the story of Saïd Pasha's Canal concession. Drawn up in a hurry, examined in a hurry, and signed in a hurry, it was only when too late that Ismaïl discovered that he had made a present of a million and a half sterling<sup>502</sup> to the lucky contractors, if we may take the estimate which Sir Rivers Wilson caused to be made<sup>502</sup> as a criterion of what the Alexandria docks ought to have cost.

But this is only one flagrant instance out of hundreds; in fact, I should go so far as to say that there is not one contract without a blot. Wishing to undertake much, to have the work quickly done, in fact overdoing things in every direction, it is clear that Ismaïl could not be very particular in his choice. He gave concessions right and left without inquiring much into the antecedents of the contractors, and he never considered "le quart d'heure de Rabelais."

<sup>502</sup> "The harbour of Alexandria is a noble work, with which are identified the names of Sir George Elliott and Messrs. Greenfield, and the cost, as entered in the Khedive's books, was 2,905,000*l.* This included 365,000*l.* interest, reducing the actual cost to 2,542,000*l.* Sir Rivers Wilson considered this an excessive charge, and caused a valuation of the works to be made, which resulted in a sum of 1,420,000*l.*, so that it would appear the contractors (as often happens in South America) had to charge 80 per cent. extra for risk. Sir George Elliott at one time feared the contract might be cancelled as leonine, and wrote to Lord Salisbury in support of Messrs. Greenfield, but Sir Rivers Wilson did not feel justified in arresting payment of the balance due."—'Egyptian Finance,' by M. G. Mulhall (*Contemporary Review*, October 1882, p. 531).

To mention a few more useful reforms, I would point out his purchase of the Egyptian post, the establishment of some 210 offices, carrying 2,500,000 letters in 1878,<sup>503</sup> the introduction of gas, the construction of the Cairo and Alexandria waterworks,<sup>504</sup> the Boulacq museum,<sup>505</sup> the national library,<sup>506</sup> the building of numerous schools<sup>507</sup> as already mentioned, the starting of rural land mortgage banks,<sup>508</sup> the subvention to steam navigation on the Nile,<sup>509</sup> &c. And in looking at the progress made in every direction, we might be able to trace a large part of the millions borrowed from Europe, and for which his enemies say that he has nothing to show "but a few lath and plaster palaces."<sup>510a</sup> Mr. M'Coan says very justly, that personally<sup>510b</sup> the Khedive<sup>510c</sup> is much less to be blamed than it has been the fashion to assume, and that he ought to be credited with the enormous material development that can in any case be set against the debt,<sup>511</sup> as satisfactorily shown by

<sup>503</sup> 'Egypt,' by Stanley Lane-Pool, p. 172.

<sup>504</sup> 'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 366.

<sup>505</sup> 'A Diary in the East,' by W. H. Russell, pp. 101 and 409 *et seq.*

<sup>506</sup> See footnote <sup>459</sup>.

<sup>507</sup> 'Egyptian Finance,' by M. G. Mulhall, p. 531.

<sup>508</sup> Ibid.

<sup>509</sup> Ibid.

<sup>510a</sup> "The statement has been broadly made, and as recklessly repeated, in print and in speech, that the Khedive 'has borrowed and raised ninety millions of money, and has nothing to show for it but a few lath and plaster palaces.' . . . A charge as unjust and rash as it is false."—'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 362.

<sup>510b</sup> 'L'Égypte et l'Europe, par un ancien juge mixte,' p. 142.

<sup>510c</sup> "C'est un prince instruit, capable, ordonné, plus régulier et plus sage que les Orientaux en général."—Speech of Prince Napoleon, Feb. 11, 1864. 'Lettres, etc., de Ferdinand de Lesseps,' p. 392.

<sup>511</sup> 'Egypt as It Is,' by G. C. M'Coan, p. 90.



the late Agent and Consul-General of the United States in his interesting work on Egypt,<sup>512</sup> where we find the following lines.

“Without attempting to act as the advocate of a prince who certainly has been very wasteful of his own and other people’s means, justice compels me to say that the charges are as unjust as they are false. This I shall proceed to prove by facts and figures, accessible to every one who will take the trouble to look them up. The truth is, that the improvements in public works begun and completed in Egypt during the past twelve years have been marvellous, unequalled by any other country.”

Twenty-five years ago Robert Stephenson commenced a single line of railway from Alexandria to Suez, little more than 230 miles in length; now there are more than 1300 miles completed, and some 10,000,000*l.* sterling have been spent recently<sup>513</sup> on railway constructions, the Khedive pushing even railways and telegraphs into the very heart of Central Africa; the Soudan line<sup>514</sup> alone will be

<sup>512</sup> ‘The Khedive’s Egypt,’ by E. de Leon, p. 362.

<sup>513</sup> This was in 1876, and about three millions will have to be added for the years 1876 to 1879.—The Author.

<sup>514</sup> After an outlay of 400,000*l.* the building of this line had to be interrupted for want of funds; yet, had Ismail been able to complete it, a few years would have sufficed to recoup his outlay, for Dongola is in the very heart of the vast cattle-breeding plains. Egypt would not only have been able to satisfy her own wants, but even those of the south of Europe, as, according to the reports of the foreign staff-officers accompanying General Stone in his exploration of Central Africa, there are herds numbering thousands of heads—in fact an unlimited supply.—The Author.

1100 miles long.<sup>515</sup> In short, Mr. de Leon substantiates his assertion that Ismail can show public works for about 30,000,000*l.* sterling.<sup>516</sup> Figures fully corroborated by even the most hostile critics, and a good deal under the mark, for everywhere the hand of Ismail can be seen, and we know that he did not do things cheaply.

Turning from the railroads to the irrigation works, we come to one of the most interesting chapters of Egyptian history. There is no doubt that nature<sup>517</sup> could not bestow upon men a greater blessing<sup>518</sup> than the Nile.<sup>519</sup> The Nile<sup>520</sup> presents an immense natural system of irrigation which man has only to direct in order to derive from it all the treasures it contains.

Thus the greatest and almost the only subject of interest to Egypt is the construction and maintenance of the canals; the more she has of them the richer she becomes. It may be imagined what the management of water means on an area of over 8000 square miles,<sup>521</sup> and those who are aware of the difficulties

<sup>515</sup> 'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 363.

<sup>516</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 367.

<sup>517</sup> "Hérodote écrivait il y a vingt siècles, l'Égypte est un don du fleuve." — 'Voyage en Égypte,' par C. F. Volney, i. p. 20.

<sup>518</sup> "Rien n'égale le respect superstitieux des habitants de l'Égypte pour le fleuve qui les nourrit." — 'Voyage en Turquie et en Égypte,' par le Comte Potocki (1784), p. 118.

<sup>519</sup> "Le Nil c'est tout l'Égypte." — 'Histoire Ancienne de l'Orient,' par J. J. Guillemain, p. 90.

<sup>520</sup> "Le fleuve nourricier de l'Égypte." — 'L'Égypte Actuelle,' par A. Guillemain, p. 160. "Toute l'existence physique et politique de l'Égypte dépend du Nil." — 'Voyage en Syrie et en Égypte,' par C. F. Volney, i. p. 17.

<sup>521</sup> 'Egypt,' by J. Barthélémy St. Hilaire, pp. 146 and 156.

of an equitable distribution of water between neighbouring grounds in our own country may be able to form an idea of the task incumbent on the Egyptian Government. Our legislation with all its scientific knowledge has not been able to settle satisfactorily these subjects of litigation and rival demands, and it would be too much to expect from the Egyptian cultivator, the prudence, wisdom, and spirit of association required to prevent continual discord. The Fellah being incapable of solving the problem, it had to be done by the ruler, or the country would have been left to ruin.<sup>522</sup> This, I imagine, is the principal and urgent cause, though not perhaps the sole one, which established despotism in Egypt. A supreme and absolute power with perfect freedom of action was wanted to protect the common interest.<sup>523</sup>

Given the infinite number of canals ramifying and intersecting one another, the population would not have been able to concert and to carry out the needful works; they were obliged to leave it in more powerful hands, and in thus transferring to their rulers the care of their means of subsistence, which depend on the management of the river, they also committed to them the absolute disposal of their lands and persons.<sup>524</sup> Thus the prosperity,<sup>525</sup> nay the

<sup>522</sup> "La fécondité du sol n'existe que grâce au Nil."—'Égypte et Turquie,' par F. de Lesseps, p. 7.

<sup>523</sup> 'Egypt,' by J. Barthélémy St. Hilaire, p. 157 *et seq.*

<sup>524</sup> Ibid.

<sup>525</sup> "La crue du Nil est en quelque sorte le thermomètre du commerce et des productions du pays."—'Commerce des Européens par l'Égypte,' par Dominique Froment, p. 21.

existence,<sup>526</sup> of Egypt, is entirely dependent on the goodwill, the energy, and the care of the power presiding over its destinies.<sup>527</sup>

We are told that Joseph was the first who established a nilometer at Memphis,<sup>528</sup> and from his days down to Mehemet Ali, "the regulator of the Nile,"<sup>529</sup> the greatness of Egypt has been closely linked with the amount of attention bestowed on this vital question, and decadence has invariably marked the neglect of this primary duty, water being the life of the country.<sup>530</sup> No wonder, therefore, that it has been of old the chief care and the chief merit of the rulers of Egypt. M. Barthélémy Saint Hilaire reminds us "that the most illustrious princes are those who devoted their attention to these labours most usefully, and the principal glory of Thotmes I. and Ramses II., or the Great, was their having constructed canals."<sup>531</sup> The simple fact that Ismaïl has added 1,500,000 feddans to the cultivated area will suffice to prove that he has emulated and surpassed his predecessors in matters of canalisation and water supply.

For all this, money and again money was wanted, and Ismaïl availed himself only too willingly of the tempting offers pressed on him by Europe, when

<sup>526</sup> "Le Nil est à l'Égypte ce que le cœur est au corps; les canaux représentent les artères."—'L'Égypte sous Méhémet Ali,' par Hamont, i. p. 204.

<sup>527</sup> 'Égypte et Turquie,' par F. de Lesseps, p. 7.

<sup>528</sup> 'The Egyptian History,' &c., by Murthadi, son of Gaphiphus (written in 1584, translated 1672 by J. Davies), p. 188.

<sup>529</sup> 'L'Égypte sous Méhémet Ali,' par Hamont, p. 196.

<sup>530</sup> "Water is the source of all Egypt's wealth and of its main internal squabbles."—'Egypt for the Egyptians,' by A. H. Montgomery, p. 9.

<sup>531</sup> 'Egypt,' by J. Barthélémy St. Hilaire, p. 156 *et seq.*

it would have been much more simple to take what Egypt was able to give, and what, in fact, she did give, for Europe has never done anything but make advances. His only preoccupation was the final aim, and he much resembled those gentlemen farmers who obtain great results, but who never calculate the cost of production. Generous and open-handed, his mania was giving, his great fault never to think of the liabilities incurred. In accepting the financial aid of the Continent, he did not discern the political consequences, nor the jealous intrigues which were to turn his monetary difficulties into a source of international meddling and encroachment. Blindfolded, Ismail allowed himself to fall into the hands of money-lenders; from high to low, all Continental usurers threw themselves upon Egypt as an easy prey. So long as he had securities to offer, the ante-rooms of his ministers were overcrowded with bankers anxious to lend him millions at a percentage prohibited by penal laws in their own country. Even after the Porte had put in a veto,<sup>532</sup> the money-lenders were equal<sup>533</sup> to the occasion, by finding means to evade a distasteful prohibition; they continued to push him to take their gold, and to mortgage Egypt, to pawn his State and his private properties up to their utmost value, renewing greedily<sup>534</sup> his bonds until they found it more advantageous to liquidate the estate. Cringing as long as they could hope to get something out

<sup>532</sup> 'Spoiling the Egyptians,' by J. Seymour Keay, p. 2. <sup>533</sup> Ibid.

<sup>534</sup> 'L'Égypte et l'Europe, par un ancien juge mixte,' p. 154.

of him, they became as threatening and as impudent as we know the money-lending tribe to be with insolvent debtors. Had his been the case of an ordinary mortal, a court of law would have reduced the outrageous claims to fair and just proportions.<sup>535</sup> But he was a Sovereign and his creditors the kings of Jews, or rather the Jews of kings, and powerful enough to bring to bear the authority and pressure of their respective governments to enforce their claims by every means available.<sup>536</sup>

A study of the Blue Books<sup>537</sup> of that period will be sufficient to condemn proceedings for which there is not even a precedent in the international meddling with Turkish finances, for when venturesome speculators have bargained for a gigantic percentage, "on account of the risk," they should take the consequences, and it is revolting to see how the Powers allowed themselves to do bailiffs' work for the money-lending confraternity. According to Mr. Cave's report (in the *Times* of May 19th, 1876), and surely there can be no better judge, Ismail and Egypt netted out of a nominal amount of a hundred millions<sup>538</sup> only forty-five millions, of which already in 1876 thirty-one millions were repaid in interest and

<sup>535</sup> In speaking one day of the iniquity of certain awards, Riaz Pasha estimated at 20 millions the imaginary claims wrongly exacted from Egypt by means of the mixed tribunals and foreign pressure.—The Author.

<sup>536</sup> "All the Consuls-General served on the Khedive on March 23rd, 1878, a note of remonstrance against the non-execution by himself, and against himself, of the decrees of the mixed courts."—"Spoiling the Egyptians," by J. Seymour Keay, p. 21 *et seq.*

<sup>537</sup> See Parliamentary Papers 2233, 2352, and 2379 of 1879.

<sup>538</sup> *Times*, May 19, 1876. See also 'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 318.

amortisation.<sup>539</sup> But even admitting that the Powers might have been justified in taking in hand the case of the Continental creditors—and I doubt whether they would have attempted anything of the kind had Egypt been a powerful State—it appeals to reason that the native creditors ought to have been put on an equal footing with the others, nay it is monstrous to think that diplomatic pressure was used<sup>540</sup> to oblige Ismail to pay the bondholders whilst his own officials, the army, &c., were not paid.<sup>541</sup>

One can well understand the bitter feeling of his subjects at seeing foreign creditors paid the utmost farthing, when their salaries were in some cases nine months in arrear, and whilst the last piastre was ground out of the Fellah.

Surely there is good reason for the hatred of the people against their foreign patrons making millions

<sup>539</sup> "According to the statement of Mr. Cave's report, the Khedive has only netted some 45,000,000*l.* on all the existing loans, State and private, which have been floated for him, and out of that he has paid back, including the last April coupon, over 31,000,000*l.* Of the remainder some 10,000,000*l.* went to defray costs connected with the Suez Canal and the unjust awards of Napoleon III. connected with it; so that but a minute sum remains which the Khedive could, by any possibility, have spent on improving his country. He can hardly have thus spent even that minute sum, because it would be needed for commissions, discounts, and market operations, and for the 'service' of the debt. Therefore, we have the huge floating debt as the sort of lumber room into which the costs of all his extravagances have been flung. The floating debts cannot reasonably be viewed as an investor's loss at all. . . ."—*Times*, May 19, 1876.

<sup>540</sup> "Lord Salisbury, by a letter dated 16th April, 1878, of which only an extract is published in the Blue Book, decided to urge payment of the coupon in preference both to the judgment creditors and the starving employés."—Parliamentary Paper 2233 of 1879. 'Spoiling the Egyptians,' by J. Seymour Keay, p. 19.

<sup>541</sup> Parliamentary Paper 2397 of 1879, p. 24.

out of Egyptian labour, whilst they, the toilers, were left to starve.<sup>542</sup>

Space does not permit me to enter into the details of the many scandalous transactions which help to swell the Khedive's debt. The natives, so reticent as a rule, tell queer tales about the origin of many claims, in fact the well-known story of a certain banker who sent Saïd Pasha a present of fruit, enforcing afterwards a claim for 15,000*l.* sterling, is only one instance out of the many common during Ismail's reign. However, figures will plead better than words could, the case of the princely spendthrift. I take from the able article<sup>543</sup> on Egyptian finance in the October number of the *Contemporary Review*,

Date.	Bank.	Nominal.	Net Product.	Issued at	Interest.	Sinking Fund.
		£	£		per cent.	per cent.
1862	Goschen .. ..	3,300,000	2,640,000	83½	7	1
1864	Goschen .. ..	5,704,000	4,864,000	98	7	4
1865	Anglo-Egyptian	3,387,000	2,750,000	90	9	3
1866	Goschen .. ..	3,000,000	2,640,000	92	7	17
1867	Imp. Ottoman	2,080,000	1,700,000	90	9	8
1868	Oppenheim ..	11,890,000	7,193,000	75	7	1
1870	Bischoffsheim ..	7,143,000	5,000,000	75	7	2½
1873	Oppenheim ..	32,000,000	17,810,000	70	7	1
1879	Rothschild ..	8,500,000	5,992,000	78	7	1
		77,004,000	50,589,000			

<sup>542</sup> An Egyptian Minister, and one of the best disposed towards us, said one day to the author, "Je me méfie des étrangers, nous avons toujours été mis dedans, on vient faire des millions, et on laisse le Fellah crever de faim ; si l'Europe demande à retrouver confiance en nous, nous demandons aussi à pouvoir en avoir en ceux qu'elle nous envoie."—The Author.

<sup>543</sup> 'Egyptian Finance,' by M. G. Mulhall (*Contemporary Review*, October 1882, p. 526).



the annexed table which gives a clear idea of the amounts borrowed and netted during his reign.

We are reminded that the Goschen loans, though the least onerous, inevitably precipitated confusion by reason of the heavy sinking fund, that the only way out of the difficulty would have been temporarily to suspend all sinking funds. Instead of that, it was attempted to stave off the evil day by giving Treasury bonds, and by contracting new liabilities on still more ruinous conditions. Thus the Oppenheim loan of 1873 was disastrous, the Khedive giving bonds for 32,000,000*l.* sterling, of which he received only 11,000,000*l.* in cash, and 9,000,000*l.* in depreciated scrip, worth 65 or at most 70 per cent., and which he was forced to accept at 93 per cent. of its nominal value, the net produce being therefore, not 20,000,000*l.*, as Mr. Cave stated, but less than 18,000,000*l.*; and for this amount the Khedive saddled himself with a fresh annual burden of 2,560,000*l.* The following year, the forced Rouznameh internal loan yielded with difficulty little more than 2,000,000*l.* New Treasury bonds were only taken at a ruinous discount, and matters drifted into such a state that Lord Derby was prevailed upon to send a Commission of Inquiry,<sup>54</sup> and the report of the Right Hon. Stephen Cave conveyed the assurance that Egypt could easily pay interest on all existing debt, assuming that the revenue from 1876 to 1885 would average 10,689,000*l.*,

<sup>54</sup> "Mr. Cave's mission implies *no* desire to interfere in the internal affairs of Egypt."—Earl Derby to Lord Lyons. State Papers, lxxxiii. (1876) p. 2.

against a cost of administration of 4,000,000*l.*; but he had to content himself with such figures as were given him.<sup>545</sup> In consequence of the high-handed conversion of all kinds of debts into what the Mouffetich Ismaïl Pasha Sadyk termed the unified debt, with a grand total of 91,000,000*l.*, the foreign bondholders took alarm, and the Right Hon. G. J. Goschen was sent out, not by our Government, but by 2500 bondholders, to re-model Egyptian finance on a different basis.

Yielding to Mr. Goschen's demands, the Khedive, by a decree of November 18th, 1876, reconstituted the debt as follows:—

Title.	Amount.	Interest.	Security.
Unified .. ..	59,000,000	4,130,000	General Revenues
Preference <sup>546</sup> ..	17,000,000	886,000	Railways, &c.
Daira .. ..	8,825,000	450,000	Khedive's estates
	84,825,000	5,466,000	

A "brilliant" result, but an impossible arrangement for Egypt, and it lasted only a few months.

Mr. Goschen had not reached England when the demands of Sir George Elliott and Messrs. Greenfield in connection with the Harbour Works of Alexandria<sup>547</sup> again reduced the Khedive to straits.

<sup>545</sup> 'Egyptian Finance,' by M. G. Mulhall (*Contemporary Review*, October 1882, p. 527).

<sup>546</sup> "The Preference stock was specially created to cover the Goschen and Oppenheim loans of 1862 and 1868; the holders receiving a bonus of 25 per cent., that is, 3,400,000*l.* in addition to 13½ millions balance due on those loans."—'Egyptian Finance,' by M. G. Mulhall, p. 527.

<sup>547</sup> See footnote <sup>542</sup>.

The Fellaheen were bastinadoed even more than before, and in order to get money to pay the bondholders the taxes were collected with energy and *in advance*.<sup>548</sup> The State revenues had been already handed over to Mr. Romaine, by Baron de Malaret and Major Baring, but were insufficient to meet the sums demanded by the Goschen arrangement.<sup>549</sup>

Sir Rivers Wilson and M. de Blignières arrived from Europe, the former to assume the rôle of finance minister, the latter that of minister of public works.

The Khedive was willing to show the bondholders how far he would go to protect their interests, and to convince them that the Goschen demands were more than the country could satisfy. The report of Sir Rivers Wilson, in August 1878, pointed out the evils from which Egypt had suffered, and proposed to increase the revenue by two ways; first, the taxation of all foreigners; secondly, the increase or equalisation of the land-tax;<sup>550</sup> for it must not be forgotten that the lands in Egypt are divided into three kinds<sup>551</sup>: Karadji, Ouchoury, and Abadieh, of which the Karadji (3,514,000 feddans) pays 22s. per feddan, whilst the Ouchoury (1,329,000 feddans) or tithe-land pays only 7s. and is exempt from the corvée on payment of 12s. per annum; the Abadieh

<sup>548</sup> "The Khedive, wrote Mr. Vivian, is compelled to collect nine months' taxes in advance; I fear this will cause the utter ruin of the peasantry, and that the bondholders will find out, perhaps too late, that they have destroyed the working bees that made the money."—'Egyptian Finance,' by M. G. Mulhall, p. 528. See also State Papers, lxxviii. (1878-79) p. 69.

<sup>549</sup> Ibid.

<sup>550</sup> 'Egyptian Finance,' by M. G. Mulhall, p. 528.

<sup>551</sup> Ibid., p. 532.

is reclaimed land, exempt from taxes for six years, and from corvée on payment of a yearly tax of 16*s.*, a manifest wrong inflicted on the hard toiling Fellah (who is the holder of the Karadji), and which requires the earnest attention of the Government, though it will meet with much opposition from the great landed proprietors, who own mostly Ouchoury lands.

Finding that the debt had risen to 92,000,000*l.* including the Daïra and floating debts, he impressed upon the Khedive that it was necessary to raise another loan, and to retrench expenditure, especially in the army. The only resources unmortgaged were the domains of the Khedivial princes and princesses, with a rent-roll of 430,000*l.* a year. The various owners having ceded them to the State, Sir Rivers Wilson concluded in November 1878, a loan of 8,500,000*l.*, at the rate of 73,<sup>553</sup> with Messrs. Rothschild<sup>553</sup> on the above security, which netted 5,992,000*l.*<sup>554</sup>

But again this was only a temporary expedient,

<sup>553</sup> "L'emprunt Rothschild est le fait le plus désastreux de toute la période qui s'est écoulée depuis le décret Goschen jusqu'au commencement de 1880."—'L'Égypte et l'Europe, par un ancien juge mixte,' p. 182.

The following little anecdote illustrates the profits made by honest brokers. "I was advised," says M. de Lesseps, in his lecture before the Société des Gens de lettres, April 1870, "to go to M. de Rothschild. . . . He said 'If you wish it I will open your subscription at my office.' 'And what will you ask me for it?' 'Good heavens, it is plain you are not a business man, it is always 5 per cent.' '5 per cent. on 8 millions, why that makes 400,000*l.*! I shall hire a place for 60*l.* and do my own business equally well.'"—The Author.

<sup>554</sup> "Notwithstanding the commission of 2½ per cent., Messrs. Rothschild delayed paying the money on finding that a number of creditors at Alexandria had already obtained a lien on the domains in question."—"Egyptian Finance," by M. G. Mulhall, p. 528. See also 'L'Égypte et l'Europe, par un ancien juge mixte,' p. 183 *et seq.* <sup>554</sup> *Ibid.*

and though the Khedive and his family readily gave up their entire private property, the exaggerated demands of the bondholders on one side, and the exasperation of an overtaxed population, of starving officials, and of an unpaid army on the other, brought matters to a climax.

Pressed by the legitimate discontent caused by the repeal of the Moukabalah,<sup>554</sup> and by the justified claims of 2500 officers for their arrears,<sup>555</sup> the Khedive resorted to a *coup d'état*, and dismissed the Cabinet<sup>556</sup> presided over by his son, Tewfik, and which included Nubar Pasha, and the European ministers.

By calling a popular native ministry under Cherif, assisted by a Chamber of Notables, he only used his right, and hoped to give satisfaction to his people, tired of systematic plundering, and of being heartlessly sacrificed to foreign creditors. The result was a diplomatic and financial coalition<sup>557</sup> against a

<sup>554</sup> "The Moukabalah, about which so much has been written, was a forced loan, whereby the Fellaheen were compelled to pay some 10 millions of land-tax in advance, and to compensate them it was agreed to refund them 150,000*l.* a year for fifty years."—'Egyptian Finance,' by M. G. Mulhall, p. 529 (*Contemporary Review*, Oct. 1882). See also 'L'Égypte et l'Europe, par un ancien juge mixte,' p. 160.

<sup>555</sup> "An *émeute* which took place at Cairo, Feb. 1879, by 2500 unpaid officers, would have resulted in the murder of Ismail Pasha, and the massacre of all the Europeans, but for the timely prudence of the Khedive, who dismissed Sir Rivers Wilson and M. de Blignières. This was resented by Lord Salisbury and M. Waddington, and in June 1879, the Sultan was induced to issue a *Hatt* deposing Ismail, and appointing his son in his room."—'Egyptian Finance,' by M. G. Mulhall, p. 529.

<sup>556</sup> "Le 7 Avril le Khédive renvoya le cabinet que présidait son fils le Khédive actuel, et le remplaça par un ministère indigène qui devait être responsable devant une chambre des députés à organiser. . . . Ce n'était en réalité que la juste et légitime revendication de son autorité souveraine et des droits de son pays."—'La Question Égyptienne,' 1881, p. 18 *et seq.*

<sup>557</sup> "Conséquemment ils (les créanciers) organisèrent contre le malheureux

sovereign who dared to plead the cause of his subjects with the bailiffs in possession. Of this I shall have to say a word hereafter, but as the international commission (sitting at Cairo, after Ismail's resignation) fixed the obligations of Egypt at 105,876,630*l.*,<sup>558</sup> it will be interesting to see how this amount has been spent. It has been previously shown that what she actually received was only 42,000,000*l.*<sup>559</sup> (Mr. Cave puts it at 45,000,000*l.*,<sup>560</sup> Mr. Dicey at 40,000,000*l.*).<sup>561</sup>

To Mr. Cave's 45 millions have to be added the revenues of seventeen years, which taking the average, and this is taking it fairly, at 7,250,000*l.* per annum<sup>561</sup> would give a total of 123,250,000*l.*, not including the proceeds of the Moukabalah, about 17,000,000*l.* Thus summing up the proceeds of loans, the annual revenue, and the Moukabalah, a grand total of 185,250,000*l.* would have to be accounted for.

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prince une guerre enragée qui culmina dans l'ignoble journal appelé 'Bulletin des créanciers du gouvernement Égyptien,' où on le traita publiquement, dans son propre pays, comme le dernier des coquins, et on le traîna dans la boue, sans qu'il osât souffler mot."—'L'Égypte et l'Europe, par un ancien juge mixte,' p. 157.

<sup>558</sup> 'Egyptian Finance,' by M. G. Mulhall, p. 529.

<sup>559</sup> *Times*, May 19, 1876. 'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. D. Leon, p. 318.

<sup>560</sup> 'England and Egypt,' by E. Dicey, p. 105.

<sup>561</sup> According to a statement published in 1874 by Messrs. Oppenheim, 'Notes sur le Budget Égyptien avec documents à l'appui,' p. 41, the annual revenues were:—

1863.. ..	£4,813,970	1868.. ..	£7,277,785
1864.. ..	5,649,795	1869.. ..	7,181,247
1865.. ..	5,706,919	1870.. ..	7,193,465
1866.. ..	5,937,710	1871.. ..	7,088,700
1867.. ..	6,932,119	1872.. ..	7,409,491

Increasing gradually to 8,032,213*l.* See "Budget provisoire pour l'exercice," 1878; the average may be taken as 7,250,000*l.*—The Author.

Putting the expenses of the Administration during seventeen years, not as Mr. Cave puts it at four millions, but at only 3,800,000*l.*, we arrive at—

1. Expenses of administration, 17 years at 3,800,000 <i>l.</i> ..	64,600,000
2. Tribute, 17 years at 681,486 <i>l.</i> .. .. .	11,585,262
3. Suez Canal, without including 5,328,000 <i>l.</i> for interest, and 3,927,000 proceeds of shares to the English Government <sup>563</sup> .. .. .	6,770,000
4. Canals <sup>563</sup> .. .. .	12,600,000
5. Railway, including 400,000 <i>l.</i> for the Soudan line <sup>563</sup> ..	13,361,000
6. Alexandria harbour, including interest 363,000 <i>l.</i> <sup>563</sup> ..	2,905,000
7. Suez docks <sup>563</sup> .. .. .	1,510,000
8. Telegraphs <sup>563</sup> .. .. .	853,000
9. Lighthouses <sup>563</sup> .. .. .	188,000
10. Société Agricole, Widow and Orphan Fund, &c. <sup>564</sup> ..	2,000,000
11. Alexandria waterworks <sup>563</sup> .. .. .	300,000
12. Buildings, improvements, gas, &c., at Cairo, Alexandria, and Suez <sup>564</sup> .. .. .	3,000,000
13. Bridges <sup>565</sup> .. .. .	2,150,000
14. Sugar and paper-mills and other establishments, including 2,404,206 <i>l.</i> paid to the Aziziéh Company <sup>565</sup> .. ..	6,100,000
15. Indemnity on account of the cattle murrain <sup>566</sup> .. ..	3,938,000
16. Khedivieh line of steamers and other steamboats <sup>566</sup> ..	1,350,171
Carried forward .. .. .	£133,210,433

<sup>562</sup> 'Egyptian Finance,' by M. G. Mulhall, p. 529. Mr. Dicey ('England and Egypt,' p. 108) puts it at 10 millions. Messrs. Oppenheim in 'Notes sur le Budget Égyptien,' p. 42, put it down (in 1874) at 10,377,131*l.* *The Edinburgh Review* (Jan. 1876) quoting from Mr. Dervien's pamphlet, published 1871, gives the amount spent by the Khedive as 16 millions. Mr. E. de Leon ('Khedive's Egypt,' p. 364) gives it as 17 millions. Mr. P. Fitzgerald ('The Great Canal at Suez,' ii. p. 76 *et seq.*) goes to the other extreme and accepts only 5,565,374*l.* as the widest margin, nay, would even make out that the Khedive has netted a profit of 1,384,626*l.* by his connection with the Canal, an extraordinary feat of financial conjuring.

<sup>563</sup> 'Egyptian Finance,' by M. G. Mulhall, p. 529.

<sup>564</sup> 'Notes sur le Budget Égyptien, 1873-74' (Messrs. Oppenheim), pp. 43 and 44.

<sup>565</sup> 'Egyptian Finance,' by M. G. Mulhall, p. 529.

<sup>566</sup> 'Notes sur le Budget Égyptien, 1873-74' (Messrs. Oppenheim), p. 44.

	Brought forward .. .. .	133,210,433
17.	Expedition to Abyssinia, and expedition to the Soudan (Sir Samuel Baker <sup>567</sup> and Colonel Gordon <sup>568</sup> ) .. ..	2,000,000
18.	Debt of the late Government <sup>569</sup> .. .. .	2,755,000
19.	Purchase of the Egyptian post <sup>570</sup> .. .. .	46,068
20.	Redemption of village debts <sup>569</sup> .. .. .	1,274,000
21.	Army equipment and material <sup>571</sup> .. .. .	2,000,000
22.	Schools <sup>572</sup> .. .. .	3,600,000
23.	National Library <sup>573</sup> .. .. .	40,000
24.	Loss by cutting the dams on his own properties to save the Fellaḥ lands from inundation in 1875 .. ..	900,000
25.	Loss on the Nile Steamboat Company <sup>574</sup> .. .. .	155,000
	Total .. .. .	£145,980,501

To this total of 145,980,501*l.* have to be added the cost of the expeditions to Turkey and to Candia, the forts of Aboukir and others, the extra expenses of the Court not covered by the Civil List, the princely donations to Europeans as well as to natives, the sums expended at Constantinople for the succession and on succeeding occasions (which could not be put down at less than 3,000,000*l.*), and last but not least the interest and amortisation paid on the various loans between 1862 and 1879, and for which 45,000,000*l.* may safely be put down, as the *Times* of May 19th, 1876, estimates the amount in 1876 already at 31,000,000*l.*, to which interest for three years at the

<sup>567</sup> "Coût de la Mission de Sir S. Baker pour la suppression de l'esclavage, 474,063*l.*"—'Notes sur le Budget Égyptien,' 1873-74, p. 44.

<sup>568</sup> 'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 366.

<sup>569</sup> 'Notes sur le Budget, 1873-74,' p. 43.

<sup>570</sup> 'Egypt,' by Stanley Lane-Poole, p. 179.

<sup>571</sup> 'England and Egypt,' by E. Dicey, p. 108.

<sup>572</sup> 'Egyptian Finance,' by M. G. Mulhall, p. 531.

<sup>573</sup> Ismail purchased the valuable collection of MSS. of his late brother Mustapha Pasha Fazil for 30,000*l.* from the executors, presenting the whole to the National Library, on which he expended in addition more than 10,000*l.*—The Author.

<sup>574</sup> 'Egyptian Finance,' by M. G. Mulhall, p. 531.



rate of 5,782,829*l.* (according to the Budget of 1878) has to be added. Thus estimating the expenditure for which data are wanted, and without taking into account the enormous interest paid on Treasury bonds issued at an average rate of 15 per cent. discount per annum, roughly at 8,000,000*l.* we arrive at a sum total of 198,980,501*l.* against total of receipts 185,250,000*l.*, which leaves about 13,000,000*l.* to the credit of Ismail, and accounted for by his own private property, amounting to 4,000,000*l.* before his accession, by the private property of his family valued at over 10,000,000*l.*,<sup>576</sup> and given up in 1878, and by items paid out of ordinary expenditure which ought to have been deducted from the 64,600,000*l.*

Although the bondholders have inculcated the impression that Ismail Pasha squandered the money which he obtained from Europe,<sup>576</sup> it is beyond controversy that they had it all back themselves, and that Egypt herself paid, in addition, for all public works. Indeed, the above will give a rough idea of their magnitude, and of Ismail's restless activity in every direction; thus an estimate may be formed of the heavy outlay required by a series of great works carried out on a scale far beyond, not the wants, but the resources of the country.<sup>577</sup> Yet in the great things accomplished will be found an excuse, not to say a justification, for the enormous debt, and notwithstanding the doubling of the tribute to the Porte, with other large but unconfessed disbursements at

<sup>576</sup> 'Egyptian Finance,' by M. G. Mulhall, p. 528.      <sup>576</sup> Ibid., p. 529.

<sup>577</sup> 'La ruine de l'Égypte,' par T. Faucon, p. 7.

Stamboul,<sup>578</sup> the Fellah begins to reap the fruits of Ismail's improvements. Whatever his faults, he raised Egypt in the scale of nations, as will be seen in the following table<sup>579</sup> :—

	Last Year of Said Pasha. 1862.	Last Year of Ismail Pasha. 1879.
Acres tilled .. .. .	4,052,000	5,425,000
Value of Imports .. .. .	1,991,000 <i>l</i> .	5,410,000 <i>l</i> .
„ Exports .. .. .	4,454,000 <i>l</i> .	13,810,000 <i>l</i> .
Revenue .. .. .	4,937,000 <i>l</i> .	8,562,000 <i>l</i> .
Public Debt .. .. .	3,800,000 <i>l</i> .	98,540,000 <i>l</i> .
Number of Public Schools ..	185	4,817
Railways (miles) .. .. .	275	1,185
Telegraphs „ .. .. .	630	5,820
Canals „ .. .. .	44,000	52,400
Population .. .. .	4,833,000	5,518,000

Nothing could be more eloquent than a comparison of the two reigns, and we find against the debt the revenues doubled, imports more than doubled, exports trebled, the area of cultivated land increased by a million and a half of feddans (almost 30 per cent.), and in addition the vastly increased net of canals, railways, roads, telegraphs, &c. If this has been the result of a reign undoubtedly burdened with extraordinary obligations like the purchase of the succession, the Suez Canal, the expeditions to Candia, Abyssinia, and the Soudan, by calamities like the cattle murrain,<sup>580</sup> an administration extravagant

<sup>578</sup> 'La ruine de l'Égypte,' par T. Faucon, p. 7.

<sup>579</sup> 'Egyptian Finance,' by M. G. Mulhall, p. 531.

<sup>580</sup> "Ismail Pasha has been very active, but there have been as many calamities in his short reign as during Pharaoh's, and ill-luck makes a man unpopular."—'Letters from Egypt,' by Lady Duff-Gordon, p. 114.

and reckless like that of Ismail, dishonest and corrupt like that of the Mouffetich, what would have been the result had the Khedive had an able *Egyptian* financier of the stamp of Mr. Goschen or Sir Rivers Wilson,<sup>581</sup> or Blum Pasha? His misfortune was that the doctors were called in when the patient was beyond recovery; "in fact it may be said that European intervention contributed only to make the condition of the unfortunate country worse than before."<sup>582</sup>

Previous to closing this chapter we must say a few words about the extension of the territory, for which he has been so loudly denounced.<sup>583</sup> It must be remembered that he inherited the greater part of those vast outlying dominions, that Europe pushed him to put an end to the slave trade which had its centre in those parts. There was only one way of doing so efficaciously, by putting an end to the independence of the slave-dealing tribes.

It would be impossible to overstate the humanitarian object, to which the Prince of Wales has certainly the merit of having given an impulse during his stay in Egypt.<sup>584</sup> In fact, the final

<sup>581</sup> 'Egyptian Finance,' by M. G. Mulhall, p. 526.

<sup>582</sup> 'L'Egypte et l'Europe, par un ancien juge mixte,' p. 180.

<sup>583</sup> "The Khedive has been loudly denounced in Europe for an insane ambition in extending his explorations and annexations into Central Africa, and most loudly by those who know least about the matter; who, counting only the cost in cash expended, and the net results thus far obtained, consider his projects in that direction as no better than idle dreams. Yet the Khedive did not create, but inherited these outlying provinces, to which he indeed has annexed others, and sought to annex more; but his main purpose has been to make these dependencies of Egypt pay."—'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 342.

<sup>584</sup> 'Diary in the East,' by W. H. Russell, p. 384.

arrangements concerning Sir Samuel Baker's appointment and expedition, were entirely due to the initiative of His Royal Highness.<sup>585</sup> The good effected by Sir Samuel, and after him by Colonel Gordon, and more recently by Gessi Pasha,<sup>586</sup> is beyond controversy. But in addition to the purely philanthropic side of the question, Ismaïl had contemplated opening new fields for the commerce of the world. The interesting writings of Sir Samuel Baker,<sup>587</sup> Colonel Gordon,<sup>588</sup> and others,<sup>589</sup> give a faint idea of what might be done. And although it may be said that he embarked on a dubious enterprise,<sup>590</sup> it should be remembered that had he been permitted to complete the Soudan Railway, he would have connected a country inhabited by eleven millions of his subjects with Egypt proper; the provinces of Berber, Dongola, Khartoum, and even Kordofan, Darfour, &c., would have found an easy outlet for their products, and cotton worth 2 talaris (8s.) in those parts and 16 talaris in the Delta would have given a large margin of profit. Surely it was not an extravagant expenditure to devote three millions sterling—that is, six shillings per head—

<sup>585</sup> 'Diary in the East,' by W. H. Russell, p. 384.

<sup>586</sup> Gessi Pasha died in 1881, a victim to the deadly climes in which he had been so nobly working for the great cause of the abolition of slavery and the slave trade.—The Author.

<sup>587</sup> 'Ismailia,' &c., by Sir Samuel W. Baker. 'L'Afrique équatoriale,' etc., par Sir S. W. Baker (abrégé par H. Vattemare).

<sup>588</sup> Publications of Egyptian General Staff and 'Colonel Gordon in Central Africa, 1874-1879,' from original letters, &c., by G. B. Hill.

<sup>589</sup> 'Uganda and the Egyptian Soudan,' by the Rev. C. T. Wilson and the Rev. R. W. Felkin. 'Mémoire sur le Commerce des Nègres,' etc., par C. L. Frank.

<sup>590</sup> 'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 170.

to put eleven millions of his subjects in contact with civilisation. Besides, Dongola would have been within easy reach of vast herds of cattle, and he would have been able, instead of importing every year thousands, to supply his own wants from the hundred thousands "fat and sleek" found in those provinces. Nay, more, he might have succeeded in doing it so cheaply as to export even cattle to Europe.<sup>591</sup> It was to obtain this grand result that he projected the railway from Waddy Halfa to Khartoum at an estimated cost of only 3,500,000*l.* sterling.<sup>592</sup> But after spending about half a million, the wants of the bondholders put a stop to an enterprise which, if completed, would have amply covered its cost after a couple of years. Moreover, as I have said before, the land near its southern terminus is capable of producing the finest crops of cotton, grain, and sugar in unlimited quantities;<sup>593</sup> but unavailable at present considering that the mode of traffic between Khartoum and Cairo involves five changes.<sup>594</sup> And thus we see again the future and prospective advantages of Egypt sacrificed to the imperious requirements of European creditors. The object, in a humanitarian, as well as in a fiscal point of view, was laudable, and if Ismail's ambition were

<sup>591</sup> 'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 378.

<sup>592</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 352.

<sup>593</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 356.

<sup>594</sup> "The present mode of conducting the traffic from Khartoum involves five changes to Cairo, the cargoes being taken in native boats down the Nile, at Aboo Hammed; whence it is taken across the Nubian desert on camels to Korosko; again transferred to boats, and carried down to the first cataract; thence on camels to Shelal, to Assouan; and thence again in boats down the Nile to Boulak."—*Ibid.*, p. 353.

greater than the means of gratifying it, let us remember that ambition "is the sin by which fell the angels,"<sup>595</sup> but by which all great ends have been secured.

And now let us look at that gigantic stumbling-block which has been the cause, at any rate the origin, of Egypt's troubles and financial collapse. There is, of course, but one voice that it is for the benefit of mankind,<sup>596a</sup> and the name of the projector and of his liberal patron will for all time remain connected with this great enterprise; yet it cannot be denied that the very country which contributed most to its completion, is the country which benefited least by the Canal, which brought upon it a loss of traffic,<sup>596</sup> a great public debt, and a foreign intervention. An opinion not new, for in a letter quoted by H.I. and R.H. Prince Rudolph,<sup>597</sup> Brugsch Pasha

<sup>595</sup> 'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 170.

<sup>596a</sup> "The formation of the Suez Canal was for the happiness of mankind."—Speech of Mr. Roebuck, House of Commons, June 1, 1858. "The Suez Canal was made for the benefit of the world."—Resolutions and Speech of the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone on the Eastern Question in the House of Commons, May 7, 1877.—See also Letter of Prince Gortschakoff to Count Schouvaloff, May 18/30, 1877.

<sup>596</sup> 'L'Égypte et l'Europe, par un ancien juge mixte,' p. 203.

<sup>597</sup> Brugsch Pasha, in a letter quoted by the Crown Prince Rudolph of Austria, says: "Den klassischen Ueberlieferungen zu folge, war Ramses II. der erste König, welcher durch einen von dem pelusischen Nilarme ausgehenden Canal die fahrbare Wasserstrasse nach dem Krokodil-See herstellte. . . . In den späteren Zeiten scheint der Canal verfallen und versiegt zu sein; dann gegen 600 vor Chr. Geb. fasste König Necho den Plan, die Verbindung zwischen dem Nil und dem Rothen Meer herzustellen, gab aber das Unternehmen (bei dem 120,000 arbeitende Aegypter zu Grunde gingen) wieder auf, als ihm ein Orakel die Warnung ertheilte er arbeite nur für die Barbaren d. h. für Ausländer."—'Eine Orientreise,' ii. p. 63 *et seq.* (by H.I. and R.H. Crown Prince Rudolph). See also 'Das heutige Aegypten,' von H. Stephan, p. 425 *et seq.*; also 'L'Égypte en 1845,' par Victor Schoelcher, p. 65.

good done to the commerce and shipping of the universe is undoubted, and equally evident are the flagrant wrongs inflicted on Egypt; but the greater the benefits we have all derived, the greater ought to be our indulgence towards a people who have borne almost the whole loss of an enterprise so prejudicial to their own interest. "Had I not been forced to honour the signature of my predecessor," said Ismaïl one day to the author, "I should have made the Canal *myself*<sup>610</sup>; it would not have cost more, and at least would have belonged to Egypt."

Nothing could be more true, and events have proved that the Canal has been the *Alpha and Omega* of all recent troubles in the Nile delta, of the misfortunes of Egypt, and of the fall of Ismaïl.<sup>611</sup>

Though the Khedive, in spending recklessly, has laid the germ of a future harvest, he does not acquit himself<sup>612</sup> of blame. Much, indeed, might have been spared Egypt and him had he been less enamoured of Europeans, and had he surrounded himself with men—foreigners and natives—less pre-occupied with making their own fortunes.<sup>612a</sup>

<sup>610</sup> "Le Vice-Roi se croit de bonne foi, capable de faire le Canal; il se trompe."—Speech of Prince Napoleon, Feb. 15, 1864. 'Lettres, etc. de Lesseps,' p. 402.

<sup>611</sup> Curiously enough, the very man who contributed most to the fall of Ismaïl, M. Tricou, Consul-General of France, when passing last winter through Suez, told a friend of the author's that there was nothing he regretted so much as having been instrumental to it.—The Author.

<sup>612</sup> "A prince who is not deceived by illusions, and forestalls criticism by criticising most severely himself, is a thing that the traveller does not meet with every day."—'The Fellah,' by Edmond About,' p. 169 (translated by Sir Randal Roberts).

<sup>612a</sup> "L'histoire des finances européenno-égyptiennes sous Ismaïl est scandaleuse. C'était la spoliation organisée du vice-roi, du pays, des fellahs,

a concession that was handing Egypt over to speculators<sup>606</sup> and foreign intervention. Ismail on his accession found himself pledged to a treaty backed by the Governments of Europe; he faced the difficulties in a liberal and public-spirited manner,<sup>606</sup> and notwithstanding the heavy cost due to Saïd's imprudent<sup>607</sup> concession, and to the stupendous indemnity adjudged by the Emperor Napoleon III., he fulfilled his part to the satisfaction even of M. de Lesseps.<sup>608</sup> The completion is the work of Ismail,<sup>609</sup> whilst he cannot justly be made responsible for the financial disaster it entailed. The pressure put upon him was greater than he could resist, nay when he contemplated putting a stop to the iniquitous *corvée*, Europe and the Canal Company, instead of assisting him in this noble work, made it almost impossible, and Egypt had to pay an additional 3,300,000*l.* sterling to free herself from a ruinous bondage. The monetary sacrifices can be traced, but how are we to estimate the loss of life, the loss of labour, the ruin indirectly brought on the Fellah taken from his own fields, to toil for M. de Lesseps and the world at large? It is a page of contemporary history which would require volumes. The

<sup>606</sup> "Spéculateurs et voleurs européens."—*L'Égypte et l'Europe*, par un ancien juge mixte, p. 200.

<sup>606</sup> "The Viceroy had acted in a very liberal, enlightened, and public-spirited manner, and had shown a noble ambition of employing the resources of his country, not upon objects of a personal nature . . . but in a work which claimed the merit of great permanent advantage and of public utility."—Speech of Lord Haddo, House of Commons, June 1, 1858.

<sup>607</sup> 'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 363 *et seq.*

<sup>608</sup> 'Lettre de M. de Lesseps au duc d'Albufeira, March 10, 1863. 'Lettres, etc. de Ferdinand de Lesseps,' p. 284.

<sup>609</sup> 'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 363.



good done to the commerce and shipping of the universe is undoubted, and equally evident are the flagrant wrongs inflicted on Egypt; but the greater the benefits we have all derived, the greater ought to be our indulgence towards a people who have borne almost the whole loss of an enterprise so prejudicial to their own interest. "Had I not been forced to honour the signature of my predecessor," said Ismaïl one day to the author, "I should have made the Canal *myself*<sup>610</sup>; it would not have cost more, and at least would have belonged to Egypt."

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<sup>612a</sup> "L'histoire des finances européenno-égyptiennes sous Ismaïl est scandaleuse. C'était la spoliation organisée du vice-roi, du pays, des fellahs,

He wanted a Colbert, and found only a bevy of second-rate Laws, *sans jeu de mots*.

To judge Ismaïl we must not use Continental weights and measures, for as Sir Charles Dilke says,<sup>612b</sup> "It is probable that his government was on the whole not worse than Eastern despotisms always are."

Ismaïl would probably have preferred reigning over people able to share his responsibilities, instead of over a country where everything had to be created, and where no wish for improvement existed.<sup>612c</sup>

We have seen what he wanted to do,<sup>612d</sup> and what he did. If he has made mistakes he has suffered cruelly for them, and "though he were unsatisfied in getting, yet ever in bestowing he was most princely"; in fact what must console him is having ensured the succession to his son—to his dynasty, and autonomy to Egypt—a blessing for future generations.

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. . . . au profit des Européens et de leur suite. Lorsque enfin la banqueroute éclata, la spoliation atteignit son maximum, 1° dans la conversion de la dette par le groupe français et dans celle de M. Goschen " . . . —' L'Égypte et l'Europe, par un ancien juge mixte,' p. 341.

<sup>612b</sup> "Coming to Egypt from India, the Englishman is inclined to believe that while our Indian government is an averagely successful despotism, Egypt is misgoverned in an extraordinary degree. As a matter of fact, however, it is not fair to the King of Egypt that we should compare his rule with ours in India, and it is probable that his government is not on the whole worse than Eastern despotisms always are."—'Greater Britain,' by Sir C. W. Dilke, Bart., M.P., p. 567.

<sup>612c</sup> "L'Égyptien n'a guère encore appris qu'à se laisser exploiter."—'L'Égypte, la basse Nubie et le Sinai. Relation d'après les notes tenues pendant le voyage de S. A. R. Monseigneur le Duc de Brabant en 1862 et 1863, par le Dr. Staquez,' p. xiv.

<sup>612d</sup> "Il voulait dans le bonheur et la prospérité de son peuple, le bonheur et la prospérité de ses descendants."—Ibid., p. 17.

## IV.

## TEWFIK.

THE reign of Mehemet Tewfik Pasha may be divided into three parts: before, during, and after the crisis. Called to take his father's place under circumstances as painful to a son as to a true patriot, he resigned himself to the tutelage of England and France.

I said before that he might have declined the barren honour, but it would have been sacrificing the dynasty, and his children's inheritance.

The dignity of the Khedivate had been gravely shaken by the manner in which Ismail's retirement had been brought about.<sup>613</sup> In making his successor a mere figure-head, in stripping him of all influence and of his legitimate share of power, England and France undermined the principle of authority, without which no government is possible in the East.<sup>614</sup> The Powers had got rid of Ismail in order to have their own way in Egypt, and in substituting for the late Khedive a successor without a will of his own, without initiative, they simply wanted to give to the Anglo-French rule an Egyptian label.

<sup>613</sup> See p. 22.<sup>614</sup> See pp. 22 and 23.

But in starting their co-operative venture England and France overlooked the immediate consequences.

Already Lord Salisbury's<sup>615</sup> high-handed interference in favour of the bondholders, and his utter disregard of the just and legitimate claims of the people of Egypt, officials, army, and Fellaheen, had not contributed to gain us, or Europe, the sympathies of the Khedive's subjects; indifferent as they are to their own affairs, surely they could not be expected to hail with joy a foreign control, a foreign interference.

The Pashas, though most of them Turks, not Egyptians,<sup>616</sup> resented being shelved; the officials saw their bread taken from them by strangers to the land; the army trembled at impending reductions; and the Fellah, whom order and equalised taxation would have benefited, preferred the old ways to European justice, for the one reason that Orientals hate any disturbance of time-honoured usages and customs; they hate change and like to be left alone. As to the Khedive, one need only remember the high opinion Oriental rulers have of their dignity, of their power, of an authority undisputed, unchallenged, infallible; and even Tewfik, young, inexperienced, unassuming, must have gnashed his teeth at seeing foreign officials dictate to him and to his ministers, and frequently in a most offensive way, though in justice to our representatives I will

<sup>615</sup> See Parliamentary Papers 2352 and 2397 (1879).

<sup>616</sup> "Les Osmanlis sont étrangers en Égypte."—"Aperçu général sur l'Égypte," par A. B. Clot Bey, p. 123.

say that I have never heard the Khedive or his ministers complain of any want of form from English officials, but doubtless others made up for it.<sup>617</sup> We may well imagine how Khedive, Pashas, and people must have secretly longed for the riddance of a hateful incubus.

This was the immediate effect of our dualism in Egypt. But though apparently approving the Anglo-French Control, and willing to let the two Powers act as the delegates of Europe, it is sheer nonsense to suppose the other great Powers, especially Italy, would accept a position debarring them from all share in the Control.<sup>618</sup> The Cabinets of Berlin and Vienna may not have looked on Egypt as a field for immediate and direct operation, but more as the arena where others would have to tilt. Prince Gortschakoff's well-known quotation, "*La Russie se recueille,*" applies equally to Egypt. Russia plays a waiting game and is in no hurry to precipitate matters; Italy, with the craving of all young powers for extension, for colonies, for influence, felt more than any other the secondary position allotted her at Cairo. With undoubted immediate interests, for, next to the Greeks, she has the largest foreign colony in Egypt, the Dual Control was to her a fresh humiliation, after finding herself already thwarted at Tunis. It can therefore not be surprising that from

<sup>617</sup> Ministers and Khedive complained openly of the *sans-gêne* of officials coming to the palace in shooting jackets and pot hats, men who would not dare to enter the anteroom of a Republican Minister at home without being in evening dress at 8 A.M.—The Author.

<sup>618</sup> 'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 382.

the first, the agents of the other Powers welcomed with secret satisfaction any obstacles thrown into the way of England and France; nay a good many difficulties might have been avoided, had they not made it their business to put the Khedive, the Ministers, the Controllers, the Pashas, and all malcontents against each other.

Then, more powerful than the rest, there was the Sultan. In appealing to him to depose Ismail,<sup>619</sup> the Powers had revived the old longing for a footing in Egypt. During Ismail's reign the Sultan had lost ground, the Khedive's millions had loosened the nominal tie linking the Nile valley to the Ottoman empire; Ismail's authority and watchfulness had prevented a secret and underhand propaganda. With the foreigner, the *Giaour*, ruling in Egypt, with a zero as Khedive, the Porte thought the opportunity too good not to try her hand at reconquering an effective share in the management of a country whose boundless resources must be tempting to an empty exchequer. Seeing his authority appealed to by the Powers, seeing his rights to Egypt recognised in theory, it was logical that Abd-ul-Hamid should have contemplated its practical revival. The dislike of the natives to foreign tutelage, at any rate in an offensive form, and the jealousies of the Western Powers, were welcome

<sup>619</sup> "La première des trois causes de la crise que traverse l'Égypte, c'est l'action *troublante* de la Porte, qui a fait du recours à sa haute intervention que la France et l'Angleterre lui ont adressé contre le Khédive Ismail, le point de départ de prétensions à une reprise de possession complète de l'Égypte."—"La Question Égyptienne," 1881, p. 1.

allies, whilst his spiritual authority assured him an occult influence with the Ulemas. Pan-Islamism became the watchword, the solidarity of faith was contemplated as the stepping-stone for Ottoman power. Furthermore, chance willed it that the military movement offered additional means for estranging the population from both the Khedive and the Control, and for sowing dissension in the camp of those whom he wished to oust.

With such divergent interests, with intrigues in every direction, what was Tewfik to do?

The nominal ruler, yet a tool of the Control, he could not even rely on a thorough understanding of England and France. The Control was a *mariage de convenance*, and there was no affection, much less identical interests, to cement it.

Isolated from his family, trusting no one, and trusted by no one, the unfortunate prince was reduced to the part of chief mourner to the Khedivate.

Having certainly just reasons for complaint, and not daring to reproach the Powers, who had put him into these straits, he was dissatisfied with the Controllers they had sent to take his lawful place, and with his ministers, with the two who between them had left him nothing but a name. He complained to his ministers of the Controllers, to the Controllers of his ministers, and to his surroundings of both.<sup>620</sup>

<sup>620</sup> "Esprit timide, le jeune prince rendait sa déchéance plus flagrante par sa manière d'être. A Riaz Pacha il se plaignait sans cesse des empiètements du Contrôle. Au Contrôle il se plaignait des exigences de Riaz. A ceux qui l'approchèrent il se plaignait de tous les deux."—'La Question Égyptienne,' 1881, p. 32.

What wonder to see him drift from right to left, when no one, least of all the Khedive himself, had any notion of what his attributes were really to be! And it was no easy task for the young prince to feel his way in this maze of intrigues, and to satisfy his own people, the Control, the other Powers, and the Porte.

Never sure of the next day, he worked in a half-hearted manner with his own ministry. In every direction he saw new curtailments of the platonic powers allotted him by his patrons.

He viewed with suspicion Cherif Pasha's programme embodying a Chamber of Notables, and the outlines for a future constitution. Tewfik saw in it only an attempt to wrench the last vestige of initiative from the hands of the Khedive. When Riaz succeeded Cherif, the all-absorbing individuality of his new Premier was equally unpalatable to His Highness; Cherif represented the embryo of national sovereignty, Riaz the omnipotence of a Grand Vizir. In both he saw the servants of Egypt, not of "Effendina," the embodiment of irresponsible kingship. Not devoid of good intentions, too weak to struggle, Tewfik resigned himself to his fate. In the Occident he would have made a first-rate constitutional monarch, but we are in Egypt. The Control ruled supreme, the Khedive's ministers presided over the interior administration, and both Controllers and ministers were necessarily credited with the merit of all reforms, whilst the mistakes of the system were invariably attributed to the Khedive.



All grievances, home or foreign, were addressed to him, he was made responsible for all wrongs; he was the centre of all reproaches, and on his head were accumulated the discontent and hatred of the aggrieved.

Foreign interference had done away with the privileges of the Pashas, with their monopoly of practically governing the land; and damaged in their material interests, suffering in their *amour propre*, they did not look upon the Control with unmitigated joy, and resented even more than the loss of their appointments, the cavalier manners and that offensive patronising way so common to European officials abroad. The Fellaheen, the most hard-working, docile, and easily governed race on the face of the globe,<sup>621</sup> though possibly better off than ever, less hardly pressed for taxes,<sup>622</sup> and able to get justice—at least compared with former days—was nevertheless far from hailing the new state of things with satisfaction. To him innovations good or bad are hateful,<sup>623</sup> he is at the present day precisely as he was

<sup>621</sup> 'L'Égypte actuelle,' by A. Guillemin, p. 156. 'Égypte et Turquie,' par F. de Lesseps, p. 6. 'England's Intervention in Egypt,' by E. Dicey, p. 164. 'L'Égypte sous Méhémet-Ali,' par Hamont, i. p. 204. 'Egypt,' by J. Barthélémy St. Hilaire, p. 91 *et seq.* 'Lettres sur l'Égypte contemporaine,' par E. Gellion-Danglar, p. 208. 'Modern Egyptians,' by E. W. Lane, p. 293 *et seq.* 'Tchevet-el-Nazerine,' par Sheikh Abdullah-el-Charkaouy, p. 8.

<sup>622</sup> 'Aegypten,' A. von Kremer, p. 89. "En Égypte, dit Ammien Marcellin, il y a de la honte à payer le tribut de bonne grâce et sans y avoir été forcé à coups de fouet."—'Correspondance d'Orient,' par M. Michaud et M. Poujoulat, v. p. 80.

<sup>623</sup> "The ancient Egyptians were averse to change, preferring in all things to remain as they were rather than risk the uncertainty of reform."—'Cleopatra's Needle,' by Erasmus Wilson, p. 33.

4000 years ago<sup>624</sup>; this immutability, this indifference to improvement, is his general and hereditary characteristic. Otherwise, far from deficient in intelligence,<sup>625</sup> his endemic fatalism<sup>626</sup> is the cause of his stationary status.<sup>627</sup>

Of old fated to work for others,<sup>628</sup> the slaves of the governing power,<sup>629</sup> wholly ignorant of any kind of rights, there has never been a shadow of political life<sup>630</sup> among the inhabitants of the Nile valley. Their wants are so modest, that improvements are immaterial to their existence; to them, new laws, whether to their advantage or the reverse, are equally repugnant, they do not like to be disturbed in their habits, and look with suspicion on regulations and decrees, as a rule seldom in harmony with their wants, and in all cases above their understanding.

Native officials had even less reason to welcome European intervention. Those who lost their places<sup>631</sup> to make room for foreigners, lost also their bread; the lucky ones, those who had been allowed

<sup>624</sup> 'Egypt,' &c., by J. Barthélémy St. Hilaire, p. 101.

<sup>625</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 91.

<sup>626</sup> 'Im Lande der Pharaonen,' von A. Stahl, p. 224.

<sup>627</sup> 'Voyage en Syrie et en Égypte,' par C. F. Volney, vi. p. 76.

<sup>628</sup> "Un peuple protégé du ciel, et qui comme l'abeille ne semble destiné qu'à travailler pour les autres, sans profiter lui-même des fruits de ses œuvres."—'L'Égypte et la Syrie,' par M. Breton, vii. p. 111.

<sup>629</sup> 'Egypt,' &c., by J. Barthélémy St. Hilaire, p. 91 *et seq.*

<sup>630</sup> 'A Diary in the East,' by W. H. Russell, p. 457.

<sup>631</sup> Even Bonaparte, in his pompous proclamation of the 24 messidor an VI. said: "Tous les Égyptiens seront appelés à gérer toutes les places, les plus instruits, les plus vertueux gouverneront et le peuple sera heureux."

to remain, felt cruelly the overbearing ways of European masters—not colleagues.<sup>632</sup>

The army, though now regularly paid, was threatened with reductions, acceptable to the private, who hates military service, but hateful to officers, a class of men unfitted for any other profession or any kind of serious work.

Thus summing up the smouldering discontent in all branches of the administration, in all classes of the population, we arrive at a grand total that might well inspire grave anxieties. It would have required an iron hand, but the Khedive and his Government were powerless. Not in a position to repress the clamouring voice of the people, much less able to content them, they tried half measures, and resorted, at the instigation of the foreign representatives, to the fatal expedient of promises and concessions.

No doubt there were grave abuses<sup>633</sup> to reform; foremost of all the injustice that foreigners were not taxed,<sup>634</sup> whilst the iniquitous inequality of the land tax<sup>635</sup> affected additionally the already overburdened Fellah<sup>636</sup>; secondly, the privileged juris-

<sup>632</sup> "Les Européens sont en haut, les Égyptiens au bas de l'échelle."—*L'Égypte et l'Europe*, par un ancien juge mixte, p. 127.

<sup>633</sup> "Ce qu'il y a de plus abominable dans les colonies européennes, c'est leur complicité pour s'enrichir aux dépens du pays et des fellahs, qui y sont à peu près les seuls producteurs et les seuls travailleurs."—*Ibid.*, p. 113.

<sup>634</sup> "La scandaleuse immunité des étrangers."—*Ibid.*, p. 280.

<sup>635</sup> 'The Khedive's Egypt,' by E. de Leon, p. 320.

<sup>636</sup> "The main source of the revenue is the land-tax, which amounts to 15s. or 17. an acre, according to the quality of the land, and brings in about half the revenue. Another important tax is that levied on all fruit-

diction enjoyed by Europeans<sup>637</sup>; and thirdly, the overstocking of the country with foreign, frequently overpaid, officials.<sup>638</sup> It would have been wise to have remedied these evils before a change could be demanded as a right.

Both Cherif and Riaz, when Prime Ministers, would only too gladly have given satisfaction to demands so just, so reasonable.<sup>639</sup> In justice to Her Majesty's Government and representatives it must be said that England had not only given her consent, but had encouraged the Egyptian ministers in their endeavours to equalise the position and the charges of foreigners<sup>640</sup> and natives, but the French threw again, in this instance, difficulties in the way; they wanted guarantees against over-taxation, they wanted previously to regulate the assessment, they wanted

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bearing date-palms, at the rate of 4s. or 5s. a tree. Salt is a Government monopoly, and every man, woman, and child must buy about 2s. worth a year. There is a tax for civil rights of about 5s.; a tax on trades; market dues of from 2 to 9 per cent. on all sales; weighing dues, slaughter-house dues of 4 to 10 per cent.; stamp fees and payments for every stage of the mal-administration of justice; some home-grown tobacco is taxed."—'Egypt,' by Stanley Lane-Poole, p. 186 *et seq.*

<sup>637</sup> 'L'Égypte et l'Europe, par un ancien juge mixte,' p. 296.

<sup>638</sup> Ibid., p. 287.

<sup>639</sup> "Deux mille officiers licenciés sans qu'on leur eût même payé des arrières de solde importants, des centaines d'employés civils remerciés sans aucune compensation, avaient été réduits à une véritable mendicité, et ils en accusaient les réformes économiques consenties par le nouveau Khédive au détriment des droits acquis de ses nationaux (sujets). . . . Toute question d'honnêteté, d'humanité et de justice à part, une politique sage et prévoyante eût sacrifié quelques millions au soulagement de ces misères."—'La Question Égyptienne,' 1881, p. 23.

<sup>640</sup> Both Cherif Pasha and Riaz Pasha told the author how gratefully they acknowledged the readiness with which Her Majesty's Government had waived all claims of an exemption of foreigners from taxation.

this, and they wanted that, not for one instant looking at the immediate effect a move in the right direction would have had on the native population.<sup>441</sup> They cared little whether it would have reaffirmed the Khedive's position, whether it would have lessened the difficulties of his ministers; the grand republican phrases of equality and the rest were only for home use, and they treated Egypt with haughty contempt, using internal dissensions for their own purposes, and throwing difficulties in the way of those vital reforms which had in Lord Granville<sup>442</sup> a most earnest advocate. Of course it is nonsense to talk of the great increase of revenue taxation of foreigners would bring to the country, and the figures of Sir William Gregory are simply ludicrous. Thus it would be impossible to exact more than 5 per cent. house tax from Europeans, and at present it is 12 per cent., and would therefore have to be reduced. I have it, on the best authority, that it would come to the same in a fiscal point of view, yet the moral satisfaction would be, and would have been, of incalculable value, independently of the boon to the native householder, who would pay 7 per cent. less.

With regard to the European officials the same difficulty arose; the Khedive and the ministers would have welcomed any reduction in their number, as well as in their salaries; England would have given the example, but neither France nor the other

<sup>441</sup> "No race of people can be better formed than the Egyptians."—*Travels of Lady Hester Stanhope*, i. p. 164.

<sup>442</sup> *Parliamentary Papers, Egypt*, No. 1 (1882) p. 2.

Powers would hear of anything of the kind. Again, the actual saving would have been much under the estimate of those who have never taken the trouble of comparing figures. In Appendix III. will be found lists of all European officials, with their respective salaries, for which the author is indebted to Sir A. Colvin, a guarantee for their correctness. We are told Egypt pays 378,000*l.* a year to Europeans in her service: true, but any one who will look into the tables will find that the average salary of the majority of Europeans does not exceed 10*l.* per month.<sup>643</sup> There are 144 officials over 20*l.*, 64 over 30*l.*, 32 over 40*l.*, 14 between 50*l.* and 60*l.*, and only 17 exceeding 100*l.* a month. It might be said that Egypt can do without Europeans, but this is not the opinion of the late and present Khedive, or of any of the native ministers I had an opportunity of meeting; one and all agree that Europeans are wanted to train natives, to act as administrative schoolmasters, and all acknowledge the advantages already derived from an infusion of European activity, order, and system into the various branches.

“What we want,” said Cherif Pasha repeatedly to the author, “is to get our money’s worth; yet,” he added, “it would not be worth our while to indispose the Powers for the sake of an annual saving of 10,000*l.* or 20,000*l.*” And here is the hitch, the holders of sinecures, those who are overpaid, those who do not work, are precisely those who prevent

<sup>643</sup> See Appendix III. B.

their Governments from assisting the Khedive in his difficulty. A year ago a commission had been already instituted with the view of overhauling the entire civil service, to clear the administration of a host of cumbersome and useless European and native officials, to regulate the salaries, and to put an end to patronage, native and foreign.<sup>644</sup>

I shall revert to this subject, but here I will state that neither England nor English officials have been or would be in the way of a thorough reform. To begin with, English officials are so well paid at home, especially in India, that they have no need to cling to highly paid offices in other countries; I could mention two or three of the best paid officials in Egypt who would have 500*l.* and even 1000*l.* a year more, were they to return to India.

As to the class of men receiving less than 50*l.* a month, with few exceptions, they are well worth the money, nay, in some instances underpaid.<sup>645</sup> The saving could only be effected by reducing the number, but in doing so, natives would have to be appointed in their places, and little would be the difference to the exchequer, whilst as far as work goes, it would be enormous were they *only* Egyptians. Clearly it is

<sup>644</sup> There can be no doubt that the Egyptian service has been too often looked upon as a Continental "workhouse" for cumbersome paupers of the upper ten thousand, and I have met heads of departments bitterly complaining of useless and incompetent additions to their staff, and assuring me that frequently they could have twice the work for half the money were they allowed to train natives.—The Author.

<sup>645</sup> Indeed, living in Cairo, Alexandria, and the chief places is so dear that few, if any, of the foreign officials will be able to save anything; certainly not those under 50*l.* a month, with a family to boot.—The Author.

wrong to pay Europeans better than Egyptian ministers ; it will be necessary to abolish a number of highly paid sinecures ; thus one commissioner at the *Caisse* would perfectly answer the purpose, and the Powers might nominate him in rotation. But the grievance of the Egyptians is less that Europeans *are* employed, than that Europeans should be selected where natives would do,<sup>66</sup> and be better paid for identically the same work. This is only fair and just, for numbers of highly efficient Egyptians are unemployed, simply because there is no room for them. Moreover all European appointments should be well understood to be only of a temporary nature ; they should have with, and under them, natives who should be trained to take their places at the earliest opportunity.

These are matters which no doubt our Government will set right, now that they have an opportunity of resisting the selfish objections of those who claim vested rights for no other reason than that they have been a number of years in the pay of Egypt. Little as an eventual reduction will affect the Budget, it is sure to smooth the ruffled plumes of the natives. It will have a wholesome effect if in future Europeans in the service of Egypt are put on an equal footing with the subjects of the Khedive, and this should be the rule, and would be in the spirit of Ismaïl's first application and of the replies of H.M.'s Government thereto ; in no civilised country would officials be admitted claiming extra-territorial privileges. Europeans

<sup>66</sup> See 'Letter of an old Egyptian,' *Morning Post*, Oct. 10, 1882.



who want permanent appointments must become Egyptians; those who do not wish to give up their nationality must understand that they can only remain for a time, that their task is to teach Egyptians their business, and that they will have to withdraw the moment there are natives able to replace them. Yet whatever may be said against the Europeans in Egypt, it would be an injustice not to recognise that, as a body, they have proved most useful, and that notwithstanding some overpaid sinecures, they have been a great saving to the country.

I make bold to say that the 379,000*l.* paid in salaries to Europeans have been earned over and over in the course of the year. I know of the head of one administration, who has more than once saved Egypt *in one month his year's salary*.<sup>647</sup>

But to return to the embarrassments of the Khedive, we must give our attention for the moment to the Control. It would be impossible to overrate the benefits it has conferred on Egypt in a financial and administrative sense.<sup>648</sup> The drawback was its dualistic nature. During the last years of Ismail's reign English influence had been paramount.<sup>649</sup> This vantage ground Lord Salisbury jeopardised, when

<sup>647</sup> I know on the best authority that Sir Frederick Goldsmid has repeatedly increased the revenues of the Daira Sanieh by 2000*l.* and 3000*l.* at a time, simply by timing the sales of sugar according to favourable fluctuations of the market.—The Author.

<sup>648</sup> "The bitterest opponents of the Anglo-French Control are forced to admit that this control has saved Egypt from bankruptcy and restored more than a milliard to the holders of Egyptian stock."—'Egypt, Political, &c.,' by G. W. Vyse, p. 289.

<sup>649</sup> 'England and Egypt,' by E. Dicey, p. 220.

he joined M. Waddington in the overthrow of the Khedive, without even insisting, as did the French, on a reinstatement of the dismissed minister.

In devising the Joint Control the two Powers thought of thus equalising their interests, and counterbalancing individual influence; true in theory, it proved the reverse in practice. The decree regulating the attributes of the Controllers,<sup>650</sup> limited their powers to a financial supervision, to *advice* affecting the interior administration.

But the Controllers were not Egyptian officials, they were English and French, and although our Controllers and Consuls-General have taken all along a right view of their respective powers, the French have from the first been at war among themselves. Jealous of their respective importance, they were always outbidding each other's influence with the Egyptian Government. The French Consul-General wanted to use the Controller as an instrument of French influence; he wanted by means of the Control to consolidate the traditional<sup>651</sup> meddling of

<sup>650</sup> Decree of Nov. 18, 1876, modified at the request of the Egyptian Government, and with the consent of the Controllers-General, who, according to M. de Blignières ('Le Contrôle Anglo-Français en Égypte, revue politique et littéraire,' 29 Juillet, 1882, p. 132), defined their own attributions in a report addressed to the Khedive on Nov. 13, 1879, saying, "Les fonctions auxquelles nous à appelés Votre Altesse n'impliquent aucune ingérence directe dans l'administration du pays, mais elles nous imposent le devoir d'indiquer à son ministère les mesures que réclame l'intérêt commun du pays et de ses créanciers."

<sup>651</sup> "Les Français ont depuis longtemps tourné les yeux vers l'Égypte . . . le paradis de l'Orient, la clef des trésors de l'Inde, aisée à conquérir, et plus aisée encore à garder."—"Correspondance de l'armée française en Égypte (interceptée par l'escadre de Nelson), publiée par T. Simon,' p. xxxiv.

France in Egyptian affairs, in fact he looked upon the Controller as a subordinate appointed by his Government not to help Egypt on to her legs, but to serve *exclusively* French interests. The Controller on the other side, influenced by considerations of a higher order,<sup>652a</sup> placed the general interest of Egypt above the individual wishes of his countrymen, backed by the Consul-General. At the same time the authority enjoyed by him and his English colleague, especially in the beginning, as long as the Egyptian Government required the good offices of the Controllers to carry the law of liquidation with the *fourteen* interested Continental Governments, contributed necessarily to give to, primarily, purely administrative functions a political coating.

No French official can ever resist the temptation *à jouer un rôle*, if we are to believe Prince Metternich's experience of old,<sup>652b</sup> and in M. de Blignières case there was the excuse of great provocation; in fact, if he did play a political part, if he did use his position frequently to put a pressure on the Egyptian Government in matters where the Consul-General had failed, it was the fault of his Government,<sup>653</sup> not his. Misfortune willed it that succeeding Consuls-General of France could not or would not discern the difference between financial control and political tutelage.<sup>654</sup> These constant *querelles de*

<sup>652a</sup> 'Le Contrôle Anglo-Français en Égypte,' par A. de Blignières, p. 132.

<sup>652b</sup> Prince Metternich's Papers, v. p. 444.

<sup>653</sup> "La France eut deux représentants en Égypte, l'un officiel et l'autre agréé."—*La Nouvelle Revue*, July 1, 1881, p. 20.

<sup>654</sup> "Ainsi de négociations en négociations et de compromissions en

*ménage* had in the sequel most damaging consequences, and added materially to the difficulties of the Controllers. The tendency of the French to identify the action of the Control with the policy of the home Government did not add to the popularity of the former, as naturally the natives looked with suspicion on irresponsible "advisers" of the Khedive, answerable, however, to their own Governments. Had the French kept as clear from official intermeddling as did our Government, until the security of Her Majesty's subjects, and the vital interests of the Empire did no longer warrant a policy of abstinence; had M. de Blignières been as fortunate in his diplomatic colleagues as Major Baring and Sir Ackland Colvin, it is possible that the Control would finally have succeeded in conciliating native susceptibility, while it would have been unassailable in maintaining a complete independence. The position was the more perplexing as the chief reforms contemplated affected the status of Europeans, officials, and residents, who shielding themselves, at least in the case of the French, behind the home Government, opposed a curtailment of what they called "their rights." In this respect Major Baring and Mr. Colvin's position was decidedly the better of the two. Our Government had consented to the rating of

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compromissions, l'intervention simplement officieuse et bienveillante, indiquée au début par M. Waddington, avait d'abord conduit la France à vouloir faciliter des spéculations de crédit en Égypte; elle l'a ensuite amenée à se mêler de l'administration même de ce pays, et enfin à prendre l'initiative d'une révolution gouvernementale."—'La Question Égyptienne,' 1881, p. 19.

foreigners to the house tax,<sup>655</sup> and had renounced the privilege of an English post-office—so vexing to native pride<sup>656</sup>; nor would our Consul-General have opposed a thorough overhauling of European officials and their salaries, whilst in every one of these matters difficulties were thrown in the way of the French Controller. It is not the practice of Her Majesty's agents to identify themselves with the private interests of British subjects beyond the usual protection. French agents, on the contrary, like patronising their countrymen, and are always asking<sup>657</sup> for something, as Frenchmen abroad look upon the Consulate-General as a sort of agency for remunerative places and concessions. In opposing the demands of the Consul-General, the Controller was making enemies with the French colony, in backing them he injured himself in the native mind; yet, he had either to leave the patronage to the Consul-General, or to use it

<sup>655</sup> "Un autre fait qui aux yeux des Égyptiens légitime leurs griefs contre le Contrôle, c'est que celui-ci aurait pu et dû, à leurs sens, rechercher l'équilibre du budget en faisant participer les Européens, possesseurs de terres ou propriétaires d'immeubles, aux charges qui incombent aux indigènes et auxquelles les premiers s'échappent, à la faveur des Capitulations."—*'La Question Égyptienne,'* 1881, p. 24, *et seq.*

<sup>656</sup> Riaz Pasha, when Prime Minister, told the author that he had almost been obliged to use violence in closing the French post-office at Cairo, and he complained bitterly that Egypt, a member of the Postal Union, should be subjected to the humiliation of French, Italian, and Austrian offices in Alexandria, independent of the loss of about 4000*l.* a year the French post at Alexandria entails upon the Egyptian exchequer.—The Author.

<sup>657</sup> Both Cherif Pasha and Riaz Pasha assured the author that they did not remember Sir Edward Malet ever having asked for either an appointment or a concession for English subjects, or ever having backed applications of that kind; and M. de Blignières fully corroborated the above, saying: "*Les Agents Anglais ne se mêlent jamais de choses personnelles—et ne sont pas mesquins.*"—The Author.

himself, much as he might have wished to remain neutral.

Strangely enough, his good understanding with his English colleagues,<sup>658</sup> his desire to sink the individual interests of England and France in a common endeavour to serve Egypt,<sup>659</sup> was interpreted by French Chauvins as high treason; they said that he was sold to the English,<sup>660a</sup> or some such nonsense.<sup>660b</sup>

If I have dwelt at length on these petty rivalries, it is to explain how and why the French Controller was forced by circumstances out of his legitimate and administrative groove, and obliged by his own Government to assume a quasi-political part, which, in course of time, led not only to an unpleasant friction with the Khedive and his ministers, but to a conflict between the Control and the Egyptian Government on one side, and the so-called National party, as represented by Arabi and the army, on the other. The office of the Controllers-General, though limited to a financial supervision by the text of the

<sup>658</sup> 'England and Egypt,' by E. Dicey, p. 221.

<sup>659</sup> "M. de Blignières ne voyait dans l'exercice du contrôle qu'un instrument de défense pour des intérêts financiers, qu'il avait charge de faire prévaloir sur tout autre intérêt."—'La Question Égyptienne,' 1881, p. 20.

<sup>660a</sup> M. de Blignières told the author that in one of the petitions for his recall, from some people whom he had declined to help to a concession injurious to Egyptian interests, one of the signatories had actually stated having seen a cheque in M. de Blignières' favour signed "Beaconsfield, Premier Ministre d'Angleterre," though he did not remember the exact amount. "And this is only one out of many idiotic accusations of that kind," said, laughingly, M. de Blignières.—The Author.

<sup>660b</sup> This just tribute to M. de Blignières' great qualities as an administrator, far above petty considerations, must not prevent me from adding that he was not an "indulgent colleague" to native ministers, and was too much given to biting sarcasm.—The Author.

decree instituting the Control, gave them necessarily an incontestable influence in every direction. It was a diplomatic fiction,<sup>661</sup> incompatible with the autonomy of Egypt, and, as we shall see hereafter, the mistakes made, the reproaches heaped on the Khedive and his ministers, were not deserved, as no liberty of action was left them to do either right or wrong. The authority of the Khedive and of his ministers, shaken by the mutiny of February 1880, was getting daily weaker,<sup>662</sup> and here we must go back to the origin of the military movement and its later development into the so-called national agitation.

Their first appearance on the political stage was on February 18th, 1879, when 400 out of 2500 ill-used officers made a demonstration against Nubar Pasha and Mr. Rivers Wilson at the Ministry of Finance, claiming their "heavy" arrears<sup>663</sup>; and though the Khedive rescued Mr. Wilson and quelled the riot,<sup>664</sup> it has been said that Ismaïl had instigated it himself; but considering the animosity of Arabi against the late Khedive, any complicity of His Highness in the matter would have been brought to light long ago, especially as only the other day

<sup>661</sup> "Le Contrôle Anglo-Français est une de ces fictions diplomatiques comme il en existe beaucoup d'autres dans les rapports de l'Europe avec l'Orient."—*La Nouvelle Revue*, 1 Juillet, 1881, p. 18.

<sup>662</sup> "The authority of the Khedive and of his ministers, shaken by the military riot of Feb. 1, 1880, has been getting daily weaker."—Report of the Controllers-General, Feb. 6, 1882 ('Documents diplomatiques d'Égypte,' 1881-82, p. 118).

<sup>663</sup> Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 5 (1879), p. 24 *et seq.*

<sup>664</sup> 'Spoiling the Egyptians,' by J. Seymour Keay, p. 35.

participation in this very riot was deemed a title to promotion.<sup>665</sup>

Surely it needed no encouragement from outside ; the flagrant wrongs inflicted on men whose bread was dependent on their profession, most of them with no other means of keeping a family, was more than enough to warrant a desperate protest.

As an old soldier, I am not likely to make myself the champion of mutineers ; the first duty of the soldier is to obey, discipline is the backbone of an army, but a Government exacting a stern compliance with military discipline, has likewise the sacred duty of seeing that those to whom the defence of the country, the maintenance of order is entrusted, receive the equivalent of their bargain. The least a soldier can expect is to be fed and paid ; nay, it is monstrous that Christian powers have lent their hand to increase the misery of poor wretches whom nothing but sheer hunger roused from abject resignation,<sup>666</sup> whom the overflowing coffers of the "Caisse" might well exasperate, and who had a right to ask why foreign creditors should be paid, when they, the native creditors, were starving. Driven to despair by the cruelty of measures revolting to every right-

<sup>665</sup> When Arabi promoted his great batch of 400 officers in April 1882, there was one who seriously claimed promotion for having pulled the beard of Mr. Rivers Wilson ; another for having insulted Tewfik on February 1 ; a third for having kicked one of the native ministers ; details given me by one of the present ministers, not the kicked one.—The Author.

<sup>666</sup> M. de Blignières mentioned to the author the case of an officer with 22 months of arrears, who applied for an advance of 2*l.* to bury a dead child, and was sent to the White Nile for having dared to address the minister in person.



thinking mind,<sup>667</sup> the dismissed officers set the example of revolt.

“Il n’y a que le premier pas qui coûte.” Yet the terror of Ismaïl’s person<sup>668</sup> overawing all, had prevented the mutiny from spreading to the regular army. The officers on half-pay having, however, succeeded in getting their claims considered, the lesson was not lost on those on active service.

As soon as Ismaïl was no longer at the head of affairs to exact submission, three of the colonels in command of regiments—Arabi,<sup>669</sup> Ali Fehmi,<sup>670</sup> and Abd-el-Al<sup>671</sup>—prompted by Mahmoud Pasha Sami, started a systematic opposition to the War Office, resenting, as they pretended, Osman Pasha Rifky’s partiality to the Circassians.<sup>672</sup> Wanting to better their

<sup>667</sup> What would English officers say if without 24 hours’ notice they found themselves stripped of their well-earned half-pay—without bread for wife and children, if respectful petitions remained unnoticed, and if the only answer they could get would be ‘There is no money for you, it is all wanted for the *foreign contractors* of the submarine tunnel scheme’? If such an iniquity were possible in England, “the home of fair play,” I fear there would be a nasty moment for the authorities in Pall Mall and Whitehall. I for one fully sympathise with the 2500 Egyptian half-pay officers, who not only were deprived of the needful, but were additionally outraged by festivities given with the money of Egypt.—The Author.

<sup>668</sup> I have from an eye-witness that when Ismaïl went down to meet the infuriated crowd, there was silence *instantanément*.—The Author. “The troops would not have acted against the rioters yesterday had not the Khedive ordered them in person to do so.”—Mr. Vivian to the Marquis of Salisbury, Feb. 19, 1879.

<sup>669</sup> See Appendix IV.

<sup>670</sup> Ibid.

<sup>671</sup> Ibid.

<sup>672</sup> Ismaïl Pasha Sadyk—the Mouffetich—had first begun to patronise Arab officers at the expense of the Circassians, who until then had wielded the monopoly of all better appointments. Osman Pasha Rifky attempted a return to the old ways, and thereby naturally indisposed the native element. It was nothing but the “ôte-toi que je m’y mette,” inherent to all ministerial changes in the East.—The Author.

own position, and that of the officers, they availed themselves of the hardships inflicted on the privates <sup>673</sup> to give more force to their pleadings, and by amalgamating their cause with that of the men, they had the pretext of being able to speak in the name of the army, just as later on, by a similar process, they took upon themselves to speak for the people.

But granting the justice of their grievances, and certainly those of the men, the way the colonels set to work was contrary to all notions of a disciplined army; for ignoring altogether their superior officers—in fact, Livas (General of Brigade), and Feriks (General of Division) might as well not have existed—they insisted upon transacting business direct with the War Office, and when they did not succeed by bullying Osman Pasha Rifky, they simply declined to obey his, or anybody's orders, and addressed themselves to Riaz, the Prime Minister, yet no longer with petitions, but with demands.

They took advantage of Tewfik's helpless state <sup>674</sup> to provoke a conflict, and challenged by his subordinates, Osman Pasha Rifky determined on bringing them to justice; but instead of openly stating his intentions he sent for them under a futile pretext <sup>675</sup>

<sup>673</sup> The action of the European Ministry in reducing the pay of privates and non-commissioned officers by more than a third of what they had under Said was cruel, considering the rise in everything and the additional depreciation in the value of money.—The Author.

<sup>674</sup> "Les officiers ont sans doute trouvé, dans la faiblesse de caractère de leur souverain un encouragement à des *pronunciamentos* qu'ils n'auraient pas osé tenter avec un prince qui aurait conservé plus de prestige."—'La Question Égyptienne,' 1881, p. 32.

<sup>675</sup> "He sent for them under the pretext of wishing to give them some instructions as to the part to be taken by their regiments on the occasion

and had them arrested as soon as they entered the Ministry ; a proceeding as undignified as it is contrary to our notions of fairness. Thereupon, the officers of the first regiment broke into the council-room of the Ministry of War, ill-treated the minister, and then, having released the prisoners by force, and followed by the men of the regiment, they proceeded to the palace of Abdin,<sup>676</sup> and demanded from the Khedive the dismissal of the Minister of War, and redress for their grievances, which consisted principally in the promotion of Turkish and Circassian officers. The Khedive informed the French and English agents that he had no means of resistance, and no regiment on which he could count ; and news having arrived that another regiment was marching in from Tourah, His Highness dismissed the Minister of War, and appointed Mahmoud Pasha Samy in his stead. Tranquillity was thereupon restored, and on the following day the mutinous colonels were reinstated in their regiments, and made their submission to the Khedive.<sup>677</sup>

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of Princess Djemila's marriage. The colonels, who had got wind of the intentions of Osman Pasha, had brought their orderlies to inform the men of their arrest should they not come out after a certain time. The moment they entered the Ministry, Eflatoun Pasha, the Under-Secretary of War, asked for their swords. An hour later they were released, force outwitting Osman's crafty scheme.—The Author.

<sup>676</sup> It has been openly stated that on the news of the arrest the soldiers went first without arms to Abdin asking for their colonels, and that the Khedive, appearing at a window, told them he had not ordered the arrest, and that the soldiers had taken His Highness's words for an indirect permission to release their leaders. I only mention it to show how anxious the men were to give to their step a semblance of legality.—The Author.

<sup>677</sup> Despatch of Earl Granville to the Earl of Dufferin, July 11, 1882.

Thus the 1st of February, 1881, gave birth to Arabi, and from this day the influence of the army went on increasing. In obliging the Khedive to appoint their nominee in the room of Osman Pasha Rifky, the colonels knew that henceforth they were masters of the situation.

“The increased ascendancy of the army soon showed itself in a practical shape. On the 20th of April two decrees were issued, the first increasing the pay<sup>678</sup> of the land and sea forces to an extent imposing an additional charge of from 50,000*l.* to 60,000*l.* a

<sup>678</sup> I take the following table from *L'Égypte* of May 5, 1881, which gives the pay and rations of the army from Mehemet Ali down to the present day :—

	Mehemet Ali.	Abbas.	Rations.	Said.	Ismail.	Tewfik.	Rations.
	P.T.	P.T.		P.T.	P.T.	P.T.	
Private .. .. .	15	15	1	30	19·10	30	1
Corporal .. .. .	20	20	1	50	30	40	1
Sergeant .. .. .	30	30	1	65	40	55	1
Quartermaster .. .. .	30	30	1	65	50	65	1
Sergeant-Major .. .. .	40	40	1	110	60	80	1
Sub-Lieutenant .. .. .	250	360	2	500	445	600	
Lieutenant .. .. .	300	360	2	750	545	750	
Captain .. .. .	500	540	3	1000	750	950	
Adjutant-Major .. .. .	1200	1500	4	1500	900	1500	
Major .. .. .	2000	2000	8	2500	2000	2500	
Lieutenant-Colonel .. .. .	3000	3000	16	..	2500	3500	
Colonel .. .. .	6000	6000	31	8000	4000	5000	
General of Brigade .. .. .	8000	8000	61	..	6000	6500	
General of Division .. .. .	..	..	..	25000	7500	8000	

It should be mentioned that Saïd, who increased the pay of both officers and men very considerably, abolished rations for officers. Ismail left it optional for officers up to the rank of captain to take either rations or an increased pay (sub-lieutenant P.T. 445 without rations, 300 with rations; lieutenant 545 and 350; captain 750 and 500 respectively); the European ministers reducing the pay of the soldier from 30 to 19·10, suppressed rations for officers, maintaining, however, the increased pay. The decree of April 20 granted the men again their old pay of Saïd's time, whilst it increased considerably the pay of officers.—The Author.

year<sup>679</sup>; the second instituting a commission to inquire into the regulations and organisation of the army. The commission consisted of the Minister of War, as president, of eleven generals, of whom four were Europeans, and of nine colonels, with one exception all Mussulmans, and among whom was Arabi Bey, one of the chief actors in the revolt of February.

“The Controllers-General, at the meeting of council in which the decrees were sanctioned, called attention to the fact that discipline could no longer be said to exist, that the officers did not obey the Minister of War, and that the latter could not guarantee that the officers would not next day demand fresh financial sacrifices of the Government.

“In the commission the Mussulman members showed a tendency to combine together against the authority of the Minister of War. The colonels made a claim, which was allowed by the Council of Ministers, that the nominations to vacancies among the officers of each regiment should rest with the colonels, so that in the disaffected regiments the new officers would be the colonel's nominees. In the course of discussion on the 1st of June, Arabi Bey went so far as to state openly that he would not yield unconditional obedience to the Minister of War, but expressed regret

<sup>679</sup> Notwithstanding this increase, the cost of the army cannot be called exaggerated. In 1880 it amounted, for a total of 12,882, to L.E. 360,000 (including L.E. 53,898 for half-pay officers); whilst it amounted in 1881, for 13,493 men, to L.E. 368,000 (pay, L.E. 115,778; rations, 85,876; forage, 17,098; uniforms, 27,116, &c., including L.E. 46,612 for half-pay officers).—The Author.

for his language upon a threat of resignation by the English member of the Commission.”<sup>680</sup>

Having undertaken the management of Tewfik's affairs it was a grievous mistake of the Powers to underrate the consequences, and not from the first to devise means for restoring the authority of either the Khedive or the Control, instead of leaving both at the mercy of the caprices of a military mob.

In February it had been possible for Mr. Malet to convince the three colonels of their folly to provoke a foreign intervention by the overthrow of the Government, and as they realised that by going too far they would jeopardise everything, Arabi and company thought it best to leave their case unconditionally in the hands of Mr. Malet. They trusted his word, and as he managed to get the chief grievances remedied, matters apparently cooled down.

I say apparently, for, to all who knew Baroudi, it was clear that he would never rest until he had overthrown Riaz, and that he would make use of the colonels just as they had made use of him.

On the other hand, Riaz could not be brought to admit that the army was really disaffected, and he certainly overrated his own hold over Khedive, ministers, officers, and men. He smiled at the possibility of a *coup de main*, and was convinced that his personal authority, backed by the Control, would suffice to maintain order; and in this opinion he was certainly encouraged by the foreign representatives.

I remember him telling me, “Je représente la justice,

<sup>680</sup> Despatch of Earl Granville to the Earl of Dufferin, July 11, 1882.

et avec cela je suis plus fort que M. de Bismarck, avec ses armées." Possibly he might have got ahead of the breakers, had the Khedive stood by his ministers, but the following extract from a letter by one of the pashas, dated March 1881, will show that such was not the case :—

"The situation here is too ridiculous, the Viceroy and the Government are afraid of the colonels, and the colonels are afraid of the former. Though having pardoned the mutineers, the Viceroy would be delighted to get rid of the leaders by putting them on half-pay, but he dare not do it. Instead of showing energy His Highness has given way to almost criminal inaction, considering the dangerous consequences it entails. Hesitating and timid, the Khedive will not take any decision, in fact his very abstention makes one doubt his sincerity. Fully aware of his own weakness, he is jealous of his ministers, whom he would like to saddle with the entire responsibility of the present state of things. He tells everybody that his position is humiliating, and that the ministers have done nothing to remedy it, which means that he would not be sorry to see them at Jericho. But instead of putting himself at the head of the army, thus to paralyse the influence of the colonels, he locks himself up at Ismailia, and undermines by his very attitude the power of Riaz. The situation is most critical. The Viceroy does not understand the danger of playing a game in which *he* must be the loser. Riaz won't see, and if matters are not worse, it is due alone to Mr. Malet's influence and energy."

The want of a good understanding between the Khedive and his advisers strengthened of course the hands of the colonels. Nevertheless, Riaz Pasha relied on the indolence and want of initiative of both officers and men, and thought that the absence of discipline would make it difficult for the officers to rely implicitly on the soldiers. Chronic insubordination cuts both ways. But there is one thing the Prime Minister did not take into account, that is the dread of the colonels that, notwithstanding the promised amnesty, they would at the first opportunity be called to account, and be sent to the White Nile<sup>681</sup> as they deserved. As long as Mr. Malet remained in Cairo they felt secure; he had promised that in *this instance* they should not be punished, that the past was wiped out; and they relied upon his word. But when he went on leave; when, tired of Riaz Pasha's "wait and all will be well,"<sup>682</sup> the Khedive nominated his brother-in-law Minister of War in Baroudi's place, and when rumours of the sending of Ottoman troops<sup>683</sup> reached Egypt, the triumvirate began to feel uneasy. Mr. Malet was no longer there to reassure them, and those most interested in the overthrow of

<sup>681</sup> Despatch of Mr. Malet to Earl Granville, Sept. 23, 1881.—Egypt, No. 3 (1882) p. 28.

<sup>682</sup> Ibid.

<sup>683</sup> The following is an extract from a letter written by an Egyptian general officer on Sept. 9, the very day of the military demonstration :—  
"La question de l'armée, tout en pouvant devenir dangereuse, ne l'est pas encore. Il s'agirait d'avoir une main de fer pour rassurer des têtes emportées simplement parceque personne n'a le courage de les arrêter. Les trois colonels révoltés m'ont assuré pas plus tard que hier qu'ils ne veulent pas des Turcs; ils préféreraient même des Chrétiens; du moins, me disait Arabi Bey, ceux-là apportent la civilisation."



not only Riaz, but of the Khedive, intentionally magnified the danger, thus pushing the colonels to new action. Arabi Bey and his accomplices became frightened and thought it—not without good reason<sup>684</sup>—expedient to forestall their adversaries.

Lord Granville mentions in his letter to Lord Dufferin the fall of Riaz in a few laconic words; he says: “The disorganisation and want of discipline in the army assumed increased proportions. An attempt which was made in September to remove some of the disaffected regiments from Cairo led to a fresh military outbreak, headed by Arabi Bey. The colonels demanded the dismissal of the Ministry, a constitution, and the increase of the army. The Khedive again yielded, assented to the dismissal of the Ministry, and summoned Cherif Pasha. Cherif Pasha at first demurred to taking office as the minister of a military revolution, but eventually agreed to become Prime Minister on being requested by the Notables, and on the assurance that the army would submit to his authority.”<sup>685</sup>

Now it seems to me that his Lordship is passing in rather a light way over one of the most important phases of the Egyptian crisis. As I have said before, the 1st of February gave birth to Arabi; thus did the 10th of September to the so-called

<sup>684</sup> It is notorious that orders had been given to arrest the colonels; in fact, their houses were surrounded, and Arabi only escaped over the roofs of some neighbouring houses, whilst the other colonels had got wind by the treachery of some official of Abd-el-Kader Pasha, the then Prefect of Police.—The Author.

<sup>685</sup> Despatch of Earl Granville to the Earl of Dufferin, July 11, 1882.

National party. And here I beg leave to say that the true National party as represented by Cherif Pasha and his friends, must not be mistaken for the sham Nationalists with whom Arabi and his European advisers have so long been able to deceive the English public, the more easily as both during Cherif's term of office were sailing under the same flag.

Up to September, there had been only a military question<sup>686</sup>; no one had ever pronounced the name of the people, except Cherif in his programme of 1879. To the colonels, "Notables and Constitution" came simply as an afterthought, when they had to shield their criminal conduct—a clever move which did not fail to gain them sympathies with malcontents at home and enthusiasts abroad, yet we look in vain for even an allusion "to the people" in Arabi's letters of September 9th to Mr. Cookson,<sup>687</sup> and to the Minister of War<sup>688</sup> in which he explained "the motives" of his impending demonstration.

By resuming office Cherif unwittingly helped to give consistency to the belief that the Nationalists, the party of young Egypt, and Arabi's pseudo-

<sup>686</sup> "Arabi replied that he and his friends were between two fires—on the one side from the Government, on the other from their own comrades, who were gradually gained over by the Government; in fact, this action had become absolutely necessary in self-defence."—Despatch of Mr. Malet to Earl Granville, Sept. 23, 1881. Egypt, No. 3 (1882) p. 30.

<sup>687</sup> "The military have endured oppression and intrigue, and have been threatened with destruction . . . we consider it our duty to protect our lives and our interests."—Letter of Colonel Ahmed Arabi to Mr. Cookson (Sept. 9, 1881), Egypt, No. 3 (1882) p. 4.

<sup>688</sup> See letter of Colonel Arabi to the Minister of War, Sept. 9, 1881. Egypt, No. 3 (1881) p. 14.

patriots were one and the same. However, as they seemed to be in the same lobby they were mistaken for each other, and Arabi made capital out of this misconception; nay, adroitly fusing the military question with that of the people, he got his foreign friends to dub him a reformer and a second Moses.<sup>689</sup>

There was not much though of a Cromwell<sup>690</sup> in him when he stood pale and trembling<sup>690</sup> before Tewfik in Abdin Square; not much of a fearless tribune when he sheathed his sword at "Effendina's" bidding; and had Tewfik followed the spirited and manly advice of Mr. Colvin, had he arrested Arabi *conspicuo omnium* or cut him down, as it was his right, there would have been an end of all mutinies, and one hardly dares to think what might not have been spared us all. It was only by yielding needlessly at a moment when he might have reconquered his lost prestige by a bold move<sup>691</sup> that he raised the rebel colonel on a popular pedestal. His Highness was under the impression that they would all have been massacred<sup>692</sup> had he laid hands

<sup>689</sup> Letter of Sir William Gregory.—*Times*, Dec. 1881.

<sup>690</sup> That he did tremble I have on the authority of an eye-witness.—The Author.

<sup>691</sup> To give an idea of the prestige still exercised by the princes, I will mention that when the troops surrounded the Palace of Abdin on that very day, Prince Mahmoud, a younger brother of the Khedive, ordered one of his servants to take a message to the harem. The soldiers would not let him pass, and barred the way with their bayonets, when Prince Mahmoud rushed forward and boxed the ears of two of them. He had not even a sword, yet they at once presented arms and allowed the servant to pass.—The Author.

<sup>692</sup> "I said to the Viceroy, 'Now is your moment.' He replied, 'We are between four fires.' I said, 'Have courage.' He took counsel of a

on Arabi, an opinion by no means shared by other witnesses of the scene. The Viceroy was lacking in nerve and initiative, not personal courage,<sup>693</sup> and as there was only Mr. Colvin and General Stone to advise energetic action, His Highness is less to blame than the princes and pashas who were as usual conspicuous by their absence, leaving foreigners to show their Sovereign the path of duty.

Moreover, why reproach the Khedive with a wavering and hesitating attitude and a wish to tide over the difficulties of the moment, when all that Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay found to comfort and assist their protégé with, was an exchange of mutual assurances that the English and French Governments attach the greatest importance "to the maintaining of an attitude of a pacifying and calming character during the present crisis in Egypt,"<sup>694</sup> something like throwing a box of Cockle's pills to a drowning man, as a preventive against sea-sickness.

The Khedive in the meanwhile having telegraphed to the Sultan for twenty battalions of Turkish troops, the Controlling Powers protested, and though one may fully share the fears of the two Cabinets that an armed intervention by the Sultan would have

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native officer on his left, and repeated to me, 'What can I do, we are between four fires? We shall be killed.'—Memorandum of Mr. Colvin, Sept. 10, 1881. Egypt, No. 3 (1882) p. 4.

<sup>693</sup> An opinion evidently not shared by the compositors and Foreign Office clerks in charge of Parliamentary papers.—Vide Egypt, No. 3 (1882) p. 4, line 7.

<sup>694</sup> Despatch of Earl Granville to Mr. Adams, Sept. 10, 1881. Egypt, No. 3 (1882) p. 6.

had serious consequences, it is difficult to understand the logic of appealing one day (as Lord Salisbury and M. Waddington had done) to the Sultan as Suzerain with a request to depose Ismaïl, and the next (as Lord Granville and M. Barthélémy St. Hilaire were doing) reprimanding Tewfik for following suit.

Advising His Highness to give way, to conciliate, he stumbled from concession to concession, until the Powers brought him into his present plight.

He had not a corporal and six men on whom he could rely; England and France would not and could not interfere, yet they frowned at Tewfik for looking to his Suzerain for assistance, and the Sultan was told that he must "use pacifying language like Her Majesty's Government,"<sup>695</sup> and not take hasty action "until the necessity had been clearly demonstrated."<sup>696</sup> But what was Lord Granville waiting for? surely Arabi had done all a rebel could do, short of taking his master's life and place? Yet one can well understand the perplexity of Her Majesty's advisers; and the false position into which Lord Salisbury and M. Waddington had placed both the Powers and Egypt when they revived the dormant rights of the Sultan, received a fresh illustration by Tewfik's appeal *in extremis*.

His Highness asked the Sultan for twenty battalions to protect life and limb, we suggested instead

<sup>695</sup> Egypt, No. 3 (1882) p. 11.

<sup>696</sup> Despatch of Earl Granville to Mr. Adams, Sept. 10, 1881. Egypt, No. 3 (1882) p. 7.

† a Turkish Moushir, whilst M. Barthélémy St. Hilaire thought that “even the despatch of one Turk might result in permanent occupation,”<sup>697</sup> and proposed to send an English and a French general, with a batch of newly-bound army regulations, as joint Military Controllers.

Asking an Egyptian general what he thought of this happy idea, he said “Have you ever seen a cat and a bulldog together in harness, taking a rat out for a pleasure trip?” I confessed I had not, and he expressed his hope that we might all be spared the spectacle. Fortunately we were.

“The reforms,<sup>698</sup>” wrote Cherif in his letter to the Khedive, “which we are about to undertake with the assent of your Highness, concern the most important interests. . . . But the examination of important questions that arise . . . cannot be the work of your ministers alone. We think, my colleagues and I, that they would be studied to better purpose and more wisely settled by an exchange of ideas and by discussion in which men would take part whose knowledge of affairs, recognised respectability, and position would give them the confidence of the public, and indicate them to the choice of their countrymen. . . . Your council of ministers consider it, therefore, now their duty to request your Highness to respond to the wish of the country, by assembling the Notables of Egypt in order to consult

<sup>697</sup> Despatch of Mr. Adams to Lord Granville, Sept. 13, 1881. Egypt, No. 3 (1882).

<sup>698</sup> Mr. Cookson to Earl Granville, Sept. 16, 1881, and Cherif Pasha to the Khedive, Sept. 10. Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 3, p. 1739.

them as to the needs of the provinces, to lay before them the defects of the administration, and to accomplish, with the aid of their experience, the necessary reforms.”<sup>699</sup>

By thus calling the Notables—and we know that he made his acceptance of office dependent on the wish of the people—Cherif Pasha had put a damper on military effervescence, and had temporarily relegated the soldiers to the background.

This assisted the Powers out of a painful dilemma, for in order to forestall an Anglo-French military control, and in defiance of Anglo-French wishes, hints, and threats, the Sultan had sent an imposing mission<sup>700</sup> to Cairo, and could only be bribed to shorten his envoy's stay by the simultaneous withdrawal of the ironclads England and France had sent to Alexandria “as a place of refuge for the foreign population.”<sup>701</sup>

It is very characteristic that the want of a “refuge” was felt in Downing Street twenty-four hours after the arrival of Ali Nizami at Alexandria,<sup>702</sup> whilst it could again be dispensed with on the 19th of the same month—the day of the departure of the envoys, and the very day of the arrival of the *Invincible*.

<sup>699</sup> Cherif Pasha to the Khedive, Oct. 4, 1881. Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 3 (1882) p. 60.

<sup>700</sup> The mission was composed of Ali Nizami (who since has been on similar errands to Berlin and Venice) and of Ali Fuad Bey, son of the great Ali, with a numerous retinue of Secretaries and A.D.C.—The Author.

<sup>701</sup> Despatch of Earl Granville to Lord Lyons, Oct. 7, 1881. Egypt, No. 3 (1882) p. 38.

<sup>702</sup> Ibid.

Yet whatever may have been the object of the Turkish mission, and whatever harm it may have done *in camera* and behind the scenes,<sup>703</sup> “the immediate effect was good, as Sir E. Malet telegraphed to Lord Granville,<sup>704</sup> for it hurried Arabi and his regiment to El Ouadi,<sup>705</sup> on the morning of Ali Nizami’s arrival; an additional proof of the unquestionable prestige of the name of the Sultan-Caliph, and of the dread of Arabi and Co. of being called to account. In fact the speeches of the colonels and of Mahmoud Samy on this occasion, were overflowing with expressions of devotion to the Khedive, and extolled the merits of Cherif and of his colleagues<sup>706</sup>; not sure what turn affairs might take, and still in the dark as to the Caliph’s intentions and *instructions*, they thought it prudent to keep on the safe side.

#### Sabit Pasha’s mission to Constantinople, and

<sup>703</sup> “The nature of the mission must not, however, be judged by the character of the chief plenipotentiaries, nor by the official instructions of which they are the bearers. Ali Nizami Pasha is a fine soldier and nothing more. Ali Fuad Bey’s only claim to distinction is that he is the son of his father, the great Ali Pasha, but unfortunately he has only inherited the paternal vanity without the ability which in some measure justified it. These two excellencies are merely the ornamental figure-heads of the mission. The soul of it, I have reason to believe, is Kadri Bey, an imperial chamberlain and an Arab by birth, who has played a considerable part in all the Pan-Islamitic intrigues which Abdul Hamid’s genius so dearly loves to weave. He indeed only accompanies the special mission in the humbler part of interpreter, but there is little doubt that to the Palace confidant is committed the delicate task of vindicating at Cairo the supreme authority of the Khalifate.”—(Letter from Constantinople, Oct. 7) *Pall Mall Gazette*, Oct. 12, 1881.

<sup>704</sup> Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 3 (1882) p. 35.

<sup>705</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 66.

<sup>706</sup> Extract from *L’Égypte*, Oct. 8, 1881. Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 3 (1882) p. 62.



Tewfik's unconstitutional surrender,<sup>707</sup> made it probable that the Sultan would support the latter and sacrifice the colonels; nay, convinced that Cherif would do all he could to prevent the Turks from meddling in Egyptian affairs if the colonels knuckled under, they gave way—*pro forma*. They knew too well that the meeting of the Notables would offer opportunities for renewing the strife, and for testing the fictitious solidarity of Khedive, Ministers, and Controllers.

I said before, that Tewfik, crushed by the personality of Riaz, had welcomed a change, but he disliked Cherif as much, if not more. Cherif's name had only been the third "submitted" by His Highness to the mutinous soldiers,<sup>708</sup> and that only at the suggestion of a foreign agent who reminded him of Cherif's popularity. Not that Tewfik disliked the man, but the principles he represented. The autocratic ways of Riaz did not exclude the possibility of a Khedive reassuming power himself, whilst with Cherif's constitutional ideas, and a Chamber of Notables, there was an end to personal rule. Besides there were other reasons of a private nature,<sup>709</sup> equally powerful.

<sup>707</sup> 'The Sultan's Policy in Egypt' (Constantinople, Dec. 12, 1881—"From our own Correspondent").—*Times*, Dec. 27, 1881.

<sup>708</sup> "His Highness named either Heidar Pasha or Ismail Pasha Eyoub as those whom he would select."—Report of Mr. Cookson to Earl Granville, Sept. 10, 1881. *Egypt*, No. 3 (1882) p. 2.

<sup>709</sup> The Khedive knew Cherif's high sense of justice, and his determination—favourably viewed by the leading men in Egypt—of putting an end to all "family proscriptions," and of allowing the return to Egypt at the earliest opportunity, not only of the exiled brothers of His Highness,

It almost required Mr. Malet's interference "to impress upon His Highness the absolute necessity of *making the public believe*, at all events, that he had full confidence in his new Ministry"<sup>70</sup>; but I do not think that either Cherif or the colonels had very sanguine illusions on this point, and the latter, rightly or wrongly, looked upon the Khedive as a trump card in their own game, and gave His Highness repeatedly to understand that with them and a strong army, he would have a fair chance of being again *somebody*.

It will easily be understood that such a state of things was not likely to facilitate the work of Cherif, notwithstanding the encouragement he received, both from within and from without, to persevere in the ungrateful task he had undertaken; his only hope was that the Chamber of Notables would form a counterpoise to the daily increasing interference of Arabi Bey<sup>71</sup> and the colonels in matters of

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but even of Ismail, in the belief that the old prestige of the father would materially assist the son.

The succession in his children's favour having *once for all* closed that question, His Highness insists nevertheless, in true Oriental fashion, on the exile of his brothers, notwithstanding all assurances of loyalty; in fact, only quite recently the Khedive prevented his brother Prince Ibrahim from joining our army in the field, though the Prince has been educated at Woolwich, and rightly considered it a duty to fight for his brother and his country. Surely if there was a fear that his brothers would conspire, it would be better to have them under his thumb, and to try them on the spot for high treason, and if there is no fear, why stir them to action by persistently refusing them the right to live with their wives and families—a right incontestable in Mussulman law?—The Author.

<sup>70</sup> Despatch of Mr. Malet to Earl Granville, Sept. 21, 1881.—Egypt, No. 3 (1882) p. 28.

<sup>71</sup> "Arabi sends orders to the Moudirs, and even to the ministers; thus a

administration, and that the Chamber would discourage the unreasonable demands for an addition of 280,000*l.* to the army estimates.<sup>712</sup>

Cherif's letter to the Khedive of September 10th,<sup>713</sup> resumed in a few lines his old programme of 1879; reasonable economy in the expenses of the State, honesty in the public service, the establishment of a clear and uniform system of legislation, the determination of public authorities and their functions, works of general utility, public instruction—in short, administration and social reforms on a liberal scale. But first public confidence had to be restored. The arrival of some of the Notables at Cairo, the moderate views expressed by them individually, and the

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few days ago he invited the Minister of Justice to quash certain judgments of which he disapproved, he ordered the Minister of Finance to appoint a number of his creatures, without consulting the heads of departments—for instance, in Mr. FitzGerald's office; he rules supreme at the War Office; receives petitions, grants favours, and assumes the post of an irresponsible dictator. I have seen several of his *communiqués* which were certainly gems of laconic presumptuousness.”—From the Author's Diary, Feb. 2, 1882.

<sup>712</sup> “The months of November and December were marked by some recurrence of military disorders, by increased interference of Arabi Bey and the colonels in matters of administration, and by a demand on the part of the Minister of War for an increase of the army, involving an addition of 280,000*l.* to the army estimates. This demand was resisted by the Controllers-General, who did not consider that the revenue allowed of more than 120,000*l.* being devoted to the purpose. In the end the view of the Controllers-General prevailed, and the Budget was framed according to the more reasonable proposal. It showed an estimated increase of upwards of 153,000*l.* in the expenditure of the Ministry of War; but the Controllers-General pointed out, in their report to the Khedive, that the real additional charge was not less than 211,000*l.*, and that further heavy expenses would probably be incurred in consequence of operations in the Soudan and on the Abyssinian frontier.”—Letter of Earl Granville to the Earl of Dufferin, July 11, 1882.

<sup>713</sup> Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 10 (1882) p. 3.

earnest determination of all not to submit to a military dictator, induced the Khedive and the Ministers to take a more cheerful view of the situation.

Thanks to the Controllers, a compromise between the Government and Arabi had so far been arrived at that the military budget was to be increased, not to 280,000*l.*, but nominally to 180,000*l.*, in reality to 211,000*l.*;<sup>714</sup> yet even this amount would have entailed either considerable reductions in other departments or additional taxation. To both, the Controllers were naturally opposed, and therefore not sorry to leave the Notables to settle *where* the money for this increased military expenditure was to come from.

They had pointed out to Mahmoud Samy—the mouth-piece of Arabi—that reductions of the budget of public instruction and public works would be fatal to the future development of the country, that reductions in the salaries of civil servants, as well as of their number,<sup>715</sup> would only represent an

<sup>714</sup> But by shifting the pension fund from the War Office to the Ministry of the Interior, they increased the military budget by an additional 31,000*l.*—The Author.

<sup>715</sup> One of “the first cares of Cherif had been to institute a commission entrusted with the overhauling of the civil administration, and . . . Bey, one of the native members of the commission, told me that he strongly doubted whether any saving would be effected without much injustice to the present holders of Government appointments. He said there were two opposite opinions in the commission; the European and enlightened native members holding that reduction of salaries should only take effect in case of vacancies; suggesting that, for instance, an official receiving 30*l.* a month, in a class which in future would only be entitled to 20*l.*, should continue to touch the higher salary until a vacancy in a higher class did allow of his transfer. Curiously enough, the Native Commissioners won’t hear of any gradual change. They say, Let us settle the new rules, ‘This is your future pay; go, if it does not suit you.’ They fancy

infinitesimal fraction of the 211,000*l.* required, nay, that the contemplated extension of the house-tax to foreigners<sup>716</sup> would be far from producing an equivalent. But the more their arguments were irrefutable, the greater was the hurry of the colonels to carry their point, and to make it law before the meeting of the Chambers.

Talking big about popular reforms and the rights of the people, Arabi and Co. had only the increase

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this will only affect the Europeans, but they are mistaken; for every foreigner, fifteen natives would have to suffer, in fact it would disturb the whole civil service and add a third factor to the discontented Ulemas and soldiers. However, a happy medium might be found by suppressing sinecures and putting inefficient men on half-pay."—From the Author's Diary, 1881.

<sup>716</sup> "It is monstrous to think that foreigners are still exempt from the house-tax and professional tax. Blum Pasha told me that he paid voluntarily his house-tax, feeling ashamed of drawing a salary without contributing, like his married servants, to State expenses, but I think he is the only foreigner whom his conscience has pricked. Malet has all along been in favour of taxing foreigners, as indicated by justice and common sense; De Martino, Lex, Saurma, and Kosjek seem all well disposed, and I think since Ring's recall, that Greece is the only country opposing the taxation of her subjects and protégés, among whom we find the leading bankers, the richest members of the foreign colony. Four-fifths of Alexandria, for instance, belongs to Europeans, yet not one of them contributes a piastre towards public expenses. The Fellah is taxed for his mud-hovel, whilst the palace of the rich banker escapes scot-free. The water-carrier, the shoeblack, the native cabby, pays a professional tax, but his foreign competitor, who does him out of his customers, pays nothing. For years Cherif, Riaz, in fact all succeeding Prime Ministers have worked to obtain justice, and though Her Majesty's Government, at any rate Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville, have openly denounced this iniquity, and given their support to a change, first the French, and now the Greeks are making difficulties. Everybody here laughs at Mr. Blunt's and Sir W. Gregory's discovery of wrongs well known, and which would long have been abolished had it only depended on Ministers and Controllers, requiring neither the fussy intermeddling of amateur politicians, nor the grandiloquent phrases of Arabi. An addition of 211,000*l.* to the military budget is surely a novel way of easing the burden of the native tax-payer."—From the Author's Diary, 1881-82.

of the army and of their own salaries in view, and it is pitiful to think that Liberals abroad allowed themselves to be hoodwinked by the gross impostures of the military clique and their foreign friends.

The forbearance of Cherif, the conciliatory attitude of the Controllers, deserve the highest praise, and only those who on the spot have been witnesses of the daily and incessant provocations to which Ministers and Control were exposed can form a just idea of the relief they felt when the convocation of the Chamber promised to act as a buffer between the ministerial programme and Arabi's exigencies.

In Cherif's letter of October 4th<sup>117</sup> was sketched the outline of his home policy; there was not a man of standing in Egypt who did not approve of his programme, not one of his political adversaries, even, who doubted his patriotism and his honest desire to benefit the people by all means in his power,<sup>118</sup> and when His Highness opened the

<sup>117</sup> Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 3 (1882) p. 60.

<sup>118</sup> Mr. W. S. Blunt, in his "personal" (indeed very personal) narrative (*Nineteenth Century*, Sept. 1882, p. 342), says: "Sir Edward was anxious at one time that I should make friends with Cherif, and I called upon him, and had a long conversation with him, which did not however encourage me to return. I found him quite undistinguishable from the numerous Ottoman pashas of my acquaintance. . . . To speak of him as an Egyptian, or a patriot, or a man of any but the narrowest and least elevated views, is, I am sure, a mere phrase. To me he disclosed himself for what he is, a *vain contemptuous Turk, profoundly convinced of his own fitness to govern, and profoundly despising the Egyptian people*. 'They are children,' he told me, 'and must be treated like children.'" This uncalled-for criticism by one who confesses having met Cherif Pasha but once in his life, induces me to mention Cherif's impressions of that interview; for happening to call the same day as Mr. Blunt—whom by-the-by I do not know—I asked the Prime Minister what he thought of Arabi's friend. He scratched his beard, smiled, and said, "C'est un âne—he wants

Chamber of Notables on December 26th, there was indeed a fair prospect of a thorough co-operation of its members.

“Tous mes efforts et ceux de mon Gouvernement, vous le savez, Messieurs, tendent à assurer le bien-être de nos populations, et l’ordre dans le règlement de leurs intérêts, en généralisant l’administration de la justice, en pourvoyant à la sécurité de tous les habitants du pays, sans distinction, dans leurs biens et dans leur vie. . . . Ami de l’instruction et du progrès, je n’ai jamais cessé de la poursuivre au grand jour. . . . C’est à vous de me seconder dans cette voie.”

These simple and able words of His Highness found an echo in all hearts, and meeting Sultan Pasha, the President of the Chamber, and some of the leading Notables the next day at Cherif Pasha’s house, I can speak from my own knowledge, and say that they were one and all for the Khedive, recognising in the Prime Minister the true and enlightened chief of the National party, that they were imbued with the necessity of holding together, of backing the Government to the utmost of their power, of helping Cherif in the work of reform, and in keeping the army in its proper place, as the guardian of order ; in fact, in discussing the future powers of the

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to know more about Egypt than we who have been born here, and lived here all our lives ;” and this was also the opinion of Sir E. Malet. Being on the topic of Arabi’s foreign henchmen, I may mention that Sir William Gregory, “who studied the Egyptian question on the spot,” did not even take the trouble to make Cherif’s acquaintance, though he did not spare him and his administration pungent criticism by the column.—The Author.

Chamber, the Notables, I saw, seemed fully to realise the wisdom of not going too far in the beginning, and of limiting their powers to a consultative voice until the country should be ripe for more.

It would have been most desirable to foster these feelings, and to avoid whatever could throw the Notables into the arms of the army, or permit Arabi to identify the military cause with that of the people. Unfortunately, the very wish and effort of strengthening the Khedive and his ministers led to a contrary result, and to-day M. Gambetta will certainly regret the paternity of the Identical Note. It was he<sup>719</sup> who, through Lord Lyons, induced our Government to join in an epistolary feat, meaningless, if we look at Lord Granville's reservation,<sup>720</sup> and yet mischievous in its consequences,<sup>721</sup> in Egypt as well as at Constantinople.<sup>722</sup>

I remember Cherif Pasha's despair: "Quelle boulette!" were his words. All was going well, the Notables well disposed, the army, so to say, out of

<sup>719</sup> Despatch of M. Gambetta to M. d'Auray, Dec. 27, 1881. 'Documents Diplomatiques, Affaires d'Égypte, 1881-82.'

<sup>720</sup> Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 5 (1882) p. 35 *et seq.*

<sup>721</sup> "Hier soir Cherif Pasha et M. Malet sont venus me trouver pour m'entretenir au sujet de la note identique. Elle aurait été malcomprise dans certaines sphères. On y verrait une appréciation défavorable de la Chambre des Notables, un acte de défiance vis-à-vis du parti national, et une menace d'intervention que rien ne justifie en ce moment. Les objections nous ont été nettement formulées par Cherif Pasha à M. Malet et à moi. M. Malet m'a proposé même devant Cherif Pasha, de demander à nos Gouvernements respectifs l'envoi d'une nouvelle note explicative destinée à ramener l'opinion."—Despatch of M. Sienkiewicz to M. Gambetta, Jan. 1, 1882. 'Documents Diplomatiques, Affaires d'Égypte, 1881-82,' p. 29 *et seq.*

<sup>722</sup> Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 5 (1882) p. 45 *et seq.*



court, and then, one does not know why, the Powers alienate gratuitously the Notables, "on les blesse au vif," they will get frightened and side with Arabi for fear of an intervention, we shall see the consequences to-morrow when Article 31 of the Organic Law will be voted. The Powers, by squeezing themselves between the Khedive and the Notables, and by undermining the solidarity of ministers and Chamber, are only giving Arabi a hold on the latter — "Ils n'auraient pas pu trouver mieux pour nous perdre."<sup>723</sup>

Though the blue-books are somewhat reticent on the point, the French yellow-book dispels all doubts as to the authorship of the identical "blunder," and one almost feels surprised at the good-natured yielding of our Cabinet to views they justly deprecated, indeed, it suggests the idea that the treaty of commerce must have been used as a prospective sugar-plum for good boys.

M. Gambetta was right enough in saying,<sup>724</sup> "that in view of a joint interference it seemed to him indispensable that there should be no divergence in the language and instructions of the two agents at Cairo; but that did not give him a right to insist upon the adoption of *his* line of conduct. Why should he expect *us* to give way? Surely it is no argument coolly to tell Lord Lyons "qu'il se heurtait à une décision déjà prise," and there should be a limit

<sup>723</sup> From the Author's Diary, Jan. 9, 1882.

<sup>724</sup> M. Gambetta to M. Challemeil-Lacour, Jan. 13, 1881. 'Documents Diplomatiques, Affaires d'Égypte, 1881-82,' p. 35.

even to the legendary "courtoisie" of Lord Granville.

At any rate, we have learned by this time that it is not for Great Britain to shape her foreign policy according to the fluctuations of the political barometer at the Quai d'Orsay. In Downing Street a ministerial change is only a change of men, not of England's international rights and duties. In France Republic means the irresponsible will and caprice of the man in power; and though French policy may occasionally carry the day, as, for instance, in the case of the Identical Note, "il n'y a pas de lendemain." To base alliances and a political programme on such foundations is building on sand, and the "condominium" in Egypt has proved it.

But before approaching the crisis, indirectly provoked by the Identical Note, though directly due to the presence and threats of Arabi during the budget debate, it will be just to throw a glance at the Khedive.

Called by Europe to succeed his father, stripped of all power and authority, an ornamental Khedive under Anglo-French tutelage, he can, of course, not be made responsible for our blustering and blundering, and I confess I have often wondered how he managed to steer clear of the traps laid for him by friend and foe. No Western prince would ever have found his way out of the maze of intrigues encircling him on every side. True, all parties wanted him as a label; true, his presence precluded more hazardous experiments; yet all efforts culminated in one stereo-

type result, the nullifying of his influence—the shrinking of his personality to a mere arithmetical unit. Possibly His Highness owes his maintenance on the Khedivial throne to his very exclusion from affairs of state, and the concurrent responsibility. But whilst he was thus kept “a stranger” in his own house, it would be wrong to imagine that he spent his days in happy indolence, or seeking to drown his sorrows in the pleasures of his harem.

The following lines<sup>725</sup> will give an idea of the Prince, before the terrible events of this summer revealed him as a *man*.

“Mehemet Tewfik I., Khedive of Egypt, is one of the youngest sovereigns in the world. Born in 1852, he is only twenty-nine; but he looks older, and is rather portly for his age. His features are regular and handsome. Though of dignified bearing he is very shy, especially with strangers. His timidity is frequently taken for want of intelligence—a mistake no one is likely to make on closer acquaintance. He is very simple in all his tastes, hates all parade, loves his home, and is an excellent husband and father. Unfortunately, as recent events show, he lacks energy, decision, and determination—a consequence of his early training in the harem; but sometimes his eye flashes in a way which leads one to think that, if he were differently surrounded and once gained confidence in his own judgment, he would most likely reveal a *will* of his own. He is a keen observer, has a great deal of common

<sup>725</sup> Egyptian Sketches, I.—*Pall Mall Gazette*, Oct. 7, 1881.

sense, and requires only time to feel his way and to take his lawful share in the affairs of his country.

“He was carefully educated, and his serious turn of mind found a useful field of activity in the education of the young. Seven years before his accession he founded at his own expense a school for orphans and for sons of officers in his palace at Couteh. Up to the present moment some 124 youngsters, from the age of ten to twenty, receive there a capital education under conscientious and painstaking masters. It is organised on the model of Continental schools for cadets, and great attention is given to the bodily development of the pupils, who delight in gymnastics, fencing, and the like. In his father's time Tewfik Pasha went almost daily to look after the boys, and he maintained (as he still continues to do) the whole establishment, at a cost of 4600*l.* a year, out of his privy purse—a somewhat heavy strain on his then scanty allowance of 30,000*l.*

“His interest in this particular institution has somewhat abated since he founded, opposite the Abdin Palace, the Ali School, where his two sons, Abbas and Mehemet Ali, are educated with about a hundred other boys, sons of princes or pashas. Yet, though this school is only intended for the children of the rich, education is gratuitous, the Khedive providing for everything, including uniforms and a somewhat too luxurious table. But within the school perfect equality prevails. The sons of the Khedive are treated exactly like the other boys, and within its

precincts they are not allowed to be styled 'Prince.' At first he had the greatest difficulty in securing attendance, but now the demand for admission is so great that he speaks of doubling the school, and of having only resident pupils. Notwithstanding that he paid for everything, he had a few years ago almost to employ force to fill his school.

"Following up his father's ideas, the Khedive contemplates opening a girls' school for the upper classes, and placing there his own daughter. 'The great thing,' said His Highness one day to me, 'is to educate women. They will then not only become true companions to their husbands, but will take an interest in the primary education of the children, which at present is so neglected, and adds so much to our difficulties when they first come to school. Family life is the greatest blessing, and it is impossible unless both men and women are educated. It is the aim of my life to achieve that result; and in time, I trust, we may be able to do away with slaves in the harem. I hate the very idea of slavery, and am doing all I can to put it down: moreover, a harem is only wanted for many wives; with one wife there won't be any necessity for seclusion. It is wrong to imagine that our religion requires us to have more than one wife, or to make the wife our slave instead of our equal. The Hanefite rite defines clearly the position of women, and assigns to them almost a leading place; but how can women lead if they are ignorant and uneducated? Another matter that

much worries me is the divorce question in the lower classes, for the rich do not indulge in divorce as much as the common men; but the way the Fellah goes to work is abominable and scandalous: not rich enough to afford more than one wife, he marries a girl simply to divorce her the next day. Three curses before witnesses suffice for a divorce, and they pay so little for the support of the children, if there are any, that it is made far too easy. I intend to put it down with all my might. But it is so difficult to educate the women of the lower classes; at our girls' schools they learn useful things, but more fitted for middle-class life. They get accustomed to cleanliness, beds, decent food, and necessarily the poor girls afterwards feel miserable to share the mud-hut of a Fellah, to sleep on the bare ground, and to live as he does. It will be necessary, first, to better the condition of the Fellah; but all that requires time. I have given much thought to the question of education, of family life, and the relations of parents and children. The future of Egypt is there. If we can raise the standard of education and social life, Egypt will in time become one of the most thriving members of the Continental family.'

"Asking His Highness whether he thought that it would be possible to train his own people so as to be able to dispense at some future time with the services of foreigners, he shook his head and said, 'We shall never be able to do without Europe; moreover, why should we? You are welcome as teachers, and we must learn from you. All I wish

is to develop the welfare of Egypt; and if Europe does not mix up politics with her task as school-master, if we are allowed to remain peacefully Egyptians, and if in time the Europeans consent to live under our laws, and do not require a privileged legislation, our people will assimilate themselves to the foreign element, without the distrust which prevails at present on account of the fear that you wish to deprive us of our independence and nationality.'

"Speaking of England, the Viceroy eulogised English ways, ideas, and institutions, and told me that he intended to send his sons to England as soon as they were old enough. He spoke with much admiration of our parliamentary system and party organisation, so fruitful through constant friction. He evinced an intimate knowledge of Continental affairs, quite surprising when one considers that he has never been out of Egypt. In addition he displays a great amount of tact and *savoir faire*. Riaz Pasha was full of his young master's praise, and told me repeatedly that it was a mistake to think that Tewfik Pasha was weak, adding that, if lacking initiative, he had more than once shown remarkable firmness. Thus, for instance, quite recently, when M. de Lesseps tried to hurry him at Alexandria into signing the fresh-water concession behind the back of his ministers, the Khedive refused point blank, declaring that he should do nothing without his Cabinet; and when M. de Lesseps threatened to remain in Alexandria until the Viceroy should have

signed, His Highness replied laughingly : ‘ In that case Egypt will have the pleasure of possessing you for good ; nay, I should never forgive myself if, by signing, I deprived us of your presence.’ ”

I may add to the above that I had frequent opportunities for talking with the Khedive on educational matters, and I confess it would be difficult to meet amongst the crowned heads of the Continent a more enlightened and more well-meaning specimen of the philanthropist.

Debarred from his share in the cares of state, he devotes his time and thoughts exclusively to the development of popular education ; he takes the liveliest interest in all schools, especially the one where his boys are brought up, and he frequently assists at their studies.

In speaking to me last winter of his idea of soon establishing a school for the princesses, he said, “ It will be a difficult matter on account of the prevailing prejudices ; one must respect the existing notions of propriety ; but even if I have to maintain the outward restrictions of the harem, it will be a step towards the emancipation of women ; it will be a beginning, and a great blessing if we succeed in taking the education of the girls out of the hands of frequently uneducated mothers, and of ignorant slaves and eunuchs. Of course I have an English governess, some of my cousins have German or French governesses for their children, but those are exceptions ; and only a girls’ school where I send



my own child will permit me to generalise female education.”<sup>726</sup>

After this diversion from our subject—and I thought it fair to show the Khedive in his true element, the education of the young, to show that he is anxious to do his duty whenever he is allowed to think and to act for himself—we must return to a less pleasant topic, the budget debate in the Chamber of Notables—to the beginning of the end.

We now approach the crisis. The news of the despatch of the fleets<sup>727</sup> had a great effect; Mahmoud Samy, Arabi, and the other ministers doubted not for a moment that England, France, and the Porte were *one*, nay that the three were acting as the mandatories of Europe. They were in the greatest state of excitement, and these very men who only a few days before had threatened the Khedive with abdication, and even with death, were now prostrate before him, seeking<sup>728</sup> his advice, and thinking of nothing but the best means of saving their heads,<sup>729</sup> and bargaining for advantageous conditions for themselves, regardless of their unfortunate subordinates. In the Appendix<sup>730</sup> will be found the details of the ministerial ups and downs according to the news of the day. In fact, as long as they believed in an Anglo-Franco-Turkish intervention, they were meek, conciliatory, full of gushing assurances of good-will to Europeans, to the Controllers and the Consuls-General,<sup>731</sup> kissing

<sup>726</sup> From the Author's Diary, 1881-82.

<sup>728</sup> Ibid.

<sup>729</sup> Ibid.

<sup>730</sup> Ibid.

<sup>727</sup> Appendix IV.

<sup>731</sup> Ibid.

the Khedive's coat and feet, profuse in their loyalty, forgetting, nay denying, that they had ever threatened their sovereign with deposition, in fact, vowing that they knew no better master, or one whom they would more readily serve.

But when the news reached Cairo that there were *not* twenty ironclads, that there were *no* Turkish ships, nay, that the Sultan was even protesting<sup>732</sup> against an Anglo-French naval demonstration, they at once changed their attitude.<sup>733</sup> Cool and haughty with the agents, impertinent with Europeans, impudent towards their master, they saw a loophole in the dissension of the Porte and the Controlling Powers; they no longer volunteered to resign, but, on the contrary, assumed sovereign airs and powers. Mahmoud Pasha Samy sent the Khedive word<sup>734</sup> that in future the Ministers declined any personal intercourse with him.<sup>735</sup> And, contrary to Article 6 of the Organic Law,<sup>736</sup> the Ministers convoked the Chamber without the Khedive, to whom alone this right belongs; and it is much to the credit of the Notables that, notwithstanding the threats of Arabi and the pressure brought upon them, they declined to sit in a body, though they were all at Cairo, without being convoked by His Highness.

The following, which I take from my notes, will give a clear account of the crisis, as everything

<sup>732</sup> Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 7 (1882) p. 137.

<sup>733</sup> Appendix IV.

<sup>734</sup> Ibid.

<sup>735</sup> Ibid.

<sup>736</sup> Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 5 (1882) p. 56.

centres around Arabi and Mahmoud Pasha Baroudi.<sup>737</sup> The latter, Arabi's late Prime Minister, and chief instigator of the present troubles, owes his ominous surname, el Baroudi—the powder maker—to the fact that his father was Director of the Powder Mill. Baroudi has nothing striking in his appearance, except an unpleasant squint, coupled with the habit of never looking into one's face when he is speaking. His tarbouche on one ear gives him a roguish air, but his joviality is sham, like his obsequious politeness, which degenerates into platitude with people he wishes to flatter or to deceive.

The other day, at the funeral of Ahmed Dramali Pasha, the late Prefect of Police, who died *rather suddenly* at a moment when his place was required for one of Arabi's creatures, the Prime Minister, Mahmoud Pasha Samy, could be seen in full uniform, deferentially holding an umbrella over Arabi's *quasi* anointed head, nay, like a servant, he kept a trifle behind the man of the day. That alone depicts Baroudi's character.

By no means particularly gifted, or even distinguished as an administrator, Mahmoud has, nevertheless, succeeded in climbing to the top of the tree, thanks to a certain shrewdness and a remarkable talent for intrigue.

Utterly unprincipled and ready to do anything to gain his ends, he has been successfully trading

<sup>737</sup> The same man whom Messrs. Broadley and Napier—according to a Reuter's telegram, *St. James's Gazette*, Oct. 26, 1882—decline to defend.

on the weaknesses and blunders of his betters, and he has the reputation of never having missed an opportunity of ingratiating himself with men at the helm.

In turn the servile courtier, first of Ismail, to whom he owes almost everything and whom he professed to worship, and then of Tewfik, he has of course been a fervent satellite of Cherif, Riaz, and Nubar, according to the political barometer of the day. Always courting the dispenser of favours, the man in power, it could be expected that he would join "the colonels" as soon as Arabi was likely to become master of the situation.

It mattered indeed little that he was a member of Cherif's Cabinet, that he had pledged himself to stand and fall with his chief; such trifling considerations had no weight; and now we know that Baroudi was the soul of the military conspiracy against his colleagues. But I must not anticipate events.

Educated at Constantinople at Ismail's expense, he gained his "spurs" at the Grand Vizirate, where he remained for seven years as a clerk, and on his return to Egypt he lingered for some years in subordinate positions until his marriage with a daughter of Ismail's *dada* or nurse, obtained him, in addition to a handsome dower, the position of aide-de-camp to His Highness.

Thus launched into the official world he complacently sunned himself in his generous master's favour, until a domestic mishap threw a cloud over his fortunes, and deprived him for a time of the

golden advantages of what he is now pleased to call the vitiated atmosphere of courts.

It appears that he discovered one day a tender weakness of his better half for a young and enterprising musician, and not satisfied with killing the disturber of matrimonial harmony, he likewise murdered the mother of his wife's lover and her slave. As to his wife and mother-in-law, they had to start for a trip up the White Nile, "whence no one returns." Ismail Pasha frowned, he was fond of his *dada*, but Mahmoud Samy managed to get his cause so ably pleaded that he was soon allowed to return to Cairo, and passing a sponge over this little episode, His Highness pardoned the ferocious Othello. Nay, his friends obtained for him after a few months the appointment of *Arzouhaldji*, or receiver of petitions at the Abdin Palace. Once again in the stirrup, Mahmoud did not lose his time, and aware of the value of powerful connections, and the influence women have in pushing husbands to the front, he was lucky enough to obtain the hand of one of Mansour Pasha's sisters, thus becoming brother-in-law to Ismail's favourite daughter, H.H. the Princess Tewhida.

Moreover, a marriage into the rich and powerful Yegen family secured him the patronage of such men as Haidar, Daoud, Kalil Pasha Yegen, Ali Pasha Cherif, and others. Sent twice to Candia with despatches, this feat gained him the rank of colonel, and during the last Russo-Turkish war he commanded a regiment of cavalry under Prince Hassan, who is

said to have had a poor idea of the gallant Colonel's military capacity.

On his return to Cairo it happened that an unscrupulous instrument was wanted for the post of Prefect of Police, and Mahmoud Samy volunteering his services was accepted. In his new position he found opportunities for making friends with those he had been appointed to watch, in fact it is stated that he knew all about the contemplated military movement of February 1st, 1879. At any rate he managed to keep Ismail, as well as the Wilson Ministry, completely in the dark; yet so well did he shuffle his cards, that he was soon after made a Minister, in fact, Cherif had to accept him as Minister of Wakfs and of Public Instruction.

In this capacity he countersigned, in August 1879, with his colleagues, what is commonly called "Cherif's Constitution," and which forms, as we know, the basis of the present Organic Law. With the other ministers, he pledged himself to stand or to fall by the reform project of his chief, but Mahmoud Samy deserted his party as soon as the non-acceptance of Cherif's proposals obliged the Cabinet to resign.<sup>738</sup> Turning his back on Notables and Constitution, he went over to Riaz, who gave him the portfolio of the Wakfs, which he exchanged on February 1st, 1881, for that of Minister of War, and it is whispered that *he* was instrumental in his predecessor, Osman Pasha Rifky's, fall, the same whose name heads the list of the forty-three Cir-

<sup>738</sup> Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 1 (1880) p. 65.

cassians, victims of the monstrous sentence which may be looked upon as the primary cause of the present troubles.

Shortly after, Baroudi had to make room for Daoud Pasha, the Khedive's brother-in-law, as he was strongly suspected of conspiring against Riaz, and of being hand-and-glove with "the colonels."

We know that his retirement did not last long, and when Cherif Pasha was called upon to form a new Cabinet on September 29th, 1881, the mutinous colonels insisted on Mahmoud Pasha Samy's appointment as Minister of War. In vain did Cherif Pasha protest, in vain did he point out that Baroudi had deserted the national and liberal cause, in vain did he declare that no confidence could be placed in a man who one day was for, and the next against, constitutional institutions. Mahmoud had bewitched his military patrons, and his appointment was made a *conditio sine quâ non*. It has been proved by the sequel that it was a grave mistake to yield to the demands of the army, yet at the time Cherif Pasha was induced to believe that he might spare his country greater disasters by giving way. At any rate, he made the greatest patriotic sacrifice a man of his high honour and feeling could make when he condescended to take such a man as Mahmoud Samy into his cabinet. It is no secret that Baroudi availed himself of his position for preparing the advent of the military party. From the first he betrayed his chief and his colleagues, and secretly encouraging the intrigues of his subordinates, he

made the War Office the centre of a conspiracy of which he and Arabi were the promoters, and which had for its sole object the overthrow of Cherif Pasha. Nevertheless, he professed the most abject devotion to his chief, denied solemnly all connection with "the colonels," and was, up to the last hour of Cherif's administration, untiring in assurances of "loyal" support.

The Notables, though possibly not elected according to our ideas, were nevertheless, as nominees of the Omdés and Sheikhs, representatives of the people in the second degree.<sup>739</sup> Moderate in their views, men of property, free from personal ambition, they so well realised the advantages of a judicious yielding to Cherif's moderate views and patriotic policy, that on January 30th<sup>740</sup> they agreed to waive their demands relative to the voting of the budget, and they delegated Sultan Pasha to convey this decision

<sup>739</sup> It may be interesting to note that, though elective, the function of Sheikh is practically almost hereditary, as naturally the most powerful family will nominate one amongst their number, and many villages are only composed of the members of one and the same family; and where such a preponderance does not exist, the feuds of Montagu and Capulet are of daily occurrence, each family insisting upon electing their own Sheikh. There have been instances of twenty Sheikhs in one village, so that administration became perfectly impossible—nay, the number had to be reduced *by law* to a maximum of four. In every instance the Sheikh represents the interests of a large party of his village, and is virtually a representative of the people, though naturally wealth has a deal to do with the matter, and, in practice, we find generally the richest man also the Sheikh. A similar process takes place in reference to the election of the Omdés, who are invariably the most important and richest amongst the Sheikhs, those who have received the best education, who can read and write and plead the cause of others with the Moudir. The Notables being elected by and from amongst the Sheikhs and Omdés, are therefore indirectly the representatives of the Fellah.—The Author.

<sup>740</sup> Appendix IV.



to Cherif Pasha, but Arabi Bey—Mahmoud's Under-Secretary of War—threatened the President of the Chamber to cut him down if he dared to comply with the vote of the Notables. Sultan Pasha had to yield to brutal threats, nay, under further pressure, he had even to deny the fact. And though Mr. Blunt has taken upon himself to contradict the truth of this statement, I venture to think that declarations confirmed not only by the Khedive, but by Cherif Pasha, and a large number of Notables and men of standing, most undoubtedly authorised Sir Edward Malet to give credence to Sultan Pasha's own version.<sup>741</sup> In fact, Sultan Pasha declined to head the deputation of fifteen Notables whom Arabi forced to wait on Cherif Pasha with the request either to accept the programme of the military party or to resign. The whole comedy had been got up at the houses of Baroudi and Arabi, where the officers met daily, and where they combined their schemes under the leadership of the Minister of War and of his omnipotent Under-Secretary. Nay, even before Cherif resigned, Mahmoud had formed his future Cabinet.

Everything had been got ready for February 1st, the anniversary of the first mutiny, and it had been arranged that another military demonstration was to enforce the will of the army, in case of objections from the Ministry. Deserted by the Powers, notwithstanding that his loyalty to their own programme had provoked the crisis, and that he

<sup>741</sup> Appendix IV.

had a right to rely *on the pledges of the Identical Note*, and not wishing to complicate a critical situation by legitimate resistance to the unwarranted exigencies of anarchy, Cherif Pasha tendered his resignation to the Khedive, in presence of the Agents of Great Britain and France.

Mahmoud Samy and his confederates were triumphant, and the former expected to be sent for to form a new administration, but he had forgotten that his master was not likely to give up the advantages of his position without actually being forced to it. Having to accept Cherif's resignation, the Khedive declined to select a successor, and though declaring his willingness to accept whomever the Chamber *might* suggest, he desired to leave to the Notables the responsibility of forming a new Cabinet ; and notwithstanding the entreaties of the Notables to help them out of the scrape, His Highness remained firm, replying, " You have deposed the minister who had my confidence ; it is for you, the Notables, to suggest his successor."

This was an unexpected blow for Mahmoud Samy and Co. ; if appointed by the Khedive he had hoped thus to make His Highness his accomplice, and he found himself now reduced to the unpleasant position of nominee of a mutinous army, for the Notables seemed likewise determined not to bring any one forward.

After twenty-four hours of painful suspense Arabi came to the rescue of his acolyte, and threatening again Sultan Pasha with his sword,

he forced the President of the Notables to submit Mahmoud's name to the acceptance of the Khedive.

True to his word, and to his novel part of "constitutional" monarch, Tewfik at once sent for the late Minister of War, requesting him to form a new ministry. But Cabinet making is not so easy as it looks, and if Mahmoud had found no difficulties in concocting an administration on paper, he soon discovered that no decent men would now join him; for such who might have accepted had Mahmoud succeeded Cherif as the nominee of the Khedive, declined to associate themselves with a premier imposed both on His Highness and on the Chamber by the good pleasure of Arabi and the army.

It took a long time ere he could get a scratch team together, all obscure names, all new men, with the exception of Moustapha Pasha Fehmy, the "permanent" Minister of Foreign Affairs, whose flexibility of principles allows him to remain as a fixture in every succeeding administration. It is affirmed that in some instances even threats had to be resorted to, to force a portfolio on an unwilling candidate. But the fact remains that he managed his "job" at last with the help and under the auspices of Arabi, who, originally only Minister of War, was *de facto* the soul of the venture.

Though only the standard-bearer of his more powerful Under-Secretary, it is Mahmoud who has been making himself not only the mouth-piece but the executor of the whims of the military party, and he is *as much*, if not more, to blame than Arabi

for the misfortunes which their madness has brought over Egypt.

It would be too long to enumerate the many arbitrary measures due to their initiative, and recent events are too fresh in everybody's memory to require a repetition. Suffice it to say, that after usurping power, after monopolising all resources for army purposes, after disorganising all services and meddling with everybody, and every department, these military reformers thought themselves strong enough to defy the Sultan, Europe, justice, and even common sense.

Without taking any measures for bettering the condition of any one except that of some hundreds of officers, and their own, of course, Arabi and Co. hit, under Mahmoud's presidency, on the glorious idea of freeing Egypt from all elements hostile to their misrule.

Not daring to begin with Europeans, they *invented* a conspiracy of Circassians, numerous arrests were made, a court-martial was improvised, some of the members being judge and party in one, and private vengeance was given an opportunity for having a fling at anybody the colonels wanted to get rid of. Subjected to the most cruel treatment, and to actual torture,<sup>742</sup> the accused were utterly at the mercy of their enemies, and might possibly have been sacrificed, had not the monstrosity of an inhuman sentence been the very means of saving these unfortunate men. It was a lucky thing for the forty-

<sup>742</sup> Appendix IV.

two Circassians, and not less for the country, that Mahmoud and his colleagues wanted to coerce the Khedive to sanction the judicial murder they had planned, and that they published the sentence before the Khedive had even seen or approved of it. Firm from the first, His Highness *manfully* declined to become their accomplice, and following entirely the *call of duty and honour, the Khedive staked undoubtedly life and throne in trying to save the victims of this infamous plot.*

Mahmoud, who had been the most violent advocate of extreme measures, did not even shrink from threatening his master with deposition, and an eventual massacre of Europeans, thus hoping to force the hand of the recalcitrant prince, though now he denies having ever said a word.<sup>743</sup>

He failed, and only succeeded in calling Europe to the rescue of the Khedive and of Egypt. It was Mahmoud Samy, as I said before, who convoked the Notables *without* the Khedive's sanction; it was he who first suggested resistance, and who, to maintain himself in power, did not hesitate to involve Egypt in a suicidal conflict with the Controlling Powers, and even with the Porte.

But when the Notables, the Ulemas, in fact, the country, declared against a military dictatorship, when the ministers found themselves isolated, it was again Mahmoud Samy who the first cringed before Khedive and Consuls-General. I have said before how they kissed the Khedive's feet, and how,

<sup>743</sup> Appendix IV.

begging their master's pardon, these worthies clung to office, thus to ensure better conditions for their surrender.

They thought of nothing but saving their *djan*, i. e. their lives, and these men who had been boasting of their civic virtues, who had been talking so big, who had threatened to set the world on fire, and whom people at home, and abroad, had naively taken *au sérieux*, did not even know how to fall with dignity, and were lacking the only redeeming quality of the mutineer, "pluck and personal courage."

It was pitiful to witness the utter collapse of these political mountebanks, and it is impossible to describe the panic following the news of the arrival of the fleets—of Anglo-French and Turkish ships, of course.

Believing Europe to be in earnest, and the Western Powers and Turkey acting in common, no resistance was dreamt of, and Arabi would have been alone had he dared to suggest it. But when it came to be known that there were only six English and French ships, and no Turkish, when it was telegraphed that M. de Freycinet deprecated any landing of troops, and when it became evident that the Powers were far from agreed, and that the naval demonstration was only another edition of platonic remonstrance, Arabi and his henchman Baroudi raised their heads again; from humble they became impudent; new threats against the Khedive were uttered, and these same men, who had reproached Tewfik with having countenanced the Sultan's legitimate interference in the Circassian business, hastened to shield themselves

behind the Porte. The lamentable weakness of the Powers, the want of understanding, and the French objections to Turkish co-operation, became powerful trumps in the hands of ministers who had nothing to lose and everything to win. Bullying their master, deceiving the Foreign Agents, and working up the masses by paid emissaries from the University of El Ahzar, they managed to keep in power by the force of intimidation. New threats obliged Sultan Pasha to disavow his share in the ultimatum. They got up petitions for the deposition of Tewfik, and on the very day Sir Edward Malet and M. Sienkiewicz presented the ultimatum, Arabi despatched an aide-de-camp to Constantinople with an appeal to the Sultan, signed by himself, most officers, all the ministers—but only eight Notables out of 160, praying to depose Tewfik, to nominate Halim, to maintain Baroudi's Cabinet, and likewise "the colonels" in command of the army.

Even the Khedive's life was in danger, and the Minister of Public Works is said to have proposed in council to kill the Khedive, as the simplest solution. Yet up to that moment, Arabi, the ministers, and "the colonels," had only brute force to back them; the Notables, *minus* eight, had all pronounced for the Khedive, so had most of the Ulemas, and certainly all Pashas of mark, and all lovers of order.

The population remained a passive spectator, nay, they hardly knew that there were troubles in high circles, and the utmost indifference continued to prevail in the bazaars.

Only when it became evident that Identical Notes, Ultimatums, and naval demonstrations meant *nothing*, when people began to realise that there was no one to protect them, and that they would be left to the mercy of Arabi and Co., they came to the natural conclusion that it would be safer not to pronounce for one side or the other, or, if need be, to hold to Arabi as the strongest.

This split in the party of order must be *solely* attributed to the hesitations and blunders of Continental statesmanship.

Half-measures, half-hearted action, and a yielding to French views, brought about disaster after disaster.

Already, it was humiliating enough for the foreign Agents to have to advise the Khedive to take back ministers who had threatened him with deposition<sup>744</sup> and who were snapping their fingers at Europe; but to be obliged to ask for the despatch of an Ottoman Commissioner after first having declined Turkish concurrence, was a sad avowal of impotence, and with it vanished the last atom of the *Dual* prestige in Egypt.

Nothing impresses the Eastern mind like facts and acts—words, notes, and paper threats have no effect.

Like the news of the arrival of the fleets, so the intelligence of Dervish Pasha's arrival acted once more magically. Arabi and the ministers trembled, Baroudi lost his head, Moustapha Pasha Fehmy, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, hid himself, and Sadyk, the Finance Minister, became mad; only one or

<sup>744</sup> Appendix IV.



two of the colonels were still beating the big drum.

The submission of Arabi could not be doubted, and those who knew Dervish, prognosticated that the old Moushir would make short work of the mutineers if they dared to oppose the Sultan's bidding. The question was, what would this bidding be.

In fact, it is almost certain that Arabi would have submitted on Sunday, had not the troubles in Alexandria once more lifted him into power.

Time will reveal to whom the first riots at Alexandria were due; so much is certain, that they were the work of some interested party, and up to the present Arabi seems the only gainer.

That Dervish Pasha should have allowed, nay asked Arabi to restore order, shows not only the gravity of the situation, but it also indicates the "little game" of the Porte.<sup>745</sup> The Sultan cannot allow his authority to be disregarded in a Mussulman country. "The Sultan is the Caliph and spiritual head of the Faithful, and at the same time the temporal ruler of the Ottoman Empire."<sup>746</sup> He cannot allow himself to be beaten on his own ground. Had the Powers availed themselves of the co-operation of the Porte,<sup>747</sup> Arabi would have been doomed. Nay, as long as there was the slightest chance of the

<sup>745</sup> The arrest of Dervish Pasha and his confinement in Yildiz Kiosk, so to say under the thumb of the Sultan, as announced by telegram of Oct. 28, 1882, is an undoubted proof of how anxious the Sultan is to make a scapegoat of him whom he had sent to Egypt to *treat with Arabi*, not to save Tewfik.—The Author.

<sup>746</sup> Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 7 (1882) p. 16.

<sup>747</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 137 and 138.

Turkish flag being seen "alongside" that of Great Britain and France before Alexandria, those who knew Turkey and Dervish Pasha had only one opinion, that Arabi would be summoned to appear before the Sultan's envoy, and that if he declined to obey the commands of the Caliph, that the old Moushir would make short work of a mutinous soldier. More than one of the Khedive's ministers told the author that any such open defiance of the Sultan's behests might have the simple consequence that Dervish Pasha would order Arabi to be beheaded then and there, and one of them added, "Arabi's head thrown out of a window at Kasr-el-Noussar (the palace of pleasure) would once and for ever cure mutinous soldiers."

That old Dervish was quite capable of realising the anticipations of the Egyptian Pashas may be gathered from the following little episode of his mission to Dulcigno, told the author by the son of the Vice-governor of Scutari. Arriving with only six battalions at Scutari, Dervish, in the name of the Sultan, summoned at once the Rebel Chief to make his submission, regardless of his camping with 35,000 men between Scutari and Dulcigno. Youssouf expressed "deep regret" at not being able to obey His Majesty's commands, saying "I am a prisoner of my own men, there are 35,000, and they will not let me come, in fact, I might have the fate of Mehemet Ali Pasha,"<sup>748</sup> they would murder me or *any one* who dared to provoke their wrath."

<sup>748</sup> Mehemet Ali, a Prussian by birth, was the Pasha so treacherously murdered by his own troops at the beginning of the campaign.—The Author.

Dervish Pasha understood the allusion and Yousouf's sarcasm, and turning to the Vice-Governor of Scutari, the learned Mollah (President of the Tribunal) Youssouf Sidi, in whose house he was staying, he showed him Youssouf Bey's letter, and asked for a mutton-bone. Familiar with Albanian superstition, he remembered that they read the future, especially the fate of friend or foe, from a dry mutton-bone. When it was brought he took it in his hand, looked at it, and after a time, shrugging his shoulders, observed in a loud voice, so that all present could hear him, "Poor Youssouf! I am sorry for him, for there I see his coffin in the bone. Poor Youssouf! Wah, Wah!"

Next morning he ordered the garrison of Scutari to cover his rear, whilst he pounced with his own few hundred men on Youssouf Bey's army. It appears that it literally rained lead, but Dervish Pasha, though on horseback in front of his men, seemed invulnerable. When his two field-pieces came up, the Pasha ordered the guns to be placed in position, and getting down from his horse he pointed one carefully himself, and seemed to scrutinise the ranks of the enemy with his field-glass. Suddenly he gave orders to fire, and immediately a great commotion was visible on the other side; the firing ceased for a time, and it soon became evident that Youssouf Bey had been killed.

Dervish Pasha got again on his horse, and calling for Youssouf Bey's brother, whom he had brought with him to witness the other's death, he said, "I

told thee the bone never lies ; poor Youssouf ! Wah, Wah ! ”

One may well believe that such a man would have made short work of half a dozen Arabis had it been his master's wish. At any rate we have only to blame ourselves if our treatment of the Sultan has contributed to spare Arabi, and to bring upon Egypt the miseries we have since had to deplore.

Having applied to the Sultan to depose the Khedive Ismaïl, having availed ourselves of the Sultan's suzerain powers, of the Caliph's prestige when we wanted him before, it would only have been logical not to have ignored the Sultan in the present instance, especially, when almost up to the last His Majesty offered to co-operate with the Western Powers.<sup>749</sup> Far be it from me to plead any policy that could “forge anew the links of the worn-out chain which bound Egypt to the swindling government of Constantinople ” ;<sup>750</sup> but not to include the suzerain power in our platonic demonstrations was a gratuitous slight, uncalled for, and, as the sequel has shown, mischievous. Nay, we indirectly almost forced and obliged the Sultan to take Arabi's part (primarily towards whom he was by no means well disposed <sup>751</sup>) as the only means of reasserting his own waning influence, and of teaching England and France that

<sup>749</sup> Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 8 (1882) p. 24.

<sup>750</sup> Speech of Sir Charles W. Dilke, Bart., M.P., to his constituents, August 20, 1879.

<sup>751</sup> “The Sultan has asked the representatives of Germany, Austria, and Italy to induce their Governments to intervene against Arabi.”—Lord Dufferin to Earl Granville. Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 5 (1882) p. 76 *et seq.*

his name was still a power. Lord Granville's letters of January 30th, and of May 20th, 24th, 25th, 26th, and 28th, 1882,<sup>752</sup> abundantly prove that Her Majesty's Government was fully impressed with the importance of the Sultan's assistance, and considered a Turkish occupation certainly the lesser of two evils<sup>753</sup>; indeed it is deeply to be lamented that—though reluctantly,<sup>754</sup> and after much hesitation<sup>755</sup>—Her Majesty's Ministers should have given way<sup>756</sup> to the views of French statesmen,<sup>757</sup> whose very action in Egypt has been all along to conspire against their partner in the *condominium*; nay, I go so far as to say that Arabi would still be a mutinous colonel only, had not French intrigue and the muddling of a few of our own countrymen lifted him upon the pedestal of a liberal reformer. The French hoped, by means of Arabi, to regain an ascendancy; they thought by helping him and the so-called National ministers, to secure the gratitude of men who surely never understood the meaning of the word. They dazzled Arabi and Co. with the prospect of an Egyptian Republic, of which he would have been the President under the wings of France. They helped him to believe that there was really a national party in Egypt and he a Washington.

I do not say that this was officially expressed, but

<sup>752</sup> Earl Granville to Lord Lyons. Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 5 (1882) p. 76 *et seq.* Ibid., No. 8, pp. 17, 31, 33, 36, 42 and 43.

<sup>753</sup> Ibid., No. 7 (1882) p. 141.

<sup>754</sup> Ibid., pp. 109 and 119.

<sup>755</sup> Ibid., No. 8 (1882) p. 45.

<sup>756</sup> Ibid., No. 7 (1882) pp. 109, 128, and 133. Ibid., No. 8, p. 38.

<sup>757</sup> Ibid., No. 7 (1882) pp. 130, 135, 136. Ibid., No. 8, p. 12.

there are many ways of encouraging people. We have only to look at Mr. Blunt and Sir William Gregory, who, simple tourists, managed to impress Arabi and his friends that they represented public opinion in England, and, as far as Mr. Blunt is concerned, a deal more. Frequently did I hear the Prime Minister's name mentioned as one sympathising with the Egyptian pseudo-reformer. It was impossible to expect half-educated Arabs, nay, even Arabi and his ministers, to discern the true value of this officious meddling. Cherif told the author himself, one day, that Arabi had been boasting of having received an encouraging letter from "Lord Gregory, the trusted Councillor" of Her Majesty the Queen of England; and as he had not heard before of the late Governor of Ceylon, he inquired who he was, and by what right false hopes were given to rebel colonels.

As to Mr. Blunt, not one, but almost all the Khedive's ministers lamented that the use of Mr. Gladstone's name should have misled Arabi and his following; an opinion shared likewise by those of the English officials I had the pleasure of knowing, including Sir Edward Malet and Sir Ackland Colvin;<sup>758</sup> whilst the Khedive was even more outspoken than any of the former,<sup>759</sup> and never missed an opportunity of complaining of the unwarranted interference of strangers. Indeed he quite seriously asked the author one day, whether Sir Edward Malet had not the power to bundle mischievous persons out of his dominions. In fact, it was His

<sup>758</sup> Appendix IV.

<sup>759</sup> Ibid.

Highness personally who insisted upon the rectification by Reuter's Agency<sup>760</sup> of the telegram Mahmoud Pasha Samy had fraudently induced the Sheikh-ul-Islam<sup>761</sup> to send to Mr. Blunt.

To my mind, the officious French agents and the self-appointed English advisers of Arabi, are more guilty than he is. He was a mutinous colonel, perhaps even an ill-inspired fanatic, but until he was prompted by others to speak in the name of the people, there was precious little of the reformer about him.<sup>762</sup> Having been at the head of successful mutinies, his name was used as a flag by intriguing Frenchmen, vain amateurs, and ambitious natives, and prominent amongst them, as I said before, by Mahmoud Pasha Samy, who certainly used Arabi only for his own ends. And whilst Arabi is at the worst a dangerous madman, Baroudi is a despicable knave—a coward grafted on a scoundrel, if we are to believe his masters, Ismail and Tewfik, and his former chief Cherif, who seem unanimous in this opinion.<sup>763</sup>

It seems a pity that, like Mr. Blunt, a poet, Baroudi should not have exercised his talents in

<sup>760</sup> See Appendix IV.

<sup>761</sup> The present Sheikh-ul-Islam, the Shafite el Embabi, and his brother have for many years past been trading in Manchester goods; and since his brother's death the Sheikh-ul-Islam manages the business alone, though in partnership with his nephew, a lad of fifteen. The firm is wealthy and highly respectable, and I only mention the fact as a curious instance of Oriental customs. An English mind can hardly picture the Archbishop of Canterbury or the Master of Balliol dividing their time between Lambeth Palace or Oxford and Mincing Lane or Gracechurch Street.—The Author.

<sup>762</sup> Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 3 (1882) pp. 4 and 14.

<sup>763</sup> Appendix IV.

writing epics, instead of breeding revolution ; but, then, the vagaries of poets are unaccountable. The moment the game was up, Baroudi endeavoured to whitewash himself, and though he had threatened his master with death and deposition,<sup>764</sup> though he had threatened the Europeans with massacre,<sup>765</sup> though he had even threatened to prevent the landing of the Turkish Commissioner,<sup>766</sup> and though he was the unscrupulous instigator of most of the mischief done, nay, with a hand in the massacres and incendiarism of Alexandria, he set his wife's relations to spread the report that "poor" Baroudi had been coerced by Arabi. Indeed, I remember a similar attempt when he and the Arabi Cabinet retired from office, after the *ultimatum*. Already, then, his relations gave out that he had only been acting under threats of death. And considering that Mahmoud Pasha Samy has sold, one after the other, his benefactor Ismaïl, Tewfik, Cherif, Riaz, every one of his former chiefs, it would not be surprising if we saw him one of these days turn "Queen's evidence" against his accomplice Arabi. It will only be a matter of price. But we have to return once more to the commutation of the sentence passed on the Circassian officers, due chiefly to Sir Edward Malet's advice.<sup>767</sup> Had the Khedive allowed Arabi and Baroudi to have their will, he would have opened the door to a *règne de la terreur*, for, not content with sentencing about forty of their personal enemies to

<sup>764</sup> Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 7 (1882) p. 104.

<sup>765</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 116 *et seq.*

<sup>766</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 108.

<sup>767</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 116.



virtual death, there were more than 300 other names<sup>768</sup> put under police supervision, who, one by one, would not have failed to follow the others up the White Nile.<sup>769</sup>

When the ministers saw that the Khedive was backed by Europe; when they saw their mistake of having shown their cards, they suggested a compromise, and offered to commute the sentences. But the matter was no longer in Tewfik's hands. He had referred it to the Sultan in consequence of a telegram from the Grand Vizir. Thereupon the ministers insisted, in most violent language, that he should telegraph to Constantinople, ask for the return of the papers, and decline Turkish interference.<sup>770</sup> It happened that the Western Powers—certainly France—were equally adverse to anything leading to a direct or indirect interference of Turkey. Called upon by the Khedive to advise him, the agents of England and France suggested that His Highness should make use of his right of grace, and thus put an end to the whole matter. Tewfik complied, and commuted the sentence to simple banishment from Egypt. But in doing so, and in causing this decree to be published ere his ministers had wind of the matter, he naturally roused their rage. They rushed to the palace, and demanded that the decree should be cancelled. They threatened him with deposition, with death. They said that a

<sup>768</sup> Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 8 (1882) p. 19 *et seq.*

<sup>769</sup> What even Egyptian soldiers and students of the Military School thought of the sentence may be gathered from Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 7 (1882) p. 96.—The Author.

<sup>770</sup> Appendix IV.

massacre of Europeans would be the consequence, and, as I have said before, they convoked the Chamber without even consulting His Highness. The Prime Minister declined in future any intercourse with the Khedive,<sup>771</sup> and Egypt had the spectacle of what M. de Freycinet terms "un ministère en insurrection contre le chef d'état."<sup>772</sup> Such a state of things naturally gave alarm, and Lord Granville suggested the sending out of an English, a French, and a Turkish general. Though not objecting to the former two, M. de Freycinet, as usual, would not hear of Turkish interference.<sup>773</sup> Meanwhile, matters got worse at Cairo. The Notables convoked, yet declining to sit in a body, were terrorised by the army<sup>774</sup>; and Lord Granville made Arabi personally responsible for the consequences.<sup>775</sup> The Khedive was, indeed, in the worst position imaginable: threatened on one side by ministers having behind them the army, and by means of the army, the Notables, the Chamber; and pushed on the other by the Controlling Powers not to give way to his powerful ministers, though no one was prepared to back him up with anything but advice. Nay, contrary to the Khedive's feelings,<sup>776</sup> he was coerced into maintaining in office these very men<sup>777</sup>; and it is quite delightful to read M. de

<sup>771</sup> Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 7 (1882) p. 117.

<sup>772</sup> Speech of M. de Freycinet, May 11, 1882, in the French Chamber. Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 7 (1882) p. 126.

<sup>773</sup> Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 7 (1882) p. 101.

<sup>774</sup> Ibid., p. 120.

<sup>775</sup> Ibid., pp. 131, 132, and 134.

<sup>776</sup> Appendix IV.

<sup>777</sup> Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 7 (1882) p. 139.

Freycinet's regrets at the "replâtrage" of the Egyptian Cabinet,<sup>778</sup> when, more than any one else, *he* had brought about the necessity of an unconditional submission of the Khedive to brute force.

Power being all Arabi and his friends wished for, they gaily proceeded to the palace of Ismailia,<sup>779</sup> and kissed Tewfik's feet as if nothing had happened. His Highness himself told the author that he had never felt more disgusted in his life; and some of those present declared that it would have been impossible to witness more cringing servility than that displayed by the rebel ministers, notwithstanding the Khedive's coldness, who did not address a single word to one of them, and beckoned them to withdraw. The advice of England and France to maintain these ministers was of course, as openly stated, only to gain time for the arrival of the fleets; and, contrary to the orders of the Khedive, Arabi pushed on military preparations,<sup>780</sup> for they all felt that they

<sup>778</sup> "M. de Freycinet regrets the 'replâtrage' of the Egyptian Cabinet." —Viscount Lyons to Earl Granville, May 16, 1882. Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 7 (1882) p. 144.

<sup>779</sup> Sir E. Malet to Earl Granville, May 16, 1882. Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 7 (1882) p. 143.

<sup>780</sup> "I have the honour to inform your Lordship that this morning the Khedive told M. Sienkiewicz and me that he had informed his Minister of War that all military preparations were in contravention of His Highness' orders. Araby Pasha professed his obedience, but continues actively to push on his preparations. In order to arrive at a settlement, the first step must necessarily be the resignation of the ministry now in power and the surrender of the military leaders, which could probably be compassed if their persons, rank, and property are guaranteed, but they should be obliged to quit Egypt for a year at least. If this were obtained, and a ministry were formed under Cherif Pasha, there would be little difficulty with the remaining questions, but if the Porte shows itself hostile to the action of the two Powers, resistance will be shown here. According to the compact between

had been kept in office to be put aside as soon as the Consuls-General could back up their will. In fact, on May 20th, Sir Edward Malet and M. Sienkiewicz suggested to their respective Governments to propose to Baroudi and Arabi that they should leave Egypt with Toulba, Abd-ul-al, and Ali Fehmy, that they should not return without the Khedive's sanction, and that the agents would guarantee them property, rank, and pay, a proposal fully countenanced by the President of the Chamber and the Notables.<sup>781</sup> Had there been a Turkish ship alongside ours, and had the Sultan not protested<sup>782</sup> against our naval demonstration, the ministers would not have been able to decline the interference of England and France, on the plea that they should only submit to the Porte, and circulating amongst officers and soldiers an untrue version of the conditions suggested by the English and French agents. The ultimatum of May 25th was the result.<sup>783</sup> We have already seen that the ministers requested the Khedive to advise them on the steps to be taken, and when both the Khedive and the Chamber expressed their concurrence with the moderate demands of the ultimatum,<sup>784</sup> the ministers resigned; but not

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England and France, Turkish troops are to suppress such resistance, but the fact of its not being generally known here that the Sultan will intervene may probably make that very intervention necessary which both of the two Powers are anxious to avert."—Sir E. Malet to Earl Granville, May 19, 1882. Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 8 (1882) p. 11.

<sup>781</sup> Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 8 (1882) p. 28 *et seq.*

<sup>782</sup> Ibid., pp. 13, 21, and 29 *et seq.*

<sup>783</sup> Ibid., p. 34.

<sup>784</sup> In fact, in order not to give the ultimatum the appearance of impos-

without threatening another military "parade." It was out of the question that Cherif Pasha,<sup>785</sup> or any one else, could have undertaken to form another ministry<sup>786</sup> "until the supremacy of the military party is broken,"<sup>787</sup> as Sir Edward Malet wrote to Lord Granville when his lordship and M. de Freycinet first urged that the Khedive should avail himself of the "favourable moment" of the arrival of the fleets for a change of ministers. Arabi, who must have known<sup>788</sup> of the Sultan's kind offer to settle the question by the deposition of Tewfik, peremptorily refused, in the face of the Chamber, to accept the ultimatum.<sup>789</sup> Arabi and his friends got up petitions in the army, and at a meeting of the Notables and chief personages of the State convened by the Khedive, in order to lay the situation before them, Toulba Pasha rudely interrupted His Highness, stating that the army more than ever absolutely refused to accept the joint note.<sup>790</sup>

Sir Edward Malet warned the Home Government against the impossibility of restoring the Khedive's authority<sup>791</sup> as long as Arabi and his associates were allowed to remain in Egypt; a view only too practically illustrated by Arabi's appearance at the head of about 100 officers at the house of the President .

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ing the will of England and France, it had purposely been framed after having ascertained from Sultan Pasha the views of the Notables, so that in reality the Powers were only exacting the demands of an impotent Chamber.—The Author.

<sup>785</sup> Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 8 (1882) p. 40.

<sup>786</sup> Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>787</sup> Ibid.

<sup>788</sup> Ibid., p. 31.

<sup>789</sup> Ibid., pp. 28 *et seq.*

<sup>790</sup> Ibid., p. 41.

<sup>791</sup> Ibid.

of the Chamber, where the chief persons of Cairo and the Deputies were assembled, "demanding" the deposition of the Khedive, and threatening death to the recalcitrants,<sup>792</sup> and when, nevertheless, almost all present, except the officers, persisted in supporting the Khedive, Arabi and his military tail insisted upon a decree reinstating him as Minister of War, and allowing twelve hours for its promulgation. The Khedive summoned the English and French agents to advise him. They could not recommend him to give way nor take upon themselves the responsibility of counselling a resistance which would have been fatal to the Khedive, and as the ministers had previously declared that they could only submit to the Porte, Sir Edward Malet recommended the Khedive to answer that the whole question was under the Sultan's consideration, suggesting at the same time to the Home Government "the prompt intervention of the Porte as the only means of restoring order."<sup>793</sup> However, on the afternoon of the same day, "the chiefs of religion, including the Patriarch and the Chief Rabbi, all the Deputies, Ulemas, and others, waited on the Khedive and asked him to reinstate Arabi as Minister of War. He refused; but they besought him saying that, though he might be ready to sacrifice his own life, he ought not to sacrifice theirs, and that Arabi had threatened them all with death if they did not obtain his

<sup>792</sup> Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 8 (1882) p. 43.

<sup>793</sup> Sir E. Malet to Earl Granville, May 28, 1882. Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 8 (1882) p. 43.

consent. The Colonel of the Khedive's Guard stated that the Guard of the Palace had been doubled, that orders had been given to them to prevent his leaving the palace for his usual drive, and to fire if he attempted to force his way. Under these circumstances the Khedive yielded, not to save himself, but to preserve the town from bloodshed."<sup>794</sup>

Is it possible to imagine a more humiliating position for a sovereign? The Khedive told the author that he was blushing at having been forced to a step beneath his dignity and honour, that he would have preferred death had it not been his duty to think of his country, and that it was the greatest sacrifice he could have made to his European advisers.<sup>795</sup>

Yet to whom was due the whole lamentable farce, if not to the stubborn refusal of the French Government to associate the Sultan in our interference, if not to the blustering policy "of barking and not biting." Europe had no right to throw the Notables into the arms of Arabi by the Identical Note. Europe had no right to push Cherif's Cabinet to a conflict with the Chamber. Europe had no right to advise the Khedive to resist the brutal force of Arabi and Co., without having at hand the means to follow up this advice. Europe had no right to indispose the Sultan against a prince whose loyalty towards both Europe and the Porte has been his

<sup>794</sup> Sir E. Malet to Earl Granville, May 28th. Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 8 (1882) p. 49. See also Appendix IV.

<sup>795</sup> Appendix IV.

greatest misfortune. Europe had no right to step in between the Khedive and his mutinous soldiers with paper threats, with an ultimatum, and platonic naval demonstrations without being prepared to carry out these threats, without being in a position to defend those whom she had brought into this perilous position, without being ready to enforce her will. The Powers only endangered the life of the Khedive, the position of the Europeans; they only increased the arrogant demands of the military party; and having compromised the Khedive, Cherif Pasha, the Notables, and all loyal supporters of the "dual" policy, they crowned their work by heaping ridicule on their own agents, by lowering the dignity of both England and France, and by giving a serious blow to the prestige of Christian Europe in the Moham-medan world.

The author was in Egypt at the time, and remembers the deplorable effect of European statesmanship. Though sad in its consequences, it, however, does not lack a comic side, and it is certainly laughable to see M. de Freycinet on that very 27th of May (when the Khedive staked his life to save his country), request the Sultan, whose interference he had all along deprecated, to blame the "conduct" of the Khedive's ex-ministers and to summon them to Constantinople for an explanation of their language and attitude,<sup>796</sup> and yet in the same breath demanding an explanation from the Khedive how he had dared to ask his Suzerain to come to his rescue, and to

<sup>796</sup> Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 8 (1882) pp. 48 and 53.



send a Turkish Commissioner to Cairo<sup>797</sup>—a preposterous liberty taken with Republican Excellencies, “calmes et fermes” at a distance. To show Tewfik the folly of his fears, to prove to him that he was not deserted, M. de Freycinet suggested, after the failure “de l’influence morale de nos escadres,”<sup>798</sup> a “Conference”<sup>799</sup> as another heroic remedy.<sup>799a</sup>

I do not know whether M. de Bunsen had French statesmen in his mind when he wrote “Events are great but men are small,” and it is not possible to imagine a policy more pitiable than that of these Republican Talleyrands. However, half a century ago Prince Metternich wrote: “Je prévois de grands embarras pour les Ministres Français. . . . comme une conséquence de leur nullité manifeste. . . . Ce qu’il faut à un homme qui n’a pas même une position sociale, c’est une somme de talents, de qualités, et surtout, de savoir faire, bien autre que ne l’exige l’usage commun. Or, c’est tout juste ce qui manque aux Ministres Français.”<sup>800</sup> Perhaps the

<sup>797</sup> ‘Documents diplomatiques, Affaires d’Égypte’ (1882) p. 142.

<sup>798</sup> M. de Freycinet à M. Tissot, May 30, 1882. ‘Documents diplomatiques, Affaires d’Égypte’ (1882) p. 148. See also Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 8 (1882) pp. 55 and 56.

<sup>799</sup> The Conference which met on June 23rd for the first time and allowed itself to be bamboozled by Ottoman diplomacy up to August 15th if I remember well, and our famous Military Convention, of which the ratification was for weeks announced every evening only to be contradicted the next morning, are almost obsolete and tedious subjects overstepping the frame of the present pages, and have only proved once more the futility of a discordant European concert.—The Author.

<sup>799a</sup> “Nations are like men: the young hope more than they fear, and the old fear more than they hope.”—‘Ten years in Sarawak,’ by C. Brooke, ii. p. 13.

<sup>800</sup> Prince Metternich to Count Apponyi, Feb. 3, 1835. ‘Aus Metternichs nachgelassenen Papieren,’ v. p. 634.

late ministers will find a consolation in the thought that they have evidently not been the first of their species.

But the Conference was not only designed to "save" Tewfik, but also to "conciliate" Arabi and to "isolate" England,<sup>801</sup> to kill three birds with one stone. There remains little to be said; the events following the utter breakdown of all authority, and of the last vestiges of Anglo-French prestige, are too fresh in every one's memory. The only practical advantage Tewfik derived from the breakdown of M. de Freycinet's "moral influence" was that he was at last permitted to go with his family to Alexandria.<sup>802</sup> The declarations of France that they would do nothing to enforce the ultimatum, the encouragement vouchsafed to Arabi by the French and the Sultan,<sup>803</sup> naturally encouraged the rebel leader. Though he knows little of Continental affairs,

<sup>801</sup> "M. de Freycinet said yesterday to a group of deputies, one of whom questioned him about the Conference: "It is not France, but England, that is isolated. . . . We can do without her. She cannot do without us. . . . Our policy now is to conciliate the National party, and by so doing keep Egypt as a buffer between ourselves and Tunis and the Porte. This is in accordance with the tradition which has been formed since 1830, when we took Algeria. Arabi is a great fact with which we must count. If we get him to our side he will be worth to us an army corps."—*Pall Mall Gazette*, July 1, 1882.

<sup>802</sup> "En présence des nouvelles circonstances nous cessons d'insister pour que le Khédive reste au Caire." — M. de Freycinet à M. Sienkiewicz, May 30, 1882. 'Documents diplomatiques, Affaires d'Égypte' (1882) p. 147.

<sup>803</sup> "L'action de la Porte, en Égypte, n'est plus aujourd'hui un mystère. Elle s'est traduite par des encouragements prodigués aux chefs de l'insurrection; . . . elle a exercé en même temps sur l'esprit du Khédive Tewfik une attraction dont son père Ismaïl s'était toujours défendu."—'La Question Égyptienne,' 1881, p. 3.

he knows, thanks to his European friends, sufficient to understand the gravity an armed interference of the French might have for France. He knew the direct effect, leaving alone Continental complications, it would have in Algiers and Tunis, where a blow against Egypt would have stirred up afresh the dormant hatred of the vanquished Mussulman; nay, he knew that the French protestations, that the French alliance with England in Egypt, were only intended the better to deceive what French Chauvinists like to call the hereditary enemy of *la belle France*; he was aware that by a little judicious management—providing he was successful—the present French ministers would be the first to hail him as one of them, and that he could rely upon the staunch support not only of French, but Continental Radicals. Therefore, not to alienate the good-will and the prospective help of the French Government, he abstained from adding to his many other outrages the crime of regicide; and the French ministers may possibly be said to have saved His Highness's life *sans le savoir*.

It is indeed a wonder how Tewfik escaped with his life, in fact, the Khedive and his *entourage* were daily expecting the worst,<sup>804</sup> and that he did escape is not due to the *protection* of Europe, but to the secret plotting of France, to the hope of Arabi to secure sympathy by *allowing* his prey to escape—a magnanimous move which he seems to have repented since, if we are to believe his own

<sup>804</sup> Appendix IV.

words<sup>805</sup>—and to an undoubted want of personal courage, for he knew well enough that he would have had to pay with his own life for such a monstrous deed. Tewfik has few friends, but still enough to avenge him should Arabi, Baroudi, and Co. have laid hands on his person.

With the Khedive's departure for Alexandria ends the second part of the drama, and it is a duty to render homage to the manly and courageous bearing of the unfortunate Prince throughout these trying weeks.<sup>806</sup> Indeed, he remained firm and dignified, and he certainly played "*le plus beau rôle dans ce dédale de bêtises.*" Having accepted the Anglo-French tutelage, he clung loyally to his patrons at the risk of his throne and life on one side, and of his popularity and the confidence of his subjects on the other. As I said before, he owes his life to the fears, hopes, and cowardice of his enemies, and possibly a little to Oriental usages, for passing in review the many assassinations of sultans at Constantinople, it will be seen that, though revolution is always outdoor work, assassination has invariably been the work of "the palace," and there he had little to fear.

But he has nothing to thank Europe for, though his blood would have been upon us, upon the Con-

<sup>805</sup> "This Khedive, whose life the country has spared up to the present time, has now joined the enemy in attacking Egyptian Moslems." Arabi's proclamation to the Moudirs upon the evacuation of Alexandria.—Mr. Cartwright to Earl Granville, July 21, 1882. Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 17 (1882) p. 184, and *Times*, July 22, 1882.

<sup>806</sup> Appendix IV.

trolling Powers who, stripping the Khedive of all authority, killed "Effendina" morally before ever his rebellious subjects dared to threaten their Master. Our mistakes have created the present situation, and no one is more to blame than Lord Salisbury and M. Waddington, the inventors of an *impotent* Khedivate, and of a blustering *condominium*; of a policy of swagger and threat, which, thanks to the French, led ultimately, I am sorry to say, to Lord Granville's and M. de Freycinet's identical note, and to the famous "ultimatum." But if Lord Salisbury left to his successors in the Dual Control an heritage utterly inconsistent with British traditions, so adverse to any direct interference with the interior affairs of foreign countries, if he has left to others to fight out the consequences of his blunders, Mr. Gladstone's administration has at any rate nobly redeemed its own faults and those of its predecessors by re-asserting single-handed not the renown of British arms—they do not need that—but the prestige of Great Britain throughout the Mussulman world; not as a conqueror, but as a friend, as the defender of a Mussulman prince against mutinous soldiers.

But to return once more to Tewfik, it has been said that in character and conduct he is about as favourable a specimen of an Oriental ruler as the world can produce.<sup>307</sup> I go even farther, and I say, that in this instance His Highness has equalled, if not surpassed, any of his Continental "cousins"

<sup>307</sup> 'England's Intervention in Egypt,' by E. Dicey (*Nineteenth Century*, Aug. 1882, p. 170).

whom fate has ever placed in a similar position. Deserted by everybody, except by a few devoted Egyptians, like Zulficar Pasha and Tigrane Pasha—I do not speak of the Europeans who remained at their posts—his implicit faith in England was the only ray of hope—and a very faint one—in the night of despair. And here I wish to add that the Vice-Queen clung with true womanly devotion to her husband in the hour of danger. His Highness told the author of his anxiety for those he loved,<sup>808</sup> but the Vice-Queen would not hear of leaving her husband, ready to die with him, if such was the will of Providence. I daresay in those moments it must be a blessing to be a follower of the Prophet; “Kismet” cannot but double the pluck of a mortal surrounded by would-be assassins—a circumstance which in no way diminishes the courage displayed by Her Highness, who, “as princess, wife, and mother, is above reproach,”<sup>809</sup> and who is equally respected by high and low, friend and foe, as a *truly good woman*.

It is certainly to the credit of the Khedive that, notwithstanding M. de Freycinet’s kind permission,<sup>810</sup> he should have stuck to the post of danger.<sup>811</sup> It is

<sup>808</sup> Appendix IV.

<sup>809</sup> *Illustrated London News*, Oct. 28, 1882.

<sup>810</sup> ‘Documents diplomatiques, Affaires d’Égypte’ (1882) p. 147.

<sup>811</sup> “There have, of course, been insinuations that the Khedive’s pluck, that his remaining at Cairo, was only a comedy put on the stage in concurrence with the rebel chiefs and that it had all been preconcerted; insinuations which the papers found in Arabi’s possession will not fail to prove as groundless as they seem unworthy of accuser and accused, and we find, at a later period, in Mr. Cartwright’s letter to Dervish Pasha, an official testimony that the Khedive does not ‘shrink from serious risk.’” —Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 17 (1882) p. 172.

useless to revert to Dervish Pasha's arrival at Cairo. I have said before, the hopes that had been formed by the party of order—hopes based on the co-operation of Turkey with the Western Powers, and frustrated by the fault of France; the very reception he gave to Arabi's "envoy," who, contrary to the Khedive's order, had ventured to go to Alexandria to meet the Sultan's representative; the simple fact of Dervish Pasha taking into his carriage Arabi's man, a simple colonel, when the highest dignitaries of the Khedivial Court had to follow in another, indicated the intentions of the Porte. "It is only to decoy Arabi," said those who could not, or would not, believe that Dervish, instead of having come to strengthen the Khedive's authority, was only in Egypt to use Arabi for the Sultan's ends, just as they said a fortnight later that the grand cordon of the Medjidieh given by the Sultan to Arabi<sup>512</sup> was only a rope to hang him with. Others, who knew the disappointment of the Sultan at the cavalier way in which he, the Caliph, had been treated throughout the whole business, doubted not for a moment of the true object of Dervish's mission; still less as the presence in his suite of the Sheikh Ahmed Essad<sup>513</sup>

<sup>512</sup> An honour well calculated to assign to Arabi the first place amongst his countrymen, when we remember that Sultan Pasha, the President of the Chamber, was only made a Commander of the same order.—The Author.

<sup>513</sup> Sheikh Ahmed Essad, known by his missions to Tunis, is the same whose correspondence has been found amongst the papers of Arabi, in whose house he secretly stopped for a fortnight in January 1882; uneasiness at Constantinople about this *trouvaille* is said to be the cause of Dervish Pasha's arrest.—The Author.

was a proof that Pan-Islamite projects would be hatched.

On the 11th of June, the first riots<sup>813a</sup> of Alexandria took place; and so much has been said and will be said on this subject, that I may well confine myself to one remark based upon numerous letters I had from native friends, that these riots were planned and organised, less with a view of killing Europeans or destroying property, than of making Arabi (head of the army, the only power in Egypt) *indispensable*. The events of Alexandria imposed upon the Khedive the necessity of asking the leader of the rebellion to protect order, which, thanks to the absence of Turkish ships, as I have said over and over again, M. de Freycinet's "moral influence" had not been able to maintain. A graphic account of the events of the 11th of June will be found in Mr. Cookson's report.<sup>814</sup> Two days later the Khedive and Dervish arrived at Alexandria, a step disapproved by the Sultan. Under pressure of the German and Austrian Consuls-General the Ragheb Cabinet was formed, and the less said on this subject the better. Sheltered under a pseudo-legality, the champion of order, the virtual master of Egypt, Arabi pushed on his preparations for defence. And though contrary to the orders of the Sultan, contrary to those of his nominal Master the Khedive, I consider his armaments the least of his crimes, for the only excuse a soldier has for not

<sup>813a</sup> Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 11 (1882) pp. 39 and 42.

<sup>814</sup> Ibid., No. 17 (1882) p. 22 *et seq.*



obeying his sovereign is the patriotic defence of the soil against foreign invasion; and though nothing of the kind was intended, though even the landing of troops would only have had for its object to uphold the lawful sovereign on his throne, Arabi may well plead fear of occupation as an excuse. Has not France by her virtual annexation of Tunis justified the fears of Mussulmans? Religious fanaticism sufficed to say to Europe "Hands off," and it hardly required Arabi's selfish motives, or the wish to increase his popularity by active preparations. It was criminal folly, no doubt, to provoke the final bombardment by armaments endangering our ships, despatched for no other purpose but the protection of the Khedive, and a refuge for the European colonies.

The present trial will throw a light on much that is dark in this matter. Such as that Arabi, at the Council held at the palace of Ramleh, volunteered submission to Sir Beauchamp's demands, but that the Khedive implored him to defend the place at any risk <sup>816</sup>—rumours possibly spread in the hope of shifting the responsibility on Tewfik, as Arabi already attempted on July 15th, when he telegraphed from Kafr Dawar, congratulating His Highness on

<sup>816</sup> According to statements made by one of the ministers, Arabi declared at the last council that he could not resist Sir Beauchamp if the English were in earnest, and that he was ready to submit, when the Khedive is said to have clasped Arabi in his arms, ordering him to defend Alexandria and the country to the last. This story, though confirmed by Ahmet Bey Rifaat, late Secretary to the Council of Ministers, is too incredible, and I only mention it to show the line of defence concocted by the prisoners.—The Author.

the influx of recruits for the defence of the country against the invader.<sup>816</sup>

We know the sequel, and one can fully understand Mr. Gladstone's reluctance to saddle England with actual war, an occupation of Egypt, and a *deal more*. Events have proved the mischief done by not having at hand a sufficient force; and though the burning of the town, planned by Arabi's people and executed before the evacuation, might not have been avoided had we at once landed four or five thousand men, it is obvious that even a small force would have sufficed to protect, if not property, at any rate life. There would have been no time for massacres had the hoisting of the white flag been followed by an immediate occupation. But these are questions not only of a military nature, but of vital international importance. Her Majesty's ministers alone can know the reason why they indulged in so fatal a forbearance. Whether it was or not an error of judgment to allow Arabi time for retreat, and for further preparations, the splendid combinations of Sir Garnet, the unequalled dash of our men, and the glorious achievements of Her Majesty's armies have passed a sponge over diplomatic shortcomings. England has put her foot on anarchy; England has crushed the rebellion; has replaced the Khedive on his throne; in fact, has done what it would have been the duty of united Europe to accomplish.

The manly example given by the Khedive during the last terrible days at Alexandria, and his escape

<sup>816</sup> Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 17 (1882) p. 147.

from death, thanks to the magic of backsheesh, &c.,<sup>817</sup> has already the eulogies of Her Majesty's Government and of all honest men. His Highness's loyalty to England and plucky self-sacrifice will not be forgotten. It would probably be the universal opinion in this country that it is England's duty to replace the Khedive on his throne, and though he has re-entered his capital under the protection of the British flag, the soldiers' work must now yield to that of the diplomatist. Everything is not accomplished by His Highness' sitting in security on a divan in Abdin Palace. Before our task is completed we must revive "Effendina," and restore that authority which Lord Salisbury and M. Waddington gratuitously undermined. The Khedive is safe as long as Her Majesty's troops are in Egypt, and in view of his future safety, a new Egyptian force is being formed in all haste; but no army can restore what Europe has taken from him, the confidence of his people: "On s'appuie sur des bayonettes, on ne s'y asseoit pas." The best of princes, the most intelligent and well-meaning, is sure to be a thorn

<sup>817</sup> "Next morning, July 12, Arabi suddenly ordered a detachment of soldiers to surround the palace where the Khedive and Dervish were waiting the issue of events, as de Martino believes, with full intent to kill them both. Thereupon Ragheb Pasha went to Arabi, and demanded sternly what this manœuvre meant. Arabi replied that it meant no particular harm; but that the troops only wished to keep the Khedive. He, however, promised to order the soldiery away, but did not keep his word, and at the last moment he actually told his men to kill the Khedive."—*St. James's Gazette*, July 14, 1882.

Letters from those present state that a handful of Medjidiehs, and as many handfuls of gold as there were men bought the lot.—The Author.

in the side of his people if forced upon them by bayonets or diplomacy. The fate of Louis XVIII., of all the kings and princes manufactured by Napoleon I., of King Otho of Greece, of King Amédée of Spain, and, saddest of all, the fate of one of the noblest princes who ever graced a throne, of one of the most liberal, highly gifted, and high-minded men of our century, of the poor Emperor Maximilian, are illustrations of the dislike of foreign pressure in dynastic matters.

Before the bombardment of Alexandria, the suffrages of Egyptians, with few exceptions, would have been for the Khedive in preference to Arabi, had public opinion been able to express itself.

But how about to-day?

Mussulmans are more fanatical, their hatred is more intense, and blood that has been shed calls for vengeance.

By a misunderstood sentimentality we have added to the flame, and accumulated on Tewfik's head the grievances of an entire nation. When Arabi and his accomplices fell into our hands, we ought either to have shipped them off at once, as our prisoners of war, to be judged by English court-martials, or, after handing them over to the Khedive, have weighed the mischief of further interference. Though England is certainly right to insist on a fair trial, why prejudice the case? What did we do when Arabi and Baroudi wanted to send the Circassians to the White Nile?<sup>818</sup> We advised the Khedive to refuse

<sup>818</sup> Did we prevent Arabi's prisoners from being tortured? Did we

his sanction to a judicial murder *at the risk of his life and throne*, for at that moment we could *not* have protected him. Why not then have waited to give—in case of a similar miscarriage of justice—a similar advice *now* that the Khedive can commute sentences without such fears?

To force English barristers on the Egyptian Government, to insist on the alteration of an established procedure, in fact, to interfere directly with the lawful course of justice, was another blow at the Khedivial authority we profess to be so anxious to re-establish. It was showing the natives that we had neither confidence in the honour of His Highness nor in the impartiality of Egyptian tribunals; nay, more, it was virtually putting the Khedive and his ministers in the dock, and was a poor compliment to Sir Charles Wilson entrusted with the task of watching the proceedings.

Not a single letter have I received from Egypt in which the course adopted has not been deeply deplored, as discrediting the Khedive and misleading public opinion; for those who know Egypt will readily believe that the ignorant masses do not understand the delicacy and nobility of sentiment which prompted Mr. Gladstone's decision. The Fellah will not ask the *why*, he looks at *facts*. To

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prevent an ex-Minister of War, like Arabi, from being treated like the lowest of criminals? I have seen several of the unfortunate victims of this fanciful plot—one a colonel—handcuffed and helpless, beaten through the streets. Yet to-day the Calcrafts of yesterday complain of “inhumane” treatment when a mosquito net is not starched to their taste.—The Author.

him the defence of Arabi and his accomplices by English barristers, means either that England does not believe in Arabi's guilt or in the Khedive's justice. He cannot realise that this concession to Arabi's officious friends is the outcome of exaggerated individual humanitarianism, and a desire to heap coals of fire on the heads of evildoers and lunatics. The native sees England as much in an English barrister as he would in a consul or any English official.

Besides, there is the indignity to Eastern royalty, to the person of both the Sultan and the Khedive, of being dragged into judicial proceedings, and of having their rights and duties discussed in open court, and possibly challenged by mutinous subjects.

It matters little whether the defence will score a victory or not, whether there will be acquittal or condemnation; the same deductions will be drawn from either. If acquitted, the natives will say Tewfik was in the wrong—and Arabi will be a hero; if condemned, they will not believe in his guilt, for would the Giaour defend a Moslem if not *convinced* of his innocence?—and Arabi will be a martyr; whilst the Khedive will in both cases be the scapegoat.

Was it not sad enough first to have stripped him of authority in 1879, and then having been obliged to bring him back between two English generals in 1882?

Mussulmans always look with unabated suspicion on Christians: to wit, the holy carpet, relegated to a lumber-room as having been desecrated by the pre-



sence of our troops. Nations never welcome foreign invaders, or what they bring in their train, be it reforms or war taxes, and least of all if their own sovereign is found in the baggage.

Forgetting that Tewfik is the victim of circumstances, neither the cause, much less the author of their present misfortunes, the natives must throw on some one the responsibility of the war and its consequences, increased money burdens, humiliated pride, and outraged religious feelings. It will not be Arabi, for he will not be there any more; not the Powers, they are too far off; and it is on the unfortunate Khedive that the whole blame will fall, as the one who apparently gained most by the foreign intervention.

Is it likely that the Caliph will forget the humiliations gratuitously heaped on the Sultan, and that he will not remember that Tewfik's difficulties furnished the opportunity for them? Unable to retaliate on the great Powers, he will make Tewfik suffer. Like the Pope, the Caliph wields a terrible arm, silent, but sure. Already no friend of Tewfik's (we have only to remember the kind offer of deposition), at all times jealous of the Khedive, his own vassal, what will His Majesty be now that Tewfik is the *vali* of Europe?

Indeed, Tewfik would have had more cause for rejoicing had the Powers shown him less solicitude. From the first day of his reign<sup>819</sup> up to the

<sup>819</sup> "Suddenly called to the throne by the will of Europe, he found that the Powers had placed him, young and comparatively inexperienced, in the midst of the evil influences which more than all else had ruined his father, to fight against the difficulties which Ismail Pasha, with greater experience, had been unable to overcome. Before taking so decisive a

present hour it has been his misfortune to be the victim of Europe, the *souffre-douleur* of friend and foe. He has never been given a fair chance. "In the East all government, to be effective, must be personal. There must be a visible sovereign who has the power of reward and punishment. . . But Tewfik has been sedulously placed in the background."<sup>820</sup> With the Controllers as *conseil judiciaire*, with the Consuls-General<sup>821</sup> as private tutors, he has never been able to assert his own will, to show himself in the sole part adapted to Eastern royalty—that of Master.

Power, the only thing the Oriental worships, has been denied him from the first; and his reign has been a long series of undeserved humiliations. Heir to Ismaïl, who united in his person all that Eastern populations reverence, Europe ought not to have endangered Tewfik's inheritance, by first deposing the father, and then discrediting the son.

Yet the young prince lacked neither good-will

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measure it is deeply to be regretted that the Powers were not at once prepared to follow it up by some more permanent action. However great may have been the faults of Ismaïl Pasha, the great majority of these were to be attributed to the evil advisers by whom he was surrounded. To depose the father and substitute the son without at the same time removing those advisers was deliberately to strengthen every evil influence in the country, and most of those who know Egypt will concur in the remark made by an experienced European official, that 'more harm will have been done in the first two months of Tewfik's reign, than in the last six months of his father's.'—*Times* Correspondence, Aug. 11. *Times*, Aug. 20, 1879.

<sup>820</sup> 'England's Intervention in Egypt,' by E. Dicey (*Nineteenth Century*, Aug. 1882, p. 173).

<sup>821</sup> "Les consuls sont donc, en Égypte, des hommes considérables, des petits potentats qui non-seulement traitent sur un pied d'égalité avec le Souverain, mais lui imposent leurs volontés."—'L'Égypte, la basse Nubie et le Sinaï, d'après des notes prises pendant le voyage de S. A. Monseigneur le Duc de Brabant, par le Dr. Stacquez,' p. 15.



nor common sense; and though fully aware of the absolute necessity of having Europeans in his service, he strongly protested against the return of the very men who had caused his father's fall,<sup>822</sup> against a European ministry as the repetition of a gross mistake.<sup>823</sup> In vain he pleaded to "give him and Egypt a chance."<sup>824</sup> And he said, "Let the past go; all made mistakes—all had great excuses. Let us begin afresh; and that is why I do most earnestly oppose the return of Wilson or Blignières in any capacity, though I give them the fullest praise for honesty of purpose." And with a little point of sarcasm, His Highness added, "For surely they cannot be the only available men you have; and why choose those who (by their own fault or not, never mind) have not succeeded."<sup>825</sup> He was not listened to in 1879; and now we hear again of a similar proposal,<sup>826</sup> and from one who knows Egypt as well, and better, than most Englishmen. Fortunately the departure of Lord Dufferin for Cairo puts an end to all fears that Her Majesty's Government intends a *réchauffé* of the past. The most popular Viceroy of Canada, one who managed to cement again our friendship with Russia, threatened by "scientific frontiers," and one who has so ably paralysed the tortuous ways of Ottoman diplomacy, may well be entrusted

<sup>822</sup> "If Europe insists I must give way, but I protest against their action as a political blunder."—Words of Tewfik, *Times* Correspondence, Aug. 11. *Times*, Aug. 20, 1879.

<sup>823</sup> See *Times* Correspondence, Aug. 11. *Times*, Aug. 20, 1879.

<sup>824</sup> Ibid.

<sup>825</sup> Ibid.

<sup>826</sup> 'England in Egypt,' by E. Dicey (*XIXth Century*, Nov. '82, p. 820).

to unravel the consequences of the Dual Control. It is clear that the Khedive needs the advice of an English envoy, and the services of a financial counsellor, yet no graver mistake could be made than the course suggested by Mr. Dicey to mix up two distinct functions. We have had enough of financial politicians and political financiers in Egypt.

What would have been the effect of Mr. Goschen's reappearance in Egypt?<sup>227</sup> Did he succeed in establishing anything lasting when he went there as the representative of 2000 bondholders? Do the Goschen loans—the first of the lot—endear his name particularly to the Khedive's subjects? It is sincerely to be hoped that we shall never hear again that England's interference has for its object to fight the battle of financiers and bondholders; that cabinet ministers and bankers are one; and that Egypt for the Egyptians is a hollow phrase.

If there are no men available, to use the Khedive's phrase, but those who have failed, none unconnected with bondholders, finance, and banking, I should not only say poor Egypt, but poor England. However, Lord Dufferin's mission settles that question; and I am sure that his authority will be welcomed by Sir E. Malet, whose warnings, had they been listened to, would have averted the catastrophe.

<sup>227</sup> Having previously paid a tribute to Mr. Goschen's well-known qualities, I need not say that it is not a question of personalities but of principle. New men, unconnected with bondholders, are wanted, and both Houses of the Legislature are rich in eminent diplomatists and administrators, of which Lord Dufferin's appointment is the best proof.—The Author.

## V.

## CONCLUSION.

IN the preceding chapter I have endeavoured to show the relations of native rulers with foreign Powers, and the harm done by the latter. Egypt would, indeed, have fared much better without that direct interference in her interior affairs, which was as little intended by Her Majesty's Government<sup>828</sup> as by Ismail when His Highness first applied for a few Englishmen to enter his service.<sup>829</sup>

<sup>828</sup> "With a view to prevent any misunderstanding, H.M.'s Government wish that it should be made clear that they are not in communication with any English capitalists upon the question of Egyptian finance."—Lord Derby to General Staunton, March 27, 1876. State Papers, lxxxiii. (1876) p. 25.

On p. 36, State Papers, lxxxiii. (1876) we find that Lord Derby does not oppose Mr. Wilson's nomination, but washes his hands of it.

"With reference to your despatch of the 7th instant, conveying the wish of the Khedive to have the assistance of an Englishman experienced in finance, *to take service as an Egyptian official* on the conditions stated in your despatch, I have to instruct you to inform His Highness that Her Majesty's Government do not feel themselves able, in the present instance, to make any official nomination; but that if His Highness' agent in this country should desire to secure the services of any British officials, they will place no difficulty in the way of their taking service under the Khedive, and that should Mr. Rogers desire to have the advice of Her Majesty's Government as to the gentlemen to whom he may wish to address himself, Her Majesty's Government will be happy to give him such information as may be useful to him."—The Earl of Derby to Mr. Cookson, June 30, 1876. Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 2 (1879) p. 5.

<sup>829</sup> "His Highness wishes very much to have the assistance of an Englishman experienced in finance to take service as an Egyptian official

However, the mischief is done : it culminated in anarchy and armed intervention, yet, luckily for Egypt, it was England alone who undertook the duties of Eastern "gensdarme."<sup>830</sup> But as there was no one else willing to undertake "the ungrateful task,"<sup>831</sup> it is but right that Great Britain should now also be allowed to settle the question—and she *intends* doing so.

The assurances of Mr. Gladstone<sup>832</sup> admit of no ambiguous interpretation; both his language and

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on the same general conditions as those accepted by Messrs. Acton and Pennell, &c., and His Highness hopes that Her Majesty's Government will have no objection to recommend him a person suitable for such a position in the *Egyptian service*."—Mr. Cookson to the Earl of Derby, June 7, 1876. Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 2 (1879) p. 3.

"M. le Gérant,—Comme vous le savez déjà, le gouvernement du Khédive avait demandé au gouvernement de sa Majesté Britannique, par l'obligant intermédiaire de M. le général Staunton, deux personnes destinées à être employées au ministère des finances égyptiennes. L'honorable M. Wilson a été le premier désigné par le gouvernement de sa Majesté à la suite de notre demande. A notre grand regret, nous nous sommes trouvés dans l'impossibilité de nous mettre d'accord avec lui et de nous assurer sa coopération, à laquelle cependant nous attachions un véritable prix, &c."—Cherif Pasha to Mr. Cookson, June 16, 1876. Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 2 (1879) p. 5.

"M. Rogers, notre agent à Londres, n'étant pas à même de connaître les officiers anglais qui seraient aptes à prendre du service dans l'administration financière d'Égypte, je viens solliciter de la bienveillance de sa Seigneurie Lord Derby, comme une faveur personnelle, de vouloir bien m'indiquer *officieusement* une personne qui pourrait utilement diriger M. Rogers dans ses choix et à laquelle je lui donnerai l'ordre de s'adresser. M. Rogers demandera alors préalablement l'avis du gouvernement de sa Majesté la Reine sur ces choix, ainsi que sa Seigneurie a bien voulu m'autoriser à le faire par la dépêche qu'elle vous a adressée et que vous avez communiquée à Cherif Pacha."—Mr. Cookson to the Earl of Derby, July 30, 1876. Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 2 (1879) p. 7.

<sup>830</sup> 'L'Angleterre et l'Égypte' (*Revue Politique et Littéraire*, Sept. 1882, p. 289).

<sup>831</sup> Ibid.

<sup>832</sup> Speech of the Rt. Hon. W. E. Gladstone, Aug. 9, 1882.

that of Lord Granville is as clear as it is reassuring,<sup>833</sup> worthy of the champion and defender of the Liberal faith. Yet if "Egypt for the Egyptians" be the motto of British policy, this does not mean an Egypt of factions, an Egypt left to foreign scheming and interior dissension; it means an Egypt above intrigues—an Egypt capable of taking care of herself, without French patronage, Ottoman meddling, military dictators, and the muddling of amateur politicians. Nor does it mean, as the *République Française*<sup>834</sup> recently inferred, "Egypt for England."

Mr. Gladstone's word should be good enough to warrant that all Great Britain requires is the safety of her highway to India; to this she has as much right as we all have to a way to our houses, and it is idle to think that Her Majesty's subjects would shrink from giving the last penny, or the last drop of blood, to ensure the safety of the Empire—of a homogeneous Empire.

However, this object, so dear to all Englishmen, does not require any privileged hold over Egypt, much less annexation. What is wanted is a state of things precluding foreign interference—*British as well as other*. To arrive in time at this result is the present care and study of Her Majesty's Government.

The Eastern Question has been shifted from Constantinople to Cairo. During half a century Russia

<sup>833</sup> Earl Granville to Sir Edward Malet, Nov. 4, 1881. Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 3 (1882) p. 72.

<sup>834</sup> See *République Française*, Oct. 1882.

has been the bugbear of politicians, now it seems to be England's turn.

The 12th of November is close at hand. Very little may resuscitate a religious war that will shake the world from one end to the other. People here laugh at it, but the Mussulman, less matter of fact and more fanatical than we are, looks with awe upon this ominous date. Sanoussi is preparing a gigantic imposture, and should the good offices of Arabi's friends help him out of his scrape, the coming "Mahdi" will have a general. I do not say a good one, but a "martyr" general; and whether it will be the False Prophet, busy in the Soudan,<sup>835</sup> or Sanoussi, we should not take too lightly the warnings impartial men, like Professor Schweinfurth, have ventured to bring under the notice of Europe. To prevent a religious conflict, to prevent further European interference, and possibly a general war, it will be necessary to come in time to a common understanding. If we are united, there will be no fear of a conflagration, nor need of international fire-engines: only divisions amongst the Powers themselves will give Sanoussi, the False Prophet, or any other local adventurer any chance of stirring up the Mussulman world.

A preventive is better than a cure according to modern medicine; and, if we look at the patient, it will be easy to determine both the weak points and the remedy at hand.

We have an Egypt rich—yet poor on account of its

<sup>835</sup> See Professor Schweinfurth's account, *Times*, Oct. 24, 1882.

debt ; quasi-independent—yet the tool of Europe ; a population nominally free—but *de facto* in bondage ; a chamber and a constitution—paralysed by the Dual Control ; responsible ministers—and irresponsible advisers ; equality on paper—and privileged jurisdiction ; overtaxed natives—and untaxed foreigners ; a Khedive in name—and foreigners ruling in his stead.

These are anomalies so palpable, so telling, that it is incredible how English ministers, like Lord Salisbury for instance, should have countenanced a system so unpalatable to Egyptians, so contrary to British common sense.

To begin with, there is the financial question, which has furnished Europe with an excuse for interference, and on which the Anglo-French *condominium* bases its *locus standi*.<sup>836</sup>

It is no use discussing now, whether the Powers had a right to interfere or not ; but I repeat my conviction that nothing of the kind would have been attempted had Egypt<sup>837</sup> been a Power to hold her own, for we have the precedent of great Powers repudiating financial obligations, and no one ventured to remonstrate. However, we have not to deal with what might or might not have been done, but

<sup>836</sup> "Suivant une expression tirée des dépêches de M. Waddington :—'La France était intervenue pour faciliter sur les marchés de Paris et de Londres les spéculations de crédit que réclamait la pénurie du trésor égyptienne.'—'La Question Égyptienne,' 1881, p. 17.

<sup>837</sup> "We might be a little kinder to Egypt. . . . Whilst the Turks are allowed freely to repudiate their debts, poor Egypt must pay her usurious creditors the uttermost farthing."—'AEI: Arabia, Egypt, India,' by Isabel Burton, p. 420.

with a *fait accompli*—the direct interference of the Powers on behalf of individual creditors.

It is a mistake to believe that this step was primarily taken in favour of the bondholders and the *haute finance*; by no means—for they had taken good care of themselves. The Continental Governments interfered when the creditors of the floating debt could not get their money, and implored protection. Yet when it was granted, the more powerful set of the creditors, the bondholders, came to the fore and managed to snatch the lion's share.

Events have proved how fatal this interference has been for Egypt, independently of the grave responsibilities for the Controlling Powers, and the dangers to the peace of the world—a great word, but there it lies in a nut-shell.

As far as one could gather from Ministerial utterances during the recess and since, a return to the Dual Control is not contemplated by Her Majesty's Government, and to know that is certainly a relief.

Discarding accordingly the *condominium*—and if Egypt *must* be controlled—there are three ways of doing so, an International, a British, or an *Impersonal* Control.

The first is a complicated affair; the second, though it seems so easy now that we are in possession, is a dangerous experiment, indeed annexation would be better than a theoretical supervision without actual, well-defined, and uncontested rights;



and to my mind the third, an *Impersonal* Control, would answer all purposes, would be more acceptable to all concerned, and by no means exclude *political* patronage, so very distinct from direct interference with the interior affairs of other countries.

It is obvious that for the moment Egypt cannot be left to herself now that she requires the arm of a powerful friend to regain breath, and strength, before she can stand on her own legs, and I shall presently develop what I understand by an *Impersonal* Control, coupled with a temporary British Protectorate.

But we must first revert to the Anglo-French Control. In preceding chapters I have endeavoured to do justice to the great services rendered by the individual Controllers. They have put order into the Egyptian finance; they have checked waste; they have equalised native taxation as far as feasible, and have, at any rate, timed the taxes, according to the convenience of the taxpayer; they have helped to reorganise the administration, and have put an antiquated machinery into something like working order.

But all this is not due to the *Dual* Control, but to the Controllers individually, to the personalities of Mr. Baring, Sir Ackland Colvin, and M. de Blignières; nay, any one of them would have attained the end as well and better alone, if not handcuffed by political considerations and the rival interests of Downing Street and the Quai D'Orsay; had they been not

Anglo-French Controllers, but "Impersonal" Controllers,<sup>838</sup> such as Ismaïl Pasha designed them to be when he first applied to England for specialists to overhaul his finances, and to put system into an Oriental administration. What Ismaïl wanted, and what Lord Derby fully understood to be the wish of His Highness, was not an English or French or foreign interference with the affairs of Egypt,<sup>839</sup> but simply the loan of an experienced man or two, to assist his ministers in unravelling a financial maze, in helping him to balance expenditure and receipts, and to show to his clamouring European creditors his honest desire to act fairly to both his country and Europe.

Mr. Dicey says very truly, in an able paper on Egypt,<sup>840</sup> "The personal rule of the Khedive forms a system of government most congenial to the wants and requirements of the Egyptian people," an argument in favour of my contention that a central administration with one able man at its head is all that is required.

Of course any one aiming at a political dictatorship would not be fit for the post of a financial controller, such as Ismaïl wished England to send him.<sup>841</sup> An "Impersonal" Controller would be the *alter ego* of the Khedive, would be the trusted counsellor, the leading

<sup>838</sup> "En tout pays, pour exercer une influence véritable, l'étranger doit conseiller et contrôler le pouvoir, et non en saisir les rênes."—*L'Égypte et l'Europe*, par un ancien juge mixte, p. 172.

<sup>839</sup> See footnotes <sup>828</sup>, <sup>839</sup>.

<sup>840</sup> 'England's Intervention in Egypt,' by E. Dicey (*Nineteenth Century*, Aug. 1882, p. 169 *et seq.*).

<sup>841</sup> See footnote <sup>820</sup>.

spirit, a sort of financial *Stockmar*, a man prepared to give to the Khedive the credit of his own acts, taking for himself the responsibilities of his advice.

I read somewhere in the letters of the Chevalier de Gentz that the Emperor Francis had one day laughingly remarked: "If I have the good luck of dying before Metternich, I shall go down to posterity as a great man—a great statesman. No one can be more surprised than I am, at all the great and clever things I am supposed to have done; it is overwhelming. We have had amongst crowned heads occasionally 'un imbécile malgré lui,' but 'un grand homme malgré lui,' that is new; in fact, governing is a pleasure with a minister like the Prince, who gives one all the credit, and takes the kicks for himself."

It may be said that a Controller who would, so to say, be *the* Cabinet Minister of the Khedive, would not remain a month in power, and we shall be reminded of the fate of Messrs. Wilson and Blignières, whose joint functions were at first intended to fulfil some such idea. To this I reply, that the Wilson-Blignières ministry represented European interests. Their instructions from home were to watch over the interests of the bondholders, and to screw out dividends, whilst Egyptian welfare was only a secondary and very remote consideration.

The task of a truly *Egyptian* Controller should be to study the interests of Egypt, and of Egypt *alone*; nay, by doing so Europe would, in the long run, gain more than by an egotistical and almost anti-Egyptian policy.

The resources of Egypt are boundless; let confidence be restored and justice *for all* be established on the same footing, and capital would flow in from all sides. Moreover, the savings<sup>842</sup> of the natives would soon come forward and dispense with foreign gold, were the Fellah to know that his earnings and his property are as sacred as his person and life, that his toil will benefit him and his family, that he is not the only tax-payer, that rich and poor, high and low, native and foreigner, contribute in just proportion, that new taxes can only be imposed with the concurrence of the Notables, of the people's representatives, and that taxes will not as heretofore increase in consequence of good harvests and hard work, but on the contrary that they will decrease in proportion to the growing industry and consequent wealth of the country—let the Fellah understand that he works for himself, for Egypt, not for others, and an unprecedented stimulus would be the result. Moreover, let the Pashas, the upper classes, see that one does not wish to exclude them from office, to estrange

<sup>842</sup> "Aujourd'hui, on cache avec soin le fruit de son travail et de ses économies. La crainte de se voir dépouiller, et de plus, exposé à de mauvais traitements, fait que chacun croit prudent de paraître ne rien posséder. Des valeurs plus considérables qu'on ne le supposerait, sont ainsi improductives. Pendant mon séjour en Égypte, M. le Vicomte Zizinia m'a assuré que les fellah du Delta vendaient, chaque année, pour plusieurs millions de francs de céréales, et que néanmoins ils paraissaient toujours malheureux, vivaient dans un état apparent de gêne et de misère. Il est donc pour lui évident, que tout cet argent est soigneusement caché, afin de le soustraire aux rapines des agents du gouvernement."—'L'Égypte, la basse Nubie et le Sinaï, relation d'après des notes tenues pendant le voyage que S.A.R. Monseigneur le Duc de Brabant fit dans ces contrées dans 1862 et 1863, par le Docteur Stacquez,' Introduction, p. 20.

them from their duty, that on the contrary they are wanted to assist in the establishment of a strong, honest, national government. Let native officials take confidence again, let them see in the Controller a friend, and let them find in him the protector they need against Court intrigues and their own superiors; let them feel that their European colleagues are experienced helpmates, that their object is to teach, to guide, to put order and system into the administration, not to take the places and the bread from the native official.

Let a stop be put to sinecures, patronage, and the dictatorial airs of foreign officials—let Egypt have her *money's worth* as Cherif said, let all understand that there is an end to extra-territorial privileges; that if optional to remain under the new regulations, a strict compliance with the same will be exacted; indeed with, eventually, the exception of a few high officials, lent for special duties, all foreign officials should become the Khedive's subjects for the time being.

But previous to entering upon the details of an "Impersonal Control," a glance at an International as well as a purely British Control may be useful. In talking one day of the former to Riaz Pasha, he strongly deprecated the idea as complicated. "Too many cooks spoil the broth."

Cherif Pasha was of opinion that it would be the lesser of two evils, and a first step towards an "Oriental Belgium," a view shared by some former ministers, and a number of Ulemas and Notables.

Of course, the Anglo-French Representatives were reticent on this subject, though it appeared to me that Sir E. Malet and Sir A. Colvin would have preferred anything to the daily increasing dual friction.

The representatives of the other Powers—with the exception of Baron Saurma—could not conceal their ill-disguised satisfaction at the failure of the *condominium* as the French like to call it, and one and all seemed inclined to look upon an International Control as the only solution.

Italy, feeling particularly sore, M. de Martino, the doyen of the agents, complained not unjustly of the French endeavours to disregard Italian interests. M. de Lex, trained in the school of Prince Gortschakoff, sharp and observant behind his blue spectacles, “se recueillait,” though occasionally remarking that the Canal was rather a short cut to some of the Russian colonies.

M. de Kosjek, a personal friend of the Sultan's and a first-rate specimen of the “Eastern” diplomatist, was always “expectant”; he looked upon Egypt as a convenient *paratonnerre*, on the Control as a *pomme de discorde*, on Arabia as a precious instrument, and on the future as farmers do on a thunderstorm, after weeks of dry weather.

Baron Saurma, genial and pleasant, had a delightful way of always appearing to be in a London November fog, and his sublime indifference seemed the best proof of the watchfulness of the great Chancellor. Yet Germany would least of all Powers be inclined to join in an International Control, which,

even if successful, would hardly prove beneficial to her own interests, and under all circumstances entail duties without adequate compensation, whilst the Anglo-French muddle had its secret charms and advantages.

The Spaniards were hopeful, and I had the impression that they would see with satisfaction an opportunity for reasserting a more prominent position amongst the Powers, and that a recognition of their *right* of asserting it, as one of the Powers most interested in the security of the Suez Canal, would be welcomed.

As to the Greeks, they were "radiant," and I somewhat sympathised with M. Ranghabé, a rising and highly polished diplomatist; for, given the importance of the Greek colony, in numbers and in wealth, it seems fair that Greece should not be reduced to the part of "frondeur quand même," so prejudicial to her own interests and to those of Egypt.

Frequently the chances and the various modes of international control formed the topic of discussion amongst natives and foreigners; of course, the idea of half-a-dozen or more controllers with functions like those of Sir Ackland Colvin and his French colleagues was out of the question, but it was thought possible to split the functions of the present controllers, and by doing away with the *commissaires de la caisse* to find room for all. A financial controller, a controller as sole *commissaire de la caisse*, a judicial controller, a military controller, a controller

of public justice, a controller of public works, a controller of the Suez Canal, and a controller of the anti-slavery department.

1. Each controller to be paid by his own country, in order to be independent of the Egyptian Government.

2. The controllers to abstain from politics and to keep strictly to their administrative functions.

3. The controllers to have only the right of inspection, but not of direct initiative, not even of direct *advice*, but obliged to send their observations to the Egyptian ministry.

4. The controllers to have only one seat on the council, electing their own representative for a given time.

5. The controllers meeting once a week, or more frequently, to exchange views and to urge in a body the reforms or changes suggested by the individual controllers to native ministers if not acted upon.

6. The controllers to be perfectly independent from their Consuls-General—to be under the orders of the Khedive, to whom personally they are lent, but with whom, however, they are only to confer through the departmental minister or in his presence—in presence of the Prime Minister if summoned in a body.

7. The controllers to keep personally clear of all patronage. Appointments in their offices to be submitted to the council of the controllers, three candidates for each place to be named, and the names, if approved, to be forwarded to the Egyptian



ministry for consideration and selection, leaving it optional to appoint one of the number. All appointments to be subject to Egyptian law and regulations, with special reference to the scale of emoluments stipulated by the Egyptian code.

8. Irregularities brought before the council of controllers and not remedied by the Egyptian Government, to be laid in form of a collective note before all Powers, through the intermediary of the Consuls-General.

9. The distribution of the various functions to be settled in rotation; the local rank and emoluments of all controllers to be the same, but not superior to that of Egyptian ministers.

10. The controllers to be "temporary" Secretaries of State, not the subordinates of ministers, but consulting specialists.

11. Any differences between an individual controller and native ministers, or between themselves, to be settled by the council of controllers, two-thirds of the acting number to form a quorum, binding on all.

These were some of the ideas thrown out in conversation, but whether practical or not, there cannot be a doubt that even under the most fortunate circumstances such a mixed control would work heavily, and be exposed to a deal of underhand wire-pulling, especially as it would be difficult to find in the various countries men of standing willing to undertake functions on such terms, and at the same time independent enough not to allow themselves

to be used as political instruments by their Home Government.

Since British intervention has cleared the course, an exclusively British Control might stand the better chance of the two, and though by no means advantageous to England, it would be, as far as Egypt is concerned, the more beneficial<sup>843</sup> and effective.

Primo, because one Controller is better than half-a-dozen, but also because British officials would be likely to make their administration less distasteful than others generally do in a foreign country. It is, perhaps, due to an innate love for their own independence at home, possibly also on account of a greater experience gained in the colonies.

An Englishman has rarely the officious self-importance of the Frenchman, never the rigid pedantry of the German. He may insist as strictly as any one that the work is done, but he does not fidget about details; he looks at results, worries not about *règlements*, and little cares whether the work is done in shirt-sleeves or with the prescribed number of well-cleaned buttons on the uniform; besides England pays well, rewards the man who does the work, and not only the superior who claims the credit.

From all I have seen and heard in Egypt, I can say that the Khedive and his ministers alike acknowledged the way British officials discharged their

<sup>843</sup> "Under British control Egypt could liquidate her debt in half a century, without laying any greater burden on the tax-payer."—'Egypt, political, financial, strategical,' by Griffin W. Vyse, p. 11.

duties, contrasting their correct and, as a rule, forbearing attitude favourably with that of their French colleagues. A British Control would, therefore, not be viewed with particular distrust, but its difficulties would originate more in the animosity and jealousy of other nations, especially in the endeavours of France to snatch it again from English hands.

"There is, in fact, a policy dating far back in the traditions of the French Foreign Office, which would assign to France the possession or patronage of Egypt; . . . a policy impossible for France if there is to be a serious alliance and friendship between the two countries, *because the mistress of India cannot permit France to be mistress directly or indirectly of the road to her Indian dominions.*"<sup>844</sup>

Yet, according to Prince Metternich, this *has* been all along the policy of France. He wrote, half a century ago: "Ce que le gouvernement français veut aujourd'hui, les divers gouvernements qui dans le cours des trente dernières années se sont succédés en France, ont constamment voulu, désiré, et cherché à l'obtenir. L'Égypte a été considérée depuis longtemps par ces différents gouvernements comme la conquête assurée de la France."<sup>845</sup> A view more than corroborated by endless French and foreign testimonies, from the time of Louis XIV.,<sup>846</sup> from Napoleon

<sup>844</sup> 'Life of Viscount Palmerston,' by Lord Dalling, ii. p. 292 *et seq.*

<sup>845</sup> Prince Metternich to Baron Neumann, Feb. 15, 1833. 'Aus Metternichs nachgelassenen Papieren,' v. p. 478.

<sup>846</sup> "The conquest of Egypt is the most efficacious step for acquiring supremacy, in the attainment of which France is so greatly interested."

I.,<sup>847</sup> down to the present day,<sup>848</sup> whilst the more moderate Frenchmen say, with M. de Lesseps, that England and France will never agree as to the possession of Egypt by either of them,<sup>849</sup> and I incline very

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—‘A summary account of Leibniz’s Memoirs,’ &c., p. 26. *Vide* also ‘Die Werke von Leibniz, v. Onno Klopp,’ iii. p. 26.

<sup>847</sup> “Si le Nil est le premier des fleuves de l’Orient, le peuple de l’Égypte, sous mon gouvernement, doit être le premier des peuples.”—‘Correspondance inédite de Napoléon Bonaparte, Égypte’ (1819) ii. p. 373.

“La France regarde l’Égypte comme une conquête qui tôt ou tard ne peut lui échapper, et le mot connu de Napoléon: que la Méditerranée est destinée par la nature à être un lac français, n’a certes rien perdu de sa valeur aux yeux du gouvernement actuel.”—Prince Metternich to Col. v. Prokesch-Osten, Feb. 23, 1833. ‘Aus Metternichs nachgelassenen Papieren,’ v. p. 483.

<sup>848</sup> ‘Mémoires sur l’Égypte,’ &c. (an vi.) p. 1.

‘Mémoires relatifs à l’Expédition Anglaise,’ &c., par le Comte de Noë, p. 39.

‘Histoire de l’Expédition Française en Égypte,’ par X. B. Saintine, ix. p. 13.

“La France et l’Égypte sont décidées à une union, une alliance, un protectorat si l’on veut.”—‘La vérité sur les affaires d’Orient,’ par Scipion Marin, p. 306.

‘Voyage en Grèce,’ &c., par F. C. H. Pouqueville, p. 361.

‘Histoire de Méhémet Ali,’ par Paul Mouriez, iv. p. 350.

‘Life of Viscount Palmerston,’ by Lord Dalling, ii. p. 351.

“La possession du littoral de l’Afrique est nécessaire non seulement à l’éclat, mais à la sûreté de notre Empire.”—*Revue des Deux Mondes*, April 1836, vi. p. 604.

“La France livrerait des combats acharnés pour que l’Égypte ne fût pas Anglaise.”—*Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1 Juin, 1840, xxiii. p. 481.

‘L’Égypte en 1845,’ par V. Schoelcher, p. 78.

‘Aperçu général sur l’Égypte,’ par A. B. Clot Bey, p. 172.

‘Lettres sur l’Égypte contemporaine,’ par E. Gellion-Danglar, p. 218.

‘Pyramid of Gizeh,’ &c., by Col. Howard Vyse, i. p. 244.

‘Question du Canal de Suez,’ par F. de Lesseps, p. 76.

“L’Égypte était presque Française, notre faiblesse et l’erreur d’un Français l’ont rendue presque Anglaise.”—*La Nouvelle Revue*, 1 Juillet, 1881, p. 15. See also p. 7.

“The great achievement of my (M. Waddington) diplomacy has been the acquiring for France in Egypt the influence in the administration to which she is justly entitled.”—‘England and Egypt,’ by E. Dicey, p. 200.

<sup>849</sup> ‘L’Égypte et Turquie,’ par F. de Lesseps, p. 27.

much to take the same view, nay, I see in that rivalry the best chance for Egypt not to be absorbed by either.

But if England has no intention of annexing Egypt, France may rest assured that notwithstanding the sincere wish for a close alliance, there is an end to French preponderance and double dealing in Egypt.

The Dual Control, though only a *pis-aller*, might have continued awhile had France not on one side secretly <sup>850</sup> encouraged the so-called National party, and on the other opposed the co-operation of Turkey, which in the beginning might have averted a catastrophe.

“Le mauvais jeu conduit toujours à la confusion, et quelle confusion effroyable que celle du moment, l'affaire turco-égyptienne! Comment les ministres français se tireront-ils de la détestable position ou ils se sont placés de gaieté de cœur?” <sup>851</sup>

This was not written to-day, but in 1833, yet Prince Metternich's words are as true now as they were then. The French ministers have only to blame themselves, nay, our Government might in justice complain of having, by its complacent yielding to a wretched policy, been led into a war, great expense of life and gold, and into difficulties without end.

We can trust to Lord Granville that the greatest

<sup>850</sup> “What you say of the French in general is very true. There is no trusting them; and they are always acting a double part.”—Letter of Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, April 23, 1840. ‘Life of Viscount Palmerston,’ by Lord Dalling, ii. p. 311.

<sup>851</sup> Prince Metternich to Count Apponyi, April 6, 1833. ‘Aus Metternichs nachgelassenen Papieren,’ v. p. 446.

possible attention will be paid not to *froisser* the susceptibilities of France, and her rights and interests will receive as much consideration as our own or those of other Powers; but the French will have to meet us half-way, and to renounce their recent policy, and their secret encouragement of the party of disorder.

Moreover, if the worst came to the worst, and if France persisted in a revival of the Dual Control, England would have to guarantee, say, 3 per cent. on the Egyptian debt, and all right of financial control would cease *per se*.

Such a measure would undoubtedly make us most popular with the natives, it would add considerably to the value of Egyptian securities, and the savings on interest would facilitate an amortisation of the debt, whilst the dread of an "eventual" British occupation would make the natives pay up, as they have always done to the utmost of their power, nay, even cheerfully since the Control has eased their burden.

The risk for England would be trifling compared with the naval and military expenditure incumbent on us if we are to remain on the *qui vive*, and in a perpetual state of armed truce, as the Oriental *gardien de la paix*.

But even if England should not wish to extend her claims to an exclusive control by herself guaranteeing the Egyptian debt, the fact that France did *not* assist in restoring order, puts an end to the *condominium*, as even the *Débats* has been honest enough to admit.<sup>852</sup>

<sup>852</sup> *Débats*, Oct. 1882.

The Dual Control has never been to the taste of the other Powers, much less of Egypt, or even congenial to the partners; yet thanks to the individual merits of the Controllers, it has done its best to pave the way for a better native administration, and with all its faults and drawbacks the Dual Control will be gratefully remembered the day it becomes a thing of the past.

But whether it will be succeeded by an International, a British, or an "Impersonal" Control, the task of reorganising all services, civil as well as military, will be the same; and it will not be an easy one, though no one is quicker to see the advantages of "submission" than the Oriental.

Indeed, the rapidity and thoroughness of the blow of Tel-el-Kebir would have much contributed to restore authority had not sentimental concessions jeopardised the good effect of the expedition, if we can believe the *Times* correspondent at Cairo.

It seems to be a weakness of Her Majesty's Government always to give way to somebody's hobby—first to the dislike of the French to Turkish ironclads in Egyptian waters, and more recently to the craving of certain people for notoriety.

I have already stated my opinion as to the serious consequences of the mismanaged Arabi trial; and I quite agree with those who think it a want of logic first to bother the Sultan for weeks to declare Arabi a rebel, and after His Majesty had done so, and most reluctantly, suddenly to reopen the question, and to say *quien sabe?*

Perhaps English Radicals have even more 'to reproach themselves with than Her Majesty's ministers. Do not Radicals by this time know that Arabi's tail is not the genuine National party? Do they ignore that freedom and justice, progress and parliamentary life, require as much to be backed by authority as the most absolute rule? Guizot said years ago, "Le mérite des gouvernements absolus c'est la prévoyance et la persévérance. Montrons au monde que les gouvernements libres savent aussi être prévoyants." Now that is exactly what the *cerveaux brûlés* of all advanced parties are never, and will consequently not allow others to be.

They want Egypt to be treated as if she had left her swaddling clothes. They apply our standard to the Fellah, and call for remedies that may suit Egypt in years to come, when for the present the restoration of order and authority, the remodelling of the administration, must take precedence of all other considerations. "How are such evils to be cured? . . . What institutions can be found sufficiently powerful and efficacious to heal these sores?"<sup>853</sup> Instead of allowing the Egyptian Government to act up to the clear, liberal, and lucid programme laid down in Lord Granville's letter to Sir E. Malet of November 4th, 1881,<sup>854</sup> a programme all men of order in Egypt hailed with satisfaction, and which Arabi prevented Cherif from calling to life—instead of

<sup>853</sup> 'Egypt,' by J. Barthélémy St. Hilaire, p. 116 *et seq.*

<sup>854</sup> Earl Granville to Sir E. Malet, Nov. 4, 1881. Parliamentary Papers, Egypt No. 3 (1882), p. 72.



following in that track, of going to work practically, Continental enthusiasts want to force on Egypt a Phrygian cap instead of turban and tarbouche.

That Europe owes Egypt reparation<sup>855</sup> for past wrongs; that the conduct of Europeans has of old been abominable in Egypt<sup>856</sup>; that the poor Fellaheen have been shamefully treated and overtaxed<sup>857</sup> is beyond controversy; but the best way of helping them is to enforce obedience to the lawful authority. Constitutions and reforms are waste paper until there sits a ruler at Abdin. What is the use of a Church without a God? of parliamentary rights without a hand to control their working, to defend their existence?

Why for Egypt this exaggerated hurry, when a century of British rule in India has not ripened people for constitutional rights, who are as loyal to Her Majesty as any of her other subjects?

England has shown in India what can be done with a small army and a handful of able administrators—and without a constitution; yet what are the seventeen millions of Egypt, the six millions of the Delta, compared to the two hundred millions of India?

<sup>855</sup> “Après avoir fait tant de mal à l’Égypte, l’Europe lui doit réparation et protection contre les Européens, et *les étrangers en général*.—‘L’Égypte et l’Europe, par un ancien juge mixte,’ p. 342.

<sup>856</sup> “The conduct of Europeans has greatly conduced to produce an increase of every crime in the people.”—‘Modern Egyptians,’ by E. W. Lane, p. 285.

<sup>857</sup> “The Fellaheen have been compelled to borrow money at 3, 5, 6, and up to 13 per cent. per month. . . . Mr. Felice reports that a large number of Europeans have become possessed of large estates which the Fellaheen have been compelled to part with for money lent to them at exorbitant rates. Such estates seem to have been obtained through the machinery of the mixed tribunals.”—Vice-Consul Borg to Mr. Lascelles, July 11, 1879. Blue Book, Egypt, No. 1 (1880) p. 19 *et seq.*

But in India Her Majesty's authority is paramount, whilst the present Khedive wields a more shadowy power than any semi-independent Maharajah; and it must sincerely be hoped that before indulging in other reform projects, the re-establishment of the Khedivate, such as the Eastern mind understands it, will be the first care of Lord Dufferin and Sir E. Malet.

The Control, whether International, British, or *Impersonal*, will have to start afresh on a new basis, so as to permit of a national development from within, not from without,<sup>858</sup> and it will have to assist, not to impede, the Khedive's Government in carrying out the programme laid down in Cherif Pasha's letter of September 15th, 1881, and approved by His Highness.<sup>859</sup>

A well-defined balance of the attributes of the public authorities, uniform legislation and uniform taxation, reduction of the army, economy, probity in the administration, a thorough overhauling of the public services and official salaries, development of public instruction, agriculture, commerce, works of general utility, and last, but not least, the bettering of the condition of the Fellah<sup>860</sup>; these are, coupled

<sup>858</sup> "Nationale Erfolge mit activer Hülfe einer auswärtigen Grossmacht zu erzielen hat . . . seine bedenkliche Seite."—"Das heutige Aegypten," von H. Stephan, p. 168.

<sup>859</sup> Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 3 (1882) p. 17 *et seq.*

<sup>860</sup> "Creators of the wealth of the country," as Mr. Vivian calls them (State Papers, Egypt, 1878-79, lxxviii. p. 72), it must not be forgotten that they have been crushed for many centuries "par l'aristocratie de la richesse qui domine" ('Histoire de l'Expédition Française en Égypte,' par X. B. Saintine, viii. p. 87), that they are sober, industrious, the easiest going people in the world, and really only require three things, "exemp-

with a faithful adherence to international obligations, the main points to which the immediate attention of the ministers will be called ; and, seeing the able hands whom His Highness has entrusted with the care of government, Egypt may look with confidence to a brighter future.

But what more immediately interests us is the reconstitution of the Control, the fate of the many deserving European officials who have given their services to Egypt, and the future position of the foreign colonies.

The first advantages of the break up of the *condominium* will be to put an end to international jealousy, to a morbid craving for patronage, to sinecures ; and there is no fear that England will encroach on the rights of others.<sup>861</sup> Equality of all nationalities is certain to form the leading feature of the changes Her Majesty's Government will introduce, with a view of abolishing privileged jurisdiction and exemp-

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tion from arbitrary taxation, power to reap the fruit of their own labour, and justice for themselves" ('England's Intervention in Egypt,' by E. Dicey, *Nineteenth Century*, Aug. 1882, p. 165). A race deserving the greatest interest, and which notwithstanding the most degrading bondage, has preserved a proud feeling of equality "qui place sur le même pied l'opprimeur et l'opprimé, qui concilie la tyrannie et l'esclavage dans une sorte de fatalisme auquel personne ne saurait échapper" ('Cinq mois au Caire,' par G. Charmes, p. 276). It will indeed be a proud achievement to raise the Fellah to be again a man, to help Egyptians to become a nation.—The Author.

<sup>861</sup> Yet it ought to be remembered that in the last years of Ismaïl's reign and until Lord Salisbury brought the French in again, "the English element was predominant in the administration" (Mr. Vivian to the Earl of Derby, July 12, 1877, see State Papers, Egypt, December 1878 to August 1879, lxxviii. p. 72), and I remember His Highness telling me how much he preferred the English, as a rule, to others.—The Author.

tion from taxation; and other nations can hardly claim more than England will stipulate for the security of the life and property of Her Majesty's own subjects.

The chief care of the Control will be to revive a good feeling between natives and foreigners, and nothing would contribute better to cement it than taxation of foreigners and a considerable reduction of the 1324 officials drawing nearly 400,000*l.* a year from the Egyptian exchequer.

It will possibly not prove a considerable saving to the treasury, as in most cases Egyptians will have to be appointed instead of the retiring Europeans; but it will give able and deserving natives a chance of employment, and much satisfaction to the population.

The process of weeding the service of Europeans will naturally require the greatest tact and impartiality, and it is needless to fear that the Controller—be it Sir A. Colvin or his successor—would not be happy to maintain efficient officials of other nations, of course willing to submit to the new regulations and the new scale of salaries, which must be framed with as little delay as possible.

In fact it might smooth the susceptibility of those who will have to go, without the option of remaining (and we know there are a number of overpaid sinecures), were no distinctions made, and were English officials put on the same footing as all others.

Thanks to the Dual system, there are at present in most administrations two, three, and more heads of departments dividing the work, but not the pay—an

English to look after the French, and *vice versâ*, and a native as a sop to national *amour propre*, though not to the native taxpayer, who pays three times for the work of one.

The new Control is certain to put at once a stop to such absurdity, ruinous from a fiscal point of view, and fatal to all good administration, in consequence of the unavoidable rivalry of two or more chiefs.

Yet it will be difficult to remodel, for instance, the Railway Board, without an injustice to either the English or French administrator, though it is obvious that one man could manage 1000 miles of railway. (And here I may remark *en passant* that the Egyptian railways are about the dearest and worst managed one could find, not to speak of the dirty and uncomfortable carriages, insecurity of one's luggage, and incivility of the European staff from high to low.)

The Post, blessed with only one head, forms a welcome contrast with the former, and is as ably managed<sup>862</sup> as are the Customs, which have likewise only one chief; and as the Baroudi-Arabi ministry endeavoured to attack the honour of a worthy and highly efficient official,<sup>863</sup> it may be as well to mention that the Commission, instituted to examine the charges invented by a notorious smuggler, failed

<sup>862</sup> M. Caillard, the English Director-General of the Post Office, shows in his report a surplus of 1300*l.* for 1877, and of 5200*l.* in 1878, against a deficit of 2700*l.* for the years 1873-6.—*Times*, Aug. 20, 1879. In 1880 the surplus was 10,000*l.*, and in 1881 10,500*l.* (the sale of postage-stamps amounting to 38,000*l.*).—'Budget du Gouvernement Égyptien, pour l'exercice 1881,' pp. 13 and 39.

<sup>863</sup> Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 7 (1882) p. 94, and *Ibid.*, No. 8, p. 25.

to bring anything home to a gentleman whom past services and high character ought to have shielded against the foul aspersions of the pseudo-nationalists.

Another administration which is also under the care of one official, is the Accountant-General's office, and as far as book-keeping and activity go, the greatest credit is due to its chief. Yet, paradoxical as it may sound, his very zeal has done a great deal of harm. Anxious to do his work well and quickly, he cleared his office of the Copts, who, since time immemorial, have been the accountants and office-toilers of Egypt. Their system may have been faulty; there may have been no system at all, yet it was a cruel and a dangerous thing to alienate a large class of deserving native officials, doing the best according to their ability and the custom of the country. At any rate, it would have been advisable not to discourage them by wholesale dismissal, not to add to their discontent by giving their places to Syrians and foreigners. In fact, it would have been well to have given them a hope for the future, by training the younger generation of Copts in our way of working; a by no means difficult task, considering their genius for figures. It showed a want of judgment, and has made us more enemies amongst the natives than any other mistake I know of. A little less system and a little more humanity, would have been better for both Egypt and the Control.

Of administrations with mixed management I must mention the Daira Sanieh, and though its English administrator speaks highly of his French and native

colleagues, one may well ask, why three, when one would be a saving<sup>864</sup> and do the work so much better, though it must be acknowledged that the administration of the Daira Sanieh has, even under adverse circumstances, fairly kept up to expectations.

The administration of the Domains<sup>865</sup> offers another example of the drawbacks of joint administration, and has been labouring under a chronic "insuffisance de recettes." The *Telegraph* has just apprised us that the Egyptian Government are unable to make up the deficit of the December coupon. No wonder, under present circumstances—nay, it ought never to have been saddled with so unjust an obligation, for why should the Government be liable for the shortcomings of an administration, however able, over which it has virtually no control, as it has only one voice on the council against five European ones? Rights entail duties, but also *vice versa*, and the commission of liquidation has acted unfairly in saddling the Egyptian State, for the benefit of Messrs. Rothschild, with the burden of an eventual deficit, without the means of preventing it; a remark which I am sure my friend the English administrator will forgive me.

We now come to the much-abused Cadastre, and in

<sup>864</sup> The Daira Sanieh comprises over 500,000 acres, and the "European" officials absorb about 20,000*l.* a year; the three administrators 2500*l.* each. For details, see the elaborate 'Rapport par le Conseil de Direction de la Daira Sanieh, etc. sur la Situation de l'année 1880 (Jablin & Co., Cairo).—The Author.

<sup>865</sup> The Domains comprise about 426,000 acres, and the Central Administration of the Domains at Cairo costs alone over 30,000*l.* a year. 25,000*l.* a year is paid to "European" officials, the three administrators receiving each 3000*l.* a year.—The Author.

the footnote<sup>886</sup> will be found a table showing its work expensive and slow, the consequence again of a triumvirate when one man would have done it so much more satisfactorily. I asked one day the English chief of this department—a most efficient and painstaking official, with thirty years' experience in India—how it was that the Cadastre did not answer. He shrugged his shoulders and said, “It will always be the same as long as they do not entrust one man with the whole matter, as long as they stick rigidly

#### 886 TABLEAUX SYNOPTIQUES.

##### I.—ÉTAT DES TRAVAUX ACCOMPLIS PAR L'ADMINISTRATION DU CADASTRE DEPUIS SON INSTITUTION (FÉVRIER 1879).

Jusqu'à Fin 1880.				Pendant l'Année 1881.				Jusqu'à Fin 1881.			
Superficie arpentée.	Superficie calculée.	Superficie classée.	Montant dépensé.	Superficie arpentée.	Superficie calculée.	Superficie classée.	Montant dépensé.	Superficie arpentée.	Superficie calculée.	Superficie classée.	Montant dépensé.
Fed.	Fed.	Fed.	L. E.	Fed.	Fed.	Fed.	L. E.	Fed.	Fed.	Fed.	L. E.
53·509	19·257	..	79·279	248·755	17·774	20·402	57·452	302·264	37·032	20·402	136·731

##### II.—ÉTAT COMPARATIF DE LA PRODUCTION PENDANT LES PREMIER ET QUATRIÈME TRIMESTRES 1881.

Moyenne relevée par brigade pendant le premier trimestre 1881.		Moyenne relevée par brigade pendant le quatrième trimestre 1881.		Augmentation.	
Fed.	Parc.	Fed.	Parc.	Fed.	Parc.
1·068	324	1·420 15	615 19	352 15	291 10

##### III.—ÉTAT COMPARATIF DES PRIX PROGRESSIVEMENT DÉCROISSANTS DU FEDDAN EN 1879, 1880 ET 1881.

Prix de Revient du Feddan.			
Au 1 <sup>er</sup> janvier 1881.	Dans le premier trimestre 1881.	Dans le quatrième trimestre 1881.	
		Moyenne générale.	Moyenne particulière à la Garbiéh.
P. E.	P. E.	P. E.	P. E.
148	21 70	13 47	8 40



to a Continental system of surveying and of reviewing the results, which is utterly unadapted to the comprehension of Eastern people, and as long as they will saddle us with the Europeans for whom they cannot find room elsewhere; we have far too many Europeans on the detail and survey of the fields, *a work which the natives, properly supervised, are capable of doing quite as well as Europeans, and at a third of the price.*"

Yet the Cadastre is of the greatest importance, as the only means of equalising taxation.<sup>867</sup> The most startling discoveries have been made: lands taxed that did not exist, but more frequently lands escaping taxation. It is this chiefly that has made the Cadastre so unpopular with the natives. The Pasha dreads being found out, and the Fellah hates being disturbed in what is, and has been for centuries.

As to the Caisse de la Dette Publique, the inconvenience of having four gentlemen to keep the key of the cash-box is of course only felt by the Egyptian Exchequer;<sup>868</sup> but it is preposterous that the Egyptian Government should pay over 16,000*l.* a year for her creditors' cash-keepers, when they might lodge the moneys with the Bank of England, for instance. It is difficult enough to pay debts, but to be mulct into thousands for a receipt is a little too bad.

And now a word about the army. We all

<sup>867</sup> 'Rapport sur les Opérations du Cadastre, 1881,' and also 'Notice sur la classification des terres et la repartition équitable de l'impôt,' where additional details on the work done can be found.—The Author.

<sup>868</sup> Each of the four Commissaires de la Caisse is paid L. E. 2925 per annum, with about 5000*l.* office expenses.—The Author.

know that General Baker Pasha's scheme has been adopted, and that the new army will be officered by Englishmen and natives only. Given the present state of the case, it may not have been either in his will or power to introduce any other foreign element but the English; yet as the stay of English officers is not contemplated to be permanent, we ought to have endeavoured also to get a number of German officers.

In talking last winter in Egypt about the army reform, the idea of German instructors met with the approval of many of the leading men; and even some of the foreign representatives thought it less objectionable than an Egyptian army officered exclusively by English or French officers.

Far be it from me not to recognise the great qualities of the English officer, but those who will be candid must admit that the organisation of the British army precludes the subaltern from being an instructor. It is left to the adjutant, the drill sergeant, and is not one of the duties of the youngster; whilst in Germany it is the subaltern, captain included, who drills from morn to noon. Now in an army like the English, with first-rate non-commissioned officers, it may possibly not be required—*et encore*; but in Egypt it will be absolutely necessary for the officer to do the work *himself*, and a few dozen German instructors might have proved invaluable auxiliaries in so arduous and trying a task.

Possibly political considerations may preclude any such admixture of foreign elements, and no doubt

the best will be done with the material at hand ; at any rate, Baker Pasha's proposal to reserve commissions for natives will give great satisfaction.

In fact it would be as unjust as dangerous not to employ Egyptians.

We have only to remember the origin of the riots—the dismissal of 2500 officers, without bread for themselves and children—and the wholesale dismissal of 3000 and more of Arabi's officers may prove again a grave mistake.

To begin with, the lower grades are, with few exceptions, excusable, and deserve no punishment ; whilst, in view of the 12th of November, of Sanoussi's movement, and with about 30,000 old soldiers scattered over Egypt, with 150,000 rifles missing, it is to say the least imprudent to increase the number of malcontents, and to drive these men, out of sheer want, into the meshes of the first adventurer who promises them the needful.

Let the chiefs, the guilty, be tried ; let an example be given ; let the army see that soldiers must know that rebellion against the Khedive, against the lawful authority, is punished with death ; they must be taught that the guardians of public order are not guardians of the people's rights ; that soldiers have only one duty—"to obey," only one right—to die for their country.

I should like now to call attention to the necessity of a number of English teachers being induced to take service in Egypt. With the exception of the Ali school, to which an Englishman has been attached for

the young Princes, there is not an English master in any of the numerous schools I have visited; yet there are a good many French, some of them painstaking and useful men.

But not only schoolmasters; Egypt will require Englishmen in almost every department, only care should be taken to send men, not as a reward for their fitness at home, but men likely to adapt themselves to Egyptian ways, men willing and able to win the confidence of the people.

Though, undoubtedly, most English officials in Egypt have worked hard and well, I think it right to say that the men most popular with the natives have been sailors; and it stands to reason, for though stern in command, sailors have a particular way of endearing themselves with their subordinates; good-natured, considerate, easy-going—what more does the native want? He is always ready to obey, and though he worships an iron rod, he clings gratefully to a kind and helping hand.

He wants to be skilfully managed; he has been taught to trust no one; and “reformers” of the Arabi stamp, driving Fellah “volunteers” in chains from the fields to the barrack-room, have added to his misery without giving him a particularly cheerful view “inside the house of liberty.”<sup>869</sup>

<sup>869</sup> “His (Mr. Gladstone’s) sympathy at one time for Egypt appeared to me greater and more intelligent than that of any other public man with whom I have conversed. . . . My position with him was that of a single voice against a multitude, the voice of one man who had lived inside the

Mr. Dicey's remark, "that if Arabi's life depended upon his being able to explain what he meant by representative institutions, his chance of escape would be far less than it is,"<sup>869a</sup> reminds me of an anecdote of 1848. The old Duke of Cumberland, who, on Her Majesty's accession in 1837, succeeded to the crown of Hanover, was, as we all know, an ultra-Tory. The Berlin revolution having even slightly contaminated the ultra-loyal Hanoverians, a deputation of "advanced" citizens waited upon the king to ask for a constitution.

His Majesty received them well, and requested the spokesman to explain to him what a constitution was, "for you know, my friends, being an absolute monarch, constitutions are not in my line."

"A constitution, your Majesty," stammered the worthy mouthpiece of the deputation, "a constitution—that is what they have in England, but I don't understand English, and so could not say much about it, Sir."

The king questioned another, who grinned, and blushed, and coughed, unable to utter a word. A third said he was a hatter, and did not know much about politics. A fourth could not read, and therefore could not tell "what was in them books," and so on, until they had, one and all, been obliged to admit that none of them had a notion of what a

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house of liberty against the many voices of men who had only stood outside."—"The Egyptian Revolution," by W. S. Blunt (*Nineteenth Century*, Sept. 1882, p. 333).

<sup>869a</sup> 'England in Egypt,' by E. Dicey (*Nineteenth Century*, Nov. 1882.).

constitution was. I will not add the old king's answer, but the fourth letter of the alphabet had a good airing that day, and he sent these reforming tinkers about their business in a way they will remember to the day of their death.

Now if thirty years ago people in Germany could be found as ignorant on matters of reform, we may surely pardon the Fellah for sinning in the same direction, and it will, of course, require time ere constitutionalism can take root amongst people so essentially given to autocratic ideas and forms; yet, as I have repeated over and over again, a beginning has to be made.

Good government for Egypt does not mean simply a splitting of power amongst half-a-dozen or more factors pulling in different directions, such as has been the case since Tewfik's accession.

For, first, His Highness had to share his authority with native ministers and the Anglo-French Control, a happy trio, where the latter played first violin.

As soon as the army detected discordant notes, it took the conductor's staff out of impotent hands, and there was a quartett; but not for long, for the Notables then came to the front, and Egypt was blessed with five different potentates. When matters would not work, and when the army became too exacting, the Controlling Powers thought they would play a little at *Jupiter tonans*, and launched the "Identical Note." Two souls in one body, England and France, now started jointly a direct

interference, distinct from the Control ; thus the five governing spirits on the Nile received a new addition. The "Identical Note" had, however, the misfortune of producing exactly the contrary effect of that intended—it threw the Notables into the arms of the army, it weakened Tewfik, instead of strengthening him.

Threatened from all sides, and rather tired of advice, His Highness, following the example of the Powers in 1879, appealed to his Suzerain, who rejoiced at the prospect of stepping in as guardian angel. He at once despatched an imposing mission ; Imperial commands, advice, blame, approval, were showered on "the vassal" with a great flourish of trumpets ; possibly the whole thing would have been settled in twenty-four hours, had not France opposed Turkey's joining, even, in a platonic naval demonstration, and that notwithstanding England's warning that this would be the lesser of two evils.

France would not listen to reason, and as is always the case *en ménage* (especially in a *faux ménage* such as the *condominium*) the strongest gave way. But *l'appétit vient en mangeant* ; and not satisfied with "moral influence" and a "moral victory," the French had more objects in view, and though the dualistic farce continued to exist in name, they indulged in what they call the "traditional" policy of France,<sup>870</sup> and did a little business of their own, outside "the firm."

<sup>870</sup> In speaking, in April 1881, with a well-known French envoy, he told me "that England had no interests in Egypt, that they could at any rate not be compared to those of France, and that in less than half a century

The other great Powers increased the confusion by collective and individual advice, of, it is true, only an officious nature, and this added a new member to the "Local Government Board," which now consisted of the Khedive, his Ministers, the Controllers, the Army, the Notables, Turkey, England, France, and the areopagus of the great Powers, not to speak of the minor stars, frequently more active than their betters, nor of the secret wire-pullers, the pseudo-nationalists and their European advisers.

What a medley ! all representing opposed interests, all pulling in different directions.

Unhappy Egypt ! and yet fortunate in so far that the jealousies of the nine brought matters to a climax ; a sad page in modern history, only relieved by the brilliant achievements of Her Majesty's forces—one rapid move, one crushing blow, and it was all over.

There is an end now to anarchy, and if we may draw conclusions from the public utterances of Her Majesty's Ministers, also an end of the Anglo-French Control and the rest. From the beginning a duo out of tune, its revival is *now* doomed, and we must sincerely hope that henceforth there will be again *one* Khedive—not nine rulers ; again *one* Master,<sup>871</sup> with

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the English flag would no longer be permitted to float in the Mediterranean." When even able men, and men who know the East, are led away to such mental aberration, what can be expected from the many, who judge politics with chauvinistic weights?—The Author.

<sup>871</sup> "No matter what the theory of government in Egypt may be, it will always be in practice, as in all Oriental countries, the rule of an autocratic prince."—"England's Intervention in Egypt," by E. Dicey (*Nineteenth Century*, Aug. 1882).



a Chamber to advise him, and an "impersonal" Controller to supervise the Exchequer.

Once the authority of the Khedive rehabilitated, and "the army debarred, both now and hereafter, from any power of interfering in the administration of the country,"<sup>872</sup> it will be England's duty to establish a system of government responding to true national aspirations, and to eliminate, as far as possible, not foreign influence, but foreign interference,<sup>873</sup> and to assist Egypt in obtaining the following objects:—

1. *Complete independence*; for the patronage of Great Britain enables Egypt to dispense with the tie linking her to Constantinople; an expensive scarecrow, and about as much a defensive weapon as the wedding ring donned by travelling spinsters as a protection.

The tribute (681,000*l.* per annum) having been pledged by Turkey, under the moral guarantee of England and France, as a security for the Tribute (1873) and Defence (1875) loans, amounting to about eight millions sterling at 5 per cent., the Porte would naturally shield herself behind her creditors to perpetuate this iniquity. To satisfy the

<sup>872</sup> "The military mutiny must be stamped out; and the army must be debarred, both now and hereafter, from any power of interfering in the administration of the country. It is not enough that Arabi and his fellow-conspirators should be punished."—'England's Intervention in Egypt,' by E. Dicey (*Nineteenth Century*, 1882, p. 171).

<sup>873</sup> "En tout pays, pour exercer une influence véritable, l'étranger doit conseiller et contrôler le pouvoir, et non en saisir les rênes. . . Il ne doit en aucun cas faire de soi-même une personne responsable et s'exposer à la critique indigène."—'L'Égypte et l'Europe, par un ancien juge mixte,' p. 172.

most exacting, let Egypt raise a loan of seven millions at  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. under the guarantee of Great Britain. The Tribute and Defence loans are at 70, and could easily be bought up for seven millions, considering that their market value does not amount to six. Three and a half per cent. interest on the new loan would amount to 245,000*l.*, leaving the first year 446,000*l.* for amortisation of capital, and in a few years the whole would be repaid.

2. *Neutrality under the guarantee of all Powers*—an *Oriental Belgium* under the protection of England as mandatory of Europe.

3. *Reorganisation of the Chamber of Notables* as a consultative assembly; four-fifths of the members to be elected, one-fifth nominated by the Khedive for life.

4. *Loyal adherence to her financial obligations*, coupled with a reduction of the interest to  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. under British guarantee.

5. *Bettering of the condition of the Fellah*, by education and material assistance; for unless the Government does so a *Fellah-Krach* will be the consequence. In 1879, when Ismail left, the *private* debt of the Fellaheen amounted only to 1,400,000*l.* To-day it is 15,000,000*l.*, of which the Land-mortgage Bank and the Crédit Foncier have advanced three millions at 9 per cent., whilst the other twelve millions have been borrowed from Greeks and other local usurers at about 30 per cent. (as a rule the Fellah gets 20 francs for 1*l.*, payable after 3 months), and unless the State steps in, that debt will double every

two or three years, in consequence of the frequent renewals.

6. *Absolute tolerance.*

7. *Reform of public instruction*, in both primary and preparatory schools, and establishment of an Arab Academy for foreign students, teachers, and professors willing to enter the Egyptian service—only a small salary to be allowed as long as they cannot lecture in Arabic; capable of doing so, a liberal and increasing scale should be held out as a temptation to efficient young men having passed their examinations at some Continental university.

8. *Reorganisation of native courts*; abolition of privileged jurisdiction; equality before the law.

9. *Equalised taxation* of both natives and foreigners.

10. *Overhauling of all public services*, and dismissal of natives and Europeans who can be dispensed with; competitive examinations.

11. *Immigration to be encouraged*, and free grants of land to be given to all willing to get naturalised.

12. *The reclaiming of land* to be made remunerative by exemption from all taxation for a given number of years.

13. *No concessions* to be given except to subjects of the Khedive, or foreigners accepting the jurisdiction of Egyptian courts.

14. *Development of the resources*, agricultural and commercial; and amongst other works of immediate public utility, construction of the Soudan railway.

15. *Abolition of slavery* and harems, by generalising the education of women.

16. *Honesty and system* in public offices.

17. *Liberty of the press*—not licence.

But to obtain the above results only approximately, England (the man in possession) will first have to combine a new *modus vivendi* between the Khedive, the Notables, and the Controller. Easy enough<sup>874</sup> if the Khedive is to be again "Effendina," the Chamber at first only a consultative assembly,<sup>875</sup> and the Controller a high official in the service of the country: all three with well-defined powers.

In other words, as long as the international highway to India is not endangered, Egypt must be allowed to manage her own affairs; nay, when there is no longer the fear of a recurrence of a military dictatorship,<sup>876</sup> England will take care that there is an end also to foreign interference. This mission she will accomplish, for "Her faith is large in time, and that which shapes it to some perfect end!"

<sup>874</sup> "La population est au fond étrangère à toutes ces compétitions, et ne s'intéresse que superficiellement aux agitations de l'armée."—*Le Temps*, Aug. 29, 1881.

<sup>875</sup> Nubar Pasha developed one day to the author his idea of a sort of great representative Privy Council, instead of the Chamber of Delegates, as more adapted to the present standard and temper of the people. But with all due deference for an eminent statesman, who knows Egypt so well, I cannot help thinking that nothing could be more fatal than to dispense with the elective principle, basis of all popular representation; and I think a happy medium might be found in the nomination by the Khedive of a limited number of native life members, representing all classes and taken amongst the most able of the land. A small addition of such men would greatly enhance the authority of the Chamber, and induce the best class of men to compete for election.—The Author.

<sup>876</sup> "I do not believe that any real progress will be made towards the settlement of the Egyptian question until that military ascendancy is subdued."—Sir E. Malet to Earl Granville, April 22, 1882. *Parliamentary Papers, Egypt*, No. 7 (1882) p. 94.



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				Ahmed 11	ISMAÏL 12		Mehe
Ibrahim 54	Ayn-el-Hayat 55	Ahmed 56	Tewhida 28	<b>MEHEMET TEWFIK</b> 29	Fatma 30	Hussein 31	Kamil 46
Schivekar 88	Ahmed 86	Mehemet 87	Abbas 66	Mehemet Ali 67	Hatedja 68	Nehdia 81	

*To face p. 299.*

## APPENDIX I.

## PASHAS AND KHEDIVES OF EGYPT.

	Born. Pasha of Egypt.			
Mehemet Ali	.. 1769	.. 1807,	died 1849.	
	(at Cavala)			
Ibrahim (1)	.. 1789	.. 1848,	„ 1848, eldest son of Mehemet Ali.	
	(at Cavala)			
Abbas (14)	.. 1813	.. 1848,	„ 1854, son of Mehemet Ali's second son, Toussoun (2).	
Said (6)	.. 1822	.. 1854,	„ 1863, fourth son of Mehemet Ali.	
Ismail (12)	.. 1830	.. 1863, Khedive 1869, abdicated 1879; second son of Mehemet Ali's eldest son, Ibrahim (1).		
Mehemet Tewfik I. (29)	1853	.. Khedive 1879, on his father's abdication; eldest son of Ismail (12).		

## DESCENDANTS OF MEHEMET ALI.

- 1, Ibrahim, Pasha of Egypt 1848, died 1848, left three sons (11, 12, 13).
- 2, Toussoun, father of Abbas Pasha (14).
- 3, Ismail, 3rd son of Mehemet Ali, died without issue.
- 4, Tewhida, eldest daughter of Mehemet Ali, married to Moharrem Bey.
- 5, Nazli, 2nd daughter of Mehemet Ali, married to Mohamed Bey (Defterdar).
- 6, Said, succeeded his nephew Abbas (14) 1854, died 1863, left one son (15).
- 7, Zeynab, only surviving daughter of Mehemet Ali, married Kamil Pasha, and had no issue.
- 8, Hussein Bey, 5th son of Mehemet Ali, died at Paris whilst at college with Ahmed and Ismail his nephews. Ali Bey, 6th son, died also without issue.
- 9, Abd-el-Halim, only surviving son of Mehemet Ali, father of 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24.
- 10, Mehemet Ali, died leaving issue: Ismail (25), Zoubeyda (26), Khadidja (27).
- 11, Ahmed, eldest son of Ibrahim (1), died leaving issue two sons and one daughter: Ibrahim (54), Ayn-el-Hayat (55), and Ahmed (56).
- 12, Ismail, 2nd son of Ibrahim (1), succeeded his uncle Said (6) 1863, Khedive 1869, abdicated in favour of his eldest son 1879; has issue living, seven sons (29, 31, 32, 34, 35, 37, 40) and four daughters (28, 30, 36, 38).

13, Moustapha Fazil, 3rd son of Ibrahim (1), died in 1878, leaving issue seven sons (41, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 53) and six daughters (42, 43, 44, 49, 51, 52).

14, Abbas, only son of Toussoun (2), 2nd son of Mehemet Ali, succeeded his uncle Ibrahim (1) in 1848, died 1854, leaving issue one son (57). succeeded by his uncle Saïd.

15, Toussoun, only son of Saïd (6), 4th son of Mehemet Ali, married in 1873 Fatma, 2nd daughter of Ismaïl (12); has issue three sons (58, 59, 61), and two daughters (60, 62), 60 and 61 by Fatma.

16, 17, 22, 23, 24, daughters of Halim (9), only surviving son of Mehemet Ali.

18, 19, 20, 21, sons of Halim (9).

25, Ismail, only son of Mehemet Ali (10), youngest son of Mehemet Ali, has two sisters (26, 27).

26, Zoubeyda, 2nd daughter of Mehemet Ali (10), married to Djelal Pasha.

27, Khadidja, granddaughter of Mehemet Ali, married in 1873 to Hassan (32), 3rd son of Ismaïl (12), and has issue (74, 75, 76, 77, 78, and 79).

28, Tewhida, eldest daughter of Ismaïl (12), born 1850, married in 1868 to Mansour Pasha, grandson of Mehemet Ali's sister; has issue two daughters, Béhiéh and Sénieh.

29, Mehemet Tewfik, the present Khedive, born in 1853, married in 1873 to Amina (89), eldest daughter of El Hami, only son of Abbas (14); has issue two sons (66, 67), and two daughters (68, 69); succeeded his father Ismaïl (12) in 1879.

30, Fatma, born 1854, married 1873 Toussoun (15), only son of Saïd (6).

31, Hussein, 2nd son of Ismaïl (12), born 1854, married 1873 to Ayn-el-Hayat (55), eldest daughter of his uncle Ahmed (11); has issue two sons (70, 73) and two daughters (71 and 72).

32, Hassan, 3rd son of Ismaïl (12), born 1854, married 1873 to Khadidja (27), eldest daughter of Mehemet Ali (10), the youngest son of Mehemet Ali; has issue three sons (74, 78, 79) and three daughters (75, 76, 77).

30, 36, 38, 39, younger daughters of Ismaïl (12).

34, Ibrahim Hilmy, and 35, 37, and 40, younger sons of Ismaïl (12).

41, Osman, eldest son of Moustapha Fazil (13) and his wife Rengigul (Colour of Rose); born 1849, married, and has issue one son (83) and four daughters (80, 81, 82, 84).

42, Nazli, eldest daughter of Moustapha Fazil (13) and his wife Dilazat, married in 1873 Khalil Pasha.

43, 44, 49, 51, 52, younger daughters of Moustapha Fazil (13).

45, Mehemet Ali, 2nd son of Moustapha Fazil (13).

46, Kâmil, 3rd son of Moustapha Fazil (13), married in 1881 Naiméh, only daughter of Ismaïl (25), son of Mehemet Ali (10).

47, Rouchdy, 4th son of Moustapha Fazil (13), died 1879, leaving issue one son, Hayder Chinassi (85).

48, 50, 53, younger sons of Moustapha Fazil (13).

54, Ibrahim, eldest son of Ahmed (11), married in 1874 to Zeynab (33), 3rd daughter of Ismaïl (12); has issue (but not by her) two sons (86, 87) and one daughter (88).

55, Ayn-el-Hayat, only daughter of Ahmed (11), married in 1873 Hussein (31), 2nd son of Ismaïl (12), and has issue two sons (70, 73) and two daughters (71, 72).

56, Ahmed, 2nd son of Ahmed (11), married to Princess Djemilah (36).

57, El Hami, eldest son of Abbas (14), died leaving issue three daughters (89,

90, 91). He had a brother, brought up amongst the Bedouins by the famous Fessal in the Nejd, a great friend of Abbas, surviving his father but a short time, and lastly a sister, born after the death of Abbas.

58, Mohamed Omar, eldest son of Toussoun (15), son of Saïd (6).

59, 61, Mohamed Said and Mohamed Djémil, younger sons of Toussoun (15).

60, 62, daughters of Toussoun (15).

63, Hussein, eldest son of Ismail (25), only son of Mehemet Ali (10).

64, Daoud, 2nd son of Ismail (25).

65, Naiméh, only daughter of Ismail (25), married in 1881 Kámil (46), 3rd son of Moustapha Fazil (13).

66, Abbas, heir presumptive, eldest son of the present Khedive (29) and of Amina (88), eldest daughter of El Hami (57), and granddaughter of Abbas (14).

67, Mehemet Ali, 2nd son of Tewfik (29).

68 and 69, daughters of Tewfik.

70, Kemal-ed-Din and Ahmet Kazim (73), sons of Hussein (31) and Ayn-el-Hayat (55).

71 and 72, daughters of Hussein (31).

74, Azziz, Izzeddin (78), and Ibrahim (79), sons of Hassan (32) and Khadidja (27).

75, 76, 77, daughters of Hassan (32).

80, 81, 82, 84, daughters of Osman (41).

83, Fazil, only son of Osman (41).

85, Hayder Chinaasi, only son of Rouchdy (47), 4th son of Moustapha Fazil (13).

86, Ahmed, eldest son of Ibrahim (54).

87, Mehemet, and 88, Schivekar, younger children of Ibrahim (54).

89, Amina, eldest daughter of El Hami (57), only son of Abbas (14), married in 1873 to Tewfik (29), and has issue two sons (66, 67) and two daughters (68, 69).

90, 91, younger daughters of El Hami (57), and sisters of the Vice-Queen.

## APPENDIX II.

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WHAT is commonly called Cherif's Constitution, presented by him to the Khedive on August 18, 1879, and the non-acceptance of which determined his resignation, is a document too well known and too voluminous to be reproduced here. His main views will be found expressed in the three following extracts.

The first is a letter from Mr. Frank C. Lascelles to the Marquis of Salisbury.

The second paper was published by the courtesy of the Editor of the *Pall Mall Gazette*, when the Prime Minister of Egypt was desirous that his views should be known in England, after the pseudo-programme of the so-called National party (drawn up by Mr. Blunt) had been palmed off on the English public as the genuine expression of the true National party, of which Cherif is incontestably the chief.<sup>877</sup>

The third paper is taken from the Author's Diary, and embodies Cherif's ideas at the moment when the supposed arrival of Anglo-French and Turkish squadrons prognosticated the fall of the Baroudi ministry, when the submission of the rebels was, during at least twenty-four hours, an accomplished fact, when the Khedive had already asked Cherif to form a new cabinet, and when public opinion in Egypt pointed to him as the only man capable of restoring confidence and order.

### A.

MR. LASCELLES TO THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY, AUGUST 19, 1879.

"In the afternoon I called upon the Khedive, who told me that a project for a Constitution had been submitted to him by the late Cabinet, of which he disapproved as being inapplicable

<sup>877</sup> "Cherif Pasha que vous considérez avec raison comme le chef du vrai parti national."—'Le Contrôle Anglo-Français en Égypte, réponse à Monsieur Clémenceau,' par M. E. de Blignières, p. 136.

to the country. The Ministry had in consequence resigned, and His Highness had accepted their resignation. . . . He hoped that in time the country would become fitted for Parliamentary institutions, and therefore he proposed to make no change with regard to the Chamber of Delegates, which might eventually become a really representative body. He would also consider whether it would be advisable or not to establish a Council of State. . . . On leaving the Khedive I called upon Cherif Pasha, who said that, although he was personally glad to be relieved from his duties, . . . as an Egyptian he regretted the return to personal power. There were many persons, both in and outside of the palace, who would be glad, for their own ends, to see the absolute power of the Khedive re-established, but it was a real misfortune for the country if it should again fall under the rule of an absolute sovereign."—Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. 1 (1880) p. 65.

## B.

## THE PRIME MINISTER OF EGYPT ON THE SITUATION.

"To begin at the beginning," said Cherif Pasha, "it is a mistake to believe that the change of ministry was the consequence of an outcry for general reform. The army had grievances, and though partly remedied after the events of February, they wanted a more speedy redress of their claims. To justify their attitude, and to attain their object, they presumed to speak in the name of the people. In reality the cry for a general reform was only an afterthought; however, it took; and since then a strong national feeling has grown out of it. I do not complain of it, for I consider it the healthy and legitimate expression of a feeling too long dormant in Egypt, and I see in it a guarantee and a promise for the future. I have therefore from the first been advising the Khedive to associate the country in our labours, by calling together the Notables, as the natural representatives of the people. They are men of property, they are moderate in their views, and we can rely on their patriotism. They are not likely to precipitate matters, and, knowing thoroughly the country, the delegates will lay before Government whatever grievances may exist; they will enlighten the ministers as to the real wants of the Fellah, and,

without being a political assembly, they will help the Government and the Control to develop the welfare and the resources of Egypt, and they will assist us in the steady pursuit of progress and reform. The army will thus no longer have the pretext of speaking for the people; not that I have ever acknowledged their right of doing so, for the very day I accepted office I told Arabi Bey that whatever his aim might be, and whether the cry for reform was justified or not, it was not for a soldier to express, much less to enforce opinions; and I added, 'Your servant, any Fellah, has more right than you to criticise the Government and the institutions of the country.'

"It is doing an injustice to the Khedive and his advisers to attribute to Arabi Bey the judicial reforms—in fact, any of the reforms at present under consideration. Three years ago I sketched out my programme, embodying the reforms we are now endeavouring to introduce, and I should never have accepted office had I not been at liberty to carry my ideas into practice. But easy as all changes seem on paper, it requires time to find the right men for the right places and to reform a procedure and customs consecrated by centuries of arbitrary rule. As to the taxation of the house property of foreigners, it is right to say that it has long been approved by the English Government as a just and necessary measure. Arabi Bey had nothing to do with it, and it required neither pressure from the army nor from any one else. It would take too long to enumerate the list of other reforms under consideration; for every branch of the administration will be carefully revised, and a number of Commissions are elaborating the necessary proposals; it would be a mistake to precipitate matters, as an injudicious change might imperil the object we have in view. Coming to the much talked of reduction of the salaries of foreigners, and to the partial or wholesale dismissal of Europeans, it hardly needs my assurance that nothing of the kind is in the mind of any thoughtful Egyptian. Of course there are some offices which might be suppressed, others which are overpaid, and a Commission is entrusted with a thorough overhauling of the entire civil service; but whatever may be done to diminish the burdens of the taxpayer, and to regulate a just repartition of work and salary, Europeans have less to fear than natives, considering that most of them are secured by special contracts.



Whether at the expiration of such contracts modifications may not, in some instances, be advisable, is another question; but the Government and the Control may safely be trusted with the ultimate and fair settlement of the reorganisation of all services. For the present, and for a long time to come, we cannot do without Europeans; how would we train our own people without their help? What we require is to secure the services of the most efficient Europeans, and we shall certainly not grudge to pay accordingly, only we must get value for our money. Referring to the Control, I cannot sufficiently eulogise the painstaking and enlightened support we receive from both the English and French Controllers, and under great difficulties their energy and conciliatory tact have been most valuable to the present Government.

“As you are writing to England, I hope you will mention how much I am indebted to Sir Edward Malet, whose moderation, calmness, and high sense of justice have materially contributed to help us over many a stumbling-block, and as long as he remains among us, there will not be the slightest fear of a misunderstanding. He has succeeded in dispelling whatever unreasonable fears had gained ground of the so-called ‘secret’ aims of Great Britain, and I trust and believe him implicitly. We know England cannot allow other nations to occupy Egypt, but we also know that England does not require for herself anything but the undisturbed and peaceful enjoyment of the great Indian highway which passes through our country. All Powers recognise the dangers of meddling with our independence, and the feudal bond which ties us to the Ottoman Empire is, to my mind, our best safeguard. The Sultan, as suzerain of my master, though precluded from any direct interference with the interior affairs of Egypt, shields us from aggression. To touch Egypt would be dismembering the Ottoman Empire; it would be a blow to the Mussulman world, and Continental statesmen are aware of the consequences. To conclude, let me assure you that Egypt has no ambition to play a political part; we want tranquillity and security. Give us time for our reforms, let us have ten years of peaceful toiling, and Europe will be astounded at the vitality of a long-suffering nation, at the prosperity and wealth, the progress and rapid development of a country so long misgoverned and for ages kept

in ignorance and in the bondage of servitude. The Khedive has devoted his life to the great question of popular education, and at his own expense, though only on a small scale, he has shown what can be done if boys are put under efficient masters. In time there will be schools all over Egypt; we require no compulsory School Act, for our children are eager to learn, while their parents are only too willing to send them; but we are lacking schools, or rather schoolmasters. To form a sufficient number of the latter is our present object, all the rest will follow in due course. Education is the basis of national welfare, and, with the help of God, we shall succeed in waking the Fellah from a lethargy of centuries, and in raising Egypt to be worthy of her past. To that end we must combine in a common work of peaceful and gradual development, and I rely upon England to give us a helping hand in our difficult beginnings. Freedom, justice, and welfare of the masses is our motto, and I am sure it will find an echo in the hearts of all subjects of your good and glorious Queen."—*Pall Mall Gazette*, January 13, 1882.

## C.

## CHERIF PASHA'S VIEWS ON MAY 21, 1882.

"No one could assume the responsibility of forming a new administration unless invested with full authority and backed by something he can rely upon.

"The prestige of the Khedive must be reaffirmed, and it is impossible to allow the Government to be hampered by the Notables, or to be at the mercy of the army.

"A just balance of power will have to be devised, and the functions of the Chamber will have to be confined within the limits of my programme of 1879.

"The Khedive ought not to be deprived, as heretofore, of a participation in the management of affairs, and though details and the execution of them ought to be left to his Cabinet, His Highness should be consulted on every matter of importance, and preside at the Council whenever it suits him.

"Nominated by the Khedive, Ministers ought to be solely responsible to him, for we are not yet advanced enough for the full enjoyment of parliamentary rights.

"A great many of our recent misfortunes are due to the mistake of having divested the Khedive of his prestige and authority.

"With a *strong* Government there might be a bright future in store, but what good could I, or any other statesman, do as long as the chiefs of the military movement remain in Egypt, and as long as the army weighs upon the Government as an omnipotent incubus.

"No Cabinet can live if the Premier is to be overshadowed by a military dictator whose will is law and whose law is brutal force.

"It will be for the Powers to devise means to dissolve the army; easy enough as far as the soldiers are concerned, whom a promise of two or three months' pay on arrival in their villages would soon induce to abandon a profession hateful to the Fellah; more difficult as regards officers. It is obvious that all commanding officers and all those who have failed in their allegiance must be dismissed as a warning example for future mutineers; the remaining officers might be put on half-pay until employment can be found in the civil service, the Cadastre, &c.; nay, a certain number of the younger ones might be sent to the military and staff colleges, there to qualify for efficient staff or regimental duties, whilst the pick of them might be allowed to join the new force.

"We only require a small body of well-disciplined and well-officered troops on whom His Highness could rely, and the soldier should be made to understand that the army is not an instrument of political agitation, but simply the guardian of public peace and order.

"The formation of a limited force—a body-guard for the Khedive and a kind of gendarmerie—would answer the first requirement, and [this was said before our intervention] it might be advisable to follow the example of the Porte and to apply to Germany for a few instructors. It would have the double advantage of relieving the Controlling Powers from the necessity of interfering in Egyptian army matters, a subject on which they are bound to split, and it would be a guarantee that the appointments of foreign officers to the native army would be of a temporary nature.

"His Highness would also have to consider whether he should

not intrust Egyptian Princes with commands in the army in order to reconcile native susceptibilities, and to link the soldier more closely with the person and family of the Sovereign.

"The army question settled, there would be no difficulty in starting afresh on the path of reform and progress.

"The elasticity of Egypt is such that it only requires a firm hand and honesty, coupled with justice, to ensure its prosperity and welfare.

"The Notables have had a wholesome lesson, and they will realise the wisdom of a moderate programme, they will be satisfied with a consultative voice, and will not claim the prerogatives of Continental Parliaments until Egypt is ripe for constitutional life.

"First, public instruction must raise the present standard of the people, and secondly a thorough remodelling of the native tribunals must precede our endeavours to assimilate foreigners and natives.

"The rest will follow in due course if the Khedive first gets rid of the army; this is the *sine quâ non* of establishing the Government and of maintaining its vitality. If the Powers are well advised "*elles sauront dorer la pillule*," and simultaneously with the dissolution of the army they will help us to weed the civil service of those European officials whose services could be dispensed with. Something of the kind has long been contemplated, and has for some time been in the minds of the English. The moment seems propitious; it would be a satisfaction to the native element, and would be the more appreciated as the Powers could at the present moment not be suspected of having their hands forced by a clamorous army."—From the Author's Diary, May 21, 1882.

## APPENDIX III. A.

## LIST OF EUROPEANS IN THE SERVICE OF THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT, ACCORDING TO THEIR NATIONALITIES.

Nationality.	Number.	Monthly Salary.
		L. E.
Americans .. .. .	8	508
Austro-Hungarians .. .. .	101	2,369
Belgians .. .. .	12	352
Danes .. .. .	1	96
Dutch .. .. .	9	340
English .. .. .	174	6,768
English protégés .. .. .	94	1,208
French .. .. .	326	9,812
Germans .. .. .	41	1,248
Greeks .. .. .	115	1,469
Italians.. .. .	348	6,011
Norwegians .. .. .	2	106
Roumanians.. .. .	3	34
Russians .. .. .	5	341
Spaniards .. .. .	12	252
Swedes .. .. .	1	96
Swiss .. .. .	14	210
European policemen .. .. .	59	368
Totals .. .. .	1,325	31,588

In deducting from the above total the officials of the Caisse, Domains, Daira Sanieh, and mixed tribunals, administrations that have been instituted by special convention, there remain 970 officials, with a monthly salary of L. E. 21,218.

## APPENDIX III. B.

LIST OF EUROPEAN OFFICIALS IN THE SERVICE OF THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT, CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO THEIR NATIONALITY AND SALARY.

(The Officials of the Mixed Tribunals, Caisse, Domains, and Daira Sanieh are not included.)

Nationality.	Under L.E. 5.	From 5 to 10 L.E.	From 10 to 15 L.E.	From 15 to 20 L.E.	From 20 to 30 L.E.	From 30 to 40 L.E.	From 40 to 50 L.E.	From 50 to 60 L.E.	From 60 to 70 L.E.	From 70 to 80 L.E.	From 80 to 90 L.E.	From 90 to 100 L.E.	From 100 to 125 L.E.	From 125 to 150 L.E.	From 150 to 175 L.E.	From 175 to 200 L.E.	From 200 to 250 L.E.	From 250 to 300 L.E.	From 300 to 350 L.E.	Total Number of Officials.	Total of Salaries, L.E.
Americans .. ..	..	..	3	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	6	284
Austro-Hungarians ..	5	14	16	..	..	..	3	5	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	66	1,389
Belgians .. ..	..	4	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	6	96
Danes .. ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0	0
Dutch .. ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	5	122
English .. ..	1	11	1	..	..	..	1	7	3	2	1	4	2	1	..	1	2	..	1	152	5,308
English protégés ..	14	25	22	12	6	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	81	1,011
French .. ..	4	33	29	38	48	26	11	3	3	2	3	2	2	1	..	2	..	..	1	209	6,309
Germans .. ..	..	6	2	10	5	5	2	1	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	32	813
Greeks .. ..	15	34	18	7	5	2	..	3	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	81	904
Italians .. ..	12	82	56	49	24	12	5	..	1	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	247	4,246
Norwegians .. ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	10
Roumanians .. ..	..	1	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	3	34
Russians .. ..	..	1	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	20
Spaniards .. ..	..	2	2	3	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	8	119
Swedes .. ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	0	0
Swiss .. ..	1	2	2	5	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	12	185
European policemen	..	59	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	59	368
Totals .. ..	53	276	174	173	144	64	32	14	6	5	5	7	5	3	2	1	4	..	2	970	21,218

APPENDIX III. C.  
LIST OF EUROPEAN OFFICIALS IN ADMINISTRATIONS EXISTING BY SPECIAL CONVENTION.

Administrations.	Americans.	Austro-Hungarians.	Belgians.	Danes.	Dutch.	English.	English protégés.	French.	German.	Greeks.	Italians.	Norwegians.	Russians.	Spaniards.	Swedes.	Swiss.	Total Number.	Total of Salaries.
Mixed Tribunals .. ..	2	21	5	1	4	4	5	35	8	26	85	1	3	1	1	1	203	5,288
Caisse of the Public Debt ..	..	3	..	..	..	1	..	11	1	1	6	..	..	..	..	1	24	1,353
State Domains .. ..	..	9	1	..	..	8	7	47	..	3	5	..	..	2	..	..	82	2,087
Daira Sanieh .. ..	..	2	..	..	..	9	1	24	..	4	5	..	..	1	..	..	46	1,642
Totals .. ..	2	35	6	1	4	22	13	117	9	34	101	1	3	4	1	2	355	10,370

## APPENDIX III. D.

LIST OF EUROPEAN OFFICIALS BELONGING TO ADMINISTRATIONS  
CAISSE, DOMAINS, DAIRA SANIEH, CLASSIFIED

Administration.	Nationality.	Under L. E. 5.	L. E. 5 to 10.	L. E. 10 to 15.	L. E. 15 to 20.	L. E. 20 to 30.	L. E. 30 to 40.	L. E. 40 to 50.	L. E. 50 to 60.	L. E. 60 to 70.
Mixed Tribunals.	Americans .. .. .	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
	Austro-Hungarians .. .. .	..	6	8	3	1	..	..	..	..
	Belgians .. .. .	..	1	1	..	..	1	..	..	..
	Danes .. .. .	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
	Dutch .. .. .	..	1	..	1	..	..	..	..	..
	English .. .. .	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..
	English protégés .. .. .	..	3	1	1	..	..	..	..	..
	French .. .. .	..	18	4	6	1	1	1	..	..
	Germans .. .. .	..	4	1	..	..	..	..	..	..
	Greeks .. .. .	..	13	7	3	..	1	..	..	..
	Italians .. .. .	..	2	49	19	8	2	2	..	..
	Norwegians .. .. .	..	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	..
	Russians .. .. .	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Caisse of Public Debt.	Spaniards .. .. .	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
	Swedes .. .. .	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
	Swiss.. .. .	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
	Austro-Hungarians.. .. .	..	..	1	..	1	..	..	..	..
	English .. .. .	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
	French .. .. .	..	2	3	3	2	..	..	..	..
	Germans .. .. .	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..
State Domains.	Greeks .. .. .	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..
	Italians .. .. .	..	..	3	1	1	..	..	..	..
	Swiss.. .. .	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..
	Austro-Hungarians .. .. .	1	4	3	..	..	..	1	..	..
	Belgians .. .. .	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
	English .. .. .	1	2	..	..	1	3	..	..	..
	English protégés .. .. .	1	..	3	2	..	..	1	..	..
Daira Sanieh.	French .. .. .	2	7	8	12	11	3	..	..	2
	Greek .. .. .	1	..	2	..	..	..	..	..	..
	Italians .. .. .	..	..	3	1	1	..	..	..	..
	Spaniards.. .. .	1	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..
	Austro-Hungarians.. .. .	..	..	..	2	..	..	..	..	..
	English .. .. .	1	..	2	..	1	..	3	..	..
	English protégés .. .. .	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Totals .. .. .	French .. .. .	1	1	1	3	5	4	6	..	1
	Greeks .. .. .	1	1	1	1	1	..	..	..	..
	Italians .. .. .	1	..	1	1	1	..	1	..	..
	Spaniards .. .. .	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..
	Totals .. .. .	14	114	73	50	30	15	12	1	4



## APPENDIX III. D.

EXISTING BY SPECIAL CONVENTION, SUCH AS MIXED TRIBUNALS,  
ACCORDING TO NATIONALITY AND SALARY.

L. E. 70 to 80.	L. E. 80 to 90.	L. E. 90 to 100.	L. E. 100 to 125.	L. E. 125 to 150.	L. E. 150 to 175.	L. E. 175 to 200.	L. E. 200 to 250.	L. E. 250 to 300.	L. E. 300 to 350.	Total Number.	Total of Salaries.	Recapitulation.
..	..	1	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	2	224	Americans .. .. 2
..	..	2	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	21	543	Austro-Hungarians 35
..	..	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	5	249	Belgians .. .. 6
..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	96	Danes .. .. 1
..	..	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4	218	Dutch .. .. 4
..	..	2	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	4	346	English .. .. 22
..	..	..	..	2	..	..	..	..	..	5	61	English protégés .. 13
..	..	2	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	35	860	French .. .. 117
..	..	2	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	8	366	Germans .. .. 9
..	..	2	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	26	473	Greeks .. .. 34
..	..	2	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	85	1,234	Italians .. .. 101
..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	96	Norwegians .. .. 1
..	..	2	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	3	320	Russians .. .. 3
..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	96	Spaniards .. .. 4
..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	96	Swedes .. .. 1
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	10	Swiss .. .. 2
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	16	Total .. .. 355
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	9	125	
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	8	
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	8	403	
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	7	133	
..	..	1	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	47	1,275	
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	3	32	
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	5	86	
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	25	
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	32	
1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	9	467	
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	3	
1	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	24	971	
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4	39	
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	5	118	
..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	12	
2	..	24	..	8	..	..	8	..	..	355	10,370	

## APPENDIX IV.

M. DE BLIGNIÈRES told me that Riaz had been determined to put a stop to the encroachments of Arabi, and that at a council on September 7 Riaz submitted a draft letter to the ministers, inviting Arabi and the colonels not to overstep their province, and reminding them that in future no communications would be accepted except in the ordinary regulation way, nay, that the first deviation would be followed by a court-martial.

"This very sensible order," said M. de Blignières, "had been signed by all the ministers, and I should certainly have been happy to join, had I not a chronic dislike to threats one is not in a position to execute, and I could not help saying to Riaz, 'I trust you will have your court-martial on the ground floor.' Why? 'Because your pashas won't break their necks when Arabi and his soldiers fling them out of the window.'" This made them reflect. The letter was not sent, and forty-eight hours later the mutinous outbreak proved that I had not been very wrong in my anticipations."—From the Author's Diary, July 23, 1881.

Fakri Pasha, the late Minister of Justice, with whom I dined at Sir Ackland's, gave me some details about the torturing of the Circassians, and fully corroborated what I heard before of their being kept from sleeping. He told me one delightful incident of the instruction. One night one of the "judges," followed by a posse of armed soldiers, appeared in the cell of one of the prisoners (whose name I forget) and forced him to put his seal to a very long document, the perusal of which was refused him. The next morning he was called before the Tribunal, and found that on the previous night he had signed a detailed denunciation against a number of people with whom they now confronted him. But, as he had never seen any of them, a dreadful muddle was the result, and the infuriated court ordered him to be locked up as insane.—From the Author's Diary, April 26, 1882.

Whilst this morning at Cherif Pasha's, a young French journalist came with letters of introduction; I think he was the correspondent of the *Clairon*; Cherif asked him whether he had been long at Cairo. "Only a day or two," was the reply, "but I had the honour of being presented this morning to His Excellency Moustapha Pasha Fehmy (Baroudi's Minister of Foreign Affairs)." "And," said Cherif laughingly, "what did he tell you of the situation?" "*Son Excellence* did not seem to take *une vue couleur de rose*," was the rejoinder; "for inquiring what he thought of Arabi Pasha (then Minister of War), His Excellency told me that Arabi was *la plus grande canaille* he had ever known, that he felt ashamed of being with him in the same Cabinet, and that he had only brought this sacrifice (?) to save the Khedive and the country." Cherif smiled, and getting up, said, "It seems that the Minister of Foreign Affairs has not a flattering opinion of his colleague at the War Office."—From the Author's Diary, May 16, 1882.

Many of the leading men—I saw to-day several Notables and large landowners—complain of the serious consequences of Arabi's doings to agricultural interests; they cannot get labourers; able-bodied men are hiding for fear of otherwise being obliged to "volunteer" for the army, of course handcuffed and with a cord or chain round the neck.

I saw yesterday a posse driven through the streets; they looked so miserable and wretched, and were followed by a tribe of dirty women and children, that I could not help stopping to inquire, and was told by the chief of the escort "that they were prisoners taken out of gaol to be drafted into the Guards." I could not help congratulating His Highness on this addition to his army, and he gave a very sad smile.

Last night they took our boab (porter) at the club by force, while we were at dinner; even the older donkey-boys are enrolled, poor fellows. The soldiers will not obey any longer; one of the mustaphezims, I was told, was smoking on duty, and remonstrated with; he naively replied, "Why should I obey? Arabi doesn't." A moudir, formerly an enraged Arabist, told me this morning that he could not get a man to dredge the canals; "and you know," he said, "what that means; no water means no crops; no crops, or an insufficient harvest, no dividends for the bondholders, and starvation for the Fellah."

The Sheikh-el-Bakri (the chief of all the Dervishes), in

speaking to me of Arabi, said, "The devil has blown into his ear." He is by no means such an important personage as his father, nor has he his reputation for learning, but I like him. "I wish I had arms," was one of his remarks; "I have more men than Arabi." A Notable who was with him seemed much distressed; "Arabi is our ruin" were his words; and though he was known as one of the few declared enemies of the late Khedive (I do not know why) he admitted that Arabi had done more harm to Egypt in seventeen weeks than Ismail, whom he hates, in seventeen years.—From the Author's Diary, March 12, 1882.

Toulba Pasha and Arabi, especially the former, are much at the house of M. Gay-Lussac, the French Administrator of the Daïra-Sanieh. The double game of the French becomes more and more evident. There is no one who does not blame Mr. Blunt, from the Khedive downwards. His letters are translated into Arabic, and the Fellahs made to believe that he is speaking in the name of the English Government and people—that the agents have been overstepping their instructions, and that the English nation sides with Arabi. Possibly Mr. Badger's letter about Mr. Blunt, which has also been translated into Arabic (but not at the instigation of the ministers), may do some good to dispel false notions. Malet is much annoyed at the uncalled for interference of *amateurs*. He complained bitterly of Mr. Blunt's doings, and said he hoped people would at last open their eyes at home.—From the Author's Diary, May 10, 1882.

Mr. Blunt has telegraphed to Sultan Pasha to ask whether it is true "that the National party and the army had split, warning him that they must unite, and hold together, as otherwise England would annex Egypt." Sultan replied evasively. But Mr. Blunt wired the same questions to another deputy, and also to a Sheikh; but as the name was illegible, it was taken to Mahmoud Samy, who sent for the Sheikh-ul-Islam, and translating Mr. Blunt's telegram told him it was for him, the Sheikh-ul-Islam. "But," said this worthy, "I don't know Mr. Blunt." "Never mind," said Baroudi. "he is a great man, and you must answer that we are all united and working together." He did so, but when it was done, it struck him he might have done a foolish thing—for even a Sheikh-ul-Islam is not infallible; so he betook himself to the Khedive with copies of these precious documents and confessed it all. His Highness was furious and

sent for Malet. Cherif was very angry and approved of a rectification, which has been sent through Reuter's agency.—From the Author's Diary, May 17, 1882.

All sorts of stupid rumours are afloat about the protracted absence of the ironclads. Until seven, to-night, there was nothing, though the Khedive told Malet that they were in sight. The ministers indulged in two councils; they are trembling, and deny ever having spoken of the Khedive's deposition. They deliberated at the first council what sort of a reception they ought to give to the fleets; and though three days ago Arabi had threatened to go down to Alexandria with his regiment and "cannon number one" (what that meant no one has ever been able to discover) he has now renounced his heroic intention. One of the ministers implored his colleagues not to make any resistance. "Oh!" said Mahmoud Samy, "who speaks of resisting? we want to know how to do honour to the fleets of the Padishah and his allies." In the evening they all went to the Khedive to ask him the object of the arrival of the fleet, and what was to be done. The Khedive replied, "I don't know, I shall comply with any demand as far as the firmans allow." The ministers looked puzzled, and Arabi said, "I put my sword at your Highness' feet, dispose of it, I am your slave."—From the Author's Diary, May 17, 1882.

I met the Sheikh El Bakri and several Ulemas, amongst them the greatest preacher of the El Ahzar, and half a dozen Moudirs at Cherif's house. They expressed a hope that the Khedive would lay the case of the ministers before the Ulemas of El Ahzar, and they made a little movement with their bony, ebonised hands, which reminded one of Calcraft's profession. The Moudirs complained that Arabi had telegraphed for the Redifs, but they want to see Effendina's order before sending the reserves up to Cairo. To-day, 150 soldiers have deserted from the Abassieh, leaving arms and accoutrements behind. There was also a Bedouin chief, who inquired of Cherif whether I was a Consul General and had ironclads; and it was only on Cherif's assurance that I was a personal friend that he consented to shake hands and to sit down next to me. I heard dreadful details about the Circassians; most of them have been tortured. One of them was hung up by his arms, only the toes touching the ground, for eighteen hours, without food or water. Those who won't speak and confess imaginary

crimes are not allowed to sleep, they are kept awake by soldiers day and night. Thumbscrews are used freely, and with the exception of Osman Pasha Rifky, late Minister of War, they have all been cruelly lashed. Colonel Yousseuf Bey had a mortified leg in consequence; they are using sticks with sharp knobs or nails. Two of Ratif Pasha's brothers are among the sufferers.

I hear from all sides that people are busily reconstructing a new ministry. But though Cherif is much pressed on all sides, he will, under no circumstances, undertake the task unless his old constitutional programme is accepted. He deplors that Mahmoud and Arabi have brought all these humiliations on Egypt through their selfish ambition.

The Khedive sent for him, and of course he went, though the enemies of both spread the rumour that he had declined going. He regrets that our Government did not believe Malet and that public opinion in England had been allowed to be misled by irresponsible muddlers. "*Ils ont fait du joli, vos Blunt et vos Gregory.*" But I daresay they will now see their mistake in London.—From the Author's Diary, May 18, 1882.

The news that only six Anglo-French ships have arrived at Alexandria, and that the Porte is protesting, has not missed its effect. This split between the two Powers and the Porte, and the want of unison between England and France (and, to judge by their agents here, the other great Powers are delighted at it), give, of course, new hopes to Mahmoud Samy and Co. Though they no longer talk of armed resistance they speak again of hostages, and I was told that they had privately informed Saurma that German subjects had nothing to fear—a compliment to Prince Bismarck. The forty-three Circassians, though reprieved, are secretly shipped off in batches of ten; the last will start to-morrow.

I have been promised a copy of the indictment, and have at last been able to procure the names.

The following is a complete list of the officers who were found guilty by the celebrated court-martial, and whose sentences were commuted by Khedivial decree:—

Osman Pasha Rifki, General of Division, Col. Yousseuf Bey Najati, Lieut. Col. Mahmoud Bey Fouad, Majors Mahmoud Effendi Talâat, Redjeb Effendi Nached, Hassan Effendi Hilmy, Abdallah Effendi Latif, Mohamed Effendi Lamet, Adjutant

Majors Osman Effendi Fadel, Aly Effendi Nassef, Captains Mohamed Effendi Lami, Mahmoud Effendi Himmet, Mohamed Effendi Chafkat, Selim Effendi Taieh, Hussein Effendi Mohamed, Moussa Effendi Kalim, Lieutenants Moustapha Effendi Ramy, Omar Effendi Fakry, Ahmet Effendi Ouzzi, Ehsam Effendi Bechir, Ahmed Effendi Rached, Mohamed Effendi Emin Chukri, Rechouan Effendi Nedjib, Sub-Lieutenants Youssef Effendi Sadik, Khalil Effendi Husni, Mustapha Effendi Abed, Mohamed Effendi Chaker, Mohamed Effendi Niazi, Khorchid Effendi Labib, Ahmed Effendi Fahim, Youssouf Effendi Cherif, Hafiz Effendi Fehmy, Mohamed Effendi Ruchdi, Sadik Effendi Fauzi, Mohamed Effendi Fuad, Mohamed Effendi Chefik, Ahmed Effendi Wasfi, Captains Moustapha Effendi Mouhri, Selim Effendi Choki, and Sub-Lieut. Mohamed Effendi Aly. In addition to the above forty officers, the sentences of two civilians were also commuted, their names being Omar Effendi Rahmy and Ibrahim Effendi Khalil. [I do not vouch for the spelling.]

Mahmoud Samy has used most threatening language to the Khedive, and has also threatened the security of Europeans. But when brought to book he denied it, and had the impudence to accuse the Khedive of having invented it. What Tewfik has to endure from these men surpasses all imagination. They have now informed him (their Master) that they decline any personal intercourse with him.

Sir A. Colvin, whom I saw at eight this morning, is dejected at the present state of affairs; he believes that nothing can, will, and ought to be done without the Turk, unless we want to fight. He speaks highly of Malet's moderation, but is as disgusted as the latter at the double dealings of our French partner. At nine o'clock I went to the Khedive to take leave from His Highness: there were a lot of people, amongst them two negro chiefs, come up from the Desert, honest-looking fellows; they kissed his hands, and were profuse in their professions of devotion.

When they had all gone, the Khedive told me that the negroes had come up to offer him assistance, and that they told him "Arabi and the ministers ought to be hung." He mentioned that as soon as M. Monge, the French consul, had been to see Mahmoud Samy, to break to him "*officieusement*" the conditions of the "ultimatum" (i. e. resignation of ministers, temporary exile of Arabi and the chief leaders, reorganisation of the army,

&c.), they rushed to the palace "to ask His Highness what they should do." The Khedive told them to wait for the official communication, adding, "I have no advice to give you."

We had a long talk, His Highness complained of the wasteful and ridiculous military preparations of Arabi, and explained his overwhelming difficulties: he is, indeed, to be pitied. He spoke in the highest terms of England and of both Malet and Colvin, but was by no means gushing about French policy and agents. When it was time to take my departure, the Khedive said, "Will you do me a great service? Then tell Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville, on your return to London:—

"1. How thankful and obliged I am to the Queen and England, to Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville for all they have done for me, and all they will do in days to come; I appreciate much the kindness shown me, and Egypt.

"2. Pray tell Lord Granville from me how well Sir E. Malet has behaved; he has conducted all this very ably, with much moderation, and has been a true friend. I have every confidence in him, for I know I can believe him; he is a thorough gentleman, a man of honour,"—and the Khedive repeated this phrase three times, in English, though our conversation took place half in French, half in English.

"3. Tell Mr. Gladstone, if you can find the opportunity, that I trust the Powers will this time be pleased with me. I have done more than I liked to suit their wishes.

"4. Tell Lord Granville that I was not for *conciliation*. I ought never to have consented to receive these ministers again: they are rebels; they are false. If you could see them with me, you would feel disgusted. Mahmoud has just been here, making the most abject protestations of his devotion and loyalty. Ask Mr. Rowsell, who was present, for I did not wish to see Mahmoud alone. I loathe the man. He is a *canaille*; how can you trust him. Thank God it will soon be over, at least I hope so. It has been for me the greatest sacrifice I could make to England to take these ministers back for a time. I did not think it dignified nor worthy of a prince to do so; but Sir Edward urged the necessity of avoiding an open rupture until the ships were here; he feared for the lives of my family and mine, and also for the Europeans; besides, they wanted someone to treat with, and who would be Prime Minister now? I should not be able to form a cabinet. I have passed a dreadful



time. Were I alone, I should not care. You are married, and know what it is to tremble for those one loves best: it is not gay, and matters are not improved by women crying all day long. Yet I could not send my family away, it would have looked like fear—a weakness. I assure you it is not pleasant to be utterly at the mercy of one's enemies, without any means of resistance." I said, "Sir, this is not the moment for reproaching you or your Government, yet I cannot help reminding you of what I told you last year." He said, "I remember it well, but Riaz would not believe, and afterwards it was too late; but you were right, we ought secretly to have organised a small force, even a few hundred men would have been sufficient." I then asked His Highness why he did not try a *coup*, as Arabi seemed only to have the officers on his side, and could not rely upon the men. I said, "Show yourself on horseback, Sir, between Sultan Pasha and the Sheikh-ul-Islam. Take thirty Notables as only escort, and address the soldiers. I bet they would declare for Your Highness. 'Effendina,' backed by the chief of the religion and the president of the representatives of the nation, must succeed." The Khedive smiled, and replied, "Possibly, but I have no choice; I am in the hands of the Powers, and must do what they wish me to do. France is afraid of greater complications. You know there is no unity, and the whole thing has been stupidly spoilt. It might have been settled in a few days. The French won't hear of an intervention, and a disembarkment of Turks. True, it might have serious consequences for Egypt, yet I know nothing can be done without the Sultan." He said, "I hope, when we meet again, it will be all over." I said, "Form a strong Government, and do not allow yourself to be put aside; it is the undermining of your prestige, and a disregard of your rights and powers, Sir, that has brought about this state of things." "I know it; but whose fault is it? I did not make my position; England and France did."—Zulficar Pasha, who occasionally has *le mot pour rire*, when wishing me good-bye, said, "Do tell your ministers and every one in England, 'Que quand on veut faire quelque chose en Égypte il faut arriver par la Porte et non pas par la fenêtre.'"

I just hear the French have failed in their *démarches officielles*; they have sent first a consul, then his secretary, then the secretary of the secretary. It would be laughable if it was not so sad.

Cherif Pasha is *simply disgusted*, he thinks the *démarches officieuses* of the French undignified and damaging, and said, "There would have been an end of this sad and pitiful farce had not Europe strengthened the power of Mahmoud, Arabi, *et consorts*, by taking them *au sérieux*, after they have shown themselves knaves and fools."

It was my last evening. I dined with Sir Edward. He and Sienkiewicz had presented the ultimatum at six o'clock. The conditions are sweetly mild:—"Resignation of cabinet. Arabi to leave Egypt for a time, but maintaining rank and pay. Ali Pasha Fehmy and Abd-el-al to go for a time into the interior. All others at liberty to remain. Everybody maintained in rank and pay. General amnesty. Army not to be dissolved." I could not help saying to Malet, "The mountain has at last brought forth a mouse." "I fear rather a tiny one," was his reply.

I told him that Cherif seemed determined not to form a new cabinet, if asked to do so, under the present circumstances.

Sir Edward thought it the best that could have been done at present; for, in putting forward as ultimatum not the wishes of the Powers, but those of the *Notables*, he said, "We have effaced ourselves altogether, and the ministers will not be able to plead that Europe is imposing conditions contrary to the will of the Egyptian nation. By supporting simply the demands of the chamber, we give Arabi and Co. an honourable *exit*. If they are patriots, as they pretend, they will be only too glad to spare their country a probable intervention and endless misery by their own temporary disappearance from the stage. Yet it is quite possible that they will refuse to make any personal sacrifice."

It was only after having delivered the ultimatum that the Agents informed the Khedive of this step, who looked puzzled, and remarked, "Vous n'êtes pas exigeants." The odds are that these sham patriots will rather let Egypt go to ruin than give up portfolios to which they cling like leeches.—From the Author's Diary, May 25, 1881.

BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

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